Vijaya Bank, Perinthalmanna Branch Rep. By Its Branch Manager v. K. Shanawas, S/o. Noor Muhammed
2019-06-19
SATHISH NINAN
body2019
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : What is the effect of the subsequent accrual of cause of action on a premature, but pending suit? The dismissal of a suit for recovery of money due under a loan transaction, as premature, is assailed in this appeal by the plaintiff. 2. The first defendant availed an educational loan of Rs.3,75,000/- from the plaintiff Bank for studies in B.E. (Mechanical Engineering). Defendants 2 and 3 are guarantors for the loan transaction. Alleging non-repayment of the loan amount in terms of the agreement, the suit was filed for recovery of the amounts with interest. 3. The defendants contended that as per the terms of the loan agreement, the loan amount is repayable in sixty equal monthly instalments, the payment of which is to commence “12 months after the completion of the course or six months after getting job whichever is earlier”. The course was completed only on 04.06.09 the first defendant is still studying for yet another course and has not obtained any job. It was accordingly contended that the suit is premature. 4. The trial court held that, going by the evidence, the course was completed only after 28.02.08, that 12 months have not lapsed therefrom, that the first defendant is not employed and hence the time for repayment had not accrued. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed as premature. Aggrieved, the plaintiff is in appeal. 5. Heard smt. Sally Thomas Chacko, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri K.M.Sathyanatha Menon on behalf of the respondents. 6. It is not in dispute that in terms of the agreement between the parties, repayment of the loan amount is to commence “12 months after the completion of the course or six months after getting job, whichever is earlier”. It is not in dispute that the B.E. (Mechanical Engineering) course for which the first defendant joined is a four year course. It is also not in dispute that the course commenced in the year 2003. In the normal circumstances, the course would have been over by 2007. Assuming that the first defendant did not get a job thereafter, still the repayment is to commence 12 months after the completion of the course, i.e. from 2008 onwards.
It is also not in dispute that the course commenced in the year 2003. In the normal circumstances, the course would have been over by 2007. Assuming that the first defendant did not get a job thereafter, still the repayment is to commence 12 months after the completion of the course, i.e. from 2008 onwards. If that be so, on failure of the first defendant to pay the loan instalments, necessarily the cause of action for the suit accrues to the plaintiff and the suit filed in 2009 cannot be held to be premature. 7. The contention of the defendants is that the first defendant completed the course only on 04.06.09. To substantiate the said contention, though Ext.Bl, stated to be a copy of the completion certificate, is produced, as noticed by the trial court, the same is a mere photostat copy and it does not even bear the signature or seal of the institution or the authority concerned. The trial court has rightly refused to accept the same. Resultantly, but for the averment of the defendants that the course was completed only on 04.06.09, there is total dearth of evidence. The said contention remains unsubstantiated. 8. However, the trial court entered into a finding that the course was completed by the first defendant only after 28.02.08. The finding was entered into relying on Exts. A5 and A6 letters of acknowledgment of debts executed by the first defendant in favour of the Bank. Exts.A5 and A6 are dated 28.09.05 and 28.02.08 respectively. The trial court was of the opinion that if the course was completed prior to 2008, there was no necessity to obtain Ext.A6 letter of acknowledgment of debt from the first defendant, and accordingly it was assumed that the course would have been completed only after the date of Ext.A6. The said reasoning is on the face of it fallacious. The loan documents are dated 01.08.03. The mere fact that to keep alive the personal liability, the plaintiff Bank obtained letters of acknowledgment of debt within the period of limitation could not, by any stretch of imagination, be a piece of material to find out as to when the course was completed. 9. Even accepting the contention of the first defendant that the course was completed only on 04.06.09, the repayment will commence after 12 months therefrom i.e. in July, 2010.
9. Even accepting the contention of the first defendant that the course was completed only on 04.06.09, the repayment will commence after 12 months therefrom i.e. in July, 2010. on default of payment, the cause of action has necessarily accrued to the plaintiff. The suit was disposed of only in December 2010. Will the acerual of the cause of action pending the suit assist the plaintiff. The effect of the subsequent accrual of cause of action on a premature suit has been considered by the Apex court in Vithalbhai (P) Ltd. v. Union Bank of India [ 2005 (2) KLT 491 (SC)]. Therein the Apex court held: “8. In our opinion, a suit based on a plaint which discloses a cause of action is not necessarily to be dismissed on trial solely because it was premature on the date of its institution if by the time the written statement came to be filed or by the time the Court is called upon to pass a decree, the plaintiff is found entitled to the relief prayed for in the plaint.” 10. The Apex court referred to Gurdit Singh & Ors. v. Munsha Singh & ors., (1977) 1 SCC 791 wherein it was held that the court trying a premature suit does not suffer from inability or incapacity to entertain the suit on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. Inspite of the suit being premature on the date of its institution, on the accrual of the cause of action, the court may still grant relief to the plaintiff if no manifest injustice or prejudice is caused to the party proceeded against. In the instant case, no injustice or prejudice would be caused to the defendant since there is admittedly non-repayment of the loan amount even after expiry of the period of 12 months from the date of completion of the course as claimed by the defendants. Therefore, the subsequent accrual of the cause of action is sufficient enough to maintain the suit and to grant a decree. 11. Therefore, viewed either way, the suit could not have been dismissed as premature. 12. The only remaining dispute is regarding the interest payable. The defendants contend that they are not liable to pay any interest. This is against the terms of Ext.Al agreement whereunder 11.5% per annum is the interest fixed. considering the fact that the loan in question is an educational loan.
12. The only remaining dispute is regarding the interest payable. The defendants contend that they are not liable to pay any interest. This is against the terms of Ext.Al agreement whereunder 11.5% per annum is the interest fixed. considering the fact that the loan in question is an educational loan. I am of the opinion that interest from the date of suit till recovery could be fixed at 6% per annum, which in my opinion, is just and reasonable. In the result, this appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the trial court is set aside. The plaintiff is granted a decree for recovery of Rs.6,71,119/- with future interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of suit (09.10.09) till realisation, from the defendants jointly and severally. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.