ORDER : 1. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, respondents/caveators and the learned AGA. 2. The petitioner is before this Court being aggrieved by the meeting notice dated 04.12.2018 calling for a meeting on 21.12.2018 at 11.00 a.m. in order to vote the motion, moved by a majority of members expressing no confidence in the petitioner. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the meeting dated 21.12.2018 stands vitiated on three grounds. Firstly, the meeting is beyond the mandatory period of 30 days as stipulated under sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj (Motion of Non-confidence against Adyakshya and Upadyakshya of Gram Panchayat) Rules, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as ‘The Rules, 1994’ for short). Secondly, the Form-I as produced at Annexure-E contains allegations, consequent to which a report has also been called for, which is produced as Annexure-F, hence has to be construed as a motion under sub-section (2) of Section 49 of the Karnataka Gram Swaraj and Panchayat Raj Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short) and thirdly, that the Form-II issued to the petitioner is not accompanied by a copy of Form-I and hence on that ground also the impugned meeting notice stands vitiated. Hence, he prays that the writ petition be allowed and the meeting notice be quashed. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the caveator/respondents would file into the Court a memo dated 19.02.2019, wherein he would submit that the Form-I produced along with the writ petition is a copy of the earlier motion moved on 19.09.2018 and that the meeting notice is pursuant to the motion moved before the Assistant Commissioner on 23.11.2018 and hence the meeting held on 21.12.2018 is well within the stipulated time and hence the writ petition is unsustainable. 5. He would submit that the contention, that the meeting is in violations of the provisions of Rule 3(2) of the Rules 1994 is unsustainable and the judgment of the Division Bench rendered in Writ Appeal Nos. 5159-5160/1998 is inapplicable to the facts of the case. 5. He would submit that the contention, that the meeting is in violations of the provisions of Rule 3(2) of the Rules 1994 is unsustainable and the judgment of the Division Bench rendered in Writ Appeal Nos. 5159-5160/1998 is inapplicable to the facts of the case. He would contend that the earlier motion moved on 19.09.2018 was not acted upon and hence the second request was made on 23.11.2018 enclosing therewith a copy of the earlier motion made in Form-I. He would further invite the attention of the Court to the proceedings of the Assistant Commissioner dated 23.11.2018, whereby the Assistant Commissioner has called for a report from the Chief Executive Officer and further by proceedings dated 27.11.2018, the Chief Executive Officer has forwarded the report to the Assistant Commissioner and the same is received by the Assistant Commissioner on 29.11.2018. It is stated that, pursuant to the same the meeting notice dated 04.12.2018 is issued. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would vehemently contend that he has made an application under the RTI and that Annexure E and G being the impugned meeting notice, were issued to him pursuant to the RTI application on 13.01.2018 and hence he would contend that the documents presently enclosed along with the memo are concocted for the purpose of the case. 7. The allegations pertain to factual issues which this Court cannot adjudicate in the present writ petition. Be that as it may. The material placed along with the memo, more particularly, in Form-I there is a note at the bottom which states that the earlier notice of motion is enclosed along with the one dated 23.11.2018 and the subsequent communications dated 27.11.2018 and 23.11.2018 refer to the motion notice dated 23.11.2018. A perusal of Annexure-G produced by the petitioner does not state as to whether the same is issued pursuant to the meeting dated 19.09.2018 or 23.11.2018. Hence this Court is inclined to accept the veracity of the documents filed along with the memo. In that view of the matter, the first contention that the meeting notice stands vitiated on account of violation of the provisions of Rule 3(2) of the Rules, 1994 requires to be rejected and is accordingly rejected. 8. Hence this Court is inclined to accept the veracity of the documents filed along with the memo. In that view of the matter, the first contention that the meeting notice stands vitiated on account of violation of the provisions of Rule 3(2) of the Rules, 1994 requires to be rejected and is accordingly rejected. 8. As regards the second contention, the learned counsel, who has placed reliance on the orders of the Division Bench passed in a batch of writ appeals, whereby the Division Bench headed by the Hon’ble Chief Justice virtually held that the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 49 of the Act are inoperable unless and until a separate rules are promulgated and that the motion under Section 49(2) of the Act cannot be proceeded under the Rules 1994, even as amended by the notification dated 21.08.2018. Hence admitting and assuming that the provisions are inoperable and a motion under Section 49(2) of the Act cannot be moved on the basis of the allegations, the said issue should not detain this Court for long, as the impugned meeting notice at Annexure-G does not refer to either the report or the allegations contained therein and is to be construed as a motion of no confidence simplicitor. 9. In this regard, this Court places reliance on the observation of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary vs. Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation Limited and Others, AIR 2015 SC 1960 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraphs 53 and 54 has observed as under: “53. The cooperative society registered under the Central or the State Act is bound to function as a democratic institution and conduct its affairs based on democratic principles. Democratic functioning on democratic principles is to be reflected in the respective Acts or Rules or Bye-laws both on the principle and procedure. If not, it is for the court to read the democratic principles into the Act or Rules or Bye-laws. If a procedure is prescribed in any Act or Rule or Bye-law regarding election of an office bearer by the Board, as defined under Article 243ZH(b) of the Constitution of India, and for removal thereof, by way of a motion of no confidence, the same procedure has to be followed. If a procedure is prescribed in any Act or Rule or Bye-law regarding election of an office bearer by the Board, as defined under Article 243ZH(b) of the Constitution of India, and for removal thereof, by way of a motion of no confidence, the same procedure has to be followed. In case there is no express provision under the Act or Rules or Bye-laws for removal of an office bearer, such office bearer is liable to be removed in the event of loss of confidence by following the same procedure by which he was elected to office. 54. Now that this Court has declared the law regarding the democratic set up of a cooperative society and that it is permissible to remove an elected office bearer through motion of no confidence and since in many States, the relevant statutes have not carried out the required statutory changes in terms of the constitutional mandate, we feel it just and necessary to lay down certain guidelines. However, we make it clear that these guidelines are open to be appropriately modified and given statutory shape by the competent legislature/authority. Having gone through the provisions regarding motion of no confidence in local self-governments, we find that there is no uniformity with regard to the procedure and process regarding motion of no confidence. Some States provide for a protection of two years, some for one year and a few for six months, to the office bearers in office before moving a motion of no confidence. However, majority of the States provide for two years and a gap of another one year in case one motion of no confidence is defeated. Some States provide for a protection of two years, some for one year and a few for six months, to the office bearers in office before moving a motion of no confidence. However, majority of the States provide for two years and a gap of another one year in case one motion of no confidence is defeated. Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 provides for a protection of two years and one year, Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 provides for a protection of two years and one year, Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides for a protection of two years and two years, Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993 provides for a protection of two and a half years, Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 provides for a protection of two years and one year, Manipur Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides for a protection of two years and one year, Orissa Panchayat Samiti Act, 1959 provides for a protection of two years, Orissa Grama Panchayats Act, 1964 provides for a protection of two years, Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides for a protection of two years, Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides for a protection of two years and one year, Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 provides for a protection of two years and Uttar Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1947, as followed by Uttarakhand, provides for a protection of two years and one year. Having regard to the set up in local self-governments prevailing in many of the States as above, we direct that in the case of cooperative societies registered under any Central or State law, a motion of no confidence against an office bearer shall be moved only after two years of his assumption of office. In case the motion of no confidence is once defeated, a fresh motion shall not be introduced within another one year. A motion of no confidence shall be moved only in case there is a request from one-third of the elected members of the Board of Governors/Managing Committee of the cooperative society concerned. The motion of no confidence shall be carried in case the motion is supported by more than fifty per cent of the elected members present in the meeting.” 10. The motion of no confidence shall be carried in case the motion is supported by more than fifty per cent of the elected members present in the meeting.” 10. As observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, supra at Paras 53 and 54, even where the relevant Acts and Rules do not provide for moving no confidence motion, the same has to be read into the said Act and Rules. As observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, democratic functioning of institutions on democratic principles is to be reflected in the respective Acts, Rules and Bye-Laws both on the principle and procedure and if no such provision is available, then the motion of confidence has to be moved following the procedure adopted for electing the office bearers. In paragraph 54, the Hon’ble Apex Court laid down certain parameters or guidelines and there can be no doubt that it is these guidelines that have been adopted by the Government and brought about the necessary amendments for providing motion of no confidence. 11. In view of the above law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that no motion can be moved is belied and misplaced. The Division Bench no-doubt has been pleased to hold that no motion under Section 49 (2) can be moved in the absence of the Rules being promulgated for the purpose of making motions under sub-section (2). In that view of the matter, the second contention requires to be rejected and is accordingly rejected. 12. As regards the third contention that the meeting notice vide Annexure-G stands vitiated as Form No. 2 was not accompanied by Form No. 1. This Court after perusing the provision does not find any support to the contention advanced by the petitioner. In that view of the matter, the third contention also requires to be rejected and is accordingly rejected. 13. This Court has taken note of the contention with regard to the violation of the provisions of Rule 3 of the 1994 Rules. Over a period of last few weeks, several petitions have been filed on the very same contention. It has been contended that the notice is either violative of the 15 day clear notice period window that is stipulated under the Rules or it is beyond 30 days’ limit. 14. Over a period of last few weeks, several petitions have been filed on the very same contention. It has been contended that the notice is either violative of the 15 day clear notice period window that is stipulated under the Rules or it is beyond 30 days’ limit. 14. The person carrying out the exercise of conducting the no confidence motion is no less a person than the Assistant Commissioner of the Revenue Division, a person who is well versed and who is trained in the art of administration. In several writ petitions, the delay is either in holding the meeting is a day or two or the meeting notice issued is shortened by a day or two and it gives rise to suspicion in the mind of the Court that the actions of the Officers concerned i.e. Assistant Commissioners of the respective Revenue Divisions, are not entirely bona-fide. 15. The objective of the Rule, primarily is to prevent any mischief, whereby the person in-charge of conducting the meeting for considering a motion of no confidence, cannot be given the latitude of holding the meeting at his own sweet will and pleasure or according to his whims and fancies. 16. Hence, it is apparent that the Rules have been framed to uphold the democratic spirit which otherwise if left to the unfettered discretion of the Officers would result in a calamitous situation where democracy would be at the mercy of some unscrupulous Officers who could get inclined or influenced by extraneous considerations and hence, keeping in mind that the person entrusted with the job being a fully trained person and well versed in the art of administration, if is found violating the mandate of the provisions of Rule 3, then the Principal Secretary, Department of Revenue, shall issue a show cause notice calling upon such Officer to explain why the delay has occurred and if the said explanation is not satisfactory, the Principal Secretary, Department of Revenue, shall forward a report to the Department of DPAR to initiate disciplinary enquiry as against such Officers. Further, the Principal Secretary shall immediately remove the said Officer and transfer him to a non-Executive Post. 17. Further, the Principal Secretary shall immediately remove the said Officer and transfer him to a non-Executive Post. 17. With the above observations, this Court is of the hope that the measures suggested would be sufficient to cure the ill’s ailing the system devised by the legislature for ensuring smooth conduct of the no confidence motions and which get defeated on account of technical violations committed by a person who is beyond the control of the Panchayat Raj Department. 18. In view of the above reasonings, the writ petition being devoid of merits stands rejected. In view of the disposal of the writ petition, the resolution book shall be handed over back to the second respondent and the second respondent is at liberty to announce the results and to take steps for holding election to the post of Adhyaksha. 19. The copy of this order be forwarded to the Chief Secretary, the Principal Secretary, Revenue Department, the Principal Secretary, DPAR and to all the Assistant Commissioners.