ORDER : 1. The present petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is filed for the purpose of seeking the following reliefs : “(A) This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, direction or order quashing and setting aside the Judgment and order dtd: 6-2-2017 passed by the 15th Add. District Judge, Savli in Misc. Civil Appeal no.101 of 2015. (B) Pending the hearing and the final disposal of the petition, the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to stay the Judgment and order dtd: 6-2-2017 passed by the 15th Add. District Judge, Savli in Misc. Civil Appeal no.101 of 2015 and the order dtd: 26-10-2015 passed below Exh.-5 and 24 in Reg. Civil Suit no.11 of 2015. (C) This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to grant such other and further relief as necessary in the interest of justice.” 2. The case of the petitioners is that father of respondent No.1 had executed a 'banakhat' in favour of father of present petitioners on 22.6.1981 and thereafter on 23.1.2015, respondent No.1 had sold the said property to respondent No.2 by way of registered sale deed and on account of that, the controversy generated amongst the parties which has resulted into filing of a complaint before Waghodia Police Station on 23-1-2015 which ultimately led the petitioners to file Regular Civil Suit No. 11 of 2015 along with an injunction application below Exh.5 for protecting the possession of the suit land. However, said application has been rejected by the trial court which is made the subject matter of present petition. 3. Mr. Nirav C. Bhatt, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners has submitted that both the courts below, without examining the material produced on record and without considering the Court Commissioner's report have come to an erroneous conclusion, as a result of this, order in question deserves to be corrected. It has further been contended that Court Commissioner's report which has been prepared with the consent of parties is indicating the factum of possession of the petitioners and hence, during the pendency of the suit proceedings, the possession of the petitioners ought to have been protected. It has further been contended that Court Commissioner's report which has been prepared with the consent of parties is indicating the factum of possession of the petitioners and hence, during the pendency of the suit proceedings, the possession of the petitioners ought to have been protected. It has further been contended that both the courts below have materially erred in appreciating documentary evidences and has adopted too technical measure without realising that on account of non-grant of interim relief, an irreversible situation will be created, hence, courts below have not exercised jurisdiction in its proper perspective, as a result of this, such a serious error of jurisdiction deserves to be corrected. Mr. Bhatt has further contended that even the reasons which are assigned by the courts below are not sufficient enough to justify the conclusion and since the findings being perverse to the record, there is hardly any case made out to justify the conclusion. No other submissions have been made. 4. To meet with the stand taken by the learned advocate for the petitioners, Mr. Trilok J.Patel, learned advocate appearing for contesting respondents has vehemently contended that this petition is basically under Article 227 of constitution of India against the concurrent findings of fact and in the absence of any material irregularity or perversity, the same even if another view is possible may not be substituted, as a result of this, impugned order is not required to be interfered with. It has further been contended that while refusing protection, even the Court Commissioner's report has also been examined by the court below and both the courts have arrived at the conclusion for not granting relief in favour of the petitioners, as a result of this, such concurrent findings of facts may not be made the subject matter of exercise of extra-ordinary equitable jurisdiction. 5. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the parties and having gone through the material on record, it appears that the courts below have clearly examined the Court Commissioner's report as well as the documentary evidence adduced and the trial court in para 9 has clearly come to the conclusion that no case is made out. Even such exercise is undertaken by the appellate court after analysing the documentary evidence produced on record and a specific conclusion has been arrived at by the appellate court in paras 14 and 15 which reads as under: “14. Even such exercise is undertaken by the appellate court after analysing the documentary evidence produced on record and a specific conclusion has been arrived at by the appellate court in paras 14 and 15 which reads as under: “14. While perusing the pleadings of the plaintiff's, it appears that the plaintiff has based his suit on the facts of possession over the suit property, since June 1981. As discussed above, plaintiff has not denied the fact that the disputed agricultural land come in the share of the respondent no. 1, being sole heir of her deceased father. At the time of placing injunction application Exh. 5, plaintiff claimed his occupancy and long and peaceful possession over the disputed land. To prove this fact, plaintiff needs to produce evidence, to show that, he is either cultivating or using the disputed agricultural land and the defendants have illegally obstructed him, only to snatch away the possession. Plaintiff has moved an application for Court Commissioner to bring the actual position of the land and Court Commissioner has also submitted his Commission Report. Perusing the same, the heavily relied 'Banakhat', does not match with the Court Commissioners report on several counts. Measurements as well as four boundaries does not tally. Further, the 'banakhat' is unregistered and executed only on Rs. 10/- Stamp Papers. Now, in view of the proceeding initiated by the plaintiff, perusing the impugned Order, the claim of plaintiffs runs contradictory to the documentary evidences on record. Appellants have also relied on several cash vouchers and affidavits of adjoining land owners of the disputed land. While, the respondents have produced registered sell deed of the disputed property. Thus, it was rightly come to the conclusion by the Ld. Trial Court, that without examining the legality of the unregistered Banakhat as well as of the Cash receipts, the same can not be relied solely to come to the conclusion that, plaintiffs have prima facie case. As per the Registered Sell deed and possession receipt, respondent no. 2 is the owner and possessor of the property. Appellant miserably failed to establish his case before the Ld. Trial Court and it appears from the impugned Order that, Ld. Trial Court has assigned all reasons for not accepting the plaintiff's claim regarding peaceful possession over the disputed lands. 15. Considering the above facts, appellant is not entitled to equitable relief. Appellant miserably failed to establish his case before the Ld. Trial Court and it appears from the impugned Order that, Ld. Trial Court has assigned all reasons for not accepting the plaintiff's claim regarding peaceful possession over the disputed lands. 15. Considering the above facts, appellant is not entitled to equitable relief. Appellant, neither from the documentary evidence nor from the circumstances, succeeded in proving that there remains prima facie case and balance of convenience in favour of him and therefore, the trial Court's order, does not warrant any interference, hence I decide issue no.1 in “Negative' and following order is passed. ORDER This Appeal from Order is hereby dismissed. The impugned order passed by the Ld. 2Nd Addl. Civil Judge, Waghodia below an application Exh. 5 in Regular Civil Suit No. 11 of 2015 dated 26.10.2015 is hereby confirmed. Parties to bear their own Cost. Cost Memo be prepared accordingly. Necessary Yadi be sent to Ld. trial Court, accordingly. xxx xxx xxx” 6. In view of the aforesaid finding of fact, it has been concurrently held by both the courts below that no case is made out in favour of the petitioners and no perversity or material irregularity is reflecting in the orders in question, hence, this Court is of the considered opinion that no case is made to call for any interference. In arriving at this conclusion, this Court has considered the parameters prescribed by the Hon'ble Court in the case of Sameer Suresh Gupta through PA Holder Vs. Rahul Kumar Agarwal reported in (2013)9 Supreme Court Cases 374 and the relevant observations made in paras 6 and 7 are sufficient enough to indicate that in the background of present facts and circumstances, case is not possible to be accepted. The said observations made in paras 6 and 7 since relevant are reproduced hereinafter : “6. In our view, the impugned order is liable to be set aside because while deciding the writ petition filed by the respondent the learned Single Judge ignored the limitations of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. The parameters for exercise of power by the High Court under that Article were considered by the two Judge Bench of this Court in Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai and others (2003) 6 SCC 675 . The parameters for exercise of power by the High Court under that Article were considered by the two Judge Bench of this Court in Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai and others (2003) 6 SCC 675 . After considering various facets of the issue, the two Judge Bench culled out the following principles: "(1) Amendment by Act No.46 of 1999 with effect from 01-07-2002 in Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by the CPC Amendment Act No. 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction, i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction - by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction - by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When the subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident, i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long -drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case." 7. The same question was considered by another Bench in Shalini Shyam Shetty vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 329 , and it was held : "(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh, followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, "within the bounds of their authority". (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality." 7. In view of the above parameters laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present petition being devoid of merits deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. Notice is discharged. 8. However, in view of the aforesaid situation, liberty is granted to the petitioners to file an application seeking expeditious hearing of the main Civil Suit. As and when such an application is given by the petitioners, it would be open for the learned trial Judge to consider the same in accordance with law considering his roster.