Gowramma W/o. Andiyappa v. A. Krishnappa S/o. Late Andiyappa Since dead by is LRs.
2019-02-18
SREENIVAS HARISH KUMAR
body2019
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : The trial court by its order dated 22.07.2015 on I.A.No.2 filed under Order 7 Rule 11(d) in O.S.No.2725/2010 rejected the plaint of the appellant. Aggrieved by the said order, the plaintiff has preferred this appeal. 2. The appellant brought the suit for partition against her brothers i.e., the respondents in this appeal, in respect of three pieces of agricultural lands described in the plaint schedule. She pleaded that all the plaint schedule lands belonged to the joint family consisting of herself and the respondents. She claimed to be in joint possession of the said lands with the respondents. Very specifically she pleaded that the defendants 1 and 2 colluded with each other in coming into being of a registered partition deed dated 23.05.2002. The said partition deed does not bind her interest as it was brought into existence without her knowledge and consent. Therefore she sought to declare the said partition deed as not binding on her and to effect partition in the plaint schedule property for carving out her 1/3rd share. 3. The respondents filed the written statement as also an application under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of CPC to reject the plaint as the suit is barred according to Section 6(5) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Amended Act of 2005). 4. The trial court allowed the said application and rejected the plaint. The trial court has given reasons that if the plaint averments alone are seen, it becomes very evident that the partition deed dated 23.05.2002 is a registered one. According to Section 6(5) of Hindu Succession Act (Amendment Act of 2005) if a partition had taken place prior to 20th December, 2004, it cannot be questioned and the daughter does not become a coparcener. The partition deed shows that not only the defendants but also their father was a party to it. Therefore the plaintiff cannot challenge the partition deed and cannot claim partition. The plaint is liable to be rejected according Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC and not under Order 7 Rule 11(a). 5. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the trial court has come to wrong conclusion that the plaint has to be rejected as the suit is not maintainable. This is due to misconception of law. His argument is that the plaintiff has not suppressed the fact of partition having taken place on 23.05.2002.
5. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the trial court has come to wrong conclusion that the plaint has to be rejected as the suit is not maintainable. This is due to misconception of law. His argument is that the plaintiff has not suppressed the fact of partition having taken place on 23.05.2002. She refers to that partition and has produced a copy of the partition deed also. All that she has stated is that the said document was as a result of fraud played by the defendants and collusion between them. Where a relief of declaration with regard to validity of partition deed is sought, the court cannot say that the suit is not maintainable. The position would have been different if the plaintiff had not stated about partition. The case put forth by the plaintiff is mixed question of law and facts. The court below should not have hastened to reject the plaint. This has resulted in depriving the plaintiff of her legitimate share in the joint family properly. 6. The counsel for the respondents argued that the father of the plaintiff and the defendants was also a party to the partition deed. While there is no dispute that the properties belonged to the joint family, but by entering into partition on 23.05.2002, the father took Rs.25,000/- towards his share. The father died in the year 2003, before the Central amendment to Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act came into force. The succession opened after death of father. If there was no partition, the plaintiff would be entitled to a share in the notional share of the father. Since father was also a party to the partition deed, there was disruption of the joint family on that date itself and the plaintiff lost her right to claim share after death of father. She might have sought declaration that the partition deed does not bind her interest. This type of declaration cannot be given when she is not a coparcener. Rightly the trial court has rejected the plaint. There is no infirmity in the trial court’s order. 7. I have considered the arguments and perused the impugned order. 8. It appears that the plaintiff approached the Court by filing a suit for partition under a misconception of fact that she is entitled to seek partition in the plaint schedule properties.
Rightly the trial court has rejected the plaint. There is no infirmity in the trial court’s order. 7. I have considered the arguments and perused the impugned order. 8. It appears that the plaintiff approached the Court by filing a suit for partition under a misconception of fact that she is entitled to seek partition in the plaint schedule properties. According to her, all the plaint schedule properties belong to the joint family and she has also stated about a partition having taken place on 23.05.2002 between her father and the two defendants in the suit. A copy of the partition deed has also been produced along with the plaint. By looking into the plaint averments alone, the trial Court came to conclusion that the suit was not maintainable. Now, if it is examined whether the trial court’s order is correct or not, it has to be stated that in the plaint itself a reference is made to the partition that took place on 23.05.2002. That means long before Central amendment was brought to Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act, there had taken place partition and it was registered also. Section 6(5) of the Hindu Succession Act clearly states that a partition taken place before 20th day of December 2004 is saved. Admittedly, in this case the partition came into effect on 23.05.2002 and therefore, the amended provisions are not applicable. The argument of the appellant’s counsel that the suit is still maintainable in view of declaratory relief sought with regard to partition deed cannot be accepted. To the partition deed father was also a party. He died in the year 2003. Since the amended provisions are not applicable in these set of circumstances, the plaintiff cannot claim herself to be coparcener. If there had not taken place a partition on 23.05.2002, the plaintiff was entitled to a share in the notional share of the father. She could not have brought a suit for partition till father was alive. The father also did not challenge the partition deed dated 23.05.2002. All that the plaintiff says is that there is a collusion between defendants 1 and 2 and it is needless to say that she has made this allegation only as a ground for seeking a declaratory relief. There is no allegation of fraud against her father in coming into being of the partition deed.
All that the plaintiff says is that there is a collusion between defendants 1 and 2 and it is needless to say that she has made this allegation only as a ground for seeking a declaratory relief. There is no allegation of fraud against her father in coming into being of the partition deed. Therefore, a question arises whether the plaintiff has a right to sue. Obviously, the answer is in the negative and viewed from this angle, it can be said that the plaint does not disclose cause of action. Actually, the defendants sought rejection of plaint by making an application under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC. But the trial Court has come to conclusion that the plaint is liable to be rejected according to Order VII Rule 11(d). But, the ultimate effect is the same. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant argued another point that the plaintiff becomes entitled to seek partition according to the Karnataka amendment brought to Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act. I do not think that this argument can be appreciated. The suit was filed in the year 2010. By that time, the Central amendment had come into force and therefore, the entire case has to be examined in the light of Central amendment to Section 6. 10. From the above discussion, I come to conclusion that this appeal is devoid of merits and it is dismissed.