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2019 DIGILAW 469 (GAU)

Rahul Kumar v. Central Bureau of Investigation CBI

2019-04-11

RUMI KUMARI PHUKAN

body2019
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. J.I. Borbhuiya, learned counsel appearing for and on behalf of the petitioner as well as Mr. S.C. Keyal, learned standing counsel for the C.B.I., appearing for the respondent No.1. 2. By filing this petition u/s.482, read with Section 397/401 CrPC, the petitioner prays for setting aside and quashing the entire proceeding of C.R. Case No.1183C/2009, originating from the FIR No.RC.2/S/2007-Kol, dated 21.06.2007 along with consequential order dated 27.09.2013, passed on Petition No.104, by the learned Juvenile Justice Board at Dibrugarh. 3. The case of the petitioner is that on 21.06.2007, the C.B.I., without having any notification of the concerned authority or any order from any Court, registered an FIR vide FIR No.RC.2/S/2007-Kol, dated 21.06.2007 and started investigation of the matter, despite the fact that the CBI was not granted consent as required under the law. On completion of the investigation, charge sheet was filed before the learned Special Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Assam at Guwahati. Accordingly the learned trial Court registered the C.R. Case No.1183C/2009, u/s.120-B/420/471 of the IPC and took cognizance of the case vide order dated 26.03.2009 and issued summons to the petitioner. 4. According to the petitioner the CBI had no document to show that the CBI had any authority under the provisions of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, as amended up-to-date or any consent/order/direction of the Court to register and to investigate the case. After appearing in case the petitioner on 11.06.2009 filed the petition No.1506, before the learned Special Judicial Magistrate u/s.7(A) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the J.J. Act) and the learned trial Magistrate, vide order dated 10.08.2009 declared that the petitioner was entitled to the benefit under the J.J. Act and accordingly declaring him as juvenile, directed to appear before the Juvenile Justice Board at Guwahati, vide order dated 14.10.2009. 5. After appearance before the Juvenile Justice Board, Guwahati the petitioner by a petition being No.1012/2009, seeks transfer of the case from the learned Juvenile Justice Board at Guwahati to the Juvenile Justice Board at Lakhisarai, Bihar as his native village was at Lakhisarai and the learned trial Court, vide order dated 11.11.2009, without taking any decision upon the petition of the petitioner, directed the petitioner to appear before the learned Juvenile Justice Board at Dibrugarh. 6. 6. The petitioner, after appearing before the Juvenile Justice Board at Dibrugarh again moved a petition for transferring the case on 05.10.2010 for transferring the case from Juvenile Justice Board at Dibrugarh to the Juvenile Justice Board at Lakhisarai, Bihar but the Juvenile Justice Board at Dibrugarh rejected the prayer by order dated 14.05.2010, on the ground that the case is at premature stage. Thereafter the petitioner moved another petition on 08.04.2011, under Rule 13, SubRule (6),(7) and (8) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the J.J. Rules), with a prayer to terminate the proceeding as under the provision, it was mandatory on the part of the J.J. Board to complete the proceeding within a period of four months. His prayer was also rejected and proceeded for recording the evidence. 7. Thereafter on completion of the evidence, the petitioner again moved a petition under Rule 78(i)(iii) of the J.J. Rules, seeking transfer of the case to Lakhisarai but same was not considered and rejected on the ground that the evidence/inquiry not completed, vide order dated 27.09.2013. 8. Challenging all above orders, the present petition has been preferred on the ground that due to non-consideration of the prayer of the petitioner under the relevant provisions, the entire proceeding is vitiated and the petitioner is deprived of Natural Justice and has made the prayer for setting aside and quash the impugned order dated 27.09.2013 as well as the entire proceeding thereof. It is submitted that the J.J. Board at Dibrugarh has acted illegally and arbitrarily without considering the relevant provisions and without obtaining the consent of the State Government, the C.B.I. has registered the case by violating the provisions of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act. It contends that the petitioner who is a juvenile have no near relative or parents in Assam and for the best interest of the juvenile, the J.J. Board at Dibrugarh should have transferred the case as sought for but by overlooking the provisions of law and the Rules, has flouted the provision and thereby committed gross irregularity which has vitiated the entire proceeding and hence liable to be quashed and set aside. 9. 9. In the entire petition the petitioner has not depicted the case under which he was booked but from the documents that has been annexed it can be found that a complaint dated 19.01.2007 was lodged by Sri K.V.S. Rao Deputy Secretary to the Govt. of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, New Delhi that under the signature of officers from Ministry of Health and Family Welfare Department Govt. of India some students tried to get admission on fake documents to MBBS/PG Course in the Medical College of Assam under 15% All India Quota. Initially matter was assigned to Assam police to investigate the case but however Govt. of India decided to handover the investigation to the CBI in view of the enormity of the issue and the seriousness thereof. During investigation it was revealed that the present applicant Rahul Kumar along with other entered into a conspiracy and on the basis of forged documents secured their admission in Assam Medical College, Dibrugarh in the year 2003 under 15% All India Quota without qualifying the pre-medical test conducted by CBSE and without counseling and even they did not fulfill the requisite criteria of getting admission in MBBS course under 15% all India quota. At the end of the investigation, conducted by CBI, charge-sheet was submitted u/s 120B/420/471 of IPC against accused petitioner and other to the effect that accused Rahul Kumar and Aviral Watsa entered into criminal conspiracy along with the then Secretary of State of Assam, Bhuded Basumatary (now expired) for securing their admission in the Assam Medical College, Dibrugarh under all India quota. 10. After filing of the charge-sheet as on 26.03.2009 before the Court Special Judicial Magistrate, Assam, Guwahati took cognizance of the offence but however, on the petition filed by the accused petitioner Rahul Kumar u/s 7A JJ Act, the learned Court conducted an enquiry and after hearing the matter declared the accused as juvenile and split up the case of the present petitioner from other accused and forwarded the case for trial by the JJ Board, Guwahati fixing on 14.10.2009. The learned JJB at Guwahati forwarded the case to the JJB, Dibrugarh for trial as the alleged offence took place in Dibrugarh where the petitioner got admitted in the Assam Medical College, Dibrugarh. The learned JJB at Guwahati forwarded the case to the JJB, Dibrugarh for trial as the alleged offence took place in Dibrugarh where the petitioner got admitted in the Assam Medical College, Dibrugarh. As has been mentioned above, the petitioner moved a petition before JJB Dibrugarh for transfer of the case to the JJB of Lakhisrai, Bihar on the ground that he belongs to that district. The learned JJB rejected the prayer for transfer initially on the ground that it was at pre-mature stage for transfer, vide order dated 14.05.2010 and 06.05.2011, on the ground that the offence committed by petitioner is serious in nature. Subsequent thereto the petitioner again filed another petition on 26.07.2013 for transfer of the case as, earlier, as per provision of Rule 78(I) (III) of JJ Rules 2007 on the ground he has no relative within the jurisdiction of JJB, Dibrugarh so the case should be transferred to Lakhisrai, Bihar. The learned JJ Board, Dibrugarh in its order dated 27.09.2013 (which is impugned here) observed that the evidence and cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses have already been completed and no more witnesses left to be examined. The learned JJB after hearing the submission of the petitioners side and on consideration of objection filed by CBI, was of opinion that as the petitioner has not challenged the earlier order of rejection for transfer dated 14.05.2010 by way of appeal u/s 52 of the Act and while he is still continuing his studies in Assam Medical College Hospital at Dibrugarh, the petitioner has forfeited his right to apply fresh petition as stipulated under Rule 78(I)(III) of the JJ Rules, 2007 and also observed that JJB Dibrugarh has the jurisdiction to try the case u/s 177 CrPC and the case is at the final stage and there is no question of granting transfer for the interest of the petitioner who has already turned major warranting no care and protection from his parents. 11. Challenging the aforesaid order, the present petition has been preferred by the petitioner on the ground that due to gross violation of the provision, the entire proceeding before the JJB, Dibrugarh, being illegal is liable to be quashed and set aside. 12. Resisting the prayer, the respondent/CBI has filed the affidavit-in-opposition submitting inter-alia that there is no authenticity in the allegation that the CBI has registered the case without being authorized by the Central Govt. 12. Resisting the prayer, the respondent/CBI has filed the affidavit-in-opposition submitting inter-alia that there is no authenticity in the allegation that the CBI has registered the case without being authorized by the Central Govt. or the State Govt. It is stated that the Central Govt. has extended the jurisdiction to the CBI to investigate the case in Assam by virtue of notification as required u/s.5 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, which is already known to the petitioner as same was divulged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court at the time of hearing of the SLP, filed by the petitioner and others. It is submitted that their investigation reveals that as many as nine candidates got admitted in MBBS and BDS courses in different Medical Colleges of Assam under 15% of All India quota, based on forged documents, purportedly issued by the Director General of Health Services, Govt. of India. As regard the other contention of the petitioner, for transfer of the case it is submitted that since the alleged offence was committed in Assam Medical College, Dibrugarh, where separate JJ Board exists, the case was rightly transferred to the JJ Board, Dibrugarh and subsequent prayer for transfer from Dibrugarh to Lakhisarai was also rejected as the trial had to continue. At the subsequent stage again such a prayer was rejected, as the case was at the final stage of adjudication and the petitioner was no more a juvenile. Accordingly it is submitted that the petitioner has taken a delaying tactics and is trying to divert the attention of the Court from the actual crime which was alleged to have been committed by him by taking undue shadow of being a juvenile and deserved to be rejected with a direction to conclude the trial at Dibrugarh, to its logical end. The petition is liable to be dismissed in limine. 13. The learned counsel Mr. Borbhuyain for the petitioner and Mr. Keyal for CBI argued at length and same is considered. Perused LCR and relevant documents annexed as well as the relevant provision of law under the J.J Act and Rules. 14. Primarily, assailing the impugned order dated 27.09.13 and proceeding before the JJB for non- compliance of the procedure while conducting trial and transfer of the proceeding, present petition has been preferred. Perused LCR and relevant documents annexed as well as the relevant provision of law under the J.J Act and Rules. 14. Primarily, assailing the impugned order dated 27.09.13 and proceeding before the JJB for non- compliance of the procedure while conducting trial and transfer of the proceeding, present petition has been preferred. Learned counsel for the petitioner by referring to Section 53 of the JJ Act has submitted that although he has not preferred any appeal as required u/s 52 of the Act but has preferred the present revision u/s 53 of the JJ Act before the the High Court, as the High Court can entertain such revision on its own or on the application received on this behalf. On the next provision of Section 38 of JJ Act coupled with the Section 50 and the Rule 13 (6) (7) (8) as well as Rule 78 (III) has been referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner, to submit that as per the mandate of law if the child hails from outside the jurisdiction then such juvenile shall be transferred to the Board having jurisdiction and as per Rule 13 of JJ Rules, enquiry by the Board shall be completed within 4 (four) months which may be extended for another 2 (two) months in exceptional cases and the delayed proceeding beyond 4 (four) to 6 (six) months, it shall lead to termination of the proceeding. Accordingly it is contended that such a proceeding liable to be terminated because of delayed proceeding without complying the procedure. On the other hand, under Rule 78 such a juvenile hails from outside the jurisdiction of the Board and so it should be transferred to the concerned State or District but the prayer of the present petitioner who hails from Bihar for transfer of the case was not considered neither the proceeding was terminated hence it contends that the entire proceeding has been vitiated. 15. The learned counsel for the respondent Mr. Keyal has however submitted that on account of the serious nature of the offence there was some delay in the proceeding and in the meantime recording of evidence has been completed and the case is at the verge of conclusion of the proceeding and the juvenile turns to be a major by this time, nothing survives on the part of the petitioner to insist either for transfer or termination of the proceeding. A certified copy of the order of Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP Crl. No. 9552/2012 and other series of SLP connected dated 25.10.2016 it has been annexed to submit that the petitioners herein on earlier occasion also came for quashing of the proceeding before the High Court challenging the investigation carried out by CBI u/s 482 CrPC as the same was not allowed, the petitioners challenged the aforesaid finding by way of SLP before the Hon’ble Supreme Court but the aforesaid SLP was also dismissed by order dated 25.10.2016 with a direction to the trial Court to expedite the trial and compete the same as early as possible. I have gone through the said order annexed. 16. Upon entire scrutiny of the matter, it is found that a serious complaint was lodged against the present petitioner that by producing forged documents, stated to be issued by the Authority under the Central Govt., the petitioner got admitted in the Assam Medical College in the year 2003 and the matter of such fake admission came into picture in the year 2007 when the complaint was lodged by Deputy Secretary to the Govt. of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. Initially Assam Police registered the case and started investigation and subsequently CBI was entrusted to the investigation and filing the charge sheet on 14.01.2009 u/s 120B/420/471 of IPC before the Special Judicial Magistrate, Assam and the plea of juvenility raised by the present petitioner was taken into consideration and after due enquiry, the petitioner was declared to be juvenile and the case was split up against him. Thereafter the case of the petitioner was forwarded for trial by the Juvenile Justice Board, Guwahati. Subsequent thereto, the accused was forwarded to the JJB, Dibrugarh as the occurrence took place at Dibrugarh. The petitioner filed petitions before the JJB Dibrugarh one after another praying for transfer of the proceeding or to terminate the proceeding which was taken up by the learned JJB and also disposed of by different orders discussed above. The Board framed the charge on 11.06.2010 u/s 417/471/120B of IPC against the petitioner and summoned the witnesses who hails from Delhi, Bhopal, Calcutta Guwahati etc. and the evidence was recorded time to time as soon as the officer concerned appeared before the JJB pursuant to service of notice. The Board framed the charge on 11.06.2010 u/s 417/471/120B of IPC against the petitioner and summoned the witnesses who hails from Delhi, Bhopal, Calcutta Guwahati etc. and the evidence was recorded time to time as soon as the officer concerned appeared before the JJB pursuant to service of notice. It is to be noted that the majority of witnesses were outside the State of Assam and prosecution examined as many as 16 witnesses including the handwriting expert and their evidence was recorded at length consuming much time. Moreover, time was also consumed for transferring the case from one place to another inasmuch as in deciding the plea of juvenility. It appears that the delay in conducting the trial/proceeding was inevitable and no illegality can be attributed to the entire proceeding. The learned JJB with utmost sincerity has attended the case in examining the witnesses by giving reasonable time for appearance of the witnesses from outside including the AGPQD from Calcutta and other witnesses from Delhi, Guwahati and sometimes witnesses prayed time for their appearance. All thorough the proceeding, the petitioner was allowed to be represented by the engaged counsel as sought for. LCR reveals that after examining all the prosecution witnesses the case is fixed for statement, defence and argument on 26.07.2013 and pursuant to the filing of the present petition there was stay of the proceeding and the LCR was called for. In the given circumstances the case could not be concluded by the Board. 17. Now, let us appreciate the provision referred by the petitioner. Matter of transfer of child before Child Welfare Committee has find place u/s Section 38 of JJ Act under Chapter III "child in need of care and protection". Section 38 read as follows: Transfer- (1) If during the inquiry it is found that the child hails from the place outside the jurisdiction of the Committee, the Committee shall order the transfer of the child to the competent authority having jurisdiction over the place of residence of the child. (2) Such juvenile or the child shall be escorted by the staff of the home in which he is lodged originally. (3) The State Government may make rules to provide for the travelling allowance to be paid to the child. Obviously the aforesaid provision relates to the child in need of care and protection, not related to juvenile. (2) Such juvenile or the child shall be escorted by the staff of the home in which he is lodged originally. (3) The State Government may make rules to provide for the travelling allowance to be paid to the child. Obviously the aforesaid provision relates to the child in need of care and protection, not related to juvenile. The provision of Section 50 now relates to the juvenile under the Chapter V Miscellaneous which read as follows: Sending a juvenile or child outside jurisdiction- In the case of a juvenile or the child, whose ordinary place of residence lies outside the jurisdiction of the competent authority before which he is brought, the competent authority may, if satisfied after due inquiry that it is expedient so to do, send the juvenile or the child back to a relative or other person who is fit and willing to receive him at his ordinary place of residence and exercise proper care and control over him, notwithstanding that such place of residence is outside the jurisdiction of the competent authority; and the competent authority exercising jurisdiction over the place to which the juvenile or the child is sent shall in respect of any matter arising subsequently have the same powers in relation to the juvenile or the child as if the original order had been passed by itself. 18. Bare reading of the provision reflects that such a sending of juvenile is subject to satisfaction of the Board after due enquiry, if it is expedient for the best interest of the child. The order of the JJB reflects that the court was not inclined to transfer the case of the petitioner due to the fact that the petitioner is already studying in AMC, Dibrugarh and no more juvenile so as to transfer the case. That apart, serious nature of the offence was also taken into account while addressing the issue. The order of the JJB reflects that the court was not inclined to transfer the case of the petitioner due to the fact that the petitioner is already studying in AMC, Dibrugarh and no more juvenile so as to transfer the case. That apart, serious nature of the offence was also taken into account while addressing the issue. That apart, Rule 78 (III) of JJ Rules 2007 provides that such a transfer can only take place after completion of the evidence and cross-examination thereof with reasons to be recorded by the Board which is read as follows: Transfer - (1) During the inquiry, if it is found that the juvenile or child hails from a place outside the jurisdiction of the Board or Committee, the Board or Committee shall order the transfer of the juvenile or child and send a copy of the order to the State Government or State or District Child Protection Unit: Provided that : (i) such transfer is in the best interest of the juvenile or child; (ii) no child shall be transferred or proposed to be transferred only on the ground that the child has created problems or, has become difficult to be managed in the existing institution or, is suffering from a chronic or terminal illness or, on account of disability; (iii) such transfer shall only take place after the completion of evidence and cross-examination that may be required in a legal proceeding involving a juvenile or child; and (iv) the reasons for and circumstances of such transfer are recorded in writing. 19. The provision incorporated in the Act and Rules itself reveals that such a transfer is not automatic nor it creates absolute right upon the juvenile to seek transfer. Similarly, termination of proceeding is not at all mandatory if the proceeding continue beyond 6 (six) months and only requirement that has been mandated under 13 sub-Clause 8 is that in such situation the Board shall send a periodic report of the case to Chief Judicial Magistrate or Chief Metropolitan Magistrate stating the reason for delay as well as the steps being taking to expedite the matter. Obviously no absolute right is created in favour of juvenile to claim termination of proceeding if the proceeding continued beyond 6 (six) months. Obviously no absolute right is created in favour of juvenile to claim termination of proceeding if the proceeding continued beyond 6 (six) months. Now, so far as the fact that whether the Board concerned submitted such periodic report or not to the CJM concerned can be ascertained from the administrative file of the office concerned which is not placed before this Court. Even for non-compliance of the same it will not render the entire proceeding a nullity. 20. From the findings and discussions above, it can be held that there is no irregularity and illegality in the order so passed by the JJB, Dibrugarh by rejecting the prayer for transfer of the case taking note of the serious nature of the offence as well as the fact that the petitioner is not required to be sent to his relatives or parents by this time. Nothing appears to interfere into the impugned order so as to invoke the revisional jurisdiction nor it is a fit case to quash the proceeding as has been sought for. 21. Needless to say that the power u/s 482 CrPC can be invoked to prevent the abuse of process of law and to ensure justice to litigants. In exercise of such wholesome power the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to a conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of process of court or that ends of justice is required that proceeding ought to be quashed and present matter reflects no such abuse of process. 22. In (2006) 4 SCC 359 Minu Kumari and Another Vs. State of Bihar and Others, it has been held that Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not confer any new power on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. 23. In view of all above, this Court is of opinion that petitioner is not entitled to get relief as sought for. Petition stands dismissed. 24. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. 23. In view of all above, this Court is of opinion that petitioner is not entitled to get relief as sought for. Petition stands dismissed. 24. Return the LCR with direction to the JJB, Dibrugarh to conclude the case so as to arrive at a logical end, as early as possible.