JUDGMENT : 1. By filing this application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the applicants-original accused nos.28 and 29 have prayed to quash and set aside the FIR being C.R.No.I-101 of 2016 registered with Bavla Police Station, District-Ahmedabad, for the offences under Sections 406, 420 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. 2. It is the case of the applicants that they are arraigned as accused nos.28 and 29 in the impugned complaint filed by respondent no.2 on 28.7.2016 that they are third purchaser of the land in question for which necessary stamp duty is paid and necessary entries were posted and certified by the revenue authorities. It is contended that no civil suit is filed challenging the sale deed of the applicants. It is also contended that names of the applicants have been posted in the revenue records after following due procedure under Section 135D of the Bombay Land Revenue Code and no RTS proceedings are pending and those entries are not challenged by anyone. 2.1 It is contended that the gist of impugned complaint is that the complainant wanted to open a petrol pump at Bavla, and for that, Reliance Industries Company Limited had also given him permission and since land was required for opening the petrol pump, the complainant hold talks with land owners of various parcels of lands. That the lands originally belonged to 25 persons and they have given General Power of Attorney to four persons and on the basis of said Power of Attorney those four persons had entered into an agreement to sell with the complainant on 28.4.2006. 2.2 On 9.1.2007, eight owners of land bearing Survey No.1266 and 1267 had executed an agreement to sell with the complainant. That the original owner of the land, viz. Aminabibi, original accused no.1 and 24 other persons had given power of attorney dated 31.3.2006 in favour of four persons and, on the basis of this power of attorney, the land bearing Survey No.1072 was sold to one Bhikhubhai Ahmedbhai Vohra by sale deed dated 3.4.2006 and that fact was never disclosed to the complainant by the original land owners. 2.3 That land bearing Survey Nos.1265, 1266, 1267 and 1073 situated at Village-Bavla were also sold by sale deed dated 13.8.2007 and that sale deed was reflected in the revenue records by revenue entry No.13305 dated 5.10.2007. 2.3 That land bearing Survey Nos.1265, 1266, 1267 and 1073 situated at Village-Bavla were also sold by sale deed dated 13.8.2007 and that sale deed was reflected in the revenue records by revenue entry No.13305 dated 5.10.2007. That other co-owners of Survey No.1073, 1265, 1266 and 1267 had also sold the lands to some other persons viz. Baldevbhai Dwarkaprasad Prajapati by registered sale deed dated 15.10.2007. That seven persons out of aforesaid 25 persons had sold their part of the land, which was remaining to be sold of Survey No.1073, 1265, 1266 and 1267 by registered sale deed dated 17.6.2010 to the present applicants. That another sale deed was entered into by Baldevbhai Dwarkaprasad Prajapati on 15.2.2010 for sale of Survey No.1073, 1065, 1066 and 1067 to the applicants herein. That one Lalumiya Ahmedmiya, who has also share in the land bearing Survey No.1065, 1066 and 1067, sold his share in the land by a registered sale deed dated 17.6.2011 to the present applicants. That for the lands bearing Survey Nos.1072, 1073 and 1065, there was an agreement to sell in favour of the complainant and that the complainant had paid consideration for the same and that ignoring the agreement to sell, the lands in question were sold to different persons by the registered sale deeds and, for that purpose, the complainant has lodged the aforesaid complaint against many persons, which includes present applicants. 2.4 It is contended by the applicants that considering the contents of the complaint, no offence could be said to have been committed by them. They are the legal and rightful owners of the land in question by way of a registered sale deed, which is certified by the revenue authorities. It is contended that they have not committed the alleged offence and the entire FIR has been filed only with a view to pressurize them. According to the applicants, filing of the impugned complaint is nothing but an abuse of process of law. On all these grounds, they have prayed to quash the impugned FIR qua them. 3. Heard Mr. Shalin Mehta, learned Senior Advocate appearing with Mr. Rohan Lavkumar for the applicants, Ms. Monali Bhatt, learned APP for the State and Mr. Amrish V. Jani, learned advocate for respondent no.2 at length. Perused the materials placed on record and also the decisions cited at bar. 4. Mr. 3. Heard Mr. Shalin Mehta, learned Senior Advocate appearing with Mr. Rohan Lavkumar for the applicants, Ms. Monali Bhatt, learned APP for the State and Mr. Amrish V. Jani, learned advocate for respondent no.2 at length. Perused the materials placed on record and also the decisions cited at bar. 4. Mr. Shalin Mehta, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the applicants submitted the same facts which are narrated in the memo of the application and has contended that the applicants are third purchasers of the land and the base of the complaint is that there was an agreement to sell in favour of the complainant and yet the original owners have sold the land to other persons and by purchasing the land, the present applicants have not cheated the complainant. While referring to the various documentary evidence, which consists of agreement to sell, registered sale deed, he has submitted that sale deed in favour of the applicants is still not challenged in any Civil Court and mutation entry made by the revenue authorities is also not challenged. While referring to the contents of the FIR, Mr.Shalin Mehta contended that no offence of cheating or any other criminal offence is made out against present applicants and the impugned FIR is nothing but an abuse of process of law. While referring to the following decisions, he has prayed to allow present application. (i) Anil Mahajan v. Bhor Industries Limited and Another reported in (2005) 10 SCC 228 , (ii) Tharmex Limited and Another v.K.M.Johny and Others reported in (2011) 13 SCC 412 . (iii) Vinod Natesan v. State of Kerala and Others reported in (2019) 2 SCC 401 . (iv) Decision of this Court rendered in Special Criminal Application No.1481 of 2015 on 31.1.2019. 5. Per contra, Ms. Monali Bhatt, learned APP appearing for the respondent-State has vehemently opposed present application and submitted that from the investigation, prima facie evidence has been found against the applicants and, therefore, draft charge-sheet has been filed. She has also contended that as there is stay of this Court, present applicants are not arrested. She has also contended that public notice was issued at the relevant time and there was pendency of civil suit and yet present applicants have purchased the land in question. According to her, there is prima facie material against the present applicants for the alleged offence. She has also contended that public notice was issued at the relevant time and there was pendency of civil suit and yet present applicants have purchased the land in question. According to her, there is prima facie material against the present applicants for the alleged offence. While referring to the documentary evidence, she has submitted that considering the evidence collected by the police, FIR qua present applicants may not be quashed. She has prayed to dismiss present application. 6. Mr. Amrish V. Jani, learned advocate for respondent no.2 has vehemently submitted that so far as sale deed of one Baldevbhai Prajapati is concerned, there was specific mention of pendency of civil suit and yet the present applicants have purchased the suit property without proper search. According to him, the applicants were knowing that the civil suit is pending and with open eyes, they have purchased the suit land and, therefore, now they cannot take a defence that revenue entry has been certified and they have purchased the land bona fidely. He also submitted that public summons was required to be issued against present applicants as the bailiff could not serve the same. It is also contended that though they were in knowledge of the pendency of the civil suit, they have suppressed this fact in the application. According to him, the points raised by the applicants herein can be raised by them as defence in the trial. In view of all these, he prayed to dismiss present application. 7. In re-submission, learned counsel, Mr. Shalin Mehta submitted that even in the suit, possession of land was not found with the plaintiff thereof. He also contended that the sale deed was in favour of Baldevbhai and his legal heirs and there was no stay of any Civil Court against the transferring the suit land pending the suit and, therefore, even if the present applicants have purchased the land in question during the pendency of the suit, it cannot be said that they have committed any criminal offence. He has contended that there is no offence of cheating committed by the present applicants and that entire litigation is of civil nature. He, therefore, prayed to allow the application. He has contended that there is no offence of cheating committed by the present applicants and that entire litigation is of civil nature. He, therefore, prayed to allow the application. 7.1 In support of his submissions, he has relied upon the observations made by the Apex Court in paragraph 6 of the decision in the case of Anil Mahajan v. Bhor Industries Limited and Another (supra):- “Reliance has been placed, in that order, on various decisions of this Court holding that from mere failure of a person to keep up promise subsequently, a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promises cannot be presumed. A distinction has to be kept in mind between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement. The subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent, dishonest intention is shown at the beginning of the transaction.” 7.2 The Apex Court also held in paragraph 8 therein that the substance of the complaint is to be seen. Mere use of expression “cheating” in the complaint has no consequence. 7.3 He has also relied upon the decision in the case of Tharmex Limited and Another v. K.M. Johny and Others (supra), wherein in paragraph 37, the Supreme Court has observed as under:- “37. It is settled law that essential ingredient for an offence under Section 420, which we have already extracted, is that there has to be dishonest intention to deceive another person. ….....” 8. Heard learned advocates appearing for the parties and perused the material produced on record and also gone through the judgments relied upon by the learned advocates. In the present case, charge framed against the accused is for the offence under Section 120 (B) read with Section 420 of IPC. Section 415 of the Indian Penal Code defines “cheating”, which reads thus:- “Section 415. In the present case, charge framed against the accused is for the offence under Section 120 (B) read with Section 420 of IPC. Section 415 of the Indian Penal Code defines “cheating”, which reads thus:- “Section 415. Cheating.- Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”. 8.1 The ingredients to constitute an offence of cheating are as follows:- (i) there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him; (ii) (a) the person so induced should be intentionally induced to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or (b) the person so induced should be intentionally induced to do or to omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and (iii) in cases covered by (ii) (b) above, the act or omission should be one which caused or is likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced in body, mind, reputation or property. A fraudulent or dishonest inducement is an essential ingredient of the offence. A person who dishonestly induces another person to deliver any property is liable for the offence of cheating. 9. Section 420 of the Penal Code reads thus: “Section 420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing deliver of property.- Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and 7 which is capable to being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 10. The ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 420 are as follows: (i) A person must commit the offence of cheating under Section 415; and (ii) The person cheated must be dishonestly induced to (a) deliver property to any person; or (b) make, alter or destroy valuable security or anything signed or sealed and capable of being converted into valuable security. Cheating is an essential ingredient for an act to constitute an offence under Section 420. 11. This Court has taken into consideration the parameters laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana and others Vs. Bhajanlal and others, reported in AIR 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, wherein the Supreme Court has held and observed in para-102 as under: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers Under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima-facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 12. Considering the factual matrix of the present case, it clearly reveals that the allegations against the present applicants made in the FIR are to the effect that they have purchased the suit land though the land was agreed to be sold to the complainant by the original owner. It also reveals from the material placed on record that for the same parcel of land, civil suit is pending between the parties. It also reveals that during the pendency of the suit, public notice was issued and in the sale deed of Baldevbhai, there was a mention of pendency of the civil suit. Now, it is trite law that if any transaction is made and during the pendency of the suit, if lis pendens is registered with the Registrar, then in that case, any transaction of the property pending the civil suit will be binding to the new purchaser. Admittedly, in this case, no lis pendens is registered. Therefore, mere pendency of the suit will not affect the subsequent transaction of the suit land. Admittedly, in this case, no lis pendens is registered. Therefore, mere pendency of the suit will not affect the subsequent transaction of the suit land. If anybody is aggrieved by the said sale transaction and the entries made thereof in the revenue register, one has to take recourse under the civil law and to bye-pass civil remedy, invocation of criminal law cannot be permitted. Even considering the allegations and averments made in the FIR and the submissions made on behalf of original complainant, it cannot be said that the ingredients of Section 406 and 420 are satisfied qua the present applicants and the dispute between the parties, at the most, can be said to be of civil nature and it is tried to be converted into criminal dispute. As such this Court is of the opinion, that continuing the criminal proceedings against the present applicants would be an abuse of process of law. 13. In view of above, present petition deserves to be allowed and the same is allowed. The impugned FIR being C.R.No.I-101 of 2016 registered with Bavla Police Station, District- Ahmedabad, for the offences under Sections 406, 420 and 120- B of the Indian Penal Code, and all other consequential proceedings arising out of the same are quashed and set aside so far as present applicants are concerned. However, the impugned complaint and all other consequential proceedings shall proceed further so far as other accused are concerned. Rule is made absolute to the above extent. Direct service is permitted.