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2019 DIGILAW 446 (UTT)

SHAILENDRA SINGH @ CHHINDA v. RAVI KUMAR

2019-08-14

SHARAD KUMAR SHARMA

body2019
JUDGMENT Hon'ble Sharad Kumar Sharma, J. This is a Second Appeal, which has been preferred by the defendants/appellants, being aggrieved against the judgment and decree dated 4th May, 2019, as passed by IInd Additional District Judge, Udham Singh Nagar in Civil Appeal No. 25 of 2011, Shailendra Singh and others Vs. Ravi Kumar and as a consequence thereto, the judgment and decree dated 25th May, 2011, as passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Kashipur, District Udham Singh Nagar in Civil Suit No. 183 of 1997, Ravi Kumar Vs. Palvendra Singh and others, has been affirmed. Resultant thereto, as a consequence of the judgment and decreeing of the Suit, the defendant/appellant has been directed to vacate the premises, i.e. shop in dispute, which as per his own case, which he contends that it was agreed to be sold to him by virtue of an unregistered agreement of sale dated 15th May, 1992, which is said to have been executed in his favour by the predecessors of the plaintiff/respondent. 2. Whereas, on the other hand, the case of the plaintiff/respondent before the Court below was that the defendant/appellant was inducted as a tenant and thus, since despite of the notice issued to him terminating the tenancy by a notice, he has not vacated the disputed premises, in question, hence, the necessity arose for plaintiff/respondent for filing of the Suit for the grant of decree of following nature. The nature of relief as sought for by the plaintiff/appellant in the Suit No. 183 of 1997, Ravi Kumar Vs. Palvinder Singh and others was to the following effect :- ß11& ;g fd oknh U;k;ky; ls izkFkZuk djrk gS fd nqdku ftldk fooj.k uhps fy[kk gS] ls izfroknhx.k dks csn[ky dj dCtk oknh dks fnyk;k tk;s rFkk nkos ds fnukad ls dCtk feyus rd iUnªg :i;s izfroknh ds fglkc ls eqvkotk Lrseky o [kpkZ eqdnek Hkh oknh dks izfroknhx.k ls fnyk;k tk;s rFkk vU; tks Hkh vuqrks'k U;k;ky; mfpr le>s oknh ds i{k esa fn;s tkus dh Ñik dh tk;sAÞ In relation to the property, in dispute, as described hereunder :- ßfooj.k nqdku & ,d fdrk nqdku okds ekSgYyk Hkwiflag 'kfDr flusek ds ikl tliqj ftyk m/keflag uxj ftlds iwjc&lMd] if'pe o mÙkj vU; nqdkukr oknh o nf{k.k vkjkth oknh rFkk tks layXu uD'ks esa uEcj 6 rFkk v{k v-c-l-n- ls iznf'kZr gSAÞ 3. Brief fact, which has emerged for consideration before the Court is that the right, which was claimed by the defendant/appellant over the shop, in question, was on the premise that since there was an unregistered agreement for sale dated 15th May, 1992, executed in his favour and he has been specifically placed reliance on the agreement for sale, which was placed on record before this Court as to be the foundation based on which, he submits that on account of part performance of the agreement for sale, since he has been placed in possession, it would be rendering the suit preferred by the plaintiff/respondent as to be not tenable in view of the provisions contained under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. 4. In the written statement, which was filed by the defendant/appellant before the Court below, particularly a reference may be had to para 15 of the written statement, wherein, he has alternatively claimed that if his theory in pursuance to a conferment of right in relation to the property in dispute, on the basis of the unregistered agreement for sale dated 15th May, 1992, is not accepted by the Court, in such an eventuality, the defendant/appellant may be treated as to be a licencee of the shop, in question, which was admittedly let out to him as tenant by the predecessors of the plaintiff /respondent, herein. 5. He further derives an inference from the aforesaid pleading that if alternatively, he is treated as to be a licencee and coupled with the fact that since he was permitted to raise the construction of the shop, which he contends that he has raised after making his own investment, then in view of the provisions contained under Section 60 of the Indian Easement Act, he will acquire an immunity from being evicted from the shop, in question. 6. Thirdly, it has been argued by the learned counsel for the defendant/appellant that since under the strength of the unregistered agreement for sale said to have been executed on 15th May, 1992, he has been placed in possession over the property, in question and under it he stood recorded in the municipal records and was also paying the municipal tax in lieu thereof, hence, for all practical purposes, he may be treated as to be the owner of the property, in question. 7. 7. The argument of the plaintiff/respondent is to the effect that as per the plaint case, which he has placed before the Court below, the plaintiff/respondent has submitted, that as far as the shop, in dispute, is concerned, which is situated in Mohalla Bhoop Singh, Near Shakti Cinema, Jaspur, District Udham Singh Nagar, which, is hereinafter to be called as the property in dispute. The same was initially recorded in the name of his father Mr. Balram, who met with the sad demise in April, 1995. Consequently, after his death, since the property being an ancestral property, all rights and title stood vested with the plaintiff/respondent by virtue of having succeeded and also coupled with the fact that there has been a family settlement between the family members of the predecessors/owner of the property, in question, right would be devolved as per the succession or at the most on the basis of family settlement arrived at between the family members. 8. It was the case of the plaintiff/respondent that as a consequence of settlement of rights in relation to the respective settlement of share in the property, which devolved upon them on the death of the predecessor/owner, the construction was raised in different phases; some of the shops were constructed in 1986 and the shop, in question, over which, the tenancy was created in favour of the defendant/appellant, it was shown to have been constructed in the year 1993 and, consequently, after the construction being raised by the plaintiff/respondent, the possession of the same was handed over to the defendant/appellant, thereafter completion of construction in the capacity of being the tenant. 9. The tenancy, as per the documents on record, was created immediately after the completion of the construction, i.e. in February 1993, and it initially carried the rent of Rs.400/- p.m. The plaintiff's case before the Court below was that though the tenancy was created in favour of the brother of the defendant, Balvinder Singh, but, subsequently, his younger brother, namely, Shailendra Singh was inducted by him, to occupy the shop and to conduct the business from the said property, in dispute. It is also the case of the plaintiff/respondent pleaded in the suit that w.e.f. 1996, since the defendant/appellant, who was inducted as a tenant in the shop, in question, had committed the default in remittance of the rent and thus, the notices terminating the tenancy, on the basis of the default was issued by the plaintiff/respondent a back as on 14th June, 1997, which was admittedly served on defendant Nos. 1 and 2, who, in turn thereof, had responded to the said notice by filing a reply to the notice on 14th July, 1997 and in the reply to the notice, in question, the case of the defendant/appellant was that their predecessors late Mr. Swaran Singh, had entered into the agreement for sale executed in his favour by the late father of the plaintiff/respondent on 15th May, 1992 and in lieu thereof, it is the case of the defendant/appellant that a part of sale consideration of a sum of Rs.15,400/- was exchanged with the predecessors of the plaintiff/respondent and, consequently, based on the unregistered agreement for sale, the defendant/appellant has contended that they acquired the ownership of the property, in question, and thus, since as far as the decipher, which was made in the agreement for sale, which was placed on record as an evidence before the Court below, since the possession has been transferred, he tried to interpret the provisions contained under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, in a fashion, as if on the transfer of the possession by the unregistered agreement for sale, the defendant/appellant would acquire an immunity from being evicted from the property, in question. The reference to the provisions contained under Section 53-A, is quoted hereunder :- “[53-A. Part performance.—Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immoveable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty; and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that, where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract: Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof.]" 10. The learned counsel for the defendant/appellant had placed reference to the unregistered agreement for sale as to be the instrument of transfer, which otherwise, satisfies the terms and conditions of its valid execution under Section 17 of the Registration Act, because the benefit of Section 53-A as contemplated therein as per his argument, it was providing an immunity, if there happens to be a part performance of the agreement for sale, it has had to be an instrument of transfer. Stress was on the word “instrument" as provided under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, of transfer, here would mean an instrument, which otherwise is validly intents to convey the property in favour of the person in whose favour, it has been executed by the owner of the property in the manner, which has been prescribed under law, any document relied by defendant/appellant as a document of right, it has to satisfy the mandatory conditions of law of its valid execution, to make it readable in evidence. 11. 11. Admittedly, the instrument, on which, reliance was placed is that of 15th May, 1992, admittedly, the said document is unregistered document, in that view of the matter, even if on the basis of the said document, if at all, it is contended that the possession was transferred in view of the interpretation, which has been given to the contents of the said document by defendant/appellant, that would not grant any protection to the defendant /appellant, under the provision contained under Section 53-A, because the protection, which has been contemplated under Section 53-A, this Court is of the view that it only flows from when the possession is handed over to the person concerned in whose favour the document has been executed and it falls to be within the ambit of definition of instrument as defined under Section 3 of the Act and it further should have been an instrument, which is registered in accordance with Section 3, i.e. the interpretation clause of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as under :- “3. Interpretation clause.—In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context,— “immoveable property". – “immovable property" does not include standing timber, growing crops or grass; ‘‘instrument".- “instrument"means a non-testamentary instrument; [“attested", in relation to an instrument, means and shall be deemed always to have meant attested by two or more witnesses each of whom has seen the executant sign or affix his mark to the instrument, or has seen some other person sign the instrument in the presence and by the direction of the executant, or has received from the executant a personal acknowledgement of his signature or mark, or of the signature of such other person, and each of whom has signed the instrument in the presence of the executant; but it shall not be necessary that more than one of such witnesses shall have been present at the same time, and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary;] “registered". – “registered" means registered in [any part of the territories] to which this Act extends] under the law for the time being in force regulating the registration of documents; “attached to the earth".- “attached to the earth" means— (a) rooted in the earth, as in the case of trees and shrubs; (b) imbedded in the earth, as in the case of walls or buildings; or (c) attached to what is so imbedded for the permanent beneficial enjoyment of that to which it is attached; [“actionable claim" means a claim to any debt, other than a debt secured by mortgage of immoveable property or by hypothecation or pledge of moveable property, or to any beneficial interest in moveable property not in the possession, either actual or constructive, of the claimant, which the Civil Courts recognise as affording grounds for relief, whether such debt or beneficial interest be existent, accruing, conditional or contingent;] [“a person is said to have notice" of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it. Explanation I.—Where any transaction relating to immoveable property is required by law to be and has been effected by a registered instrument, any person acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest in, such property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration or, where the property is not all situated in one sub-district, or where the registered instrument has been registered under sub-section (2) of section 30 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), from the earliest date on which any memorandum of such registered instrument has been filed by any Sub-Registrar within whose sub-district any part of the property which is being acquired, or of the property wherein a share or interest is being acquired, is situated: Provided that— (1) the instrument has been registered and its registration completed in the manner prescribed by the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), and the rules made thereunder, (2) the instrument or memorandum has been duly entered or filed, as the case may be, in books kept under section 51 of that Act, and (3) the particulars regarding the transaction to which the instrument relates have been correctly entered in the indexes kept under section 55 of that Act. Explanation II.—Any person acquiring any immovable property or any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof. Explanation III.—A person shall be deemed to have had notice of any fact if his agent acquires notice thereof whilst acting on his behalf in the course of business to which that fact is material: Provided that, if the agent fraudulently conceals the fact, the principal shall not be charged with notice thereof as against any person who was a party to or otherwise cognizant of the fraud.]" 12. In the absence of there being a valid execution of document, which ultimately, on its registration gives it a shape of being an instrument, it is then only that when the instrument is executed in the manner specified under the law, then only the transfer of possession in part performance of the said document under Section 53-A, can be drawn as a protection to the defendant/appellant to contend that he has acquired a title over the property, in question, on the basis of unregistered agreement for sale dated 15th May, 1992. Thus, the argument so far it is extended by the learned counsel for the defendant/appellant in the light of the provisions contained under Section 53-A, which is to be read along with the provisions contained under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act , it is not acceptable by this Court. Because this Court is of the view that for the reason, which has already given above, the protection under Section 53-A will only be extended when the document is executed is as per the manner prescribed and recognized under law and falls to an instrument executed and is covered under Section 3 of Transfer of Property Act, which provides for what instrument would be as per law. 13. Apart from it, if the agreement for sale dated 15th May, 1992, is taken into consideration in the light of the provisions contained under Section 17 of the Registration Act, since it is being treated as to be a document, by virtue of which, an interest is claimed to have been created in relation to an immovable property. In such an eventuality, the protection as claimed under Section 53-A to be read with Section 17 of the Registration Act will not be provided to a person in whose favour the document is said to have been executed and it is unregistered and is in relation to the immovable property because the said document cannot be described as to be a testament or an instrument, which is validly conveying the immovable property in favour of the person with whom the document has been executed. 14. 14. For the said purpose, the effect of the provisions contained under Section 17 (1-A) of Registration Act, is also required to be taken into consideration, where it contemplates that the document containing the contract of transfer, it has to be for the consideration and for any immovable property, then for the purposes of 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, it is mandatory required to be registered, lest failing which, the transfer of possession, which has been made, it shall have no effect for the purposes of valid transfer of the property. Section 17 (1-A) is quoted hereunder:- “[(1-A) The documents containing contracts to transfer for consideration, any immovable property for the purpose of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882) shall be registered if they have been executed on or after the commencement of the Registration and Other Related laws (Amendment) Act, 2001 and, if such documents are not registered on or after such commencement, then, they shall have no effect for the purposes of the said section 53-A.]" 15. Hence, incorporation of the provisions contained under Section 17 (1-A) itself has diluted the effect of the provision of Section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act and that would only be extended subject to the condition that the document thus relied for right, as executed was conferring a right in relation to immovable property is mandatory required to be registered under Section 17, lest failing which, the inference under Section 17 (1-A) will come into play, and in such an eventuality, the said document cannot be read for the purposes of creating any right or title in favour of the person and hence, in view of the bar, which has been created by the Registration Act itself, the said document cannot be read in evidence in view of the provisions contained under Section 49 so as to be relied with to show any settlement of right in relation to the property, in question. 16. 16. The said argument of the learned counsel for the defendant/appellant in the light of the provisions contained under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, itself runs contrary to his own pleading, which has been raised in para 15 of the written statement, by virtue of which, he has attempted to draw the implication of Section 60 of the Indian Easement Act, wherein, he contends that in the pleading that if he is not treated as to be the owner of the property under the strength of the unregistered agreement for sale deed dated 15th May, 1992, in such an eventuality, he may be treated as to be a licensee and thus, if he is treated as a licensee as defined under Section 52 of Easement Act, he would be entitled for the benefit and protection, which has been granted and claimed by defendant/appellant alternatively under Section 60 of the Easement Act. The word “licence" has been defined under Section 52 of the Indian Easement Act, which is quoted hereunder :- “52. “License" defined. -Where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a license." 17. The immunity, which has been provided under Section 60 of the Act, that it contemplates that a licence and the licence thereunder as contemplated under Section 52, the licence will not be revocable subject to the condition that the right of raising construction over an immovable property, which is intended to be conveyed is voluntarily permitted to be raised by the lessor and if the construction is carried by making investment by the lessee, in whose favour the license has been executed. The license, thereafter, becomes irrevocable. The license, thereafter, becomes irrevocable. This deviation and the purpose of interpretation of Section 60, which has been made by the appellant/defendant is from the view point that the foundation of his argument in the proceeding before the Court below was to the effect that when after the execution of the unregistered agreement for sale on 15th May, 1992, it is his case that since he has started raising construction of the shop, in question, from his own investment and since the action of raising construction was not opposed by the plaintiff/respondent, then their action of terminating the tenancy by the subsequent notice would be barred by the principle of estoppel and acquiescence. In such an eventuality, what would be the relevant is that to draw the implication under Section 60 of the Act for granting an immunity from revoking the license, it would be only when the document dated 15th May, 1992 is treated by the defendant/appellant as to be a licence. He cannot be permitted to be waivered in his argument with regard to the interpretation given to an agreement for sale dated 15th May, 1992, either, it has to be treated as to be an agreement to convey the property in order to derive a benefit claimed under Section 53-A or it could be treated as to be a document, which is granting licence and consequent thereto, he was in terms of the agreement was permitted to raise the construction by the licensor in order to attract the immunity of revocation of licence under Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act. It cannot be treated both as a licence and also an agreement for sale simultaneously to be utilized in the manner, it suits the defendant/appellants' purpose. 18. There is a massive contradiction in the pleadings and the evidence and the manner, in which, the interpretation was assigned by defendant/appellant to the unregistered agreement for sale dated 15th May, 1992. It is a settled law that no right or title could be created over the property, in question, which is admittedly an immovable property, admittedly, by the document, which does not exists in the eyes of law and hence, the interpretation given to the said document according to suitability of the defendant/appellant is not acceptable by this Court. It is a settled law that no right or title could be created over the property, in question, which is admittedly an immovable property, admittedly, by the document, which does not exists in the eyes of law and hence, the interpretation given to the said document according to suitability of the defendant/appellant is not acceptable by this Court. Consequently, the protection, which has been contemplated under Section 60 of the Easement Act, will not be attracted because the Act of construction should be an act, which is permissible under the document of licence itself. The implication of Section 60 could not be drawn on the pretext that the act of action of raising the construction since it was not opposed by the plaintiff/respondent, thus by applying the principle of estoppel and acquiescence, the protection under Section 60 cannot be extended to the defendant/appellant, who has on the other hand has claimed himself to be the owner in pursuance to the implication of Section 53-A and who has alternatively claimed himself to be licensee under Section 52 of the Easement Act, thus, this Court is of the confirmed opinion that the right, which was being derived by the unregistered agreement of sale dated 15th May, 1992, which was, admittedly, an unregistered document, it will not confer any right or title in favour of the defendant/appellant and his status, since being that of a tenant and the tenancy, which stood terminated by the notice issued by the plaintiff/respondent to them on 14th July, 1997, terminating the tenancy that was sufficient enough because the fact pertaining to the denial of remittance of rent since 1996, after the creation of the tenancy on 1993 is a fact which was not proved otherwise by any document on record brought by defendant/appellant to show that the rent was continued to be paid thereafter also. Hence, in view of the pleading pertaining to the defendant/appellant being the licensee and the effect of termination of tenancy by the notice dated 14th July, 1997 that itself was sufficient to terminate the tenancy and consequently, the licence also stood terminated, which was claimed by the defendant/appellant. 19. Hence, in view of the pleading pertaining to the defendant/appellant being the licensee and the effect of termination of tenancy by the notice dated 14th July, 1997 that itself was sufficient to terminate the tenancy and consequently, the licence also stood terminated, which was claimed by the defendant/appellant. 19. The learned counsel for the defendant/appellant has also argued the matter from the view point that, what would be the impact of his name being recoded in the Municipal records under the strength of the so called unregistered agreement for sale dated 15th May, 1992. In order to substantiate the same, he has placed the documents on record, i.e. the publication, which was made in the newspaper on 7th October, 1996, i.e. paper No. 43-Ga, which was issued by the local authority inviting objection against the application for mutation, which was filed by the defendant/appellant to be recorded in the municipal records on the basis of the unregistered agreement for sale dated 15th May, 1992. What he wants to contends that when there was a public notice issued on 7th October, 1996, inviting the objection against the application for mutation and since the plaintiff/respondent had not filed any objection to it, it would be presumed that the plaintiff/respondent has accepted the veracity of his title, which he contends was falling upon him in pursuance to the unregistered agreement for sale executed by the plaintiff/respondent on 15th May, 1992, i.e. paper No. 30 Ga 2. 20. 20. As far as this aspect of argument is concerned, this Court is of the view that even if let us presume for a moment that in pursuance to the proceedings, which has been resorted to by the local authority for recording the name of the defendant/appellant in pursuance to the publication dated 7th October, 1996, it is un-controverted preposition of law that the recording of his name in the Municipal record as against an immovable property is only for the purposes of the remittance of the local taxes and revenue payable, which are payable in relation to the property, in question, the mutation, in itself, will not confer any right or title to the defendant/appellant, more particularly, when there is nothing on record either in the pleadings or in the evidence that the defendant/appellant had ever made any effort to get the sale deed executed in pursuance to the so called unregistered agreement for sale dated 15th May, 1992, because, otherwise also the unregistered agreement for sale dated 15th May, 1992 could not be sustained in view of the implication, which was flowing from the provisions contained under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, which mandates that for the purposes of creating a right in relation to the immovable property, the document has had to be registered under the provisions contained under Section 17 of the Registration Act. Thus, considering the aforesaid contentions, the learned Trial Court by the judgment dated 25th May, 2011, impugned in the present Second Appeal had decreed the suit of the plaintiff/respondent and as a consequence thereto, the defendant/appellant was directed to vacate the premises, i.e. the shop in dispute, defined by figure “abcd" in the plaint map and, he was directed to hand over the vacant possession of disputed shop to the plaintiff/respondent. 21. 21. The learned Trial Court, while considering the other issues, which were framed based on the pleadings, had recorded a finding in favour of the plaintiff/respondent so far it related to the statement of the exclusive ownership on the basis of the family partition, while deciding issue No. 1 and also in relation to what would be the impact to provide an authenticity of possession of the defendant/appellant over the shop, in question, in the absence of there being a valid document of conveyance and secondly, the effect of the termination of the tenancy, by virtue of the notice dated 14th June, 1997, which was placed on record as paper No. 6-Ga. 22. The said judgment dated 25th May, 2011 was put to challenge by the defendant/appellant in the Civil Appeal No. 25 of 2011, Shailendra Singh and others Vs. Ravi Kumar. The Appellate Court too after considering the propriety of the judgment and hearing the parties at length, had ultimately observed that the very foundation of the claim raised by the defendant/appellant to be the owner of the property, in question, is not sustainable and hence, he will not get any protection of Section 53-A, as it has been sought to be argued by the learned counsel for the defendant/appellant and as already dealt with above in the light of the provisions of Section 17 (1-A) of Registration Act and Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. 23. The defendant/appellant has argued the matter from another perspective before the Court below that was in relation to the affixation of the stamp on the document filed on record to be read as exhibit, which has been placed before the Civil Courts as an exhibit in view of the provisions contained under Section 35 of the Stamp Act. Section 35 of the Stamp Act reads as under :- “35. Section 35 of the Stamp Act reads as under :- “35. Instruments not duly stamped inadmissible in evidence, etc.—No instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, or shall be acted upon, registered or authenticated by any such person or by any public officer, unless such instrument is duly stamped: Provided that— (a) any such instrument [shall], be admitted in evidence on payment of the duty with which the same is chargeable, or, in the case of an instrument insufficiently stamped, of the amount required to make up such duty, together with a penalty of five rupees, or, when ten times the amount of the proper duty or deficient portion thereof exceeds five rupees, of a sum equal to ten times such duty or portion; (b) where any person from whom a stamped receipt could have been demanded, has given an unstamped receipt and such receipt, if stamped, would be admissible in evidence against him, then such receipt shall be admitted in evidence against him, then such receipt shall be admitted in evidence against him on payment of a penalty of one rupee by the person tendering it; (c) where a contract or agreement of any kind is effected by correspondence consisting of two or more letters and any one of the letters bears the proper stamp, the contract or agreement shall be deemed to be duly stamped; (d) nothing herein contained shall prevent the admission of any instrument in evidence in any proceeding in a Criminal Court, other than a proceeding under Chapter XII or Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898); (e) nothing herein contained shall prevent the admission of any instrument in any Court when such instrument has been executed by or on behalf of the Government or where it bears the certificate of the Collector as provided by section 32 or any other provision of this Act." 24. What he wants to contend that in itself will make the document as an agreement for sale, though it was admittedly unregistered, as to be the document, which was readable in evidence and it could be read for the collateral purposes in view of the fact that the possession stood transferred to him on its execution. 25. What he wants to contend that in itself will make the document as an agreement for sale, though it was admittedly unregistered, as to be the document, which was readable in evidence and it could be read for the collateral purposes in view of the fact that the possession stood transferred to him on its execution. 25. The argument, which has been raised by the learned counsel for the defendant/appellant in the light of the inference, which has been sought to be drawn by defendant/appellant in view of the provisions contained under Section 35 of the Stamp Act, this Court is of the view that affixation of stamp on a document under Section 35 of the Stamp Act, it is only for the purposes that when a document or any instrument, which is chargeable with the stamp is required to be read in evidence in the proceedings before the Civil Court, then under Section 35 of the Stamp Act, it only contemplates that it has to be stamped by the person placing reliance on it for the purposes of the said paper to be read in evidence. Affixation of stamp under Section 35 of the Stamp Act, will not in itself make the document, which is otherwise to be read in evidence as to be a document, which was conferring a valid title in the absence of there being registration as contemplated under Section 17 of the Act and thus, in view of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, the same cannot be treated as to be a document of title of the defendant/appellant, merely because of an affixation of stamp under Section 35 of the Stamp Act. 26. The learned Appellate Court too concurred with the finding, which was recorded by the learned Trial Court by the judgment dated 25th May, 2011 and by virtue of the judgment dated 4th May, 2019, had dismissed the Appeal and affirmed the judgment of the Trial Court. 27. 26. The learned Appellate Court too concurred with the finding, which was recorded by the learned Trial Court by the judgment dated 25th May, 2011 and by virtue of the judgment dated 4th May, 2019, had dismissed the Appeal and affirmed the judgment of the Trial Court. 27. In view of the concurrent finding recorded concurrently by both the Courts below with regard to the flow of title, which was claimed by the defendant/appellant in pursuance to the alleged 17 unregistered agreement for sale since has been concurrently not accepted by both the Courts below in view of the fact that it was unregistered document in relation to an immovable property, which could not have been read in evidence in view of Section 49 and since it was mandatorily required to be registered, the Appellate Court too held that the decree of eviction as passed by the Trial Court in Suit No. 183 of 1997, Ravi Kumar Vs. Palvendra Singh and others, was rightly affirmed by the judgment of the Appellate Court dated 4th May, 2019. 28. In view of the reasoning, which has been assigned above, this Court is of the view that substantial question of law, which was sought to be pressed by the learned counsel for the appellant/defendant so far it relates to the substantial question of law 1, 2 and 3, which was principally pressed by the learned Senior Counsel, do not evolve to be considered in the present Second Appeal in view of the reasons, which has been already assigned above. 29. Thus, this Court is of the view that the Second Appeal lacks merit and is according dismissed. 30. However, there would be no order as to costs.