ORDER : 1. The cardinal question commonly arising in the captioned cases is whether the Appellate Authority, constituted under Section 18 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (in short, the Act) has power to condone delay in filing an appeal by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short, the Limitation Act). A similar doubt raised earlier had been dispelled when the Supreme Court pronounced a judgment in Mukri Gopalan vs. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, AIR 1995 SC 2272 . But, now it appears that the doubt has resurrected in the minds of some learned Judges who disposed of the appeals involved in these cases on the basis of a pronouncement by a Division Bench of this Court in Ratheesh vs. A.M. Chacko and Another, 2018 (5) KHC 35 , which in turn relied on M.P. Steel Corporation vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2015 (7) SCC 58 . 2. Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioners and contesting respondents. 3. We shall narrate the relevant facts in brief: R.C.R. No. 262 of 2019 is filed by the tenants/respondents in R.C.P. No. 8 of 2014 before the Rent Control Court, Adoor, who suffered an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. The order passed by the Rent Control Court was challenged in R.C.A. No. 6 of 2018 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Pathanamthitta. The revision petitioners approached the Appellate Authority beyond the prescribed time and they filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. The Appellate Authority took a view that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to the proceedings before it and hence the petition was dismissed. Consequently, the appeal was also dismissed. 4. Revision petitioners in R.C.R. Nos. 218, 221 and 239 of 2019 are the tenants sought to be evicted under Sections 11(2) and 11(3) of the Act by a common landlord in R.C.P. No. 4 of 2012 before the Rent Control Court, Thiruvalla. The Rent Control Court allowed eviction in favour of the landlord, against which the revision petitioners approached the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Pathanamthitta with R.C.A. Nos. 12, 11 and 13 of 2018. In these cases too, they approached the Appellate Authority beyond the prescribed time and they therefore filed applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. 12, 11 and 13 of 2018. In these cases too, they approached the Appellate Authority beyond the prescribed time and they therefore filed applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. Those applications were dismissed by the Appellate Authority expressing a view that it has no power to condone delay by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 5. R.C.R. No. 41 of 2019 is filed by the tenant/respondent in R.C. (OP) No. 2 of 2015 before the Rent Control Court, Kottarakkara. Revision petitioner suffered an order of eviction under Section 12(3) of the Act against which he preferred an appeal after expiry of the prescribed period and for that reason the Appellate Authority refused to entertain the appeal. 6. Banking on the ratio in Ratheesh's case, the Rent Control Appellate Authorities entered a finding that they cannot invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matter of condoning delay in filing appeals against the orders passed by the Rent Control Courts. In view of their stance, it is essential to consider the scope and ambit of the ratio in Ratheesh's case. 7. Facts in Ratheesh's case show that the petitioner before this Court suffered an ex-parte order of eviction at the hands of the Rent Control Court and he moved an application to get the ex-parte order set aside. But there was some delay in filing the said application. He therefore moved another application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay. The respondent argued that the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings before the Rent Control Courts. Placing reliance mainly on M.P. Steel Corporation's case, the Division Bench in Ratheesh's case held that the Rent Control Court has no power to condone delay going by the provisions in the Act and the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1979 (in short, the Rules). Incidently, the learned Judges referred to Mukri Gopalan's case, Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department, (2008) 7 SCC 169 and some other decisions. 8. On a reading of the facts in Ratheesh's case, it will be clear that the Division Bench was examining the powers of the Rent Control Court to set aside an ex-parte order of eviction, sought through a belated application, by invoking the principles in Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 8. On a reading of the facts in Ratheesh's case, it will be clear that the Division Bench was examining the powers of the Rent Control Court to set aside an ex-parte order of eviction, sought through a belated application, by invoking the principles in Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In Ratheesh's case, Section 23 of the Act and Rule 13(3) of the Rules were closely examined. The Government's power to make rules, as mentioned in Section 31 of the Act, was also considered. In the above context, relying on the decisions mentioned earlier, it was found that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to an application for setting aside ex-parte order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court. The most crucial aspect to be noted is that in Ratheesh's case, power of the Appellate Authority to invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act in a belated appeal filed before it was not considered. In other words, on facts Ratheesh's case shall not be taken as an authority to hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by the Appellate Authority under the Act. 9. From the scheme of the Act, it will be evident that Section 3 deals with constitution of the Rent Control Courts and appointment of Accommodation Controllers. Section 3(1) of the Act says that the Government may, by notification in the Gazette, appoint a person who is or is qualified to be appointed, a Munsiff, to be the Rent Control Court for such local areas as may be specified therein. Section 18 of the Act deals with appeals to the Appellate Authorities on the orders passed by the Rent Control Court. Section 18 of the Act is quoted hereunder for clarity: “Appeal - (1)(a) The Government may, by general or special order notified in the Gazette, confer on such officers and authorities not below the rank of a subordinate Judge the powers of appellate authorities for the purposes of this Act in such areas or in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order. (b) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Control Court may, within thirty days from the date of such order, prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having jurisdiction. (b) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Control Court may, within thirty days from the date of such order, prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having jurisdiction. In computing the thirty days aforesaid, the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded. (2) On such appeal being preferred, the appellate authority may order stay of further proceeding in the matter pending decision on the appeal. (3) The appellate authority shall send for the records of the case from the Rent Control Court and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and, if necessary, after making such further inquiry as it thinks fit either directly or through the Rent Control Court, shall decide the appeal. Explanation - The appellate authority may, while confirming the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court, grant an extension of time to the tenant for putting the landlord in possession of the building. (4) The appellate authority shall have all the powers of the Rent Control Court including the fixing of arrears of rent. (5) The decision of the appellate authority, and subject to such decision, an order of the Rent Control Court, shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law, except as provided in Section 20.” Sub-section (1)(b) of Section 18 of the Act would show that any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Control Court may within thirty days of such order prefer an appeal in writing to the Appellate Authority having jurisdiction. It further says that in computing the thirty days as aforesaid, the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded. Rest of the provisions deal with the procedure before the Appellate Authority and power of the Appellate Authority. 10. In exercise of powers conferred by Section 18(1)(a) of the Act, the State Government has published a notification - SRO No. 1631 of 1989. Rest of the provisions deal with the procedure before the Appellate Authority and power of the Appellate Authority. 10. In exercise of powers conferred by Section 18(1)(a) of the Act, the State Government has published a notification - SRO No. 1631 of 1989. It reads as follows: “S.R.O. No. 1631/89 - In exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (a) sub-section 1 of Section 18 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (Act 2 of 1965), and in suppression of all previous notifications on the subject, the Government of Kerala hereby empower the District Judges having jurisdiction over the areas within the provisions of the said Act, have been extended the powers of the Appellate Authorities for the purpose of the said Areas. (G.O. (MS) No. 50/89/Housing dated 31.8.1989 published in KG No. 38 date 26.9.1989)” Pursuant to the above notification, District Judges started exercising the powers of Appellate Authority under the Act. 11. Before dealing with Mukri Gopalan and M.P. Steel Corporation, we may refer to a three Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum vs. T.P. Kunhaliumma, AIR 1977 SC 282 where the apex Court examined applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act to a proceeding filed before the District Judge for compensation under Sections 10 and 16(5) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 read with Section 51 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910. It is observed in paragraph 20 as follows: “The provisions in the Telegraph Act which contemplate determination by the District Judge of payment of compensation payable under Section 10 of the Act indicate that the District Judge acts judicially as a court. Where by statutes, matters are referred for determination by a Court of Record with no further provision the necessary implication is that the court will determine the matters as a court. National Telephone Co. Ltd. vs. The Postmaster-General, 1913 AC 546. In the present case the statute makes the reference to the District Judge as the Presiding Judge of the District Court. In many statutes reference is made to the District Judge under this particular title while the intention is to refer to the Court of the District Judge. The Telegraph Act in Section 16 contains intrinsic evidence that the District Judge is mentioned there as the court of the District Judge. In many statutes reference is made to the District Judge under this particular title while the intention is to refer to the Court of the District Judge. The Telegraph Act in Section 16 contains intrinsic evidence that the District Judge is mentioned there as the court of the District Judge. Section 16(4) of Telegraph Act requires payment into the court of the District Judge such amount as the telegraph authority deems sufficient if any dispute arises as to the persons entitled to receive compensation. Again, in Section 34 of the Telegraph Act reference is made to payment of court-fees and issue of processes both of which suggest that the ordinary machinery of a court of civil jurisdiction is being made available for the settlement of these disputes. Section 3(15) of the General Clauses Act states that the District Judge in any Act of the Central Legislature means the Judge of a principal civil court of original jurisdiction other than the High Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, unless there is anything repugnant in the context. In the Telegraph Act there is nothing in the context to suggest that the reference to the District Judge is not intended as a reference to the District Court which seems to be the meaning implied by the definition applicable thereto. The District Judge under the Telegraph Act acts as a civil court in dealing with applications under Sec.16 of the Telegraph Act.” When we apply the above principles to the notification referred to above, we find no reason to hold that empowerment of the District Judges as Appellate Authorities under Section 18 of the Act was with an intention to treat them only as persona designata and not as District Judges, manning the District Courts as envisaged under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short, the Code). 12. Tests to identify if an authority is persona designata or not have been delineated in Mukri Gopalan and those observations remain unaffected by subsequent pronouncements, including M.P. Steel Corporation. Furthermore, the principles have been re-stated in Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Nandini J. Shah, AIR 2018 SC 1197 . This decision is referred to in detail infra to highlight the point under consideration. Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary (4th Edn. Furthermore, the principles have been re-stated in Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Nandini J. Shah, AIR 2018 SC 1197 . This decision is referred to in detail infra to highlight the point under consideration. Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary (4th Edn. p.253) defines “persona designata” as a person who is pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character. In Mukri Gopalan's case, apart from the above definition, other precedents were also considered to hold that the Appellate Authorities as constituted under Section 18 of the Act, being District Judges, constitute as a class and they cannot be considered to be persona designata. 13. In fact, the above reason is one in addition to the observations in this regard made in Kerala State Electricity Board's case to find that the Appellate Authorities under the Act are not persona designata. This finding remains indisputable even after some later decisions deviated from some aspects mentioned in Mukri Gopalan's case. 14. We may refer to Section 2(8) of the Code where the term “Judge” has been defined as the presiding officer of a Civil Court and in Section 2(4), we find the definition of the term “district” as the local limits of jurisdiction of the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction (called a “District Court”). From the above notification, it is very clear that the Government of Kerala had expressly conferred all powers under Section 18 of the Act on the District Judges having jurisdiction over the areas within which the provisions of the Act had been extended. In the light of the principles declared in Kerala State Electricity Board's case, we have no hesitation to hold that the District Judges, on whom the appellate powers traceable from Section 18 of the Act have been conferred on, function as Civil Courts controlled by the provisions of the Code. 15. In this context, we may point out one principle having significance on the topic under discussion. It is a fundamental postulate that the Code and Limitation Act are to be read together because both statutes relate to procedure and they are in pari materia. Unchallengeable is the proposition that all the provisions in the Limitation Act apply to courts to which the Code applies. It is a fundamental postulate that the Code and Limitation Act are to be read together because both statutes relate to procedure and they are in pari materia. Unchallengeable is the proposition that all the provisions in the Limitation Act apply to courts to which the Code applies. The above observations made by us are fortified by a verdict in Kandaswami Pillai vs. Kannappa Chetty, AIR 1952 Madras 186, where a Full Bench of the Madras High Court held thus: “(14) In this state of divided judicial opinion I think it useful and instructive to trace the course of legislation in so far as it has a bearing on the present question. In doing so, I propose to deal with the several Limitation Acts and the Civil Procedure Codes together as having material bearing on each other. It is well established that the Limitation Act and the Code are to be read together, because both are statutes relating to procedure and they are in pari materia and therefore to be taken and construed together as one system as explanatory of each other Ruckmaboye vs. Lullooo Bhoy, 5 Moo Ind App 234, Arunachala Chetti vs. Periasami Servai, 44 Mad 902 and Tribeni Prasad vs. Ramasray Prasad, 10 Pat 670. It is not without significance that in the same year when the one Code was replaced by a subsequent Code, similarly a new Limitation Act succeeded the one already in existence.” The above view of the Madras Full Bench was approved by a Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Vidyacharan Shukla vs. Khubchand Baghel and Others, AIR 1964 SC 1099 . 16. From the above discussion, it will be clear that an Appellate Authority under the Act is a District Judge, enjoined to adjudicate cases in accordance with the mandate of the Code and provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to the proceedings before him. However, the Act being a special law, regard must be had to the provisions in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. As catena of decisions support our view in this regard, we do not venture to expatiate this aspect. 17. Now we shall examine the so called eclipsing of the ratio in Mukri Gopalan's case by a pronouncement in M.P. Steel Corporation. As catena of decisions support our view in this regard, we do not venture to expatiate this aspect. 17. Now we shall examine the so called eclipsing of the ratio in Mukri Gopalan's case by a pronouncement in M.P. Steel Corporation. In Mukri Gopalan's case, the straight question considered by a two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court was whether the Appellate Authority constituted under Section 18 of the Act has power to condone delay in filing an appeal before it by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering Vidyacharan Shukla and other decisions, the Supreme Court interpreted Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act in the following terms: “8. xxx xxx xxx A mere look at the aforesaid provision shows for its applicability to the facts of a given case and for importing the machinery of the provisions containing Ss.4 to 24 of the Limitation Act the following two requirements have to be satisfied by the authority invoking the said provision. (i) There must be a provision for period of limitation under any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or application. (ii) The said prescription of period of limitation under such special or local law should be different from the period prescribed by the schedule to the Limitation Act. 9. If the aforesaid two requirements are satisfied the consequences contemplated by S.29(2) would automatically follow. These consequences are as under: (i) In such a case S.3 of the Limitation Act would apply as if the period prescribed by the special or local law was the period prescribed by the schedule. (ii) For determining any period of limitation prescribed by such special or local law for a suit, appeal or application all the provisions containing Ss.4 to 24 (inclusive) would apply insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.” Further, in paragraphs 10 and 11, it is observed thus: “10. In the light of the aforesaid analysis of the relevant clauses of S.29(2) of the Limitation Act, let us see whether S.18 of the Rent Act providing for a statutory appeal to the appellate authority satisfies the aforesaid twin conditions for attracting the applicability of S.29(2) of the Limitation Act. It cannot be disputed that Kerala Rent Act is a special Act or a local law. It cannot be disputed that Kerala Rent Act is a special Act or a local law. It also cannot be disputed that it prescribes for appeal under S.18 a period of limitation which is different from the period prescribed by the schedule as the schedule to the Limitation Act does not contemplate any period of limitation for filing appeal before the appellate authority under S.18 of the Rent Act or in other words it prescribes nil period of limitation for such an appeal. It is now well settled that a situation wherein a period of limitation is prescribed by a special or local law for an appeal or application and for which there is no provision made in the schedule to the Act, the second condition for attracting S.29(2) would get satisfied. As laid down by a majority decision of the Constitution Bench of this court in the case of Vidyacharan Shukla vs. Khubchand Baghel, AIR 1964 SC 1099 when the first schedule of the Limitation Act prescribes no time limit for a particular appeal, but the special law prescribes a time limit for it, it can be said that under the first schedule of the Limitation Act all appeals can be filed at any time, but the special law by limiting it provides for a different period. While the former permits the filing of an appeal at any time, the latter limits it to be filed within the prescribed period. It is, therefore, different from that prescribed in the former and thus S.29(2) would apply even to a case where a difference between the special law and Limitation Act arose by the omission to provide for limitation to a particular proceeding under the Limitation Act. 11. It is also obvious that once the aforesaid two conditions are satisfied S.29(2) on its own force will get attracted to appeals filed before appellate authority under S.18 of the Rent Act. When Section 29(2) applies to appeals u/S.18 of the Rent Act, for computing the period of limitation prescribed for appeals under that Section, all the provisions of Ss.4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply. Section 5 being one of them would therefore get attracted. When Section 29(2) applies to appeals u/S.18 of the Rent Act, for computing the period of limitation prescribed for appeals under that Section, all the provisions of Ss.4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply. Section 5 being one of them would therefore get attracted. It is also obvious that there is no express exclusion anywhere in the Rent Act taking out the applicability of S.5 of the Limitation Act to appeals filed before appellate authority under S.18 of the Act. Consequently, all the legal requirements for applicability of S.5 of the Limitation Act to such appeals in the light of S.29(2) of Limitation Act can be said to have been satisfied. That was the view taken by the minority decision of the learned single Judge of Kerala High Court in Jokkim Fernandez vs. Amina Kunhi Umma, AIR 1974 Kerala 162. The majority did not agree on account of its wrong supposition that appellate authority functioning under S.18 of the Rent Act is a persona designata. Once that presumption is found to be erroneous as discussed by us earlier, it becomes at once clear that minority view in the said decision was the correct view and the majority view was an erroneous view.” 18. On a careful scrutiny of the decision in M.P. Steel Corporation, we find no reason to hold that the learned Judges have differed from the above view expressed in Mukri Gopalan's case rendered by relying on the principles in Vidyacharan Shukla's case. From the facts in M.P. Steel Corporation's case, it can be seen that the Supreme Court was considering a case in which questions relating to law of limitation arose in an appeal, filed before the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals), who dismissed the appeal finding that he has no power to condone delay beyond the period specified in the Customs Act, 1962. Learned Judges in the course of discussion took cognizance of the declaration of law in Mukri Gopalan's case. Learned Judges in the course of discussion took cognizance of the declaration of law in Mukri Gopalan's case. After considering the ratio in Consolidated Engineering Enterprises's case rendered by a three Judge Bench and noticing that in Om Prakash vs. Ashwani Kumar Bassi, (2010) 9 SCC 183 the ratio in Mukri Gopalan's case was distinguished, the learned Judges observed in M.P. Steel Corporation's case as follows: “Obviously, the ratio of Mukri Gopalan vs. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, (1995) 5 SCC 5 , does not square with the observations of the three-Judge Bench in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises vs. Irrigation Deptt. (2008) 7 SCC 169 . In the latter case, this Court has unequivocally held that CST vs. Parson Tools and Plants, (1975) 4 SCC 22 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 185 : (1975) 3 SCR 743 , is an authority for the proposition that the Limitation Act will not apply to quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals. To the extent that Mukri Gopalan vs. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, (1995) 5 SCC 5 , is in conflict with the judgment in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises vs. Irrigation Deptt. (2008) 7 SCC 169 , it is no longer good law.” We may immediately refer to Consolidated Engineering Enterprises, wherein the question of applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to a proceeding, where Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 applied, was examined by the Supreme Court. It was held that benefit of exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act is available where an application under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is pursued in a Court without jurisdiction. However, proviso to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, being a specific legislation, excludes applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It has been emphatically found that court has no discretion to extend limitation beyond 30 days prescribed in proviso to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act even on showing sufficient cause. 19. In the above factual setting, the Bench in M.P. Steel Corporation's case thought it fit to pronounce that the Limitation Act will not apply to quasi-judicial bodies or Tribunals. 20 .In our case, such a question does not arise at all. The Appellate Authority under the Act can never be regarded as a quasi-judicial body or a Tribunal. 19. In the above factual setting, the Bench in M.P. Steel Corporation's case thought it fit to pronounce that the Limitation Act will not apply to quasi-judicial bodies or Tribunals. 20 .In our case, such a question does not arise at all. The Appellate Authority under the Act can never be regarded as a quasi-judicial body or a Tribunal. Appellate Authority under the Act is a District Judge, thereby meaning a Judge manning a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction having all the powers and restrictions mentioned in the Code. Hence, we find no legal reason to apply the ratio in M.P. Steel Corporation's case to these kind of cases. 21. We may even at the cost of repetition make it clear that Ratheesh's case is not an authority to hold that the Appellate Authority has no right to invoke power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 22. In Life Insurance Corporation's case (supra), many decisions, including Mukri Gopalan, were noticed. That was a case where questions involved in Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorised occupants) Act, 1971 were considered. Under the said Act, a District Judge is to be designated for the purpose of being the Appellate Officer for hearing appeals from every order of Estate Officer by virtue of Section 9. Powers of the Appellate Officer have been examined and thus observed: “30. Sub-section (1) of Section 9 is the core provision to be kept in mind for answering the point in issue. It postulates that an appeal shall lie from every order of the estate Officer, passed under the Act, to an Appellate Officer. As to who shall be the Appellate Officer has also been specified in the same provision. It predicates the District Judge of the district in which the public premises are situated or such other judicial officer in that district of not less than 10 years standing as the District Judge to be designated for that purpose. The first part of the provision does suggest that the appeal shall lie to an Appellate Officer, however, it does not follow therefrom that the Appellate Officer is persona designata. Something more is required to hold so. Had it been a case of designating a person by name as an Appellate Officer, the concomitant would be entirely different. The first part of the provision does suggest that the appeal shall lie to an Appellate Officer, however, it does not follow therefrom that the Appellate Officer is persona designata. Something more is required to hold so. Had it been a case of designating a person by name as an Appellate Officer, the concomitant would be entirely different. However, when the Appellate Officer is either the District Judge of the district or any another judicial officer in that district possessing necessary qualification who could be designated by the District Judge, the question of such investiture of power of an appellate authority in the District Judge or Designated Judge would by no standards acquire the colour or for that matter trappings of persona designata. In the first place, the power to be exercised by the Appellate Officer in terms of Section 9 is a judicial power of the State which is quite distinct from the executive power of the State. Secondly, the District Judge or designated judicial officer exercises judicial authority within his jurisdiction. Thirdly, as the Act predicates the Appellate Officer is to be a District Judge or judicial officer, it is indicative of the fact of a preexisting authority exercising judicial power of the State. Fourthly, District Judge is the creature of Section 5 of the Maharashtra Civil Courts Act, 1869, who presides over a District Court invariably consisting of more than one Judge in the concerned district. The District Court exercises original and appellate jurisdiction by virtue of Sections 7 and 8 respectively, of the 1869 Act and is the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction in the district within the meaning of C.P.C. as per Section 7 of that Act. As per Section 8 of the Act of 1869, the District Court is the Court of appeal from all decrees and orders passed by the subordinate Courts from which an appeal lies under any law for the time being in force. As per Section 16 of that Act, the District Judge can refer to any Additional District Judges subordinate to him, any original suits and proceedings of a civil nature, applications or references under Special Acts and miscellaneous applications. The Additional District Judges have jurisdiction to try such suits and to dispose of such applications or references. As per Section 16 of that Act, the District Judge can refer to any Additional District Judges subordinate to him, any original suits and proceedings of a civil nature, applications or references under Special Acts and miscellaneous applications. The Additional District Judges have jurisdiction to try such suits and to dispose of such applications or references. Section 17 of that Act envisages that an Additional District Judge shall have jurisdiction to try the appeals as may be referred to him by the District Judge. Section 19 of that Act, is a provision to invest power on the Additional District Judges, with power of District Judge. The hierarchy of judicial officers of the District Court can be culled out from the 1869 Act. On the similar lines, the Bombay City Civil Court has been constituted under Section 3 of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948, with jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of all suits and other proceedings of a civil nature arising within the Greater Bombay except a suit or proceedings which are cognizable by the High Court referred to therein and by Small Causes Court. Section 7 of this Act envisages that when the City Civil Court consists of more than one Judge, each of the Judges may exercise all or any of the powers conferred on the Court by the said Act or any other law for the time being in force. Clause (b) of Section 7 stipulates that the State Government may appoint any one of the Judges to be the Principal Judge and any two other Judges to be called the Additional Principal Judges. The Principal Judge has been given authority to make such arrangements as he may think fit for the distribution of the business of the Court among the various Judges thereof. In other words, the District Judge or Principal Judge exercises judicial power of the State and is an authority having its own hierarchy of superior and inferior Courts, the law of procedure according to which it would dispose of matters coming before it depending on its nature and jurisdiction exercised by it, acting in judicial manner. The District Judge or Principal Judge of the City Civil Court is the officer presiding over the Court and derives his description from the nomenclature of the Court. The District Judge or Principal Judge of the City Civil Court is the officer presiding over the Court and derives his description from the nomenclature of the Court. Even if the District Judge/Principal Judge of the City Civil Court might retire or get transferred, his successor-in-office can pick up the thread of the proceedings under Section 9 of the 1971 Act from the stage where it was left by his predecessor and can function as an appellate authority. The District Judge/Principal Judge of the City Civil Court and other judicial officers of these Courts possessing necessary qualifications constitute a class and cannot be considered as persona designata. The Appellate Officer, therefore, has to function as a Court and his decision is final in terms of Section 10 of 1971 Act. The legislative intent behind providing an appeal under Section 9 before the Appellate Officer to be the District Judge of the concerned District Court in which the public premises are situated or such other judicial officer in that district possessing necessary qualification to be designated by the District Judge for that purpose, is indicative of the fact that the power to be exercised by the Appellate Officer is not in his capacity as persona designata but as a judicial officer of the pre-existing Court. The historical background of the 1971 Act would make no difference to the aforementioned analysis.” 23. This decision by a three Judge Bench, pronounced after M.P. Steel Corporation's case by a two Judge Bench, also reinforces our view that the ratio in M.P. Steel Corporation's case followed in Ratheesh's case shall not be relied on to find any inability or hindrance for the Appellate Authorities to invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act in appropriate cases. The above stand taken by the Appellate Authorities is palpably wrong. 24. In the previous paragraphs we have found that an Appellate Authority under the Act, being a District Judge, undoubtedly possesses all the required powers under the Code for an effective adjudication of the case. Generally speaking, the appellate power is an extension of original authority's power. In other words, appellate power is co-extensive to and co-terminus with the original power. On a reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it will be evident that the Section speaks inter-alia about the appellate court's power to condone delay in filing an appeal. Generally speaking, the appellate power is an extension of original authority's power. In other words, appellate power is co-extensive to and co-terminus with the original power. On a reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it will be evident that the Section speaks inter-alia about the appellate court's power to condone delay in filing an appeal. In precise words, it can be stated that the appellate court's power to condone delay in filing an appeal by relying on Section 5 of the Limitation Act is an independent power conferred on it de hors the original authority's lack of power for condonation of delay. As stated above, Appellate Authority under the Act is a District Judge with full-fledged powers vested in a District Court to which the entire Code applies. Therefore, among other provisions, Section 5 of the Limitation Act also applies to the Appellate Authority with full vigour. This aspect also reassures our finding that the Appellate Authority under the Act has the power to invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act in appropriate cases. 25. Albeit the counsel's urging before us to consider the Rent Control Court's power to apply Section 5 of the Limitation Act, we are not tempted and we refrain from making any pronouncement thereon because that question does not arise in these cases. In the result, all the revision petitions are allowed. The impugned orders passed by the Appellate Authorities are hereby set aside. We hereby remit the matters to the Appellate Authorities concerned and they shall take fresh decisions on the issues involved in these matters in accordance with the principles mentioned above. Parties shall appear before the Appellate Authorities concerned on 29.07.2019. It is hereby directed that the courts executing the orders of eviction involved in these matters shall hold on the proceedings until the Appellate Authorities dispose of the matters in accordance with law. The Appellate Authorities shall dispose of all the cases as expeditiously as possible. 26. All pending interlocutory applications will stand closed.