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2019 DIGILAW 452 (CAL)

Ramgopal Kejriwal v. Kolkata Municipal Corporation

2019-04-05

PROTIK PRAKASH BANERJEE

body2019
JUDGMENT : 1. These ten (10) writ petitions involve common questions of facts and law. Therefore, I have heard them together with notices to the learned Advocates for the parties. The same set of learned Advocates had appeared for all the ten (10) writ petitioners and the respondents. Affidavits-in-opposition and reply have been exchanged by the parties and filed in Court. Perhaps, because of the above reasons there has been some confusion in assigning the reason of revaluation in some matters by alleging facts which were not applicable to those cases but thankfully these have occurred only in the Affidavits-in-opposition and not the orders impugned. Accordingly, it does not prevent me from taking up the matters on the basis of the records disclosed by the writ petitioners. 2. The ten (10) writ petitions pertain to ten (10) separate flats having been the same premises number and which one formed part of the same mother premises. The transferors of the said flat were initial holders of agreements for sale from the owner/developer of the mother premises. Though the Kolkata Municipal Corporation had issued hearing notices to them and assessed the mother property admittedly they were not responsible to make payment of the consolidated rates/taxes on land and building at that time before any deed of sale was executed in their favour. The annual valuation fixed by the Hearing Officer had been challenged by the transferors/owner developer of the mother premises and the learned building assessment tribunal was pleased to reduce the valuation of the mother premises. These were with effect from the fourth quarter of 1990-91, 3rd quarter of 1992-93 and the third quarter of 1998-99. Subsequently, the writ petitioners obtained deeds of sale from the transferor which were duly registered. This was after a process of civil litigation between the writ petitioners and the transferor/promoter/developer/owner of the mother premises. After the writ petitioners had acquired title in the above manner they applied for mutation and apportionment of the proportionate consolidated rates on land and building. Needless to mention this was in respect of their individual flats. 3. The respondent no. This was after a process of civil litigation between the writ petitioners and the transferor/promoter/developer/owner of the mother premises. After the writ petitioners had acquired title in the above manner they applied for mutation and apportionment of the proportionate consolidated rates on land and building. Needless to mention this was in respect of their individual flats. 3. The respondent no. 1 corporation mutated the respective flats in the names of the individual petitioners on April 19, 2008 but it issued hearing notices under Section 183(3) and 183(4) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 proposing an increase of the annual valuation with effect from the first quarter of 1992-93, the third quarter of 1992-93, third quarter of 1998-99 and the third quarter of 2004-2005 to different amounts. The said notices were purported to be of revised valuation of the said flats. The writ petitioners filed similar, if not identical objections in writing, to the proposed valuation in each case. In each of the objections in writing, inter alia, the writ petitioners made the following submissions: - Paragraph 1: "I like to inform you that hearing of the area of my Flat in occupation for the period 1/92-93, 3/92-93 & 3/98-99 is already completed by assessing the officer on 14/10/99 followed by an appeal before the Ld. Municipal Assessment Tribunal Kolkata vide appeal no. 2510, 2511 and 2512 of 1999. An order is passed by the Ld. Municipal Assessment Tribunal, Kolkata dated 14/2/06 for the period of 4th quarter 1990-91, 3rd quarter 1992-93 and 3rd quarter 1998-99." Paragraph 2: "Our Ld. Advocate submitted a letter of request for adjustment of excess payment made as per Tribunal orders duly received by KMC on 28/3/06." Paragraph 3: "I further like to state that for the period 3rd Qr. 2004-05, please consider the valuation as per the Tribunal Order by adding 10% appreciation to the valuation for the last period of 3rd qr. 1998-99 fixed by the Ld. 2004-05, please consider the valuation as per the Tribunal Order by adding 10% appreciation to the valuation for the last period of 3rd qr. 1998-99 fixed by the Ld. Tribunal Court order dated 14/02/06." Paragraph 5: "The above mentioned flat is purely used for residential purposes and self-occupied no portion at the flat has been let out on rent to any person." Paragraph 6: "It is well settled by various judgments that reasonable rental value cannot be the basis for determining the annual value of a self occupied flat." At paragraph 7 the writ petitioners submitted that the basement and ground floor of the building were sanctioned for car parking areas of the residents of the building and as a common space its mutation and assessment in the hands of the petitioners were against the sanction plan and already the matter is sub judice before a competent civil court. At paragraph 4 a point was taken that though municipal taxes had been paid by the petitioners from time to time according the demand of the respondent no. 1, the same had not been adjusted in accordance with the learned tribunal's order dated February 14, 2006. 4. Try as I might, I could not find a whisper of the jurisdictional challenge levelled by the learned advocate for the writ petitioners while arguing the writ petition. The writ petitioners had contemporaneously objected to the revision of valuation only in respect of the quantum and had themselves offered to have the annual valuation determined by the learned tribunal enhanced by 10% percent - their other objections were on the basis of lack of adjustment and whether reasonable rental value could be a ground for enhancement of a self-occupied flat. These, as were rightly pointed out by Mr. Mukherjee appearing for the respondent no. 1, were questions which challenged the decision to enhance the facts without impeaching the decision-making process. The writ petitioners did not themselves raise the purported lack of jurisdiction of the respondent no. 1 to make a separate valuation instead of apportionment of the valuation made by the learned tribunal for the entire premises in the hands of the transferor, only because there had been a transfer. Therefore, there was no jurisdictional challenge made by the writ petitioners though they had a chance to do so - rather they went on the merits of the revision of valuation. 5. Therefore, there was no jurisdictional challenge made by the writ petitioners though they had a chance to do so - rather they went on the merits of the revision of valuation. 5. At the time when the writ petitions were being argued, Ms. Koyeli Bhattacharya, learned Advocate, had vehemently argued that the revision of valuation was without jurisdiction because if apportionment had been sought, the respondent no.1 only had jurisdiction to divide the valuation already made by the learned tribunal in respect of the property in the hand of the transferor, by the order dated February 14, 2006 and to revise the valuation to impose a higher annual valuation in respect of each flat. In this connection, she had relied upon the first proviso to Section 178(1) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 and had urged that the flats constituted portions of the building together with the site and the land appurtenant thereto which were vertically divisible and separately owned so as to be entirely independent and capable of separate enjoyment notwithstanding the fact that access to such separate portions was made through a common passage or common staircase. She pointed out that the apportionment was being done when the right of such access was admittedly protected by a registered deed of sale. 6. As I have demonstrated from the written objections filed by the writ petitioners to the hearing notices, these were not the points on which the revision of valuation was objected to by the writ petitioners. Now that the annual valuation has been made, the writ petitioners learned advocate is raising a jurisdictional question which the writ petitioners never raised, and are doing so by way of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, bypassing the statutory remedy of Section 189 of the Act of 1980 which would have required them to deposit the amount of tax including penalty and interest, in terms of the said valuation, as a condition for maintaining the appeal. The questions raised by the petitioners, themselves show that the writ petitioners are not averse to the valuation fixed by the learned tribunal for the mother premises in the hands of the transferor, being enhanced, instead of the original valuation being divided between the separate flat owners - they only want it to be enhanced by 10% and adjustment be made and credit be given to the amounts they have already paid. This is not an exception which would persuade me to ignore the existence of an effective and alternative statutory remedy of appeal; rather this is a case where a clever advocate has attempted to persuade the court to intervene by way of judicial review where her client has objected during the hearing to the revision of valuation on merits, and not on jurisdictional grounds. There is not even a demand for justice raising the said jurisdictional questions. I find the first trace of such a jurisdictional ground only in the writ petitions, which naturally, are drafted by learned advocates. Such attempts on the part of the legal profession to make out a case which was not even envisaged by their clients - the litigants - when they opposed the revision of valuation, not only ferment litigation, but are detrimental to the rule of law and judicial process because they subvert the procedure established by law and transform Article 226 of the Constitution of India into an opportune instrument to be used by lawyers when there is a perfectly adequate alternative remedy. In some of the other cases the corporation has claimed that the learned tribunal had fixed annual valuation without considering that roof rights had been granted to the respective writ petitioners, and this was the reason for revaluation. Be that as it may, the writ petitioners could have taken all these points including, if otherwise permitted in law, the question of whether in an apportionment case, the original valuation fixed for the mother premises by the learned tribunal in the appeal of the transferor could have been abandoned and a fresh valuation of each flat made instead of apportioning the said original valuation between each flat owner according to the respective areas in the statutory appeal against determination of valuation/revision of valuation. 7. 7. In that view of the matter, I dismiss the writ petition without going into the merits of the objection raised by the learned advocate for the writ petitioners or the objections in writing made by the writ petitioners and relegate them to the statutory appeal under Section 189 of the Act of 1980 in accordance with law. All the questions are left open. If the writ petitioners have not received a copy of the reasoned order passed by the hearing officer on the basis of which the objections were decided in terms of Section 188 of the Act of 1980 - which is not pleaded in the writ petition - the respondent no. 1 shall make available copies of the said orders to the respective writ petitioners within seven days from their applying for the same. 8. There shall be no order as to costs.