JUDGMENT : SUNEET KUMAR, J. 1. Heard Sri Ashok Khare, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Utkarsh Birla, learned counsels for the petitioner and Sri V.K. Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Prakhar Tandon, learned counsels for the respondents. 2. The instant writ petition is directed against the order dated 3 May 2005 passed by the appellate authority/third respondent, Prabandh Mandal, Uttar Pradesh Forest Corporation, Lucknow, affirming the order dated 2 May 2002 of the disciplinary authority-fourth respondent, Managing Director, dispensing with the services of the petitioner and further directing recovery of the loss caused to the Uttar Pradesh Forest Corporation (in short 'Corporation'). It is additionally prayed that the petitioner be reinstated in service with consequential benefits. 3. The facts, briefly stated, is that the petitioner was working as Assistant Logging Officer at Varanasi and was given an additional charge of District Ballia. Petitioner was served with a charge-sheet on 13 November 1995 for two charges. Each of the charge contain sub charges. Petitioner denied the allegations therein and submitted his reply on 29 January 1996. The Enquiry Officer submitted the enquiry report on 29 March 1997 and held the petitioner guilty of Part II of Charge No. 1, whereas, for Part I and Part III of Charge-1 and whole of Charge No. 2 petitioner was found not guilty. In other words petitioner was held guilty of causing loss of Rs. 2,46,922.56 paise to the Corporation. 4. Petitioner, thereafter, was called upon to show cause on the enquiry report vide notice dated 5 November 1999. Petitioner submitted reply/objections on 4 February 2000 stating that he was not liable for the loss caused to the Corporation. The fourth respondent, Managing Director upon considering the enquiry report and the reply submitted by the petitioner imposed major penalty dispensing with the services of the petitioner and directed recovery of the loss caused to the Corporation to be recovered from the petitioner. Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal before the Governing Body/Prabhand Mandal, on 31 January 2004. The appellate authority in its 186 meeting held on 3 May 2005 affirmed the order of the disciplinary authority. Pursuant, thereof, proceedings was initiated against the petitioner for recovery of the loss under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Forest Corporation Surcharge Rules 1992[Rules, 1992]. Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal before the Governing Body/Prabhand Mandal, on 31 January 2004. The appellate authority in its 186 meeting held on 3 May 2005 affirmed the order of the disciplinary authority. Pursuant, thereof, proceedings was initiated against the petitioner for recovery of the loss under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Forest Corporation Surcharge Rules 1992[Rules, 1992]. It is agreed by the learned counsels for the respective parties that Corporation adopted the Uttar Pradesh Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999[Rules, 1999], applicable to government servants, under which the disciplinary proceedings was held against the petitioner. 5. On specific query, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent-Corporation categorically states that apart from the Rules, 1999, no other Regulations, in particular Civil Services Regulations, applicable to government servants was adopted by the Corporation. The service of the Corporation is non pensionable. In this backdrop, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the entire disciplinary proceedings stands vitiated as the disciplinary authority had not issued any show cause notice on the point of disagreement with the Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer found Part-II of Charge No. 1 of having caused loss to the Corporation proved against the petitioner, whereas, for Part-I and Part-III of Charge No. 1, the petitioner was exonerated as the charge was found not proved. The disciplinary authority disagreed with the Enquiry Officer on Part-III of Charge No. 1 and, held the charge proved against the petitioner, however, before passing the order, no show cause notice nor any explanation was sought from the petitioner, while disagreeing with the Enquiry Officer. The disciplinary authority otherwise agreed with the Enquiry Officer on all other counts including Charge No. 2. A categorical pleading to this effect has been made by the petitioner in paragraph 45 and 46 of the writ petition. The contents thereof is not emphatically denied in the counter affidavit filed by the Corporation. 6. The learned counsel for the Corporation on specific query admits that no show cause notice was given to the petitioner by the disciplinary authority while disagreeing with the findings returned by the Enquiry Officer on Part-III of Charge No. 1 and the impugned order terminating the service was passed straight away. 7. It is informed that in the meantime, petitioner retired on attaining the age of superannuation on 10 October 2014. 8. 7. It is informed that in the meantime, petitioner retired on attaining the age of superannuation on 10 October 2014. 8. It is in this backdrop, contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that petitioner not being a government servant/civil servant within the meaning of Article 310/311 of the Constitution of India, cannot be proceeded against from the stage of show cause notice. In other words, there being no Rule governing the employee of the Corporation that permits the Corporation to continue the enquiry after retirement of its employee. In view thereof, it is urged that the entire disciplinary enquiry stands vitiated on two counts: (i) for violation of the mandatory requirement of notice; (ii) there is no rule empowering the Corporation to continue the disciplinary proceeding against a retired employee. 9. On specific query, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Corporation admits that Regulation 351-A of the Civil Service Regulations empowering the State Government, in certain circumstances to continue the proceedings after retirement is not applicable to the employees of the Corporation. He, however, submits that the matter be remanded to the disciplinary authority with liberty to pass a fresh order on the charge proved by the Enquiry Officer, ignoring the disagreement of the disciplinary authority on the other part of the charge. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner opposes the submission and contends that admittedly there being no Rule to continue the disciplinary proceedings after the retirement of an employee of the Corporation, in that event, the entire enquiry vitiates for non-compliance of the mandatory provision. The impugned order cannot be sustained in part. Petitioner came to be terminated straight away without notice and opportunity rendering the impugned order a nullity. 11. The Supreme Court in the case of Bhagirathi Jena Vs. Board of Directors, O. S. F. C. and others[ 1999 (3) SCC 666 ], held that in the absence of a provision for conducting a disciplinary enquiry after retirement of an employee and nor any provision empowering the employer, in case, misconduct is established, a deduction could be made from the retiral benefits. In that event, it was not open for the Corporation to continue the departmental enquiry after retirement. The Court held that in absence of such authority, it must be held that the enquiry had lapsed and the appellant therein was entitled to avail retiral benefits on retirement. 12. In that event, it was not open for the Corporation to continue the departmental enquiry after retirement. The Court held that in absence of such authority, it must be held that the enquiry had lapsed and the appellant therein was entitled to avail retiral benefits on retirement. 12. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad and another Vs. Public Services Tribunal U.P. and others[ (1998) 2 UPLBEC 830 ], has held that the petitioner therein was an employee of the Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad, his services has came to be terminated and during pendency of the proceedings before the Service Tribunal he reached the age of superannuation. The Court held that though imposing punishment for violation of principles of natural justice does not mean that disciplinary proceedings have been quashed. Whenever, an order is quashed on the ground of violation of natural justice, the original proceedings revive unless the proceedings are also quashed or under the law, the proceeding cannot continue. The Court, however, taking note of the fact that the post of the employee under the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti is not pensionable and the provisions of Article 351-A of Civil Services Regulation is not applicable and there being no other provision under which disciplinary proceeding can continue after superannuation, the Court consequently held the entire disciplinary proceedings has rendered infructuous after superannuation and was directed to be dropped. The Court in paragraph no.36 observed as follows:- "36. The position in this case is similar. The effect of quashing of punishment order is that the disciplinary proceedings revive and are pending. No provision has been pointed out for continuing the departmental enquiry or making deduction from post retiral benefits (apart from Article 351-A, which we have held is not applicable). In view of the same, the disciplinary proceeding cannot go on : the petitioner is entitled to the salary and post retiral benefits". 13. Similarly in Girijan Cooperative Corporation Limited, Andhra Pradesh Vs. K. Satyanarayana Rao[2010) 15 SCC 322], the Supreme Court has held that in absence of any Rules, a disciplinary proceeding against a retired employee should not have been continued. 14. 13. Similarly in Girijan Cooperative Corporation Limited, Andhra Pradesh Vs. K. Satyanarayana Rao[2010) 15 SCC 322], the Supreme Court has held that in absence of any Rules, a disciplinary proceeding against a retired employee should not have been continued. 14. Rule 7 of Rules, 1999 prescribes the procedure for imposing major penalty which, inter alia, requires that the facts constituting the misconduct on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced in the form of definite charge or charges. The charges framed shall be so precise and clear to give specific indication to the charged servant of the facts and circumstances against him. The charged servant shall be required to put in written statement of his defence in person on a specified date and whether he desires to cross-examine any witness or desires to give any evidence in his defence. Where the charged officer denies the charges the enquiry officer shall proceed to call the witness proposed in the charge-sheet and record their oral evidence in the presence of the charged servant, who shall be given opportunity to cross-examine such witnesses. 15. After recording the evidence, the enquiry officer shall call and record the oral evidence which the charged government servant desired in the written statement to be produced in his defence. When the enquiry is complete the enquiry officer shall submit enquiry report to the disciplinary authority along with records of the enquiry. The enquiry officer shall not make any recommendation about the penalty. 16. Rule 9 of Rules, 1999 provides action on the enquiry report. The disciplinary authority for reasons to be recorded in writing may agree or disagree with the findings of the enquiry officer. Sub-Rule (ii) of Rule 9 provides that the disciplinary authority shall, if disagrees with the findings of the enquiry report on any charge, record its own findings thereon for the reasons to be recorded. 17. Sub-Rule (iv) provides that if the disciplinary authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the charges is of the opinion that any penalty specified in Rule 3 should be imposed on the charged government servant, he shall give a copy of the enquiry report and the findings recorded under Sub-Rule (ii) to the charged servant and require him to submit his representation if he so desires, within a reasonable specified time. The disciplinary authority shall having regard to all the relevant records relating to the enquiry and the representation of the charged servant, if any, pass a reasoned order of imposing one or more penalties mentioned in Rule 3 of the Rules, 1999 and communicate the same to the charged servant. 18. It is admitted that Rule 9 and in particular Sub-Rule (iv) was not followed. The petitioner was not made aware by way of show cause notice that the disciplinary authority had disagreed with the findings returned by the Enquiry Officer on Part-III of Charge No. 1, which was found not proved by the Enquiry Officer. The requirement of notice on the disagreement with the finding of the Enquiry Officer was not issued. The petitioner was called upon to show cause on the enquiry report. On receiving the objection from the petitioner, disciplinary authority recorded his disagreement on the finding of the Enquiry Officer and imposed major penalty of termination. Enquiry Officer had held the petitioner guilty of causing loss to the Corporation. On that count it is urged that only minor penalty of recovery for loss caused could have been imposed. Major penalty terminating the services of the petitioner was imposed without notice. 19. This Court in Sanjeev Kumar vs. State of U.P. and others[2009 (1) ESC 448] has held that where the disciplinary authority is in disagreement with the enquiry report, imposed punishment without recording any reasons, it was held to be violative of Sub-Rule (ii) of Rule 9 and thus the order was set aside. Under Rule 9 there are two stages at which the disciplinary authority has to pass reasoned orders, one under Sub-Rule (ii) and the other under Sub-Rule (iv). Under Sub-Rule (ii) it has to record reasons for disagreement with the enquiry report in respect to findings on the charges and thereafter communicate the same to the latter. Under Sub-Rule (iv), it has to pass a reasoned order for imposing penalty after the representation of the delinquent employee is received. (Refer: Shiv Shanker Lal vs. State of U.P. [2008 (2) UPLBEC (Sum) 62]). 20. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of U.P. Vs. Under Sub-Rule (iv), it has to pass a reasoned order for imposing penalty after the representation of the delinquent employee is received. (Refer: Shiv Shanker Lal vs. State of U.P. [2008 (2) UPLBEC (Sum) 62]). 20. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of U.P. Vs. Ashish Niranjan and another[2012 (1) ALJ 124], held that upon submission of the enquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority if he agrees with the finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer, he will issue a show cause notice, alongwith a copy of the enquiry report to the delinquent to submit his reply. But in case the Appointing Authority/State Government feels not satisfied with the findings recorded with regard to any charge or charges, then he will have to give his tentative opinion or reason for such disagreement requiring the delinquent to submit his reply against such tentative opinion. On receipt of such reply it will be open for the Appointing Authority to pass appropriate final orders as he deems fit. 21. The application of principles of natural justice, resting as it does upon the statutory implication must always be in conformity with the scheme of the Rule and with the subject matter of the case. In the application of the concept of fair play, there must be real flexibility. There must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as mere technical infringement of natural justice. The requirements of natural justice must depend upon the facts and circumstances of the each case, the nature of enquiry, the Rule under which the tribunal is acting, is subject matter to be dealt with and so forth. 22. In the facts of the present case, it is admitted that the mandate of Rule 9 of Rules, 1999 which is binding upon the disciplinary authority was not followed. The disciplinary authority disagreed with the findings of the enquiry officer with regard to Part-III of Charge No. 1 which was the basis for imposing major penalty i.e. removal from service. The only charge proved by the enquiry officer is confined to Part II of Charge No. 1, that is, causing loss to the Corporation. The disciplinary authority disagreed with the findings of the enquiry officer with regard to Part-III of Charge No. 1 which was the basis for imposing major penalty i.e. removal from service. The only charge proved by the enquiry officer is confined to Part II of Charge No. 1, that is, causing loss to the Corporation. For the loss caused a minor penalty of recovery from the salary at the most could have been imposed, but major penalty of removal from service came to be imposed on a charge for which petitioner was not put to notice bypassing the mandatory requirement of Rule 9 of Rules, 1999. The infringement was not a mere technical infringement but caused real prejudice to the petitioner depriving him of his livelihood. The order cannot be upheld in part as is being suggested by the learned counsel for the respondent. The impugned order for this reason cannot be sustained. 23. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that recovery of loss determined in disciplinary proceedings cannot be recovered under Rules, 1992. Rules, 1999 and Rules, 1992 operate in separate fields and the procedure prescribed therein is separate and distinct. The loss caused to the Corporation determined in disciplinary proceedings is required to be recovered from salary of the employee and not otherwise. The recovery under the Rules, 1992 cannot be invoked to recover the sum determined towards loss in disciplinary proceedings. I need not enter the issue for the reason that the impugned order imposing penalty including recovery from the petitioner has been held bad in law, therefore, the basis of recovery under the Rules, 1992 no longer survives to be recovered against the petitioner. 24. The learned counsel appearing for the Corporation finally submits that petitioner shall not be entitled to back-wages on the principle of no work no salary. The submission in the given facts lacks merit, is accordingly, rejected. The petitioner is not at fault, he was kept out of service by the Corporation and the order terminating the services of the petitioner has been faulted and set aside, the consequence would follow. The status quo ante stands restored with all consequential benefits. 25. The Supreme Court in the case of Shobha Ram Raturi Vs. The petitioner is not at fault, he was kept out of service by the Corporation and the order terminating the services of the petitioner has been faulted and set aside, the consequence would follow. The status quo ante stands restored with all consequential benefits. 25. The Supreme Court in the case of Shobha Ram Raturi Vs. Haryana Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited and others[(2016) 16 SCC 663], the Court held that principle of "No work No pay" cannot be applied where the fault lies with the employer in not utilising the services for the period. In the instant case the petitioner came to be terminated illegally, therefore, it cannot be held that the petitioner was at fault and therefore, the principle of "no work no pay" would not apply in the present case. It is settled law that when an employee is not allowed to work due to fault of employer/authorities, such person is entitled for salary for the period he has not been allowed to work. The employer cannot deny salary to an employee, who is always willing and ready to work but was not allowed to do so by an act or omission directly attributable to the employer. (Refer : Division Bench decision rendered in the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and another Vs. Prayag Narain Dubey(Special Appeal Defective No. - 405 of 2018)). 26. Having due regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned order is, accordingly, set aside and quashed. Petitioner shall be entitled to arrears of salary from the date of passing of the impugned order of termination till the date of his superannuation and other consequential retiral benefits, if any, within four months from the date of service of certified copy upon the competent authority. 27. The writ petition stands allowed.