ORDER : 1. The petitioner-husband is aggrieved of the judgment dated 27.06.2018 passed in Cr. Appeal No.11 of 2018. He has been convicted for the offence punishable under section 498A IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for 2 years with fine of Rs.1,000/- in P.C.R. Case No.216 of 2011 which was converted into T.R.No.5 of 2018. His challenge to the judgment of conviction and order of sentence both dated 23.01.2018 has failed as Cr. Appeal No.11 of 2018 has been dismissed. 2. During pendency of this revision petition, the petitioner was released on bail by an order dated 09.08.2018. 3. Order dated 21.01.2019 records that the parties have now arrived at a settlement and they have decided to withdraw cases filed by them against each other. The order dated 21.01.2019 records as under: “The petitioner seeks quashing of the judgment dated 27.06.2018 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 2018 by which judgment of conviction and order of sentence both dated 23.01.2018 in P.C.R Case No. 216 of 2011 corresponding to T.R No. 05 of 2018 have been affirmed. The petitioner has been convicted for offence under section 498A IPC and he has been sentenced to undergo two years’ imprisonment and fine of Rs.1000/-. On the basis of a complaint petition filed by O.P No. 2 cognizance for the offence under section 498A IPC was taken. During the trial four witnesses were examined on behalf of the complainant. By judgment dated 23.01.2018 the petitioner has been convicted for the aforesaid offence. The trial Judge in his order of conviction has recorded that after the compromise the accused took O.P No.2 with himself for joining her in her matrimonial home, however, on the way he left her and, therefore, it appears that “he has demanded dowry of Rs. 30,000/-”. On such evidence the petitioner was convicted and the appeal preferred by him vide Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 2018 has been dismissed. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that on mere probability, more particularly, in absence of a statutory presumption, an accused cannot be convicted for an offence in such fashion. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in terms of the compromise between the parties the petitioner has already paid Rs.3,50,000/- to O.P. No.2 and she has agreed to withdraw all the cases. O.P No. 2 is represented through Miss Aanya, the learned counsel. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in terms of the compromise between the parties the petitioner has already paid Rs.3,50,000/- to O.P. No.2 and she has agreed to withdraw all the cases. O.P No. 2 is represented through Miss Aanya, the learned counsel. Through I.A No. 10594 of 2018 the petitioner has brought on record a copy of the compromise petition dated 18.09.2018 which was filed in the court below. Let an affidavit be filed by O.P No. 2 on the aforesaid issue. Post the matter on 14.02.2019. ” 4. In a long line of judgment including the one in “B.S.Joshi & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Anr.” (2003) 4 SCC 675 , the Supreme Court has explained the distinction between section 320 Cr.P.C and section 482 Cr.P.C and held that even the non-compoundable cases can be quashed by the High Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or section 482 Cr.P.C. Such powers can be exercised by the High Court, more particularly, in the cases arising out of matrimonial disputes. It has been observed that if the parties have settled their dispute and the allegations in the complaint is not so well-founded and it appears to the Court that further continuance of the criminal proceeding would be detrimental to the peace and harmony in the family or the matrimonial life of the parties, not only the entire criminal proceeding the order of sentence can also be set-aside. 5. In “Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs State of Punjab & Anr.” (2014) 6 SCC 466 , the Supreme Court has observed that in the following circumstances a criminal proceeding can be quashed by the High Court in exercise of powers under section 482 Cr.P.C; 29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: 29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.” 6. In “Manohar Singh vs. State of M.P.” (2014) 13 SCC 75 , the Supreme Court has held, thus; “8. In the instance case, the appellant is convicted under Section 498-A IPC and sentenced to undergo six months’ imprisonment. He is convicted under Section 4 of the Dowry Act and sentenced to undergo six months’ imprisonment. Substantive sentences are to run concurrently. Even though the appellant and Respondent 2 wife have arrived at a compromise, the order of conviction cannot be quashed on that ground because the offences involved are non-compoundable. However, in such a situation if the court feels that the parties have a real desire to bury the hatchet in the interest of peace, it can reduce the sentence of the accused to the sentence already undergone. Section 498-A IPC does not prescribe any minimum punishment. Section 4 of the Dowry Act prescribes minimum punishment of six months but proviso thereto states that the court may, for adequate or special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term which may be less than six months. Section 498-A IPC does not prescribe any minimum punishment. Section 4 of the Dowry Act prescribes minimum punishment of six months but proviso thereto states that the court may, for adequate or special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term which may be less than six months. Therefore, sentence of the appellant can be reduced to sentence already undergone by him.” 7. I.A. No.10594 of 2018 has been filed by the petitioner. In this application, the petitioner has stated about the settlement between the parties and deposit of Rs.3,50,000/- by him. 8. Now, an affidavit dated 11.02.2019 has been filed on behalf of the Opposite-Party No.2 stating that in terms of the compromise her husband has deposited Rs.3,50,000/- in the Nazarat of Civil Court, Jamtara. 9. In view of the settlement, the petitioner seeks setting-aside of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed in P.C.R. Case No.216 of 2011 which was affirmed by the appellate court in Cr. Appeal No.11 of 2018. 10. In view of the aforesaid facts, more particularly, the compromise arrived at between the parties in furtherance of which the petitioner has already deposited Rs.3,50,000/- in the Nazarat of the Civil Court, Jamtara, I am of the opinion that it would be in the interest of justice that the order of sentence dated 23.01.2018 passed in P.C.R. Case No.216 of 2011 (T.R.No.5 of 2018) is set-aside. 11. Ordered accordingly. 12. Consequently, the judgment dated 27.06.2018 passed in Cr. Appeal No.11 of 2018 stands set-aside, to the aforesaid extent. 13. In the result, I.A. No.10594 of 2018 in Cr. Rev. No.986 of 2018 is allowed. 14. Cr. Rev. No.986 of 2018 stands disposed of. 15. The petitioner is discharged of the liability of the bail-bonds furnished by him.