JUDGMENT : Rashid Ali Dar, J. 1. The instant appeal in terms of Section 21(3) of NIA(National Investigation Act) has been preferred by the appellant against the order of Special Judge Designated Under NIA Act, Srinagar, whereby the application filed by him for grant of bail has been rejected. The order in this regard has been passed on 17.08.2019 (for short referred to hereinafter as ‘impugned order’). 2. It appears from the perusal of the records that the petition for grant of bail came to be presented on 06.07.2019 before the court of learned Additional Sessions Judge (TADA/POTA), Srinagar by the appellant herein. Learned Additional Sessions Judge (TADA/POTA), Srinagar instead of directing diarization of the petition seeking bail, directed the SHO, P/S Srigufwara(respondent herein) to report through APP and the matter was directed to be put up on 20.07.2019. The original application appears to have been forwarded to the said Police said Station for submission of report. 3. The appellant had pleaded in the said application that he was arrested in FIR No.63/2018 under Section 13 ULA(P) Act (Unlawful Activities(Prevention) Act, 1967 registered in Police Station, Srigufwara. The appellant was already admitted to interim bail on 03.10.2018 by the court of learned Principal Sessions Judge, Anantnag, however, was not released and instead was detained under Public Safety Act in terms of detention order No. 58/DMA/PSA/DET/2018 dated 09.10.2018. The said detention order was challenged before this Court and was quashed vide order dated 22.04.2019. It was further pleaded that the bail application in terms of which interim bail order was passed on 03.10.2018, got dismissed because of absence of the accused/appellant which was due to his preventive detention and not any willful default. Further, the appellant had pleaded in the petition that he is innocent and was implicated in the said FIR, falsely, mischievously and without any rhyme or reason. According to the appellant, as is being pleaded in the said petition for grant of bail, he is having a good reputation in the society and is a peace loving person. 4. Report was submitted by the concerned Police Station, wherein gist of allegations was given. According to the appellant, as is being pleaded in the said petition for grant of bail, he is having a good reputation in the society and is a peace loving person. 4. Report was submitted by the concerned Police Station, wherein gist of allegations was given. Learned Special Judge has made the observation in the order passed on 20.07.2019 that since the appellant herein had not surrendered before the said court and as such, direction was given to the Incharge Sub Jail, Kotibagh to keep the appellant in judicial custody till 25.07.2019. 5. Case-diary was called and perused and the parties heard by the learned Special Judge. Accordingly on 17.08.2019 in terms of the impugned order, the bail petition was dismissed mainly on two counts; first being the nature of the evidence about the allegations and so Section 43(D) proviso 5 of ULA(P) Act being applicable; and secondly the nature and severity of the offence and the larger interests of the security of the State required the bail application to be rejected. 6. The challenge has been thrown to the impugned order in terms of the instant appeal while pleading that the appellant herein was arrested without any justification and was thereafter taken to the police station Srigufwara wherein he was implicated in case FIR No. 63/2018 for the offences punishable under Section 13 Unlawful Activities(Prevention) Act, 1967. It is being pleaded that the appellant had applied for bail in the case before the court of learned Special Judge Designated Under NIA Act, Srinagar, however, the bail was rejected. Further it is being pleaded in the appeal that the learned Special Judge has travelled beyond the purview of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 while rejecting the bail application of the appellant and has not decided the bail application in consonance with the said Act. The impugned order also runs contrary to the Article 21 of the Constitution of India, is also set-forth. 7. Objections have been placed on the record, wherein gist of allegations against the appellant has been reiterated and it has been put-forth that the case had been registered on 06.09.2018 as FIR No. 63/2018 under Section 13 ULA(P) Act, P/S Srifufwara and seven persons namely 1) Riyaz Ahmad Lone, 2) Gulzar Ahmad Bhat, 3) Mohd. 7. Objections have been placed on the record, wherein gist of allegations against the appellant has been reiterated and it has been put-forth that the case had been registered on 06.09.2018 as FIR No. 63/2018 under Section 13 ULA(P) Act, P/S Srifufwara and seven persons namely 1) Riyaz Ahmad Lone, 2) Gulzar Ahmad Bhat, 3) Mohd. Iqbal Rather, 4) Shahid Ahmad Lone, 5) Tariq Ahmad Hajam, 6) Mushtaq Ahmad Bhat, and 7) Bilal Ahmad Lone, came to be arrested. It is being alleged that all the seven persons are involved in planning to hamper the functioning of Government of India and to harm the sovereignty and national integrity of India and are making nefarious plans of separation of State of Jammu and Kashmir from the Union of India. During the questioning, one of the accused namely Bilal Ahmad Lone had divulged that two more persons are involved in the matter (appellant herein and one Abdul Hadi Reshi), who too were arrested and during the investigation some objectionable material(posters) was recovered from them. The particulars of posters which were allegedly recovered from the house of the appellant herein, are not quoted. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant as well as Sr. AAG. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant while laying emphasis on the contention that the appellant was entitled to bail, submitted that the observations made by the learned Special Judge Designated regarding embargo contained under Section 43(D)(5) of ULAP Act being applicable in the instant case and so the appellant could not be admitted to bail, was misplaced, as the infraction of Section 13 of the Act is not referred to in Section 43(D)(5) of the Act. Section 13 of the Act falls within the Chapter-III of the said Act while as the offence covered by Chapter IV under Sections 15 to 23 and VI under Sections 35 to 40, wherein the bar is applicable and the court is under obligation to record satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true. 10. It is also his submission that the main accused in the matter had been already bailed out. 10. It is also his submission that the main accused in the matter had been already bailed out. To lend support to the same, reliance has been placed on the copies of the dockets directing release of Mohammad Iqbal Rather, Abdul Hadi Reshi, Mushtaq Ahmad Bhat, Shahid Ahmad Lone and Bilal Ahmad Lone issued by the court of Special Judge which had rejected the bail application of the appellant herein. On the application of principle of parity, thus, the appellant too had the entitlement to bail and the learned Special Judge has misdirected himself by dismissing the application on the application of bar created under Section 43(D). It is also his submission that even prima facie no case is made out against the appellant herein under Section 13 of the Act as the respondents relied solely on the disclosure of the co-accused regarding involvement of the appellant and Abdul Hadi Reshi in the case. The said disclosure, according to him, is not admissible in evidence. One more point put-forth by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the opinion tendered by the Special Judge that for considering the entitlement of the bail in favour of the appellant it was necessary to take him into custody, was not countenanced by law as the Section 497 Cr.PC which lays down basic principle for grant of bail does not necessitate that a person must be in custody for grant of bail. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the judgments reported in, (a) 1983 Cri.L.J 1212 The State Petitioner Vs. Maguni Charan Sahu & Ors.. and (b) 2011(4) Crimes 323(SC) Sanjay Chandra Vs. CBI, to canvass that taking into custody a person as was done in terms of the order dated 20.07.2019 in the instant case by the Special Judge was not pre-requisite for considering entitlement of bail, as in Section 497 Cr.PC the words are used ‘appears’ or ‘is brought before the court’. It is also his contention that bail once granted in a case its withdrawal could not be made in a routine manner. Reliance is placed on the judgment reported in AIR 1984 SC 372 , Bhagirathsinh Judeja Vs. State of Gujarat. 12. In Maguni’s case, while taking reliance of the judgment of Niranjan Singh Vs. It is also his contention that bail once granted in a case its withdrawal could not be made in a routine manner. Reliance is placed on the judgment reported in AIR 1984 SC 372 , Bhagirathsinh Judeja Vs. State of Gujarat. 12. In Maguni’s case, while taking reliance of the judgment of Niranjan Singh Vs. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote, AIR 1980 SC 785 , their lordships interpreted the word ‘custody’ in the context of Section 439 Cr.PC and observed that the accused can be said to be in custody even when he surrenders before the court and submits to its directions. 13. In Bhagirathsinh’s case, their lordships enunciated that interference with discretionary order for grant of bail cannot be done ordinarily. The High Court was held misdirected itself by cancelling the bail granted by the Sessions court. The material consideration in such cases as observed by their lordships was whether the accused would be readily available for trial. 14. Mr. Shah, learned Sr. AAG while being heard has not disputed that the other accused have been admitted to bail by the learned court which include Ab.Hadi Reshi. It is also not denied that the appellant after getting bail from the court of learned Principal District & Sessions Judge, Anantnag was detained under preventive custody which was later quashed by this Court. 15. Considered the matter in the light of the submissions made by the parties and material on record. 16. The record available before us manifestly makes it clear that the appellant herein had been arrested on 14.09.2018 and admitted to interim bail by the learned Sessions Judge, Anantnag and thereafter the application was dismissed for non-prosecution on 06.12.2018 as the appellant did not appear before the said court. 17. The fact remains that the appellant had been in preventive custody when his bail application pending before the court of Principal District & Sessions Judge, Anantnag was dismissed in view of his non-appearance. It is also a fact that the appellant had been granted interim bail by the court of learned Sessions Judge, Anantnag after affording opportunity to the parties to lend assistance and taking into account law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court. The police station concerned, which had taken the appellant into custody, was accordingly directed to release him on bail. 18. The police station concerned, which had taken the appellant into custody, was accordingly directed to release him on bail. 18. Admittedly, the bail application of the appellant filed before the court of Sessions Judge, Anantnag entailed dismissal because of non-appearance of the appellant for which fault could not be attributed to the appellant herein as he was in preventive custody at that point of time. 19. Section 43(D)(5) of the Unlawful Activities(Prevention) Act, 1967 is not attracted in the instant case as the appellant herein and the other persons were alleged to have committed the offences under Section 13 of the said Act, which falls under Chapter-III of the ULA(P) Act. Same does not come within the purview of mischief created by the said Section. It may be proper to have reference of Section 43(D)(5) of the ULA(P) Act:- “43(D)(5). Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release; Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true.” 20. We also find merit in the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant that on the applicability of the principle of parity the appellant was entitled to the concession of bail. It is the case of the Investigating Agency that seven persons have been found involved in the offence under Section 13 of ULA(P) Act on the information from reliable sources, which is stated to have resulted in registration of the case against the accused persons who initially have been quoted seven in number. The appellant herein along-with Abdul Hadi Reshi have been arrested only in view of the disclosure statement of one of the accused persons namely Bilal Ahmad Lone. 21. The appellant herein along-with Abdul Hadi Reshi have been arrested only in view of the disclosure statement of one of the accused persons namely Bilal Ahmad Lone. 21. Since the other accused persons including Abdul Hadi Reshi have been entitled to bail in the said FIR and the allegations leveled against the appellant herein are more or less similar in nature, we do not find it fair to single out the appellant and to hold that he does not deserve to be granted concession of bail. We also take note of the fact that the learned Principal District & Sessions Judge, Anantnag, who was approached for grant of bail (prior to creation of court of Special Judge Designated Under NIA Act) found the appellant entitled to concession of bail after hearing both the parties and taking in view the nature of allegations leveled against him including evidence on record. 22. It may be quite apt to place reliance on the recent judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in Syed Parvez Vs. State of Karnataka 2018 SCC Online Kar 4 and Sanjaybhai @ Samir @ Hs Himatbhai @ Maheshbhai Valjibhai Gohil Vs. The State of Gujarat, MANU/SCOR/01277/2019. 23. In Sanjaybhai’s case, the grievance of the petitioner had been that the co-accused though had been released on bail and the said fact has been canvassed before the High Court (Gujarat), was not considered at all. The Hon’ble Supreme Court allowed the Special Leave Petition and directed release of the petitioner to the satisfaction of the trial court in connection with FIR named therein. 24. In Syed Parvez’s case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court after considering the entire merits of the case granted bail in favour of the petitioners therein by imposing reasonable conditions, while also taking not of the fact that some other accused had been admitted to bail against whom similar set of allegations have been leveled. The principle of parity was also taken resort to while granting bail. 25. Having considered the matter, we are of the opinion that the order passed by the Special Judge Designated Under NIA Act, Srinagar on 17.08.2019 is not in consonance with law. The principle of parity was also taken resort to while granting bail. 25. Having considered the matter, we are of the opinion that the order passed by the Special Judge Designated Under NIA Act, Srinagar on 17.08.2019 is not in consonance with law. Accordingly, we allow the instant appeal and set aside the order impugned dated 17.08.2019 and as such, the appellant is admitted to bail subject to furnishing bail bond by two sureties in an amount of Rs.1.00 lac each, to the satisfaction of learned trial Judge, conditioned that the appellant:- (a) shall appear in person before the trial court on each and every date of hearing; (b) shall not leave the territory of the Valley without prior permission of the trial court; (c) shall not tamper with the prosecution evidence; and (d) shall not change his place of residence until permitted by the trial court. 26. Disposed of in terms of the above. 27. Copy of this order be furnished to the learned trial court for compliance. A copy shall also be sent to the concerned Superintendent Jail.