JUDGMENT : Lok Pal Singh, J. Civil Revision is directed against the judgment and order dated 25.01.1994, passed by Addl. Civil Judge, Roorkee, in Misc. Case No. 24 of 1992, whereby the arbitral award has been set aside; as also the judgment and order dated 25.05.2012, passed by the District Judge, Haridwar, dismissing the appeal against the said order. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire record. 3. Facts leading to the present case are that the plaintiff, a registered partnership firm, entered into a contract, being no. 2/EE 86-87 with defendant no. 2 The Executive Engineer, Tunnel and Power House Division II, Shinchai Bhawan, Dehradun in connection with the supply of instruments as mentioned in the contract and the plaintiff was also asked to install the instruments. The work having been found satisfactory, the defendant no. 3 Superintending Engineer, Lakhwar Construction Circle-1, Yamuna Bhawan, Dehradun entered into a second contract No. 4/SE/87-88 for instrumentation for the same project at Lakhwar. The terms and conditions of both the contracts are the same. As per Clause no. 1-10, contractor is responsible towards supply of instruments and their fixing and 20% of the cost of instruments and cable as stipulated in clause 1 of ID form no. 111, will be deducted for one year. ID form 111 specifies bank guarantee as an alternative to cash which is also applicable for performance guarantee. Some dispute arose relating to execution of agreement no. 2/EE/86-87 dated 01.01.1987 between M/s New Engineering Enterprises, Roorkee and Executive Engineer, Lakhwar Colony, Division Dakpathar and Agreement no. 4/SE/87-88 between M/s New Engineering Enterprises and Superintending Engineer, Lakhwar Vyasi Construction Circle-01, Dehradun. Since the work was not completed by the revisionist, the Irrigation Department initiated proceedings to invoke the bank guarantee submitted by the plaintiff / revisionist. Feeling dissatisfied, plaintiff / revisionist filed Original Suit no. 365 of 1989, Ms New Engineering Vs Indian Overseas Bank and others, with the prayer that defendant no.1 (respondent no.1 hereinbe restrained by means of a permanent injunction not to make payment of bank guarantee nos. LG/359/57/87 dated 26.12.1987 for Rs.20,000/- LG/359/58/87 dated 26.12.1987 for Rs.25,000/-; LG/359/1/89 dated 02.01.1989 for Rs.24,008/- and LG/359/2/89 dated 09.01.1989 for Rs.16,000/- to defendant nos. 2 and 3 or either of them on the basis of the letter of invocation no. 10962 / Lakhwar-I / Agr.No.4 / SE / 87-88 dated 20.12.1989 or otherwise. 4. LG/359/57/87 dated 26.12.1987 for Rs.20,000/- LG/359/58/87 dated 26.12.1987 for Rs.25,000/-; LG/359/1/89 dated 02.01.1989 for Rs.24,008/- and LG/359/2/89 dated 09.01.1989 for Rs.16,000/- to defendant nos. 2 and 3 or either of them on the basis of the letter of invocation no. 10962 / Lakhwar-I / Agr.No.4 / SE / 87-88 dated 20.12.1989 or otherwise. 4. Defendants/respondents filed their written statement stating therein that the dispute relates to the contract agreement and in view of the clause in said agreement any dispute arising between the parties shall be referred to the Arbitrator. Therefore, a prayer has been made that the matter be stayed till the Arbitrator passes the award. 5. Learned trial court vide order dated 31.05.1990 allowed the interim injunction application of the plaintiff restraining the Indian Overseas Bank not to pay the amount of bank guarantee in view of the letter dated 20.12.1989 referred to the bank to invoke the bank guarantee. 6. Mr. Mahesh Dutt Dubey, Chief Engineer (Retd) was appointed sole Arbitrator to adjudicate / decide the dispute between the parties vide order dated 27.06.1990 passed by the Chief Engineer, Yamuna Valley Projects, Dehradun. On appointment, learned Arbitrator issued notices to the parties. Plaintiff was directed to submit its statement of claims in two copies to the Arbitrator. Therefore, defendants were directed to submit their written statements within 15 days from the receipt of the claim from the contractor. 7. Plaintiff / revisionist filed its statement of claims before the Arbitrator on 19.09.1990. The defendants filed their written statement on 29.10.1990. Against the statement of claims, defendants denied the averments as contended by the plaintiff before the Arbitrator. 8. The arbitration proceedings commenced from 30.06.1990. Learned Arbitrator gave its award on 28.05.1992. The First Schedule appended to the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), contemplates as under: “The Arbitrator shall make their award within four months after entering on the reference or after having been called upon to act by notice in writing from any party to the Arbitration agreement or with such extended time as the Court may allow.” 9. Indisputably, the arbitration proceedings commenced on 30.06.1990, whereof Arbitrator passed the award on 28.05.1992 much after the period of four months as prescribed in the Schedule appended to the Act. 10. Feeling aggrieved by the award dated 28.05.1992, the defendants/respondents filed their objection against the award before the Court. Indisputably, the arbitration proceedings commenced on 30.06.1990, whereof Arbitrator passed the award on 28.05.1992 much after the period of four months as prescribed in the Schedule appended to the Act. 10. Feeling aggrieved by the award dated 28.05.1992, the defendants/respondents filed their objection against the award before the Court. The award was submitted in the Court on 08.07.1992. The trial court on 08.07.1992, passed the following order: “Award has been received from Arbitrator. Put up on the date fixed.” 11. Executive Engineer, Tunnel and Powerhouse Division and another filed their objection under Sections 30, 33, 58 of the Act, challenging the award dated 28.05.1992, on several grounds. It is contended that the learned Arbitrator has illegally passed the award which is liable to be set aside. It is further contended that the award has not been passed within four months, therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. The plaintiff / revisionist filed objection to the grounds raised by the defendants / respondents. The objection filed by the defendants / respondents was registered as Arbitration Suit No.24 of 1992, Executive Engineer, Tunnel & Power House Division II and others Vs. M/s New Engineering Enterprises and others. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, learned trial court framed following issues: (1) Whether the award dated 28.05.1992 is liable to be dismissed on the basis of ground given in para 9 of the objection? (2) Whether respondent / opposite party no. 1 is liable to pay the maximum amount of the guarantee being a guarantor? If yes, its effect? (3) Whether the Arbitrator has committed error of law and fact by ordering recovery of disputed bank guarantee of Rs.85,000/- and, as such, committed illegality? (4) Whether the Arbitrator has committed a mistake by ordering to pay interest? If yes, its effect? (5) Whether the action of the Arbitrator is contrary to the rules? If yes, its effect? (6) Whether the objection is barred by limitation? If yes, its effect? 12. Learned trial court after giving opportunity to lead evidence in the matter, recorded its findings on issue nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 and held that the learned Arbitrator has committed illegality in passing the award in violation of provisions contained in Section 30 of the Act. The trial court further recorded the finding that the learned Arbitrator has got no jurisdiction to pass an award releasing the bank guarantee. 1, 2, 3 and 5 and held that the learned Arbitrator has committed illegality in passing the award in violation of provisions contained in Section 30 of the Act. The trial court further recorded the finding that the learned Arbitrator has got no jurisdiction to pass an award releasing the bank guarantee. The court below has further recorded a finding that though there is no other illegality in award accept the fact that the award has been passed after the prescribed period which is void and has no binding effect and the learned Arbitrator has acceded in its jurisdiction in giving the award after the expiry of four months period and consequently, set aside the award dated 28.05.1992, passed by the Arbitrator, which was submitted to the Court on 08.07.1992, vide its judgment and order dated 25.01.1994. 13. The revisionist filed a review application being review application no. 05 of 1994 seeking review of the judgment and order dated 25.01.1994. Learned trial court after inviting objections from the revisionist and having heard learned counsel for the parties by order dated 26.07.1994, dismissed the review application. 14. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 25.01.1994, passed by Addl. Civil Judge, Roorkee, setting aside the award, the revisionist preferred Civil Appeal no. 01 of 2004, before the District Judge, Haridwar. 15. Said appeal was preferred on the ground that in O.S. No.365 of 1989, M/s New Engineering Vs. Indian Overseas Bank and others, the proceedings of the suit was stayed with the direction to the parties to appear before the Arbitrator. Thereafter, that period was extended by mutual consent between the parties, but the trial court did not consider this submission setting aside the award. Further grounds have been taken that since the period was extended by mutual consent, therefore, the award ought not to have been set aside as time barred. Further ground has been taken that the learned trial court has committed illegality in setting aside the award being time barred. 16. Learned Appellate Court having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the material available on record by its judgment and order dated 25.05.2012, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment and order dated 25.01.1994, passed by the trial court. 16. Learned Appellate Court having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the material available on record by its judgment and order dated 25.05.2012, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment and order dated 25.01.1994, passed by the trial court. The Appellate Court being the last court on facts and law, recorded its categorical findings that after filing the suit in the court with the consent of the parties, the matter was referred to the Arbitrator and learned Arbitrator after having heard the parties passed the award. However, it was incumbent upon learned Arbitrator to pass the award within four months from the date of proceedings initiated by him. Since the award has not been passed within four months as per the period prescribed in the Act, the same is void being without an authority of law. Further finding has been recorded that as per the directions made vide order dated 31.05.1990, passed in O.S. No. 365 of 1989, the matter has been referred to the Arbitrator and the same has to be decided by the Arbitrator within four months. On 18.03.1991, the defendants / respondents have prayed to extend the period of six months and the court allowed the said application to extend the period of six months, which came to an end on 17.09.1991. Therefore, the further period cannot be considered as extended period in the matter. 17. A perusal of the order sheet of the trial court would reveal that on 18.03.1991, an application (paper no. 74C) was filed, wherein it has been prayed that the case be adjourned for six months so that the proceedings before the learned Arbitrator be completed and the award be published. This application was filed on 18.03.1991. The same was allowed and, thereafter, no further extension of time was granted. Therefore, at the most, time upto 17.09.1991 expired. However, the award was submitted to the court on 08.07.1992. 18. Having considered the dictum of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Hardayal, [State of Punjab Vs. Hardayal, AIR 1985 SC 920 ], wherein it has been observed that as per the provisions contained in the Arbitration Act, an Arbitrator has to pass award within the prescribed time period of four months and unless the said time period is extended by the court, the Arbitrator has no authority to pass the award beyond the time stipulated. Hardayal, AIR 1985 SC 920 ], wherein it has been observed that as per the provisions contained in the Arbitration Act, an Arbitrator has to pass award within the prescribed time period of four months and unless the said time period is extended by the court, the Arbitrator has no authority to pass the award beyond the time stipulated. The parties also have no right to say that they have participated in the arbitral proceedings before the Arbitrator and the time limit has been increased. It has also been observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jitendra Nath, [Jitendra Nath Vs. M/s Chopra Land Developers Pvt. Ltd, AIR 2007 SC 1401 ], that the Arbitrator has no authority to pass the award after the expiry of period of four months unless the court extends such period. However, court has the power to extend the time limit. 19. Undisputedly, the court has not extended the time by passing any order. Assuming that on the application the time was extended, but it was extended upto 17.09.1991. Thus, it was incumbent upon the learned Arbitrator to pass its award at least by the end of the extended period, i.e., 17.09.1991. After 17.09.1991, the court has not extended any time limit, permitting the Arbitrator to pass the award thereafter. The First Appellate Court further recorded the finding that since the award has not been passed as per the mandatory provisions of the Arbitration Act within four months and in view of the judgments (supra), the Arbitrator has passed the award beyond the period of limitation prescribed, therefore, the award passed is without jurisdiction. The judgment and order dated 25.01.1994 passed by the trial court was affirmed and the appeal was dismissed. Feeling aggrieved, present civil revision has been filed before this Court. 20. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the revisionist would submit that by mutual consent of the parties the time limit was extended so that the Arbitrator may pass the award. Consequently, the Arbitrator passed the award dated 28.05.1992 and submitted the same before the court on 08.07.1992. Revisionist has not brought on record any material to show that the parties by mutual consent requested the Arbitrator to extent the period to pass the award after the statutory period of four months. Consequently, the Arbitrator passed the award dated 28.05.1992 and submitted the same before the court on 08.07.1992. Revisionist has not brought on record any material to show that the parties by mutual consent requested the Arbitrator to extent the period to pass the award after the statutory period of four months. Furthermore, the provisions contained in the Act do not permit the Arbitrator to pass the award after the statutory period of four months. The parties by mutual consent cannot seek extension of the period by requesting the Arbitrator to pass the award after the expiry of statutory period. It is only the Court which can extend the period to pass the award. It is settled position in law that if law prescribes a thing to be done in a particular manner, the same should be done in that manner alone and not otherwise. Thus, in view of the settled position in law, the Act stipulates that the Arbitrator should pass the award within four months or within the period extended by the court, and not otherwise. 21. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State would submit that the award was set aside by the trial court which has been affirmed in appeal, therefore, the revision would not lie. The respondents have raised the issue of maintainability of the present civil revision. 22. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and also considering the fact it is apparent that there is no provision of filing a second appeal in the Act. Filing of appeal is provided under Section 39 of the Act. Sub-Section (2) of Section 39 of the Act specifically mandates that no second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court. Thus, sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Act prohibits filing of second appeal. In the cases where second appeal is not provided against the judgment and order passed by the First Appellate Court, in such contingency, the party aggrieved may challenge the order by filing the revision or a writ under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 23. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shyam Sunder Agarwal, [Shyam Sunder Agarwal and Company Vs. 23. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shyam Sunder Agarwal, [Shyam Sunder Agarwal and Company Vs. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 132 ], has held that a revision application before the High Court against an appellate order passed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act is maintainable. There is no express provision in the Arbitration Act putting an embargo against filing a revision application against appellate order under Section 39 of the Act. The Arbitration Act has put an embargo on filing any second appeal from appellate order under Section 39 of the Act. The Arbitration Act is a special statute having limited application relating to matters governed by the said Act. Such special statute, therefore, must have its application as provided for in the said statute. The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the Civil Procedure Code or under any other statute therefore shall not stand superseded under the Arbitration Act if the Act does not contain any express bare against exercise of revisional power by the High Court provided exercise of such revisional power does not mitigate against giving effect to the provisions of the Arbitration Act. Even if a special statute expressly attaches finality to an appellate order passed under that statute, such provision of finality will not take away revisional powers of the High Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. There is also no such express provision in the Arbitration Act attaching finality to the appellate order under Section 39. 24. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ITI Ltd., [ITI Ltd. Vs. Siemens Public Communications Network Ltd., (2002) 5 SCC 510 ], in para 18 of said judgment, have held as under: “18. Power conferred on the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 over all subordinate courts within its jurisdiction is a supervisory power and has been distinguished from its power of appeal to correct errors of fact and law. The power of revision under Section 115 being in the nature of power of superintendence to keep subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction cannot be readily inferred to have been excluded by provisions of a special Act unless such exclusion is clearly expressed in that Act. The power of revision under Section 115 being in the nature of power of superintendence to keep subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction cannot be readily inferred to have been excluded by provisions of a special Act unless such exclusion is clearly expressed in that Act. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996 which is for consideration before us by provision contained in Section 37(3) of the said Act only takes away the right of second appeal to the High Court. The remedy of revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is neither expressly not impliedly taken away by the said Act.” 25. Indisputably, second appeal is barred under sub-section (3) of Section 39 of the Act, but merely because second appeal is barred would not debar a person aggrieved to avail the remedy of revision. Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is being excerpted hereunder: “115. Revision. –(1) The High Court may call for the record of an case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears- (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit: [Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings, (2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto. (3) A revision shall not operate as a stay of suit or other proceeding before the Court except where such suit or other proceeding is stayed by the High Court. Explanation. –In this section, the expression "any case which has been decided" includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding.” 26. Explanation. –In this section, the expression "any case which has been decided" includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding.” 26. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code is extraordinary and can be exercised suo motu. In view of the provisions contained in Section 115 of the Code and the dictum of Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgments (supra), this Court is of the view that the objection raised by learned counsel for the revisionist regarding maintainability of revision is untenable. It is held that the revision petition is maintainable against an order passed by the appellate court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 39 of the Act. 27. In Electrical Manufacturing Company Ltd., [Electrical Manufacturing Company Ltd. Vs. Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. and another, (2016) 8 SCC 667 ], it has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court as under: “23.4. The Arbitral Tribunal in the present case had entered upon reference and held its first meeting on 13-1-1993. The mandate of Sections 28(1) and (2) of the Act read with Schedule I, Clause 3 of the Act was that the statutory period to complete the proceedings and make the award was four months after entering on the reference. The minutes of the meeting dated 7-4-1993 show awareness that the period would expire on 12-5-1993. The law on the point is clear that in such circumstances, the enlargement of time could be possible if parties to the arbitration agreement consent to such enlargement. The decision of this Court in Hari Krishna Wattal v. Vaikunth Nath Pandya, (1973) 2 SCC 510 is quite eloquent and relevant paragraphs thereof are: “6. Section 3 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 provides: ‘3. Provisions implied in arbitration agreement.— An arbitration agreement, unless a different intention is expressed therein, shall be deemed to include the provisions set out in the First Schedule insofar as they are applicable to the reference.’ 7. The First Schedule has 8 clauses describing the implied conditions of an arbitration agreement. Clause 3 reads as follows: ‘3. Provisions implied in arbitration agreement.— An arbitration agreement, unless a different intention is expressed therein, shall be deemed to include the provisions set out in the First Schedule insofar as they are applicable to the reference.’ 7. The First Schedule has 8 clauses describing the implied conditions of an arbitration agreement. Clause 3 reads as follows: ‘3. The arbitrators shall make their award within four months after entering on the reference or after having been called upon to act by notice in writing from any party to the arbitration agreement or within such extended time as the court may allow.’ * * * 10. The question depends upon the true construction of Section 28. There is no doubt that the arbitrator is expected to make his award within four months of his entering on the reference or on his being called upon to act or within such extended time as the Court may allow. Reading Clause 3 of the Schedule along with Section 28 one finds that the power to enlarge the time is vested in the Court and not in the arbitrator. Clause 3 and Section 28(1) exclude by necessary implication the power of the arbitrator to enlarge the time. This is emphasised by Section 28(2) which provides that even when such a provision giving the arbitrator power to enlarge the time is contained in the agreement, that provision shall be void and of no effect. The headnote of Section 28 brings out the force of this position in law by providing that the power is of the Court only to enlarge time for making the award. 11. Sub-section (2) of Section 28, however, indicates one exception to the above rule that the arbitrator cannot enlarge the time, and that is when the parties agree to such an enlargement. The occasion for the arbitrator to enlarge the time occurs only after he is called upon to proceed with the arbitration or he enters upon the reference. Hence, it is clear that if the parties agree to the enlargement of time after the arbitrator has entered on the reference, the arbitrator has the power to enlarge it in accordance with the mutual agreement or consent of the parties. That such a consent must be a post-reference consent, is also clear from Section 28(2) which renders null and void a provision in the original agreement to that effect. That such a consent must be a post-reference consent, is also clear from Section 28(2) which renders null and void a provision in the original agreement to that effect. In a sense where a provision is made in the original agreement that the arbitrator may enlarge the time, such a provision always implies mutual consent for enlargement but such mutual consent initially expressed in the original agreement does not save the provision from being void. It is, therefore, clear that the arbitrator gets the jurisdiction to enlarge the time for making the award only in a case where after entering on the arbitration the parties to the arbitration agreement consent to such enlargement of time.” In the circumstances, if the Arbitral Tribunal insisted upon appropriate consent to extend the time, no fault could be found with. At the same time, if Respondent 1 was not willing to give such consent, the Arbitral Tribunal had to go on with the matter and make the award within the statutory period. The Division Bench was not right in observing that the Arbitral Tribunal showed undue haste in the matter.” 28. Indisputably, the learned Arbitrator did not pass the award within the period prescribed under the Act. However, the application filed on 18.03.1991 seeking six months further time to pass the award in the matter was allowed by the trial court, meaning thereby that the trail court extended the period of passing the award upto 17.09.1991, but thereafter neither any application was moved by the parties before the court below nor any further time was extended by the court. If that is so, the period to pass the award expired on 17.09.1991, thereafter, the learned Arbitrator lost its jurisdiction to pass the award. 29. Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Hardayal, [State of Punjab Vs. Hardayal, AIR 1985 SC 920 ] and Jitendra Nath, [Jitendra Nath Vs. M/s Chopra Land Developers Pvt. Ltd, AIR 2007 SC 1401 ], has held that as per the provisions contained in the Arbitration Act, an Arbitrator has to pass award within the prescribed time period of four months and unless the said time period is extended by the court, the Arbitrator has no authority to pass the award beyond the time stipulated. The court only can enlarge the time to submit the award and such enlargement of time could be possible if parities to the arbitration agreement move to the Court for such enlargement. Since after 17.09.1991, the period was not enlarged and in view of the dictum of the Hon’ble Apex Court laid down in the judgments (Supra), this Court is of the firm opinion that the trial court has rightly set aside the award being passed after the period of limitation and the appellate court which is the last court on facts and law, after having appreciated the material available on record did not find favour with the revisionist and recorded a categorical finding on the point involved in the case that the award is void being passed after the expiry of the statutory period. The proceedings before an Arbitrator are quasi judicial in nature. Law on the point is clear that the statutory period to complete the proceedings and make the award was four months after entering on the reference. As such, the Arbitrator is obliged to pass the award within the statutory period of four months, unless the Court extends the period of arbitration. The learned Arbitrator or the parties cannot extend the period. It is absolutely within the domain of the Court to enlarge the time to make the award. However, from the date of first submitting the claim the award could not be passed within the statutory period of four months by the Arbitrator and time was not extended further. Thereafter, on an application (paper no. 74C) subsequently filed by the respondents on 18.03.1991, the same was allowed for a period of six months and, therefore, further time never has been extended by the court. The period of four months as mandated under the Act to submit the award is statutory period and it is only the court, who can enlarge that period. It means that the court by enlarging the time has only permitted the Arbitrator to submit the award within the extended period and not thereafter. The application was for enlargement of time was submitted on 18.03.1991, as such, the period of extended six months should have come to an end on 17.09.1991. No extension was ever given. Award was submitted on 08.07.1992, i.e., after the expiry of extended period. The application was for enlargement of time was submitted on 18.03.1991, as such, the period of extended six months should have come to an end on 17.09.1991. No extension was ever given. Award was submitted on 08.07.1992, i.e., after the expiry of extended period. Therefore, the Arbitrator seizes its office and become functus officio to pass an award and in case after becoming functus officio and seizing its office the Arbitrator passes the award, the same shall be treated as void and nullity. 30. Thus, both the courts below having considered the facts of the case and law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgments (Supra), have categorically recorded the findings on facts and law that the award submitted by the Arbitrator after the statutory period is without jurisdiction and void and the concurrent findings in this regard have been recorded by the courts below in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code. This Court cannot sit like an Appellate Court over the judgment passed by the lower appellate court. 31. The revisional jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is strictly conditioned by clauses (a) to (c) thereof, and should be applied only in those cases, where a subordinate court appears to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. In other words, such revisional jurisdiction may be invoked on the ground of refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in the subordinate court or assumption of jurisdiction which the Court does not possess or on the ground that the court has acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The revisionist could not bring its case within the parameters as laid down under Section 115 of the Code. The jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code is akin to the jurisdiction as guaranteed upon this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code is not to correct the mistake of fact and to substitute its own findings by the revisional court. 32. The jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code is akin to the jurisdiction as guaranteed upon this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code is not to correct the mistake of fact and to substitute its own findings by the revisional court. 32. In view of the above, this Court has no reason to interfere in the orders impugned passed by the courts below as the revisionist has failed to show that grave injustice or failure of justice has occasioned to him, or the courts below have assumed a jurisdiction which they do not have, or have failed to exercise a jurisdiction which they do have and that the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction. 33. Therefore, the civil revision is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. The same is hereby dismissed. Lower court record be sent back forthwith. 34. Having considered the fact that the original suit is pending since 1989 and more than 30 years have elapsed, the trial court is directed to decide the suit expeditiously, in accordance with law, and granting of unnecessary adjournments to either of the parties shall be avoided.