JUDGMENT : 1. By this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs: “(A) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the order dated 10.09.2004 passed by the respondent No.1 and further be pleased to hold the order dated 28.05.2003 passed by the Market Committee removing the respondent No.4 from the service of the Market Committee as legal; (B) Pending admission and final disposal of this petition be pleased to stay the executing, operation and implementation of the order dated 10.09.2004 passed by the respondent No.1 at Annexure “A” to this petition.” 2. The respondent No.4 was removed by the order dated 28.05.2003 from the post of Secretary after holding a detailed departmental inquiry. The same was challenged by the respondent No.4 before the revisional authority by way of Revision Application No.92 of 2003 under Section 48 of the Agriculture Produce Market Committee Rules, 1963 (‘the APMC Rules’ for short). By the order dated 10.09.2004, the order of removal dated 28.05.2003 was set aside and the present petitioner was directed to reinstate the respondent No.4 in service as a Secretary. 3. Learned advocate Mr.Bhatt appearing for the respondent No.4 has submitted that the writ petition does not require interference since the impugned order dated 28.05.2003 removing the respondent No.4 from the post of Secretary is non-speaking order. He has submitted that the respondent No.4 was dismissed in view of the departmental proceedings. He has also submitted that the order dated 10.09.2004 does not require any interference since the State Government after considering the relevant aspects has precisely set aside the order of removal. 4. Learned advocate Mr.V.C.Vaghela appearing for the petitioner- Agriculture Produce Market Committee (APMC) has submitted that the final directions issued by the respondent-State vide order dated 10.09.2004 is erroneous since if the inquiry proceedings or the order of removal was required to be set aside on the technical grounds, the respondent-State should have remanded the matter from the stage of defect. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on the judgment of the Chairman life Insurance Corporation of India & Ors. V/s. A.Masilmani, reported in (2013) 6 SCC 530 . In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on the judgment of the Chairman life Insurance Corporation of India & Ors. V/s. A.Masilmani, reported in (2013) 6 SCC 530 . Thus, he has submitted that since the disciplinary proceedings are set aside on technicalities, the respondent No.4 could not have been ordered to be reinstated and the inquiry should have been ordered to be proceeded from the stage of defect. 5. In response to the aforesaid submission, learned advocate Mr.Bhatt for the respondent No.4 has submitted that the respondent No.4 has already reached the age of superannuation in the year 2012 and hence, even if the matter is remanded, the respondent No.4 cannot be reinstated in service and hence, appropriate order may be passed directing the petitioner to hear him so that his claim for retirement benefits is not jeopardiesed. 6. In rejoinder, learned advocate Mr.Vaghela for the petitioner- APMC has submitted that appropriate directions may be issued in case the matter is remanded for imposing any penalty as per the rules and regulations, which are provided for the retired employees and the consequential benefits shall also be made subject to the hearing of the respondent No.4. 7. Learned AGP Mr.Vishrut Jani for the respondent-State has submitted that the impugned order passed by the State Government dated 10.09.2004 does not require any interference since the State Government has found that the entire departmental proceedings suffered from the technical defect of not supplying the documents to the respondent as well as in violation of Rule 41(3) of the APMC, 1965. 8. I have heard learned advocates appearing for the respective parties. 9. In the instant writ petition, the respondent No.4 was removed by the impugned order dated 28.05.2003. A perusal of the impugned order reveals that the same is bereft of any reason and the respondent No.4 has been dismissed from the service by passing a succinct order. The respondent No.4 had filed a detailed representation dated 21.04.2003 pursuant to show cause notice dated 10.04.2003, which was issued after the filing of the Inquiry Officer’s report. The Chairman, APMC has totally ignored the representation dated 21.04.2003, which was filed by respondent No.4 pursuant to the show cause notice. The petitioner/authority though has referred to it, but has not dealt with any of its contents. The Supreme Court in the case of A.Masilmani (supra) has observed thus: “19. The Chairman, APMC has totally ignored the representation dated 21.04.2003, which was filed by respondent No.4 pursuant to the show cause notice. The petitioner/authority though has referred to it, but has not dealt with any of its contents. The Supreme Court in the case of A.Masilmani (supra) has observed thus: “19. The word “consider” is of great significance. The dictionary meaning of the same is, “to think over”, “to regard as”, or “deem to be”. Hence, there is a clear connotation to the effect that there must be active application of mind. In other words, the term “consider” postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. Thus, formation of opinion by the statutory authority should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record. The order of the authority itself should reveal such application of mind. The appellate authority cannot simply adopt the language employed by the disciplinary authority and proceed to affirm its order.” 10. The order dated 28.05.2003 does not reflect such application of mind of the petitioner since there is no reference made to either findings of the Inquiry Officer’s report or to the averments/contentions raised by the respondent No.4 in his reply dated 21.04.2003 to the show cause notice. 11. The aforesaid order has been set aside by the State Government vide order dated 10.09.2004 on procedural defects i.e. 1. the impugned order of dismissal is de-hors the provision of Rule 41(3) of the APMC Rules, 1965 wherein it is stated that the respondent No.4 would not be removed without the presence of 2/3rd majority of the total number of the members of the market committee and 2, the non supply of the documents to the respondent No.4, which he had demanded from the petitioner during the course of the inquiry. 12. It would be apposite to refer to the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of A.Masilmani (supra), which read as under: “16. It is a settled legal proposition, that once the court sets aside an order of punishment, on the ground that the enquiry was not properly conducted, the court cannot reinstate the employee. It must remit the case concerned to the disciplinary authority for it to conduct the enquiry from the point that it stood vitiated, and conclude the same. 17. The second question involved herein is also no longer res integra. It must remit the case concerned to the disciplinary authority for it to conduct the enquiry from the point that it stood vitiated, and conclude the same. 17. The second question involved herein is also no longer res integra. Whether or not the disciplinary authority should be given an opportunity to complete the enquiry afresh from the point that it stood vitiated depends upon the gravity of delinquency involved. Thus, the court must examine the magnitude of misconduct alleged against the delinquent employee. It is in view of this, that courts/tribunals are not competent to quash and charge-sheet and related disciplinary proceedings, before the same are concluded on the aforementioned grounds.” 13. After the respondent-State opined that there were technical defects vide impugned order dated 10.09.2004, the petitioner was directed to reinstate the respondent No.4 with all consequential benefits. In the considered opinion of this Court, such directions are contrary to the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of A.Masilmani (supra). It is no longer res integra that if the disciplinary proceeding is quashed on the ground that the same is not properly conducted, or there is violation of principles of natural justice, it has to be relegated to the disciplinary authority for continuation from the point it stood vitiated. 14. Under the circumstances, the impugned order dated 10.09.2004 is hereby set aside. Since it is found that the order dated 28.05.2003 is also a non-speaking order and defective, the petitioners are hereby directed to provide an opportunity of hearing to the respondent No.4. As the petitioner has already reached the age of superannuation; no order of reinstatement can be passed. Appropriate order shall be passed after giving an opportunity of hearing to the respondent No.4. Thus, in the eventuality if it is found that some penalty is required to be imposed on the respondent no.4, the same shall not be imposed without following the necessary procedure prescribed under the Rules/Regulations meant for the retired employee. The grant of necessary consequential benefits will be subject to the final outcome of such order. In case, no penalty/punishment or procedure is prescribed for the retired employees, necessary consequential benefits and retirement benefits shall be granted to the respondent No.4. The entire exercise shall be carried out within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the writ of the order of this Court. In case, no penalty/punishment or procedure is prescribed for the retired employees, necessary consequential benefits and retirement benefits shall be granted to the respondent No.4. The entire exercise shall be carried out within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the writ of the order of this Court. The present petition is partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.