Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 475 (ALL)

Anil Kumar Major v. Madanlal

2019-02-21

JASPREET SINGH

body2019
ORDER : JASPREET SINGH, J. 1. This second appeal has been preferred by the defendant calling in question, the judgment and decree dated 04.10.2017 passed by the Additional District Judge (Vishista Nyayalaya) Lakhimpur Khiri in First Appeal No. 96 of 2010 (Akhilesh Kumar and others vs. Madanlal and others) by which the First Appellant Court has upheld the judgment and decree dated 30.10.2010 passed by the Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division, Lakhimpur Khiri in R.S. no. 107 of 1992 by which the suit of the respondent was decreed. 2. At the time of admission of the second appeal, the following substantial questions of law were framed which are mentioned herein under:- "(a) Whether the suit and first appeal could have been decided by the first appellate court as well as trial court to decree the suit of plaintiff-opposite party permitting the plaintiff to set up a new case, beyond his pleadings? (b) Whether the alleged partition deed could have been read in evidence in the teeth of bar of Section 49 of Registration Act, 1908? (c) Whether the first appeal could not have been decreed by the first appellate court without framing the points of determination, decision thereon and reason for decision as required under Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C.?" 3. The Court has heard Sri Zainuddin Mohammad Siddiq for the appellant and Sri K.S. Rastogi for the respondent. 4. The principle submission of the learned counsel for appellant is that in a suit for declaration and arrears of rent and ejectment, it was necessary for the plaintiff respondent to have established his title as well as the relationship of landlord and tenant, failing which no effective decree could have been passed. He further went on to urge that the sole basis upon which the trial court has decreed the suit and the First Appellant Court has concurred with the said finding is the document bearing paper no. Ka 63 which was a document of partition dated 07.04.1991 and since the said document was neither registered nor stamped. Therefore, it could not have been taken note of by the courts of law as it was hit by section 49 of the Registration Act. Ka 63 which was a document of partition dated 07.04.1991 and since the said document was neither registered nor stamped. Therefore, it could not have been taken note of by the courts of law as it was hit by section 49 of the Registration Act. If the said document is ignored then neither the relationship of landlord and tenant nor the title of the plaintiff in respect of the property was established and therefore the courts have erred in placing reliance upon on inadmissible document, which has vitiated the findings. It has also been urged that the First Appellant Court has erred in proceeding to decide the matter without framing the points of determination and without recording its own reasons, which violates the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 of C.P.C. 5. Per contra the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the second appeal is concluded by concurrent findings of fact wherein both the courts have held the plaintiff to be the owner and the landlord. Therefore, the suit has rightly been decreed and thus it requires no interference from this Court under Section 100 C.P.C. 6. In order to appreciate the contentions of the respective parties briefly the facts leading up to this second appeal is being noted. 7. That plaintiffs-respondents instituted a suit before the Court of Munsif, Mohammadi, District Khiri which was registered as R.S. No. 107 of 1992. In the plaint it was specifically pleaded that the plaintiff-respondent was the owner of the shop in question which was given to him on lease by the Gram Sabha. The plaintiff had raised constructions over the said land in the year 1986 and thereafter let out the same to the defendant Munshilal in the year 1986 on a monthly rent of Rs. 600/-. As the defendant did not pay the rent since April 1991, thus till 31.08.1992 a sum of Rs. 10,200/- swelled as arrears. Accordingly a notice was given to the defendant dated 04.12.1991 by which the tenancy was terminated and since the defendant did not respond by complying with the said notice. Thus, the suit was instituted seeking a decree for declaration regarding the ownership as well as arrears of rent and eviction. 8. It was also pleaded in paragraph 4 of the plaint that the tenancy was created orally as plaintiff and the defendant belonged to the same family. Thus, the suit was instituted seeking a decree for declaration regarding the ownership as well as arrears of rent and eviction. 8. It was also pleaded in paragraph 4 of the plaint that the tenancy was created orally as plaintiff and the defendant belonged to the same family. It was also pleaded that since the defendant had denied the title of the plaintiff. Thus, the decree for declaration was being sought. 9. The defendant filed his written statement and denied the contentions of the plaintiff. It was categorically pleaded in the additional pleas that property in question was given to the defendant by the Gram Sabha on lease dated 02.07.1973 and the defendant is in possession of the aforesaid in pursuance of the said lease. He further denied that no lease was given to the plaintiff by the Gram Sabha and his allegation was false. He further denied any contract of tenancy and rate of rent and specifically stated that there was no relationship of the landlord and the tenant. Since, there was no relationship of the landlord and the tenant, accordingly there was no question of paying any rent to the plaintiff. He stated that after taking the land on lease from the Gram Sabha, the defendant himself raised the construction over the land which comprises of 4 rooms, 1 shop, 1 verandah and 1st air case and the plaintiff has nothing to do with the said property. The suit has been instituted on the basis of false allegations. Accordingly, the suit was liable to be dismissed. 10. The trial court on the basis of the pleadings of the parties framed 5 issues and the parties led both oral and documentary evidence. However, for the present second appeal Issue nos. 2, 3 and 4 are relevant which related to the fact whether the plaintiff was the owner of the property in question and whether the defendant was a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 600/- and whether any arrears of rent is outstanding against the plaintiff as per the plaint averments. 11. The plaintiff filed documentary evidence namely Ka 63 which is titled as 'Swikar Patra Vahami Batwara' dated 07.04.1991 and paper no. Ka 61 which were letter issued by the Block Development Officer, Pasgawan, District Khiri addressed to the plaintiff (a photocopy). On the other hand, the defendant filed paper no. 11. The plaintiff filed documentary evidence namely Ka 63 which is titled as 'Swikar Patra Vahami Batwara' dated 07.04.1991 and paper no. Ka 61 which were letter issued by the Block Development Officer, Pasgawan, District Khiri addressed to the plaintiff (a photocopy). On the other hand, the defendant filed paper no. Ka 24, a map of disputed property and Ka 23, a valuation report in respect of the same. 12. The trial court while considering Issue no. 2 regarding the title of the plaintiff heavily relied upon the document Ka 63 and held that since that document titled 'Swikar Patra Vahami Batwara' was executed between Munni Devi (mother of the plaintiff) and Munshilal (father of the defendant) dated 07.04.1991 which as per the court below was binding on the parties and in clause 3 of the said document it contained a recital that Munshilal will get the sale deed executed in respect of the shop situated at Mohammadi Road Pasgawan from Madanlal. 13. The trial court concluded that by virtue of the said admission, the title of Madanlal in respect of the property stood proved. However, while considering the Issue nos. 3 and 4, the trial court found that there was no evidence by which it could be established that the rate of rent is Rs. 600/- and consequently returned a finding that the plaintiff was unable to prove the rate of rent of Rs. 600/- per month. He further went on to hold that since the plaintiff had filed the notice bearing paper no. Ka 6 and Ka 7 dated 04.12.1991 and 26.07.1992 to which the defendant had sent his reply on 18.08.1992 bearing paper no. Ka 8. Thus, the notice stood admitted consequently the termination of tenancy was considered sufficient and the suit of the plaintiff was decreed. 14. The appellant, before this court, preferred a regular Civil Appeal No. 96 of 2010 wherein the First Appellate Court has also affirmed the findings of the trial court without considering the submissions of the appellant. It is being aggrieved against the judgment and decree dated 04.10.2017 and on 30.10.2010 that the present second appeal has been preferred. 15. The Court has given anxious consideration to the submissions raised by learned counsel for the parties and has carefully perused the record. 16. It is being aggrieved against the judgment and decree dated 04.10.2017 and on 30.10.2010 that the present second appeal has been preferred. 15. The Court has given anxious consideration to the submissions raised by learned counsel for the parties and has carefully perused the record. 16. To put the matter in a perspective to decide the controversy between the parties, the plaintiff in order to succeed would have to establish his title as well as the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. If the plaintiff succeeds in doing so, the suit stands rightly decreed while if the Court finds that the plaintiff had failed to do so then the present second appeal must be allowed and the suit must fail. 17. It is in this backdrop that this Court had heard the learned counsel for the parties and the substantial questions of law framed by the Court have been considered. 18. It becomes prime important to note that the basis of decreeing the suit, by the two courts, has been the document Ka 63 which is titled Swikar Patra Vahami Batwara. From the pleadings in the plaint, the plaintiff has made a categorical averments that the property over which the shop in question was raised was given to him by the Gram Sabha on lease over which he constructed a shop in the year 1985 which was let out to the defendant in the year 1986. He further pleaded that since the plaintiff and the defendant belonged to the same family (not real brothers) therefore, the contract of tenancy was not reduced in writing and when there was some dispute regarding the ancestral properties the intention of the defendant-appellant became bad, this led the plaintiff to terminate the tenancy and institute the above suit. 19. On the other hand, the defendant while denying the contentions has clearly disputed the ownership as well as the relationship of the landlord and the tenant including the rate of rent and the fact that rent was ever paid to the plaintiff. 20. On the contrary, he has specifically pleaded that the property in question was given to him on lease by the Gram Sabha on 02.07.1973 over which he, after getting a map sanctioned has raised constructions and he is residing therein. Therefore, the plaintiff has no right over the property in question. 21. 20. On the contrary, he has specifically pleaded that the property in question was given to him on lease by the Gram Sabha on 02.07.1973 over which he, after getting a map sanctioned has raised constructions and he is residing therein. Therefore, the plaintiff has no right over the property in question. 21. From the record, it reveals that the plaintiff has failed to bring on record any document to establish that the Gram Sabha had leased the property to him. He also failed to bring on record any document by which it could be inferred that he raised constructions. 22. As the tenancy was oral and no rent receipts were issued by the plaintiff, thus, it was for the plaintiff to prove the factum of tenancy by cogent evidence. The only document Ka 63 was filed by the plaintiff which is in the shape of Swikar Patra Vahami Batwara dated 07.04.1991 which has been made the basis by the courts to decree the suit. 23. The submission of the learned counsel for appellant is that the aforesaid document Ka 63 was a document of partition which related to an immovable property beyond value of Rs. 100/- and consequently it was required to be registered. In absence of its registration, the said document was hit by Section 49 of the Registration Act. Therefore, it became inadmissible and could not have been taken note of by the two courts and by relying upon the same, the courts have committed the error. Thus, if the aforesaid document is ignored then the suit of the plaintiff ought to have been failed. The first appellate Court also did not follow the mandate of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and on this ground as well the judgment of the first appellate Court is vitiated. 24. The learned counsel for respondent, on the other hand, submitted that he had filed the document only to indicate and rely upon clause 3 for the purposes of showing that the defendant Munshilal had admitted that the property belongs to the plaintiff since he has agreed to get the sale deed executed in respect of the property in question from Madanlal. He further submitted that since this document was in the nature of an oral settlement in the family therefore, it did not require any stamp duty nor any registration was required. He further submitted that since this document was in the nature of an oral settlement in the family therefore, it did not require any stamp duty nor any registration was required. He further submitted that the question relating to the violation of Order 41 Rule 31 of C.P.C. also did not arises since the First Appellate Court in its judgment had framed points of determination. Therefore, there was no violation and the aforesaid question did not require any attention from this Court. 25. The learned counsel for appellant in reply, submitted that the plaint in suit was merely based on the contract of oral tenancy. There was no pleadings or even a whisper regarding the alleged settlement. Thus in absence of any pleadings, there was no way the evidence on the aforesaid point could have been led by the plaintiff and the document Ka 63 apart from being hit by Section 49 of the Registration Act was inadmissible in the evidence as in absence of any pleadings and issues on the said point no proof could have been led in respect thereto. Therefore, the courts by decreeing the suit have allowed the plaintiff to improve his case which was beyond his pleadings. 26. In order to decide the above controversy which relate to substantial question of law framed at S. No. (a) and (b), this Court has scrutinised the document Ka 63 and from perusal of the same it indicates that it is a document by which Munni Devi, the mother of the plaintiff and Munshilal, the father of the present appellant had entered into a settlement with respect to a number of properties which also included the property in respect of which the present suit has been filed. 27. This document was executed on 07.04.1991 and it specifically states that in presence of some mediators (panch), the parties arrived at a settlement and the terms of the settlement have been reduced. Clause 1 states that as far as the ancestral house is concerned the same goes to the share of Munni Devi and in lieu thereof, the defendant Munshilal has been given a shop and a space at Chakwi along with Bagger. Clause 1 states that as far as the ancestral house is concerned the same goes to the share of Munni Devi and in lieu thereof, the defendant Munshilal has been given a shop and a space at Chakwi along with Bagger. Clause 2 states that Munshilal would execute a sale deed in respect of 1.5 acres of land at Garraiya in favour of Munni Devi and in this fashion there has been a reference of various transactions in relations to other properties including the property in question which finds a mention in clause 3 which is being reproduced herein after:- "Madanlal ke naam jo dukaan Mohammadi Road Pasgawan me hai, woh registry dwara apne naam Munshilal kara lenge" 28. Significantly, what is strange is the fact that this document is dated 07.04.1991 whereas according to the plaint case the tenancy commenced sometime in the year 1986 and yet there was no mention in the document that the defendant has been occupying the said shop as a tenant nor there is mention of any rate of rent. Clause 3 as reproduced above also does not make a mention as to within what time the defendant will get the sale deed executed in his name nor there is any mention regarding the consideration for which it shall be executed. 29. In respect of other properties as a whole, it clearly indicates that obligations were cast on the respective parties which were to be complied with in future. Thus, the settlement arrived at in between the parties was in the presenti i.e., on 07.04.1991 and it is not a document wherein an oral partition had occurred in the past and its terms were being reduced subsequently. On the record, there is no evidence from either side to indicate whether any of those conditions or obligations contained in the documents dated 07.04.1991 were ever complied with by either of the parties. 30. It is quite clear that the document bearing paper no. Ka 63 was not a memo of oral settlement which could be treated as exempted from registration and payment of stamp duty. 31. The submission of learned counsel for respondent that it was merely an acceptance by the defendant that the plaintiff is the owner of the shop by relying upon clause 3 is of no help. Inasmuch as the document Ka 63 has to be taken into consideration as a whole. 31. The submission of learned counsel for respondent that it was merely an acceptance by the defendant that the plaintiff is the owner of the shop by relying upon clause 3 is of no help. Inasmuch as the document Ka 63 has to be taken into consideration as a whole. The document is to be made admissible or not admissible as a whole and it cannot be said that it could be treated to be admissible only in respect of clause 3 and not in respect of other parts. 32. Thus, submission of learned counsel for respondent is misconceived and does not find favour with this Court. Apparently, the law relating to registration of a family settlement is fairly well settled inasmuch as the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Roshan Singh vs. Zile Singh reported in AIR 1988 SC 881 had the occasion to consider the aforesaid aspect and the relevant extract is being reproduced for reference as under:- "......9. It is well-settled that while an instrument of partition which operates or is intended to operate as a declared volition constituting or severing ownership and causes a change of legal relation to the property divided amongst the parties to it, requires registration under s. 17(1)(b) of the Act, a writing which merely recites that there has in time past been a partition, is not a declaration of will, but a mere statement of fact, and it does not require registration. The essence of the matter is whether the deed is a part of the partition transaction or contains merely an incidental recital of a previously completed transaction. The use of the past tense does not necessarily indicate that it is merely a recital of a past transaction. It is equally well-settled that a mere list of properties allotted at a partition is not an instrument of partition and does not require registration. Sec. 17(1)(b) lays down that a document for which registration is compulsory should, by its own force, operate or purport to operate to create or declare some 1114 right in immovable property. Therefore, a mere recital of what has already taken place cannot be held to declare any right and there would be no necessity of registering such a document. Sec. 17(1)(b) lays down that a document for which registration is compulsory should, by its own force, operate or purport to operate to create or declare some 1114 right in immovable property. Therefore, a mere recital of what has already taken place cannot be held to declare any right and there would be no necessity of registering such a document. Two propositions must therefore flow: (1) A partition may be effected orally; but if it is subsequently reduced into a form of a document and that document purports by itself to effect a division and embodies all the terms of bargain, it will be necessary to register it. If it be not registered, s. 49 of the Act will prevent its being admitted in evidence. Secondary evidence of the factum of partition will not be admissible by reason of s. 91 of the Evidence Act, 1872. (2) Partition lists which are mere records of a previously completed partition between the parties, will be admitted in evidence even though they are unregistered, to prove the fact of partition: See Mulla's Registration Act, 8th edn., pp. 54-57. 10. The tests for determining whether a document is an instrument of partition or a mere list of properties, have been laid down in a long catena of decisions of the Privy Council, this Court and the High Courts. The question was dealt with by Vivian Bose, J. in Narayan Sakharam Patil v. Cooperative Central Bank, Malkapur & Ors., ILR (1938) Nag. 604. Speaking for himself and Sir Gilbert Stone, CJ. the learned Judge relied upon the decisions of the Privy Council in Bageshwari Charan Singh v. Jagarnath Kuari LR (1932) 59 IA 130 and Subramanian v. Lutchman LR (1923) 15 IA 77 and expressed as follows: "It can be accepted at once that mere lists of property do not form an instrument of partition and so would not require registration, but what we have to determine here is whether these documents are mere lists or in themselves purport to 'create, declare, assign, limit of extinguish ..... any right, title or interest' in the property which is admittedly over Rs. 100 in value. any right, title or interest' in the property which is admittedly over Rs. 100 in value. The question is whether these lists merely contain the recital of past events or in themselves embody the expression of will necessary to effect the change in the legal relation contemplated." Sir Gilbert Stone, CJ speaking for himself and Vivian Bose, J. in Ganpat Gangaji Patil v. Namdeo Bhagwanji Patil & Ors., ILR (1942) Nag. 73 reiterated the same principle. See also: order cases in Mulla's Registration Act at pp. 56-57." 33. This Court in the case of Bankey Bihari vs. Surya Narain reported in AIR 1999 Allahabad 167 also considered the effect of family arrangements and its registration and held as under:- ".......... The law, however, is well-settled that the family arrangement may be even oral and in that case, no registration is necessary. However, registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. The Supreme Court in the case of Kale (supra) has held that a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of the family arrangement and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made. In such a case, the memorandum Itself does not create or extinguish any right in immovable property and, therefore, not compulsorily registrable." 34. In light of the settled legal position as extracted herein above, if the document Ka 63 is to be examined, it would be found that it is not a memorandum of family arrangements by which some antecedent arrangement had been noticed and recorded for information or for remembrance rather on close perusal it clearly amplifies that the document is relating to partition and settlement of properties as per terms and conditions contained in the aforesaid document and the same were to be complied with by the parties in due course of time. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhoop Singh vs. Ram Singh Major reported in 1995 (5) SCC 709 has held is as under:- ".......... But something more is required to be said to find out the real purport of clause (vi). It needs to be stated that sub-section (1) of section 17 mandates that the instrument enumerated in clauses (a) to (e) shall be registered compulsorily if the property to which they relate is immovable property value of which is Rs. But something more is required to be said to find out the real purport of clause (vi). It needs to be stated that sub-section (1) of section 17 mandates that the instrument enumerated in clauses (a) to (e) shall be registered compulsorily if the property to which they relate is immovable property value of which is Rs. 100/- or upwards. When the document purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest therein, whether vested or contingent, it has to be registered compulsorily. The Act does not define "instrument". Section 2(14) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, defines "instrument" to include every document by which any right or liability is, or purports to be, created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. Sub-section (2) of section 17 of the Act engrafts exceptions to the instruments covered only by clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1). We are concerned with clause (vi) of sub-section (2). Clause (vi) relates to any decree or order of a court, except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject matter of the suit or proceeding. Clause (v) is relevant which in contrast reads thus: "Any document not itself creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing any right, title or interest of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards to or in immovable property, but merely creating a right to obtain another instrument which will, when executed, create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any such right, title or interest;". The Explanation amplifies that a contract for the sale of immovable property containing a recital of payment of any earnest money or of the whole or any part of the purchase price shall not be deemed to be required or ever to have required registration. 13. In other words, the court must enquire whether a document has recorded unqualified and unconditional words of present demise of right, title and interest in the property and included the essential terms of the same; if the document, including a compromise memo, extinguishes the rights of one and seeks to confer right, title or interest in present in favour of the other, relating to immovable property of the value of Rs. 100/- and upwards, the document or record or compromise memo shall be compulsorily registered." 35. 100/- and upwards, the document or record or compromise memo shall be compulsorily registered." 35. This Court, by applying the principles laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court as extracted herein above to the document Ka 63, it would indicate that even if clause 3 of the document Ka 63 is taken on its face value even then it will at best be an agreement between the parties relating to a sale of an immovable property, which also requires registration in view of the amendment made in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 as applicable in the State of U.P. which is reproduced hereinafter for ready reference:- "..... 54. "Sale" defined - "Sale" is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. Sale how made - Such transfer, in case of tangible immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards or in the case of revision or other intangible things, can be made only by registered instrument. In the case of tangible immovable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument of by delivery of the property. Delivery of tangible immovable property takes place when the seller place the buyer or such person as he directs, in possession of the property. Contract for sale - A contract for the sale of immovable property B a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. Amendment of Section 54 of the Act 4 of 1882 - In its application to the State of Uttar Pradesh, in Section 54,-- (a) in the second paragraph the words 'of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards' shall be omitted; (b) the third and fourth paragraphs shall be omitted; (c) after the last paragraph, the following paragraph shall be inserted, namely: "Such contract can be made only by a registered instrument" 36. Thus in view of above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the document Ka 63 was a document which was not merely a list of properties or a memo recording a transaction of a partition in the past rather it was a settlement/partition which was effected in present and was to take effect and thus it was covered by Section 17(1) clause (a) to (e) of the Registration Act and consequently required registration. In absence of the registration of the said document it was hit by Section 49 of the Registration Act and accordingly could not be taken note of by the two courts below for basing its findings on the question of title. 37. At this stage, the learned counsel for respondent relied upon a decision of this Court in case of Qabool Singh vs. Board of Revenue at Allahabad reported in 1972 RD 342, however, the said judgment is of no help to the plaintiff-respondent. It is stated in the light of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as noted above and moreover it also on different set of facts and is clearly distinguishable. 38. The learned counsel for respondent also could not explain that if at all the defendant-appellant was a tenant in the property in question since 1986 then why at the time of alleged settlement in the year 1991 there was no mention regarding his status as a tenant or a reference to the rate of rent. The document also does not refer to any time limit in the alleged agreement for the defendant to get the sale deed executed. There is no averment that till the time the defendant is able to get his sale deed executed, he will continue to pay the rent to the plaintiff. In absence of any cogent explanation and any evidence before the Court, the findings returned by the two courts below are perverse. The two courts have been swayed and based their findings on an inadmissible document which has rendered them vulnerable to be interfered with under Section 100 of C.P.C., by this Court. The two courts, merely on the basis of the said document Ka 63 have held the title with the plaintiff and this finding is erroneous. 39. This matter can be looked at from another angle that apart from the fact that the document is inadmissible. The two courts, merely on the basis of the said document Ka 63 have held the title with the plaintiff and this finding is erroneous. 39. This matter can be looked at from another angle that apart from the fact that the document is inadmissible. The plaintiff has sought a relief of declaration without raising any plea of his title nor any document of title was produced including the copy of the alleged lease executed by the Gram Sabha. No document relating to his averment of having raised construction and thus the plaint case was grossly unestablished and this has also been ignored by the two courts. 40. Apparently, no evidence was available to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant and merely reference to a notice which is denied cannot form the basis of relationship of landlord and tenant. Moreover, the trial court had already held that the rate of rent could not be proved by the plaintiff, though there is no evidence to support the case of the plaintiff-respondent. 41. Thus, two courts merely on the basis of the said document Ka-63 have held that the title with the plaintiff and this finding is erroneous. Apparently, no evidence worth it's name was available to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant and merely by referring to a notice which in any case was denied by the defendant-appellants, could not form the basis to establish a relationship of landlord and tenant. Apart from the solitary document of notice, there is no evidence regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant which also was not satisfactorily proved, hence, the findings of relationship of landlord and tenant arrived at by the courts below is also erroneous. As already indicated above that the trial court had no found the rate of rent established and this finding was not assailed by the plaintiff-respondents in the first appeal, hence, the same attained finality and is not open for challenge before this Court either. 42. In view of above, neither the title nor the relationship of landlord and tenant and neither the rate of rent was established. 43. Thus, the overall scenario which emerges is that the plaintiff was unable to establish his title and the sole basis upon which he claimed is also demolished in the light of the document Ka 63 having been found inadmissible for want of registration. 44. 43. Thus, the overall scenario which emerges is that the plaintiff was unable to establish his title and the sole basis upon which he claimed is also demolished in the light of the document Ka 63 having been found inadmissible for want of registration. 44. In view of the above discussions, this Court is of the considered view that the judgment and decree passed by the Court of Additional District Judge (Vishista Nyayalaya) Lakhimpur Khiri dated 04.10.2017 and judgment and decree dated 30.10.2010 passed by Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division, Lakhimpur Khiri deserves to be set aside. Accordingly, the second appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the two courts in R.C.A. No. 96 of 2010 and R.S. No. 107 of 1992 stands set aside and the suit of the plaintiff bearing R.S. No. 107 of 1992 stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.