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2019 DIGILAW 447 (KER)

Shycy Santhosh v. HDFC Housing Finance, HDFC House, M. G. Road, Ravipuram

2019-06-13

DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN

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JUDGMENT : The protective prescripts of Section 31(j) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act ('the SARFAESI Act' for brevity) are spotlighted in these writ petitions, with the petitioners attempting to unleash it, as a shield against the action initiated against them under the said Act by the respondent Financial Institution for recovery of certain amounts allegedly due to them. 2. The petitioners predicate that since the amounts due from them are below the threshold of 20% of the principal sun and interest thereon, no such recovery is permissible under the rigor of the afore Section and they thus challenge the recovery proceedings as being non-est in law, contending that they are, therefore, entitled to assail it before this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, without having to invoke their alternative statutory remedies. 3. These two writ petitions require to be considered together because the necessitous and vital issues presented in them are homologous and also because they have been filed by the same persons, who concede that they have availed certain loan facilities from the respondent Financial Institution. 4. The petitioners impel a very interesting contention that even though they are admittedly in arrears of the EMIs payable under the loan facilities, the respondent Financial Institution still cannot recall the loans nor can they invoke steps under the SARFAESI Act to seek recovery of the amounts due from them. These submissions are edificed on the assertion that until the arrears swell to more than 20% of the principal amount and interest thereon, no action under the the SARFAESI Act is possible on account of the prescriptions in Section 31(j) of the said Act. 5. Since the entire case of the petitioners are hypostasised on Section 31(j) of the SARFAESI Act, I deem it appropriate to extract it as under, so as to let it be read as it is drafted: “31. Provisions of this Act not to apply in certain cases.-The provisions of this Act shall not apply to (j) any case in which the amount due is less than twenty percent of the principal amount and interest thereon”. 6. I have heard Sri.Titus Mani Vettom, learned counsel for the petitioners in both these cases and Sri.K.K.Chandran Pillai, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Smt.S.Ambily, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Financial Institution. 7. 6. I have heard Sri.Titus Mani Vettom, learned counsel for the petitioners in both these cases and Sri.K.K.Chandran Pillai, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Smt.S.Ambily, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Financial Institution. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners began his submissions by unequivocally conceding that the petitioners have taken three loans in the year 2014, totalling Rs.60,00,000/-, which is the subject matter of W.P.(C)No.12727/2019 and another loan of Rs.28,00,000/-, which is involved in W.P.(C)No.12891/2019. He then admits that all these loans have a term of fifteen years each and that the total EMI payable for the first three loans is Rs.68,896/-, while that for the fourth one is Rs.30,519/-. 8. However, pertinently, the learned counsel is unable to tell this Court the amount of arrears of the defaulted EMIs as on today or the actual number of EMIs that have been defaulted by the petitioners. He nevertheless confesses that substantial arrears are remaining unpaid and that the petitioners have not yet been able to liquidate the same. 9. That said, his submissions against the action taken by the respondent Financial Institution to recover the loans, after recalling it, is, as I have already indicated above, that until the arrears of the defaulted EMIs accumulate to an amount more than 20% of the principal sum and interest thereon, which the respondent Financial Institution must first prove, no action under the SARFAESI Act is possible because, 'the amount due' as mentioned in Section 31(j) thereof means 'arrears' and not 'the total outstanding'. 10. Strange as it may sound, the predication that the amount due under Section 31(j) of the SARFAESI Act can only mean 'arrears of defaulted EMIs' is vehemently asserted to by the learned counsel for the petitioners, adding that until this amount exceeds 20% of the principal and the interest thereon, the Financial Institution cannot even initiate any action for recovery under the SARFAESI Act. Thus, according to the petitioners, as long as they are able to maintain the defaulted arrears of EMI below the 20% limit, vis-a-vis, the principal amount and interest thereon, action under the SARFAESI Act can never be taken and that if at all the Financial Institution wants to recover such amounts of arrears, they will have to approach the Civil Court or the Debts Recovery Tribunal, invoking other applicable Statutes. 11. 11. I must say that this Court is taken aback by these submissions and the force with which it is impelled, because the provisions of Section 31(j) is certainly never intended to operate in the manner as has been claimed by the petitioners. A bare reading of the said Section makes it indubitable that it is designed to offer protection to a borrower who repays the loan amounts honestly and in time, thus keeping the amounts recoverable from him, at every point of time, below 20% of the principal amount and interest thereon. This provision certainly cannot apply to persons who commit persistent default, but cleverly manages to keep the overdue instalments below 20% of the principal amount and interest on it and if this is the way in which Section 31(j) of the SARFAESI Act is to be interpreted, then it would be a total travesty of justice, offering premium to dishonesty. 12. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent Financial Institution commenced arguments affirming my views as afore and supplementally stating that the petitioners are in persistent default of the EMIs even as on today. He says that, in fact, in the year 2018, the petitioners had approached this Court by filing W.P.(C)No. 22510/2018, but without seeking any relief based on Section 31(j) of the SARFAESI Act and had obtained Exhibit P2 judgment, wherein they were permitted, with the consent of the Financial Institution, to pay off the arrears, as on that day, in the three loans involved in W.P. (C)No.12727/2019, however, on the specific condition that they will continue to pay the regular EMIs thereafter. The learned Senior Counsel submits that even though some amounts towards arrears were paid by the petitioners pursuant to the directions in the said judgment, they defaulted the regular EMIs in the said loans thereafter and therefore, that their conduct is in gross affront to the directions of this Court. He adds that the repayment in the fourth loan, namely the subject matter in W.P.(C)No.12891/2019, is no better and consequently that the respondent Financial Institution has now recalled all the four loans entirely, thus initiating action for recovery of the total outstanding dues therein under the SARFAESI Act. 13. He adds that the repayment in the fourth loan, namely the subject matter in W.P.(C)No.12891/2019, is no better and consequently that the respondent Financial Institution has now recalled all the four loans entirely, thus initiating action for recovery of the total outstanding dues therein under the SARFAESI Act. 13. The learned Senior Counsel then reiteratingly submitted that it was in such circumstances that the Financial Institution was forced to recall the entire loan and to initiate action for its recovery and that the stipulations in Section 31(j) of the SARFAESI Act would never inhibit this, since concededly, the present total outstanding amounts due from the petitioners is Rs.82,74,947/-as on 30.04.2019, which is well in excess of 20% of the principal amount and the interest calculated thereon. He, therefore, prays that these writ petitions be dismissed finding it to be an abuse of process of law and to allow the respondent Financial Institution to take further action pursuant to the impugned notices, under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. 14. I have no doubt that the submissions of the learned Senior Counsel carry abundant force. I cannot find the petitioners to be deserving of any sympathy or lenitude from this Court, when they are manifestly in violation of the directions in Exhibit P2 judgment nor can I find them to be honest in their repayment, when they admit that the EMIs after Exhibit P2 judgment had not been paid, except an amount of about Rs.1.5 lakhs, which can, at the best, represent only two such instalments. In the afore circumstances, I cannot find favour with any of the contentions raised in these writ petitions nor can I offer imprimatur to the conduct of the petitioners, who appear to be making an attempt to get over the earlier directions of this Court by thrusting untenable contentions. I was, therefore, initially inclined to impose exemplary costs on the petitioners, but acceding to the exoneratory request of their learned counsel, I deem it appropriate not to do so and to consequentially dismiss these writ petitions without making any order as to costs.