ORDER : 1. Petitioner, Jitendra Kumar has challenged the order dated 09.04.2015 passed by learned CJM, Jamui in connection with Jamui P.S. case no.154/2013 whereby and whereunder he along with others has been summoned to face trial for an offence punishable under Sections 302, 325, 326, 331, 352, 34 of the IPC coupled with subsequent prosecution arisen therefrom under Sessions Trial No.280 of 2016 pending before First Additional District & Sessions Judge, Jamui for want of prosecution in accordance with Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. 2. Arvind Kumar Mishra, Jailor, Jamui filed written report on 01-07-2013 disclosing therein that accused Munna Singh being under custody in connection with Jamui P.S. Case no.95/2013 was taken on police remand and during course thereof, S.I. of Town P.S. namely Jitendra Kumar, S.I. of Giddaur P.S. Satyabart Bharti brutally assaulted him as disclosed by aforesaid custodial accused Munna Singh to other custodial accused. It has further been averred that aforesaid custodial accused Munna Singh died at PMCH during course of treatment. 3. On the basis of aforesaid written report, Jamui P.s. Case No.154/2013 has been registered against so many persons and after completing investigation, a charge sheet was submitted against Satyabart Bharti, Jitendra Kumar keeping investigation pending against others. It is further evident that petitioner Jitendra Kumar Singh is taking tooth to nail in order to linger the proceeding and for that, each and every opportunity is being availed for the aforesaid purpose. From the order sheet it is evident that the trial has been taken cared of by the High Court whereunder, time schedule has been given to the learned lower court to complete the trial, and under the aforesaid direction, the learned lower court came up to the stage of argument, argument of prosecution has completed, argument of defence also begun then thereafter a petition has been filed at the end of the petitioner to exonerate as, the proceeding has commenced without sanction as required under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. in the background of the fact that petitioner happens to be public servant as defined under Section 21 of the IPC and, the offence so alleged has been committed during due discharge of his official duty. 4. It is further evident from the order sheet of the learned lower court that aforesaid prayer was made on 19.12.2018 and, after hearing both sides, vide order dated 20.12.2018, the prayer has been rejected. 4. It is further evident from the order sheet of the learned lower court that aforesaid prayer was made on 19.12.2018 and, after hearing both sides, vide order dated 20.12.2018, the prayer has been rejected. Consequent thereupon, instant petition has been filed though aforesaid order dated 20.02.2018 is not under challenge, specifically. 5. It has been submitted at the end of the petitioner that the alleged occurrence could not be distinguished being away from due discharge of official duty and that being so, there would be applicability of Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. That means to say, without having sanction from competent authority, the trial would not survive, as the order of cognizance is in absence thereof. In order to justify the same, the facts of the case has been placed. Elaborating the same, it has been submitted that as per prosecution version so alleged victim/deceased was taken on police remand and so, whatever activity has been alleged, committed during course of police remand and that being so, the activity so alleged would be in due discharge of his official duty whereupon, protection as provided under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. would be applicable as the petitioner is removable by the State Government. In order to justify such plea, the learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon Sankaran Moitra vs. Sadhna Das & Anr. reported in (2006) 4 SCC 584 , Om Prakash & Ors. vs. State of Jharkhand & Anr. reported in (2012) 12 SCC 72 , D.T. Virupakshappa vs. Subash reported in (2015) 12 SCC 231 , Sanjay Kumar Thakur vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 2016(1) PLJR 19 , Devinder Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab through the CBI reported in (2016) 12 SCC 87 . 6. On the other hand, the learned A.P.P. opposed the submission and submitted that the prayer whatsoever been made on behalf of petitioner is misconceived whereupon, not at all maintainable. Also submitted that even in worst case, the police officials were not at all entrusted during discharge of official duty to assault an accused whose presence has been procured on police remand ultimately costing his life when the deceased was subjected to victimization during course of one sided game and for that, relied upon P.K. Pradhan Vs. Also submitted that even in worst case, the police officials were not at all entrusted during discharge of official duty to assault an accused whose presence has been procured on police remand ultimately costing his life when the deceased was subjected to victimization during course of one sided game and for that, relied upon P.K. Pradhan Vs. The State of Sikkim reported in AIR 2001 SC 2547 , Raj Kishore Roy vs. Kamleshwar Pandey & Anr. reported in AIR 2002 SC 2861 . 7. From the record, it is evident that at an initial stage there was absence of the accused. Anyhow, his presence was procured. It is further evident that after misrepresenting the facts as well as wrong submission got bailed out but, vide order dated 23.01.2009 passed in Cr. Misc. No.3392/2018 bail bond was cancelled and is under custody on account thereof. Then thereafter, the proceeding has been under the surveillance of the High Court and as is evident, the trial was to be concluded by the December 2019. Before that, on 19.12.2018 prayer has been made to acquit the accused as trial has vitiated on account of absence of sanction in accordance with Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. and the same has been rejected by the learned lower court vide order 20.12.2018. The relevant para of the order is quoted below: *izLrqr ekeys ds vfHkys[k ds lkf{k;ksa ds lk{; ds voyksdu ls Li"V gS fd vkosnd dk dk;Z rkRif;Zr :i ls vf/kdkfjd dk;Z ugh Fkk vf/kdkfjd fLFkfr ds nq:i;ksx ls mnHkwr fdlh vijk/k ds fy, n.M izfdz;k lafgrk dh /kkjk 197 ds v/khu Lohd`r dh vko';drk ugha gksrh gSA vr,o vkosnu fnukad 19-12-2018 dks [kkfjt fd;k tkrk gSA cpko i{k dks funsZf'kr fd;k tkrk gS fd laiw.kZ ekeyk ekuuh; mPp u;k;ky;] iVuk ds vkns'kkuqlkj fuR; izfrfnu pykus dks vknsf'kr gS ,oa fopkj.k lekIr gsrw fofgr le; blesa fnlEcj ekg fu/kkZfjr gSA vr,o bUgsa ;g funZf'kr fd;k tkrk gS fd viuk cgl lekIr djsaA* 8. The petitioner knowingly and intentionally withheld to challenge this order as para-1 of the petition speaks as: “1. The petitioner knowingly and intentionally withheld to challenge this order as para-1 of the petition speaks as: “1. That the petitioner above-named prefers this application seeking quashing of the order dated 09/04/2015 passed in connection with Jamui P.S. Case No.154 of 2013 dated 01/07/2013 registered for offences under sections 302 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamui in connection with by which cognizance has been taken for offences under sections 302,325,326,331,352 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 so far as it concerns with the petitioner herein and also for consequently quashing the entire subsequent prosecution of the petitioner in connection with S.Tr. No.280 of 2016 pending in the Court of the Additional District & Sessions Judge-I, Jamui on the ground of cognizance being barred under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for want of sanction for prosecution and no sanction has been obtained to prosecute the petitioner even though the trial is about to end.” 9. For the present, in the background of aforesaid finding recorded by the learned lower court in consonance with the deficiency having at the part of the petitioner in ignoring that part of order, did not justify the prayer because of the fact that now the whole scenario is to be seen in the background of the evidences whatever been produced during course of trial which, this Court, exercising the power under section 482 Cr.P.C would not. 10. In Kalicharan Mahapatra v. State Of Orissa reported in 1998 6 SCC 411 , it has been held: “10. Section 19(1) of the Act is in pari materia with Section 6(1) of the preceding enactment, i.e., the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (the old Act). When a similar contention was raised before a three-Judge Bench of this Court regarding section 6 of the old act in S.A Venkataraman v. State 1958 SCR 1040 that contention was repelled. It was held thus: “The words in Section 6(1) of the Act are clear enough and they must be given effect to. When a similar contention was raised before a three-Judge Bench of this Court regarding section 6 of the old act in S.A Venkataraman v. State 1958 SCR 1040 that contention was repelled. It was held thus: “The words in Section 6(1) of the Act are clear enough and they must be given effect to. There is nothing in the words used in Section 6(1) to even remotely suggest that previous sanction was necessary before a court could take cognizance of the offences mentioned therein in the case of a person who had ceased to be a public servant at the time the court was asked to take cognizance, although he had been such a person at the time the offence was committed. It was suggested that clause (c) in Section 6(1) refers to persons other than those mentioned in clauses (a) and (b). The words ‘is employed’ are absent in this clause which would, therefore, apply to a person who had ceased to be a public servant though he was so at the time of the commission of the offence. Clause (c) cannot be construed in this way. The expressions ‘in the case of a person’ and ‘in the case of any other person’ must refer to a public servant having regard to the first paragraph of the sub-section. Clauses (a) and (b), therefore, would cover the case of a public servant who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government or the State Government and clause (c) would cover the case of any other public servant whom a competent authority could remove from his office. The more important words in clause (c) are ‘of the authority competent to remove him from his office’.” The same view was adopted by another three-Judge Bench in C.R Bansi v. State Of Maharashtra 1971 3 SCR 236 . This was followed in State of W.B v. Manmal Bhutoria 1977 3 SCR 758 . The Constitution Bench in K. Veeraswami v. Union of India 1991 3 SCC 655 upheld the view that no sanction is required to prosecute a public servant after retirement.” 11. In Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab through CBI reported in AIR 2016 SC 2090 , it has been held: “37. The Constitution Bench in K. Veeraswami v. Union of India 1991 3 SCC 655 upheld the view that no sanction is required to prosecute a public servant after retirement.” 11. In Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab through CBI reported in AIR 2016 SC 2090 , it has been held: “37. The principles emerging from the aforesaid decisions are summarized hereunder : I. Protection of sanction is an assurance to an honest and sincere officer to perform his duty honestly and to the best of his ability to further public duty. However, authority cannot be camouflaged to commit crime. II. Once act or omission has been found to have been committed by public servant in discharging his duty it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned. Public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent Section 197 CrPC has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. III. Even in facts of a case when public servant has exceeded in his duty, if there is reasonable connection it will not deprive him of protection under section 197 Cr.P.C. There cannot be a universal rule to determine whether there is reasonable nexus between the act done and official duty nor it is possible to lay down such rule. IV. In case the assault made is intrinsically connected with or related to performance of official duties sanction would be necessary under Section 197 CrPC, but such relation to duty should not be pretended or fanciful claim. The offence must be directly and reasonably connected with official duty to require sanction. It is no part of official duty to commit offence. In case offence was incomplete without proving, the official act, ordinarily the provisions of Section 197 CrPC would apply. V. In case sanction is necessary it has to be decided by competent authority and sanction has to be issued on the basis of sound objective assessment. The court is not to be a sanctioning authority. VI. Ordinarily, question of sanction should be dealt with at the stage of taking cognizance, but if the cognizance is taken erroneously and the same comes to the notice of Court at a later stage, finding to that effect is permissible and such a plea can be taken first time before appellate Court. It may arise at inception itself. VI. Ordinarily, question of sanction should be dealt with at the stage of taking cognizance, but if the cognizance is taken erroneously and the same comes to the notice of Court at a later stage, finding to that effect is permissible and such a plea can be taken first time before appellate Court. It may arise at inception itself. There is no requirement that accused must wait till charges are framed. VII. Question of sanction can be raised at the time of framing of charge and it can be decided prima facie on the basis of accusation. It is open to decide it afresh in light of evidence adduced after conclusion of trial or at other appropriate stage. VIII. Question of sanction may arise at any stage of proceedings. On a police or judicial inquiry or in course of evidence during trial. Whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage and material brought on record depending upon facts of each case. Question of sanction can be considered at any stage of the proceedings. Necessity for sanction may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case and it would be open to accused to place material during the course of trial for showing what his duty was. Accused has the right to lead evidence in support of his case on merits. IX. In some case it may not be possible to decide the question effectively and finally without giving opportunity to the defence to adduce evidence. Question of good faith or bad faith may be decided on conclusion of trial.” 12. After giving analytical thought to the facts and circumstances of the case, the instant petition is found devoid of merit, consequent thereupon is dismissed. 13. Though no stay was grated at an earlier occasion so this Court expect disposal of the trial within stipulated period if not, then the learned lower court will proceed with the trial and concluded it as early as possible, preferably within a month after receiving the order and will submit report thereafter. Office to communicate and procure compliance report.