ORDER 1. By this writ petition, the order dated 20.8.2018 passed by Additional Commissioner, Bhopal passed in Case No. 167/Appeal/2017/18 has been challenged. 2. According to the Petitioner as well as the respondents, the necessary facts for the disposal of the writ petition are that Mahendra Singh and Rajesh Singh (Respondents in W.P. No. 20/2019) are the real brothers of Radha Bai (Petitioner in W.P. No. 20/2019). The family tree is as under : Prem Singh Kamal Singh Radha bai Mahendra Singh Rajesh Singh Harsh   Raj Raghuvanshi (Neither the petitioner nor the respondents have made a specific 2019 statement, that Prem Singh had only one Son, namely Kamal Singh. Thus, this judgment would be purely in personam and not in rem) 3. It is submitted by the Counsel for the Petitioner that her grand father, namely Prem Singh was the owner of approximately 122 bighas of land situated in village Sankalkheda. After the death of Prem Singh, his son Kamal Singh (father of the Petitioner) inherited the said property and after the death of Kamal Singh, She is entitled for 1/3rd share in the property. However, in the year 2016, she came to know that the property has been partitioned amongst Kamal Singh, Mahendra Singh and Rajesh Singh. Since, the petitioner was not given any share in the properties, therefore, She filed an appeal before the Court of S.D.O., Vidisha along with an application for condonation of delay. The delay in filing the appeal was condoned, and the matter was finally heard. By order dated 20.2.2017, it was held by the S.D.O., Vidisha that the partition done by the Tahsildar Vidisha was vitiated and the petitioner has 1/3rd share in the properties and accordingly, the appeal was allowed. The respondents, being aggrieved by the order of the S.D.O., preferred an appeal before the Court of Additional Commissioner, Bhopal Division, Bhopal, which has allowed the appeal and by order dated 25.10.2018 passed in case No. 189/Appeal/2016-17 has held that although the petitioner is the real sister of the respondents but in view the provisions of section 6(5) of Hindu Succession Act, as the registered sale deed and the “Will” were already executed prior to 20th Day of December 2004, therefore, section 6 of Hindu Succession Act, would not apply. 4. 4. Challenging the order dated 25.10.2018 passed by Additional Commissioner, Bhopal Division, Bhopal, it is submitted that interpretation made by the Additional Commissioner, Bhopal Division, Bhopal is perverse and hence liable to be set aside, for the simple reason, the partition had taken place on 21.11.2007, therefore, section 6 (5) of Hindu Succession Act, has no application. It is submitted that in fact Prem Singh, the Grand father of the petitioner was the owner of the properties in dispute i.e., Survey No. 131,159, 164, 165, 320, 398, 404, 412, 429, 440, 449, 572, 505, 596, 758 and 867 total area 25.587 hectares. After the death of Prem Singh, her father Kamal Singh inherited the entire properties, however, some properties were got mutated by the respondents in their names in a clandestine manner. The respondents and Kamal Singh, thereafter, moved an application under section 178 of M.P.L.R.Code, and without issuing notice to the petitioner, the properties were partitioned amongst the respondents and Kamal Singh (father of the Petitioner), however, nothing was given to the petitioner. It is submitted that in fact the registered sale deed dated 26.9.1969 executed by Prem Singh (Grand Father) in favor of Kamal Singh (father) and so called “Will” executed by Prem Singh (Grand Father) in favor of respondents (brothers) were either sham documents or were forged documents, which were never intended to be acted upon, and therefore, Kamal Singh and the respondents moved an application under section 178 of M.P.L.R.Code, for partition of the entire properties. 5. Per contra, it is submitted by Shri Mishra that by registered sale deed dated 26.6.1969, Prem Singh had sold survey No. 643 and 644 which have been renumbered as 505/2 in favour of the father of the petitioner namely Kamal Singh, accordingly, his name was recorded in revenue records. Prem Singh by an unregistered “Will” dated 4.10.1988 had bequeathed survey Nos. 164, 165, ½ of 141, ½ of 398, 440, 0.115 out of 447, 448, 0.626 out of 506/1 to respondent No. 2 Rajesh Singh, whereas 0.062 hectares out of 134, 0.225 hectares out of 141/2, 1.777 hectares out of 392/2, 3.073 hectares out of 449 and 3 hectares out of 505 were given to respondent No. 1. On the basis of this “Will”, names of respondents No. 1 and 2 were mutated on 26.12.1989, in the revenue records (Annexure P-6). On the basis of this “Will”, names of respondents No. 1 and 2 were mutated on 26.12.1989, in the revenue records (Annexure P-6). For the convenience of the parties, the respondents as well as their father Kamal Singh filed an application under section 178 of MPLRC for partition of survey No. 142/2,412/1,505/2, 134/1, 141/1, 398/2, 448/2, 472,505/1, 141/2, 142/1, 308/1, 428, 440, 447/2, 448, 449/1, 473, 476, 505/1 and accordingly, the aforesaid property was partitioned by the Tahsildar by order dated 21.11.2007. It is submitted by the counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2 that this partition was nothing but it was executed for the sake of convenience of the parties, whereas the property was already given to Kamal Singh by way of a registered sale deed as well as to respondents No. 1 and 2 by Unregistered “Will” executed by Prem Singh. It is further submitted that the mutation of name of Kamal Singh on the strength of the sale deed and the mutation of names of respondents No. 1 and 2 on the strength of the “Will” was never challenged by the petitioner. If the petitioner being the daughter of Kamal Singh (grand daughter of Prem Singh) was of the view that she has been deprived of her valid rights then she should have filed a suit, for challenging the sale deed executed in favour of her father Kamal Singh as well as “Will” executed by Prem Singh in favour of the respondents No. 1 and 2 and since the same has not been challenged by the petitioner for 42-45 years, therefore, now she cannot claim any title or share in the property in dispute. It is further submitted that the land which was disposed of by Prem Singh as well as Kamal Singh during their life time has also been included in the order dated 20.2.2017 passed by S.D.O., Vidisha, which is contrary to fact and law. The property which was already disposed of by Prem Singh and Kamal Singh during their life time should not have been included by the S.D.O. in its order dated 20.2.2017. To buttress his contention, counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2 has relied upon the judgment passed by Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Poonam Chand Jain v. Ramesh Kumar, reported in 2012 MPRN 73. To buttress his contention, counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2 has relied upon the judgment passed by Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Poonam Chand Jain v. Ramesh Kumar, reported in 2012 MPRN 73. It is further submitted by the counsel for the respondents that as per section 6(5) of Hindu Succession Act, the property which was disposed of prior to 20th day of December, 2004 would not be governed by section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, therefore, the S.D.O. has wrongly held that the petitioner is entitled for her 1/3rd share in the property. It is submitted that after the partition takes place, the holder has an unfettered rights to deal with the separated property which includes alienation by sale or mortgage. It is further submitted that the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 is not retrospective in nature and therefore, any transaction which had taken place prior to 20th day of December 2004, cannot be reopened. To buttress his contentions the Counsel for the respondents have relied upon the judgments passed in the case of Hardeo Rai v. Sakuntala Devi, reported in 2017 (1) RN 216= (2008) 7 SCC 46 and Sushila bai v. Rajkumari, reported in 2017(1) RN 215 = 2017(1) MPLJ 157 and Prakash v. Phulavati, reported in 2017 (1) RN 65 = (2016) 2 SCC 36 . 6. It is submitted by the counsel for the respondents that the document must be read in its entirety. Once the “Will” was already executed in favour of respondents No. 1 and 2 and the same was acted upon by them by getting their names mutated in the revenue record as well as the sale deed was also executed in favour of Kamal Singh and his name was also mutated in the revenue record on the basis of sale deed, then the S.D.O. by order dated 20.2.2017 should not have held that the property in dispute is an ancestral property. To buttress his contentions, the Counsel for the respondents has relied upon the judgment passed in the case of C. Cheriathan v. P. Narayanan, reported in 2009 (3) MPLJ 568 . 7. To buttress his contentions, the Counsel for the respondents has relied upon the judgment passed in the case of C. Cheriathan v. P. Narayanan, reported in 2009 (3) MPLJ 568 . 7. It is submitted by the counsel for the respondents that once the respondents have acquired the property by virtue of sale deed as well as by virtue of a “Will”, then they have an exclusive right and, therefore, after execution of the sale deed as well as the “Will” as the case may be, the S.D.O. by its order dated 20.2.2017 has wrongly held that the property in dispute is still ancestral in nature. 8. It is further submitted by the counsel for the respondents that it is well established principle of law that this Court while exercising power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot correct the errors committed by the Courts below unless and until the jurisdictional error is committed by them. It is further submitted that since the sale deed executed by Prem Singh in favour of Kamal Singh as well as the “Will” executed by Prem Singh in favour of respondents, were never challenged by the petitioner within the period of limitation, therefore, now she cannot not challenge the same. It is further submitted that if the petitioner has any right or title in the property in dispute, then she has an efficacious remedy of filing civil suit. 9. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties. 10. The following factual matrix appears from the arguments of the Counsel for the parties : 1. Prem Singh was the owner of the properties in dispute. 2. By registered Sale deed dated 26.9.1969, he executed a sale deed in favor of his son Kamal and Survey No. 643 and 644 (Renumbered as 505/2) were sold to him. 3. In respect of the remaining land, “Will”dated 4.10.1988 was executed by Prem Singh in favor of the respondents 4. The names of Kamal Singh as well as that of respondents were recorded in the revenue records on the basis of the registered sale deed as well as the “Will”. 5. Inspite of the fact that the respondents were claiming that Prem Singh has executed a “Will” in their favor and Prem Singh has sold some part of property to their father Kamal Singh, an application under section 178 of M.P.L.R.Code was filed for partition of the properties. 5. Inspite of the fact that the respondents were claiming that Prem Singh has executed a “Will” in their favor and Prem Singh has sold some part of property to their father Kamal Singh, an application under section 178 of M.P.L.R.Code was filed for partition of the properties. 6. By order dated 21.11.2007, the Tahsildar, by observing that vkosnd vkil es firk iq= gS ;g [kkrs iSr`d lEifr gS ------ had partitioned the entire property. In the said proceedings, it was specifically pleaded by the respondents and Kamal Singh (father of respondents and petitioner) that the properties in dispute are still ancestral. 7. Since, the partition was effected by order dated 21.11.2007, then whether the provisions of section 6(5) of Hindu Succession Act would apply or not? 8. It has not been claimed by either by the petitioner or by the respondents that Prem Singh had no other issue, except Kamal Singh. 9. It has also not been clarified by the Counsel for the respondents that when Kamal Singh was the only legal representative of Prem Singh, then why, Prem Singh, just before 5 months of his death, executed the “Will” dated 4.10.1988 in favor of the respondents, who are his grand sons being son of Kamal Singh. 10. It is well established principle of law that propounder of the “Will” has to remove all suspicious circumstances attached to a “Will” and before mutating the names of the respondents, no findings were recorded by the revenue authorities with regard to the genuineness fo the “Will” dated 4.10.1988. 11. No proceedings have been filed by the respondents, to show that before mutating their names, any enquiry was done by the revenue authorities. 12. It is alleged that Prem Singh had executed a “Will” on 4.10.1988 and he expired on 2.4.1989 and only after his death, the said “Will” dated 4.10.1988 was produced by the respondents, before the Sub-Registrar for its registration, and accordingly, the “Will” dated 2.4.1989 was got registered after the death of Prem Singh. 13. Since, according to the respondents themselves, the “Will” dated 4.10.1988 had remained unregistered during the life time of Prem Singh, therefore, this Court shall consider the “Will” as an unregistered document. 11. 13. Since, according to the respondents themselves, the “Will” dated 4.10.1988 had remained unregistered during the life time of Prem Singh, therefore, this Court shall consider the “Will” as an unregistered document. 11. By referring to section 6(5) of Hindu Succession Act, it is submitted by the Counsel for the respondents that since, some part of land was sold by Prem Singh to Kamal Singh by registered sale deed dated 26.9.1969 and Prem Singh had executed a “Will” dated 4.10. 1988 in favor of the respondents therefore, the properties were already disposed of prior to 20th day of December 2004, therefore, the provisions of section 6 of Hindu Succession would not apply. It is further submitted that partition dated 21.11.2007 was nothing but was done for the sake of convenience, therefore, it has to be ignored. 12. Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act reads as under : 6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property.—(1) On and from the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, in a Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, the daughter of a coparcener shall,— (a) by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son; (b) have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son; (c) be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenary property as that of a son, and any reference to a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to include a reference to a daughter of a coparcener: Provided that nothing contained in this subsection shall affect or invalidate any disposition or alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition of property which had taken place before the 20th day of December, 2004. (2) Any property to which a female Hindu becomes entitled by virtue of sub-section (1) shall be held by her with the incidents of coparcenary ownership and shall be regarded, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, or any other law for the time being in force, as property capable of being disposed of her by testamentary disposition. (2) Any property to which a female Hindu becomes entitled by virtue of sub-section (1) shall be held by her with the incidents of coparcenary ownership and shall be regarded, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, or any other law for the time being in force, as property capable of being disposed of her by testamentary disposition. (3) Where a Hindu dies after the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, his interest in the property of a Joint Hindu Family governed by the Mitakshara law, shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survisorship, and the coparcenary property shall be deemed to have been divided as if a partition had taken place and,— (a) the daughter is allotted the same share as is allotted to a son; (b) the share of the pre-deceased son or a predeceased daughter, as they would have got had they been alive at the time of partition, shall be allotted to the surviving child of such predeceased son or of such pre-deceased daughter; and (c) the share of the pre-deceased child of a predeceased son or of a pre-deceased daughter, as such child would have got had he or she been alive at the time of the partition, shall be allotted to the child of such pre-deceased child of the predeceased son or a pre-deceased daughter, as the case may be. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub- section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub- section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. (4) After the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, no Court shall recognise any right to proceed against a son, grandson or great grandson for the recovery of any debt due from his father, grandfather or great grandfather solely on the ground of the pious obligation under the Hindu law, or such son, grandson or great-grandson to discharge any such debt: Provided that in the case of any debt contracted before the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, nothing contained in this sub-section shall effect— (a) the right of any creditor to proceed against the son, grandson or great-grandson, as the case may be; or (b) any alienation made in respect of or in satisfaction of, any such debt, and any such right or alienation shall be enforceable under the rule of pious obligation in the same manner and to the same extent as it would have been enforceable as if the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 had not been enacted. Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (a), the expression “son”, “grandson” or “great-grandson” shall be deemed to refer to the son, grandson or great-grandson, as the case may be, who was born or adopted prior to the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. (5) Nothing contained in this section shall apply to a partition, which has been effected before the 20th day of December, 2004." 13. Now, the moot question for consideration is that whether the “Will” executed by Prem Singh in favor of the respondents or the registered sale deed dated 26-9-1969 were sham documents or they were intended to be acted upon. 14. It is the case of the respondents that after the execution of “Will” by Prem Singh, their names were mutated in the revenue records on 26.12.1989, therefore, it is clear that the “Will” was in fact, acted upon by the parties. On deeper scrutiny, it is clear that the above mentioned submissions made by the Counsel for the respondents cannot be accepted. 15. On deeper scrutiny, it is clear that the above mentioned submissions made by the Counsel for the respondents cannot be accepted. 15. A specific question was put to the Counsel for the respondents, that when a “Will” was already in their favor as well as when there was already a registered sale deed in favor of Kamal Singh, then why they filed an application for partition of the properties, then it was replied by him, that for the sake of convenience, the same was done. The submission made by the Counsel for the respondents, cannot be accepted, for the simple reason, that by partition, owners of the property cannot exchange his property with another owner of another property. 16. Section 178 of M.P.L.R.Code reads as under : "178. Partition of holding.- (1) If in any holding, which has been assessed for purpose of agriculture under section 59, there are more than one bhumiswami any such bhumiswami may apply to a Tahsildar for a partition of his share in the holding : [Provided that if any question of title is raised the Tahsildar shall stay the proceeding before him for a period of three months to facilitate the institution of a civil suit for determination of the question of title.] [(1-A) If a civil suit is filed within the period specified in the proviso to sub-section (1), and stay order is obtained from the civil Court, the Tahsildar shall stay his proceedings pending the decision of the Civil Court. If no civil suit is filed within the said period, he shall vacate the stay order and proceed to partition the holding in accordance with the entries in the record of rights.] (2) The Tahsildar, may, after hearing the co-tenure holders, divide the holding and apportion the assessment of the holding in accordance with the rules made under this Code. [(3) x x x] [(4) x x x] [(5) x x x] Explanation I.-For purposes of this section any cosharer of the holding of a bhumiswami who has obtained a declaration of his title in such holding from a competent civil Court shall be deemed to be a co-tenure holder of such holding. Explanation II.-[ x x x] [178A. Partition of land in life time of Bhumiswami. Explanation II.-[ x x x] [178A. Partition of land in life time of Bhumiswami. - (1) If any Bhumiswami wishes to partition his holding assessed for purpose of agriculture under section 59 or any part thereof amongst his legal heirs during his life time, he may apply for partition of such holding or part thereof to the Tahsildar. (2) The Tahsildar may after hearing the legal heirs divide the holding or part thereof and apportion the assessment in accordance with the rules made under this Code.]" 17. Thus, from the plain reading of this section, it is clear that if the property is ancestral or joint property, only then the same can be partitioned amongst the co-owner. Partition presupposes that the properties in question are joint or ancestral. An individual holding cannot be put for partition under section 178 of M.P.L.R. Code. 18. The Supreme Court in the case of Shub Karan Bubna v. Sita Saran Bubna reported in (2009) 9 SCC 689 has held as under : 5. “Partition” is a redistribution or adjustment of pre-existing rights, among coowners/coparceners, resulting in a division of lands or other properties jointly held by them into different lots or portions and delivery thereof to the respective allottees. The effect of such division is that the joint ownership is terminated and the respective shares vest in them in severalty. 6. A partition of a property can be only among those having a share or interest in it. A person who does not have a share in such property cannot obviously be a party to a partition. “Separation of share” is a species of “partition”. When all co-owners get separated, it is a partition. Separation of share(s) refers to a division where only one or only a few among several coowners/coparceners get separated, and others continue to be joint or continue to hold the remaining property jointly without division by metes and bounds. For example, where four brothers owning a property divide it among themselves by metes and bounds, it is a partition. But if only one brother wants to get his share separated and other three brothers continue to remain joint, there is only a separation of the share of one brother. 19. For example, where four brothers owning a property divide it among themselves by metes and bounds, it is a partition. But if only one brother wants to get his share separated and other three brothers continue to remain joint, there is only a separation of the share of one brother. 19. Thus, the conduct of the respondents and Kamal Singh, in filing an application under section 178 of M.P.L.R. Code, itself show that the properties in dispute were still joint and were not separated as claimed by them. Thus, it is clear from the conduct of the respondents themselves that the so called registered sale deed dated 26.9.1969 and Will dated 4.10.1988 were nothing but were sham documents, which were never acted upon by the respondents themselves, and since, the partition took place on 21.11.2007, therefore, section 6(5) of Hindu Succession Act, would not apply to the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, the findings given by the Additional Commissioner, Bhopal Division Bhopal are erroneous and contrary to law. 20. There is another important aspect of the matter, which cannot be lost sight of. The order of partition dated 21.11.2007 was challenged by the petitioner by filing an appeal before the S.D.O., Vidisha on 19.8.2016 along with an application for condonation of delay. It was mentioned in the application, that the petitioner was not aware of the order of partition dated 21.11.2007, therefore, the appeal could not be filed within the period of limitation. According to the petitioner, the delay in filing the appeal was condoned by the S.D.O. Vidisha. Thus, it is clear that the S.D.O., Vidisha had come to a conclusion that since, the petitioner was not aware of the order of partition dated 21.11.2007, therefore, She could not file the appeal within the period of limitation. The order of S.D.O., by which the delay in filing the appeal was condoned, was never challenged by the respondents, thus, it is clear that the petitioner was not aware of the order of partition dated 21.11.2007. The order of S.D.O., by which the delay in filing the appeal was condoned, was never challenged by the respondents, thus, it is clear that the petitioner was not aware of the order of partition dated 21.11.2007. Further the contention of the Counsel for the respondents, that since, the registered sale deed dated 26.9.1969 and “Will” dated 4.10.1988 were never challenged by the petitioner, therefore, She cannot challenge the correctness of these documents is concerned, this Court has already come to a conclusion, that by filing an application under section 178 of M.P.L.R. Code, the respondents by their own conduct had proved that the registered sale deed dated 26.9.1969 and “Will” dated 4-10-1988 were never acted upon and the properties in dispute were still joint/ancestral in nature, therefore, when according to the respondents themselves, when these documents were sham documents, and were never intended to be acted upon, then in the considered opinion of this Court, no adverse inference can be drawn against the petitioner, if She had not challenged the said documents. Further, it is clear from the mutation proceedings as well as partition proceedings, no notice was ever issued to the petitioner. Thus, both the orders were obtained by the respondents, behind her back. No separate orders were passed by the authorities while mutating the names of the respondents. The Supreme Court in the case of Rangammal v. Kuppuswami, reported in (2011) 12 SCC 220 has held as under : 31. Application of section 101 of the Evidence Act, 1872 thus came up for discussion in Subhra Mukherjee case and while discussing the law on the burden of proof in the context of dealing with the allegation of sham and bogus transaction, it was held that the party which makes the allegation must prove it. But the Court was further pleased to hold, wherein the question before the Court was “whether the transaction in question was a bona fide and genuine one” so that the party/plaintiff relying on the transaction had to first of all prove its genuineness and only thereafter would the defendant be required to discharge the burden in order to dislodge such proof and establish that the transaction was sham and fictitious. This ratio can aptly be relied upon in this matter as in this particular case, it is Respondent 1-plaintiff Kuppuswami who relied upon the alleged sale deed dated 24.2.1951 and included the subject-matter of the property which formed part of the sale deed and claimed partition. This sale deed was denied by the appellant defendant on the ground that it was bogus and a sham transaction which was executed admittedly in 1951 when she was a minor. 32. Thus, it was Respondent 1-plaintiff who should have first of all discharged the burden that the sale deed executed during the minority of the appellant was genuine and was fit to be relied upon. If the Courts below including the High Court had felt satisfied on this aspect, only then the burden could be shifted on the appellant-defendant to dislodge the case of the plaintiff that the sale deed was not genuine. 21. There is another important aspect of the matter. By registered sale deed dated 26.9.1969, survey No. 643 and 644 (renumbered as 505/2) were given to Kamal Singh and by “Will” dated 4.10.1988 Survey No. 164, 165, ½ of 141, ½ of 398, 440, 0.115 out of 447, 448, 0.626 out of 506/1 to respondent No. 2 Rajesh Singh, whereas 0.062 hectares out of 134, 0.225 hectares out of 141/2, 1.777 hectares out of 392/2, 3.073 hectares out of 449 and 3 hectares out of 505 were given to respondent No. 1. 22. Whereas by partition, Survey No. 412/1, 440, 447/2, 448, 449/1 and 449/2 were given to Kamal Singh whereas Survey No. 134/1,1411/1, 142/2, 429, 505/2 were given to respondent No. 1 whereas Survey No. 141/1, 142/1, 398/1, 398/2, 472, 473, 476, 505/1 were given to respondent No. 2. Thus, it is clear that different lands were given in partition to the respondents and Kamal Singh. If the contentions of the Counsel for the respondents, that they had become owners of the lands in dispute by virtue of registered sale deed and “Will”, is accepted, then they cannot transfer their ownership to a different person by partition. Either they have to exchange their lands or they have to sell the same, but by partition, different lands cannot be given. Either they have to exchange their lands or they have to sell the same, but by partition, different lands cannot be given. Thus, it is clear that the registered sale deed dated 26.9.1969 and “Will” dated 4.10.1988 were never acted upon and they were sham documents and in fact the entire property remained joint/ancestral till 21.11.2007, when the same was partitioned on the application filed by the respondents and Kamal Singh under section 178 of M.P.L.R. Code. 23. The next contention of the Counsel for the respondents, that the S.D.O. Vidisha, in his order, has included even those lands which were already disposed of either by Prem Singh or Kamal Singh is concerned, suffice it to say, that it is apparent from the impugned order passed by the Additional Commissioner, Bhopal Division Bhopal, as well as the order dated 20.2.2007 passed by the S.D.O. Vidisha, that no such objection was ever raised by the respondents either before the S.D.O. Vidisha or the Additional Commissioner, Bhopal Division, Bhopal. Even the copy of reply submitted before the Court of S.D.O. Vidisha or the memo of appeal filed before the Additional Commissioner, Bhopal Division Bhopal has not been placed on record. Thus, it appears that the factual objection with regard to sale of some of the properties by Prem Singh and Kamal Singh during their life time, was never raised by the respondents before the Courts below. Therefore, they cannot be allowed to raise this objection before this Court for the first time. 24. A co-ordinate bench of this Court, in the case of Samudri Bai and others v. Mohit Kumar Jain and ors. reported in 2018(2) MPLJ 398 has held as under : "12. Even otherwise, it is settled law that jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be exercised to correct all errors of subordinate Court acting within its limitation. It can be exercised where the order is passed in grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principle of law and justice. Even otherwise, it is settled law that jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be exercised to correct all errors of subordinate Court acting within its limitation. It can be exercised where the order is passed in grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principle of law and justice. [See Jai Singh and another v. MCD, (2010) 9 SCC 385 and Shalini Shetty v. Rajendra S. Patil, 2010(4) M.P.L.J. (S.C.) 590= (2010) 8 SCC 329 .] Further co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Ashutosh Dubey and another v. Tilak Grih Nirman Sahakari Samiti Maryadit, Bhopal and another, 2004(3) M.P.L.J. 213 = 2004(2) MPHT 14 held that Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is exercised for keeping the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. Accordingly, the present writ petition is dismissed." 25. From the above mentioned discussion, it is clear that the error in the order of the Additional Commissioner, Bhopal Division Bhopal is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings as the same has been passed in utter disregard of the provisions of law. 26. Resultantly, the order dated 25.10.2018 passed by Additional Commissioner, Bhopal Division Bhopal in case No. 189/Appeal/2016- 2017 is hereby set aside, and the order dated 20.2.2017 passed by S.D.O., Vidisha in case No. 147/Appeal/2015-2016 is hereby restored. 27. The petition succeeds and is hereby Allowed with cost of Rs. 26. Resultantly, the order dated 25.10.2018 passed by Additional Commissioner, Bhopal Division Bhopal in case No. 189/Appeal/2016- 2017 is hereby set aside, and the order dated 20.2.2017 passed by S.D.O., Vidisha in case No. 147/Appeal/2015-2016 is hereby restored. 27. The petition succeeds and is hereby Allowed with cost of Rs. 10,000/-, to be deposited in the Account of Legal Aid Services Authority, Gwalior within a period of one month from today.