JUDGMENT : Pankaj Naqvi, J. 1. This criminal appeal is preferred against the judgment and order dated 28.11.2005 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 3, Meerut in S.T. No. 814 of 1994 (Case Crime No. 272 of 1993) convicting appellant for life under Section 302 IPC with fine of Rs. 5,000/- and a default sentence of 2 years R.I. under section 201 IPC to 5 years R.I. with fine of Rs. 2500/- and a default sentence of 1 year R.I. All sentences were to run concurrently. PW-2 a neighbour of the victim submitted a written report (Ex. Ka-1) dated 29.4.1993 that previous night at about 7.30 PM, accused-appellant strangulated his wife (victim) to death, cries for help were heard by neighbours and the body taken to the burial ground. On aforesaid information, an F.I.R. dated 29.4.93 (Ext Ka 2A) came to be registered at 11.20 AM under section 302 IPC against the accused-appellant. During investigation names of 3 other accused i.e. Ashfaq, Amir and Sitara Begum also surfaced in the commission of crime. 2. The trial court held that all the links in the chain of circumstances are complete against the appellant in the commission of crime, convicted the accused/appellant but acquitted the other 3 accused. No appeal/revision against acquittal was brought to our notice. 3. Heard Shri Sheshadri Trivedi, the learned Amicus and Shri A.N. Mulla, the learned A.G.A. 4. The learned Amicus made the following submissions:- (i) F.I.R. is ante-timed and ante-dated (ii) Prosecution failed to establish that at the time of the occurrence, husband alone was present in the house thus the question of discharging the burden under section 106 of Evidence Act on the part of the accused appellant does not arise. (iii) It's a case of circumstantial evidence, all links in the chain are not established so as to rule out the hypothesis that it was the appellant alone who committed the murder of the deceased inside his house coupled with the acquittal of other 3 accused. 5. Learned A.G.A. opposed the submission. 6. PW-2, a co-villager, not a family member of the deceased is the first informant. He submitted a written report (Ex Ka-1) at the police station intimating the death of the wife of appellant by strangulation attributable to appellant previous night i.e. on 28.4.1993 at 7.30 P.M. and that the appellant was on way to bury her body. 6. PW-2, a co-villager, not a family member of the deceased is the first informant. He submitted a written report (Ex Ka-1) at the police station intimating the death of the wife of appellant by strangulation attributable to appellant previous night i.e. on 28.4.1993 at 7.30 P.M. and that the appellant was on way to bury her body. He acquired above information on 28.4.1993 PM from one Sadiq (not examined). The written report came to be registered as an F.I.R. (Exbt Ka 2-A) on 29.4.1993 at 11.20 A.M. which is also authenticated in the inquest (Ex Ka-12). The inquest commenced at 12.30 PM to conclude at 1.30 PM. PW-1 and 5, i.e. uncle and a cousin of the victim on receipt of news of death of the victim from Pogal (brother-in-law of victim) on the midnight of 28/29th at Saharanpur, left along with other family members for Baraut by bus at about 9.00 in the morning to reach Baraut bus station on 29th around noon. At Baraut bus station they were informed by members of the community that the body of the deceased has been taken to the burial ground. PW-1 along with others reached the graveyard and noticed froth coming out from the mouth and blood from the nose of the victim. PW-1 has given a sequential detail right from receipt of information regarding the death of his niece and his participation in the inquest at the burial ground. PW-4 for the first time on 29.4.1993 learnt of the unnatural death of his sister after reaching Baraut only. He being a family member of the victim submitted a written report (Exbt Ka-2) implicating the family members of the accused. The police arrived at the grave yard, accused upon coming across the police fled from the scene. The police took the body of the victim in its custody, conducted inquest (Ex Ka-12) at the burial ground in which PW-1 and 4 were witnesses. The inquest indicates that F.I.R. came into existence as F.I.R. is one of the enclosures. Mere absence of case particulars in the inquest does not mean that F.I.R. is ante timed. We also clarify that the F.I.R. came to be lodged at 11.20 AM (not PM) as the same is also discernible from the impugned judgment (para-3) where 'PM' has been struck off to be substituted by 'AM'. Mere absence of case particulars in the inquest does not mean that F.I.R. is ante timed. We also clarify that the F.I.R. came to be lodged at 11.20 AM (not PM) as the same is also discernible from the impugned judgment (para-3) where 'PM' has been struck off to be substituted by 'AM'. PW-2 turned hostile, his version that the FIR came to be lodged on 29.4.1993 at 7.30 PM is not corroborated from any record. Thus plea of ante-timing/ante-dating of F.I.R. stands repelled. 7. PW-4 brother of the victim was stating that the marriage of his sister with the accused/appellant was only 11 month old, accused often used to torture his sister. A dispute arose with the accused/appellant when he (PW-4) refused to advance Rs. 10,000/- to him as a result of which appellant deserted his sister but in his absence the father of the accused had taken back his daughter-in-law. He admitted that he too had submitted a written report (Exbt Ka-2) on 30.4.1993 alleging death of his sister by strangulation attributable to all 4 accused as witnessed by PW-1. PW-4 to the extent he alleges that PW-1 is a witness to the scene is unreliable, as the latter was at Saharanpur when the occurrence took place. On other aspect he has fully supported PW-1. 8. PW-5 a maternal cousin of the deceased claims to be a witness to the entire occurrence but in cross-examination admitted that he learnt about the death of his sister only on 28.4.1993 at around 1 A.M. from one Mohd. Rafiq, a close relative while he was in the house of PW-1. Thus he also could not be an eye-witness, but only a witness to the inquest. 9. Rafiq, a close relative while he was in the house of PW-1. Thus he also could not be an eye-witness, but only a witness to the inquest. 9. PW-7 the medico on 29.4.1993 carried out the autopsy (ExKa-5) of the deceased at 5 PM with following ante-mortem injuries:- ^^1- [kjkl o uhyxw fu'kku 4 lsehΠxq.kk 1@2 lsehΠds {ks= esa xnZu ij ckbZ vksj] ck;s dku ls 6 lsehΠuhpsA 2- e`rdk ds 'kjhj ij xnZu] psgjs o vka[kksa dh iydksa ij dkQh lwtu FkhA ukd o eaqg esa [kwu FkkA vka[kksa esa ykfyek Fkh] uk[kwu uhys gks x;s FksA 'kjhj ls e`R;q i'pkr dh vdM+u tk pqdh Fkh lMu 'kq: gks pqdh FkhA 'ko ds vkUrfjd ijh{k.k ij xnZu ds vUnj fgLls esa [kwu tek FkkA 'okl uyh esa Hkh [kwu tek Fkk] QsQM+s Qwy FksA MkDVj dh jk; esa e`R;q dk dkj.k ne ?kqVuk Fkk vkSj e`R;q xyk nckus ls fnukad 28-4-1993 dks lka; 7 cts gksuk laEHko FkhA** 10. The doctor opined that the death was due to strangulation and was fixing the time of death as alleged by prosecution. He denied involvement of any rope in strangulation. It is not the case of defence that the victim committed suicide involving a rope. 11. Thus going by oral account of PW-1 and 4 death of the victim on account of strangulation is corroborated fully by medical evidence. 12. PW-8 the I.O. in whose presence case was registered, proceeded to the burial ground, wherein he came across the body of the victim, a cot in which body was brought, a spade and a wooden plate, which he all took in his custody, prepared a memo Ex Ka-6 of wooden plate and that of (Ex Ka-7) the cot in which the body was brought, latter was handed over to the care taker in writing and site plan as Ext Ka-8 where the body was to be buried. On the instruction of PW-8, S.I. Ahiraj Singh (not examined) conducted the inquest (Ex Ka-12) of the deceased under his supervision at the burial ground. 13. Conjointly reading the testimonies including the exhibited documents, the prosecution has established that the victim died an unnatural death inside the house of the appellant and her body intercepted at the burial ground before it could be buried. 14. 13. Conjointly reading the testimonies including the exhibited documents, the prosecution has established that the victim died an unnatural death inside the house of the appellant and her body intercepted at the burial ground before it could be buried. 14. We are of the view that the prosecution has established the following links in the chain of circumstances: (i) The marriage of deceased and appellant was only 11 months old, relations strained, wherein the victim was deserted. (ii) The father-in-law of the victim took back his daughter-in-law (victim), a week before the occurrence, in the absence of PW-4. (iii) The victim was strangulated on 28.4.93 at around 7-7.30 P.M. inside the house of her husband/appellant. (iv) PW-1 along with his wife and PW-5 on receipt of above information left Saharanpur on 29.4.1993 at about 8.30/9.00 A.M. for Baraut by bus, so as to reach Baraut bus station around noon. (v) PW-2 a co-villager lodged an FIR against the accused-appellant relating to the death of the deceased on account of strangulation on 29.4.1993 at about 11.20 A.M. (vi) Members of the community informed PW-1 at Baraut bus station that the body of the deceased has been taken to the burial ground. (vii) The police arrived at the burial ground, accused fled from the scene, recoveries (Ex Ka- 6 and 7) were made, inquest conducted at the burial ground under the supervision of PW-8, in presence of PW-1, PW- 5 and others along with site plan (Ext Ka-8) of the grave where the victim was to be buried. (viii) No attempt by the accused/appellant (husband) in either lodging an FIR of an unnatural death of his wife nor was any attempt made to provide her any medical help. 15. Thus, in view of above incriminating circumstances the burden now lay upon appellant/ husband to explain how and under what circumstances the death of the victim took place inside his house. No explanation was coming forward in the statement of accused-appellant relating to the circumstances causing the death of his wife. The appellant as her husband cannot feign ignorance, as under Sec. 106 of the Evidence Act he shall be presumed to have knowledge of fact and circumstances relating to death of his wife as the prosecution has successfully established that the victim was strangulated by the appellant inside his house. 16. The appellant as her husband cannot feign ignorance, as under Sec. 106 of the Evidence Act he shall be presumed to have knowledge of fact and circumstances relating to death of his wife as the prosecution has successfully established that the victim was strangulated by the appellant inside his house. 16. We find useful to quote the following paragraphs of the judgment of the Apex Court in Trimukh Maroti Kirkan vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681 :- "If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the Courts. A Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. Stirland vs. Director of Public Prosecution, 1944 AC 315 quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab vs. Karnail Singh, (2003) 11 SCC 271 . The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it reads: (b) A is charged with traveling on a railway without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him." 17. Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it reads: (b) A is charged with traveling on a railway without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him." 17. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation: "21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence where no eye-witness account is available, there is another principle of law which must be kept in mind. The principle is that when an incriminating circumstance is put to the accused and the said accused either offers no explanation or offers an explanation which is found to be untrue, then the same becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances to make it complete. This view has been taken in a catena of decisions of this Court. State of Tamil Nadu vs. Rajendran, (1999) 8 SCC 679 (Para 6), State of U.P. vs. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal, AIR 1992 SC 2045 (Para 40), State of Maharashtra vs. Suresh, (2000) 1 SCC 471 (Para 27), Ganesh Lal vs. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 1 SCC 731 (Para 15) and Gulab Chand vs. State of M.P. (1995) 3 SCC 574 (Para 4)." 18. Applying the aforesaid legal position, we are of the view that failure to explain the death of the wife of the appellant, inside his house under unnatural circumstances is an additional link in the chain of circumstances which not only makes it complete but also rules out all the hypothesis but for the guilt of the appellant.. 19. Applying the aforesaid legal position, we are of the view that failure to explain the death of the wife of the appellant, inside his house under unnatural circumstances is an additional link in the chain of circumstances which not only makes it complete but also rules out all the hypothesis but for the guilt of the appellant.. 19. The appeal is bereft of merit and is liable to be dismissed. The appeal is dismissed. 20. Let a copy of this judgment along with records be sent to the learned Sessions Judge, for compliance and intimation to this court within 2 months. 21. The Court places on record the valuable assistance rendered by the Learned Amicus. The Registrar General is directed to ensure a payment of Rs. 15,000/- to the learned Amicus, for services rendered.