JUDGMENT : Claim petition filed under order XXI Rule 58 of the code of Civil Procedure was dismissed by the execution court. The claimant is in appeal. 2. A decree for money, charged on immovable property is under execution. The suit was one filed by the vendor for recovery of balance sale consideration charged on the property. The suit was filed on 06.11.2007. The suit was decreed on 30.06.2010 allowing the plaintiff to realise the decree debt charged on the property. 3. In the course of the execution proceedings, the appellant and one Byju M. Mathew filed claim petitions as EA 182/15 and EA 184/15 respectively under order XXI Rule 58 of CPC. The said Byju M. Mathew claimed to have purchased the property as per Ext. Al sale deed dated 08.11.2013. The appellant herein claimed to be a tenant under him. 4. Both the claim petitions were jointly considered by the execution court. It was held that, Ext. Al sale in favour of Byju M.Mathew is subsequent to the charged decree in favour of the plaintiff decree holder and is hit by lis pendens. Accordingly dismissed. 5. Heard Sri. Liju v. Stephen, learned counsel for the both the claim petitions were appellant and, Sri.T.Krishnanunni (Sr.) and Sri.Philip T. Varghese, learned counsel for the respondents. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the impugned order is not sustainable for reasons more than one. Firstly though Ext. Al sale deed in favour of Byju M. Mathew is after the decree, his vendor got title over the property as per Ext.A2 sale deed dated 03.03.2008 which is prior to the date of passing of the charged decree. Hence the finding of the execution court that the transaction is hit by lis pendens is not correct. Secondly, a claim for charge is not a suit relating to immovable property and hence section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is not attracted. He relies on a judgment of the Full Bench of the High court of oudh in Abdul Ghaffar v. Ishtiaq Ali [AIR (30) 1943 oudh 354]. Finally it is contended that, at any rate, Sri Byju M. Mathew is a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice of the charge and hence the charge will not bind him. He relies on the proviso to section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act. 7. Finally it is contended that, at any rate, Sri Byju M. Mathew is a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice of the charge and hence the charge will not bind him. He relies on the proviso to section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act. 7. While the appellant is right in his submission that Ext. A2, the prior deed of Ext. Al sale deed was on 03.03.08 and prior to the decree, it is to be noticed that the suit was filed on 06.11.07. Therefore, even Ext. A2, is pending the suit. Hence the transaction is hit by lis pendens. 8. The contention of the appellant that in a suit claiming charge over the property the right to immovable property is not in question and hence does not fall within the sweep of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, hardly deserves consideration since the law is too well settled against him. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act reads thus:- '52. Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto: During the pendency in any court having authority within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond such limits by the Central Government of any suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the court and on such terms as it may impose. Explanation : For the purposes of this section, the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction and to continue until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order, and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the time being in force. The section deals with a suit of proceeding in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question. The section deals with a suit of proceeding in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question. The terms “any right to immovable property”, will definitely include the right to proceed against an immovable property. when a suit is filed claiming a charge over an immovable property, necessarily, the question arises as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to a charge over the said property and as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to proceed against the same in execution of the decree. Therefore, whether the immovable property is liable to be proceeded against, is in issue in the suit. That being so, section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act squarely applies in a suit where charge is claimed over immovable property. Any dealing with the property pending the suit will be hit by lis pendens unless the suit is proved to be collusive. The decision of the Full Bench of the High court of oudh relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant does not reflect the correct law. Incidentally it is noticed that a Full Bench of the Allahabad High court in Mahesh Prasad v. Mt. Mundar [AIR (38) 1951 Allahabad 141] had dissented from the view taken from the oudh High court. 9. In Nagubai Ammal & ors. v. B. Shama Rao and ors. ( AIR 1956 SC 593 ), the Apex court held that when a suit is filed for maintenance with a prayer for charge on immovable property, it is a suit in which the right to immovable property is directly in question. It was further held that the lis commences on the date of the plaint and not on the date of the decree creating the charge. 10. In Joseph v. Marium Thomas [ 2006 (1) KLT 894 ], a Division Bench of this court relying on the said judgment held thus:- 'For attracting S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act it need not necessarily be a suit relating to a property. It is sufficient if a charge is claimed in respect of the property, In that case also the prohibition contained in Section 52 is attracted and any transfer after the filing of the suit will be hit by S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is sufficient if a charge is claimed in respect of the property, In that case also the prohibition contained in Section 52 is attracted and any transfer after the filing of the suit will be hit by S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act. In this case admittedly the purchase of the property by the appellant was after the suit for maintenance claiming charge over the plaint schedule property. Therefore even if the appellant is a bona fide purchaser he cannot claim any right in preference to the claim for charge as ordered by the Civil Court. 11. In Jagan Singh v. Dhanwanti [ (2012) 2 SCC 628 ], the Apex court held “The broad principle underlying section 52 of the TP Act is to maintain the status quo unaffected by the act of any party to the litigation pending its determination.” 12. In Siddagangaiah v. N.K.Giriraja shetty [ (2018) 7 SCC 278 ], the Apex court held that a suit for maintenance with a prayer for creating charge on immovable property is a suit in which right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question. It was further held that the lis commences on the date of presentation of the plaint. Therefore, it is beyond deliberation that a suit claiming charge over a specific immovable property attracts the principle of lis pendens embodied under section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. 13. In Sankaran v. Achuthan ( 1955 KLT 307 ), it was held that the principle of lis pendens applies not only to a case where the plaintiff seeks to enforce the pre-existing charge but also to a case in which the plaint asks for grant of a charge. 14. Though the learned counsel for the appellant would rely on the proviso to section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act which protects purchasers for value and without notice of the charge, law is settled that section 100 gives way to section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Even a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice, if the transaction was pendente lite, will not be protected. The purchaser takes the property subject to the outcome of the suit. [see Siddagangaiah v. N.K. Girirajashetty (supra) J . The contentions of the appellant based on section 52 and section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act thus fail. 15. The purchaser takes the property subject to the outcome of the suit. [see Siddagangaiah v. N.K. Girirajashetty (supra) J . The contentions of the appellant based on section 52 and section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act thus fail. 15. As noticed supra, the appellant claims to be a tenant under Byju M. Mathew who claims to have obtained title under Ext.Al sale Deed. The said Byju M. Mathew has filed EA 182/15 claiming right over the property, jointly tried and Both the applications were dismissed as per the common impugned order. However, the said Byju M. Mathew has not challenged the order against him. The said dismissal having become final it is not open for the appellant who is claimed to be a tenant under the said Byju M. Mathew to contend that Ext.Al is not hit by lis pendens and that her lessor has obtained an indefeasible title over the property. The plea is barred by the principles of res judicata. so also it is to be noticed that though the appellant claims to be a lessee under the said Byju M. Mathew, there is no evidence in the said regard. The lease claimed is for five years which has to be by a registered document. In the absence of proof of the lease the claim is only to be rejected. That apart, it has come out that as per order dated 07.11.07 in IA1114/07 in the suit, there was an interim attachment over the property. Exts.A2 and Al transfers are after the attachment. In view thereof, the transfer effected thereunder are hit by section 64 of the code of civil Procedure and is void. 16. Therefore, in any view of the matter, the dismissal of the claim petition by the execution court is only to be affirmed, and I do so. The appeal fails and is dismissed.