JUDGMENT : Dr. B.R. Sarangi, J. 1. The petitioners, by means of this writ petition, seek to quash letter dated 05.01.2010 in Annexure-4 issued by opposite party No. 1-Director General of Police, Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), New Delhi, as well as letter dated 20.01.2010 in Annexure-6 issued by opposite party No. 3-Deputy Inspector General of Police, Central Reserve Police Force, Group Centre, Bhubaneswar, by which the application submitted for compassionate appointment has not been entertained in view of completion of five years of invalidation of the Government servant on medical ground. 2. The epitome of the facts leading to filing of this writ petition, in a nutshell, is that petitioner No. 1 was continuing as a Cook in CRPF, Group Centre, Bhubaneswar. While so working, he suffered from Schizophrenia. After a lot of treatment, when his condition was not developed, he was examined by the medical board. After thorough examination, the medical board found him Unfit to perform the duty and recommended for invalidation vide report dated 25.05.2004. On the basis of such recommendation, petitioner No. 1, being unfit to discharge his duty as a Cook, was struck off from service w.e.f. 02.07.2004, vide office order dated 02.07.2004 issued by the Additional Deputy Inspector General of Police, Group Centre, CRPF, Bhubaneswar. Consequentially, he was directed to submit the relevant papers/documents for payment of his risk fund amount. On submission of the same, the amount was duly paid to him by the authority. By the time petitioner No. 1 was struck off from service on 02.07.2004, petitioner No. 2 the son of petitioner No. 1 was minor. Therefore, he could not apply for compassionate appointment under Rehabilitation Assistance Scheme nor the wife of petitioner No. 1 could apply as she had to take his care. When petitioner No. 2 was continuing his +2 Second Year Arts, he became major and filed an application for compassionate appointment on 17.12.2009, his date of birth being 05.06.1993. But the opposite parties, without taking into consideration the miseries faced by the family, after the name of petitioner No. 1, who was the sole bread winner of the family, was struck off from service, rejected the application on 05.01.2010 on the ground that the application was filed beyond the limitation period of five years. But the opposite parties, without taking into consideration the miseries faced by the family, after the name of petitioner No. 1, who was the sole bread winner of the family, was struck off from service, rejected the application on 05.01.2010 on the ground that the application was filed beyond the limitation period of five years. Thereafter, the petitioners filed another representation on the very same day citing an example where the dependant son of late Mohan Singh, Constable Force No. 801261261, who had been serving in F/52 Bn. CRPF and expired on 18.05.1985 had applied in 2004 and got a job on compassionate ground. In spite of standing order of 05 of 2001, even such representation was rejected on the very same ground stating that the application for compassionate appointment filed by the Government servant invalidated out of medical ground is not entertained after completion of five years, pursuant to letter dated 20.01.2010. Hence this application. 3. Mr. B. Senapati, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that petitioner No.1, after declared invalidated on medical ground and struck off from service, was getting pension of Rs.1,915/- per month, which was even insufficient for medical expenses. The family was in distress condition with effect from 2004 and the same condition is also continuing till date because of meager amount of pension. It is further contended that the sole ground on which the application for compassionate appointment has been rejected by the authority is that in case of struck off of the name of an employee from service due to medical invalidation, the application for compassionate appointment was to be filed within five years, but while rejecting such application the basic ground reality has not been taken into consideration. Meaning thereby, by the time the name of petitioner No. 1 was struck off from service on 02.07.2004, petitioner No. 2 was a minor and as such, the wife of the petitioner could not make any application as she was taking care of petitioner No. 1. The moment petitioner No. 2 became major, he filed an application for compassionate appointment but the authority rejected the same on a ground which is not legally tenable. The moment petitioner No. 2 became major, he filed an application for compassionate appointment but the authority rejected the same on a ground which is not legally tenable. It is further contended that when in a case of death of an employee in the year 1985, compassionate appointment has been considered in the year 2004, that is to say after 19 years, non-applicable of the same analogy to the present case amounts to discrimination and violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In other words, the limitation of five years provided in Clause-VI(h) of the Standing Order in the cases of invalidation and prescription of no limitation for death cases-is discriminatory and violates Articles-14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and should be ignored. Therefore, the opposite parties may be directed to accept the application of the petitioners and consider the case of petitioner No. 2 for compassionate appointment. To substantiate his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Bharathidasan University v. All India Council for Technical Education, (2001) 8 SCC 676 and Lata Naik v. State of Odisha, 2018 (11) OLR 652. 4. Mr. H.S. Panda, learned Central Government Counsel appearing for the opposite parties contended that in view of the provisions contained in Standing Order No. 5 of 2001 the application for compassionate appointment of a family member of a medically retired employee will not be entertained after completion of five years from the date of retirement. Therefore, rejection of application filed by the petitioners for giving compassionate appointment to petitioner No. 2, after lapse of five years, is wholly and fully justified. He also contended that so far as death of government servant is concerned, the time Limit in such cases may go beyond five years or so far acceptance, and in all other cases, such as, invalidation on medical ground, etc. will not be entertained beyond five years from the date of retirement. It is further contended that the dependent son of late Mohan Singh who got employment on compassionate ground 5 years after the death of his father is acceptable in a death case only, and the said case cannot be compared with the case of the petitioners, thereby seeks for dismissal 'of the writ petition. 5. Heard Mr. B. Senapati, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. H.S. Panda, learned Central Government Counsel for the opposite parties. 5. Heard Mr. B. Senapati, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. H.S. Panda, learned Central Government Counsel for the opposite parties. Pleadings have been exchanged between the parties and with their consent the writ petition is being disposed of finally at the stage of admission. 6. The facts delineated above are not disputed. Therefore, in view of rival submissions of the parties, the only question to be considered in this case is, whether the Standing Order No. 5 of 2001 issued by the opposite parties putting restrictions on compassionate appointment in case of invalidation on medical ground beyond 5 years is legally justified, though no such limitation has been prescribed in case of death. 7. Clause-VI(h) of the Standing Order No. 5 of 2001, resorting to which application for compassionate has been rejected in the instant case, provides that request for compassionate appointment where the death of the Government servant took place long back, say five years or so, may be entertained, but however, in all other cases such as invalidation on medical ground etc. will not be entertained after completion of five years from the date of retirement. But, there is no rationale behind fixation of such restriction in Clause-VI(h) of Standing Order No. 5 of 2001, and the object which is sought to be achieved by putting such restriction. If the benefit of compassionate appointment can be extended in case of death of an employee beyond five years, why such benefit cannot be extended to an employee retired on being medically invalidated, beyond five years. The present is a peculiar case where petitioner No. 2 was a minor by the time the name of petitioner No. 1 was struck off from service on 02.07.2004 and the wife of petitioner No. 1 could not submit her application for compassionate appointment because she took care of her husband, who was suffering. When petitioner No. 2 attained majority, his date of birth being 05.06.1993, he was prosecuting his studies in +2 Second Year Arts, and he submitted his application for compassionate appointment, but the same was rejected mechanically relying upon Clause-VI(h) of Standing Order No. 5 of 2001 on the ground that the same was submitted beyond the limitation period of 5 years. 8. 8. In Bharathidasan University (supra), while considering the provisions contained in Regulations 4 and 12 of All India Council for Technical Education (Grant of Approval for Starting New Technical Institutions, Introduction of Courses or Programmes and Approval of Intake Capacity of Seats for the Courses or Programmes) Regulations, 1994, the apex Court in paragraph-14 of the judgment observed as follows: "14. The fact that the Regulations may have the force of law or when made have to be laid down before the legislature concerned does not confer any more sanctity or immunity as though they are statutory provisions themselves. Consequently, when the power to make regulations is confined to certain limits and made to flow in a well-defined canal within stipulated banks, those actually made or shown and found to be not made within its confines but outside them, the courts are bound to ignore them when the question of their enforcement arises and the mere fact that there was no specific relief sought for to strike down or declare them ultra vires, particularly when the party in sufferance is a respondent to the lis or proceedings cannot confer any further sanctity or authority and validity which it is shown and found to obviously and patently lack. It would, therefore, be a myth to state that Regulations made under Section 23 of the Act have "constitutional" and legal status, even unmindful of the fact that any one or more of them are found to be not consistent with specific provisions of the Act itself. Thus, the Regulations in question, which AICTE could not have made so as to bind universities/UGC within the confines of the powers conferred upon it, cannot be enforced against or bind a university in the matter of any necessity to seek prior approval to commence a new department or course and programme in technical education in any university or any of its' departments and constituent institutions." 9. Relying upon the aforesaid judgment, Mr. B. Senapati, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that if restriction is imposed under Clause-VI(h) of Standing Order No. 5 of 2001, taking into consideration the present position that petitioner No. 2 was a minor by the time the name of petitioner No. 1 was struck off in the year 2004, such restriction could have been ignored and the authority could have considered the application of the petitioners for compassionate appointment. 10. 10. Similarly, in Lata Naik (supra), this Court while taking into consideration the order dated 22.10.2017 to regulate payment of Grant-in-Aid to Non-Government Educational Institutions (Non-Government Colleges, Junior Colleges and Higher Secondary Schools), namely, the Odisha (Aided Colleges, Aided Junior Colleges and Aided Higher Secondary Schools) Grant-in-Order, 2017, Clause-3 whereof deals with entitlement of the employees, but on the same day, i.e., on 22.10.2017 another order was issued by the Government, vide Annexure-4 prescribing the following terms and conditions: "The employees of Non-Government Aided Colleges who are governed under the provisions of Grant-in-Aid Order 2008, Grant-in-Aid Order 2009 or Grant-in-Aid Order, 2009 (for Upashastri & Shastn Colleges) as on 31st December, 2017 and who are willing for the negotiated settlement may follow the modalities in the Annexure-A." Annexure-A of the Modalities provides that the employee has to submit an affidavit in non-judicial stamp paper of value Rs. 10/- with due notarization to the effect that he has no court case pending in any legal forum/have withdrawn the said case (as in Annexure-B). The format for affidavit, Annexure-B, stipulates that the employee has to swear an affidavit stating that he is desirous of availing the benefit of negotiated settlement offered by the Government as per the Grant-in-Aid Order, 2017; he has no court case pending before any legal forum to avail Grant-in-Aid as per Grant-in-Aid Order, 1994 or under any special provisions of any Act and Rules made for the purpose; that he has withdrawn the case bearing No. GIA/WPC/SLP or any other (specify) before the learned Tribunal/High Court/Supreme Court. Added to it, if at any subsequent stage anything is found incorrect/false in connection with the incumbent concerned, the benefit of Grant-in-Aid as per the Grant-in-Aid Order, 2017 shall be withdrawn. He/She shall also be liable to refund the amount received by him/her within a stipulated time and in case of failure to refund, the same shall be recovered as per the provisions of Odisha Public Demands Recovery Act, 1962. While considering such provision, reliance has been placed on the judgment of the apex Court in Imtiyaz Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 2012 SC 642 and Anita Kushwaha v. Pushap Sudan, AIR 2016 SC 3506 and this Court in paragraph-13 held as follows: "13. While considering such provision, reliance has been placed on the judgment of the apex Court in Imtiyaz Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 2012 SC 642 and Anita Kushwaha v. Pushap Sudan, AIR 2016 SC 3506 and this Court in paragraph-13 held as follows: "13. By the impugned order, the Government have created a distinction between the employees who are willing to avail the benefits and others to pursue the litigation in the court of law. The Government is the ideal employer. As held by the apex Court access to justice is the fundamental right enshrined under Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The said right cannot be cabined, cribbed or confined by the impugned order." And finally in paragraph-18, this Court held as follows: "18. The logical sequitur of the analysis made above is that the modalities prescribed in clause-2 under Annexure-A, clause-3 of the affidavit under Annexure-B as well as clause-3 of the declaration under Annexure-C so far as withdrawal of cases pending before different for a are arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India." 11. Applying the very same principle to the present context, the claim for compassionate appointment in case of medically invalidated employee, who applied beyond five years, vis-a-vis the application submitted in case of death of an employee beyond 5 years as per Clause VI(h) of Standing Order No. 5 of 2001 is discriminatory one and violates Articles-14 and 21 of Constitution of India. Such imposition of restriction cannot sustain in the eye of law. 12. The apex Court in Balbir Kaur and another v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others, AIR 2000 SC 1596 , while considering compassionate appointment under the Steel Authority of India, held that compassionate appointment benefit cannot be negatived on the ground of introduction of scheme assuring regular monthly income to disabled employee or dependants of deceased employee. The apex Court observed thus: "8. The apex Court observed thus: "8. The employer being Steel Authority of India, admittedly an authority within the meaning of Article 12, has thus an obligation to act in terms of the avowed objective of social and economic justice as enshrined in the Constitution but has the authority in the facts of the matters under consideration acted like a model and an ideal employer -- it is in this factual backdrop, the issue needs an answer also whether we have been able to obtain the benefit of constitutional philosophy of social and economic justice or not. Have the lofty ideals which the founding fathers placed before us any effect in our daily life -- the answer cannot however but be in the negative -- what happens to the constitutional philosophy as is available in the Constitution itself which we ourselves have so fondly conferred on to ourselves. The socialistic pattern of society as envisaged in the Constitution has to be attributed its full meaning. A person dies while taking the wife to a hospital and the cry of the lady for bare subsistence would go unheeded on a certain technicality. The bread earner is no longer available and prayer for compassionate appointment would be denied as it is likely to open a Pandora's box" -- this is the resultant effect of our entry into the new millennium. Can the law courts be mute spectators in the matter of denial of such a relief to the horrendous sufferings of an employee's family by reason of the death of the bread earner? It is in this context this Court's observations in Dharwad Distt. P.W.D. Literate Daily Wage Employees Assn. v. State of Karnataka, (1990) 2 SCC 396 : ( AIR 1990 SC 883 ; 1990 Lab IC 625) seem to be rather apposite. This Court upon consideration of Randhir Singh v. Union of India (Daily Rated Casual Labour Employed under P & T Dept. through Bharatiya Dak Tar Mazdoor Manch v. Union of India), (1988) 1 SCC 122 : ( AIR 1987 SC 2342 : 1988 Lab IC 37) as also Surinder Singh v. Engineer-in-Chief, (1986) 1 SCC 639 : ( AIR 1986 SC 584 : 1986 Lab IC 551 and D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 : ( AIR 1983 SC 130 : 1983 Lab IC 1) observed in paragraphs 14 & 15 as below: 14. We would like to point out that the philosophy of this Court as evolved in the cases we have referred to above is not that of the court but is ingrained in the Constitution as one of the basic aspects and if there was any doubt on this there is no room for that after the Preamble has been amended and the Forty-second Amendment has declared the Republic to be a socialistic one. The judgments, therefore, do nothing more than highlight one aspect of the constitutional philosophy and make an attempt to give the philosophy a reality of flesh and blood." 13. Referring to the same, this Court in 2015 (Supp. I) OCR 713 Dhira Kumar Parida v. Mahanadi Coal Fields Ltd., 2014 (II) ILR-CUT-608, directed for consideration of compassionate appointment in terms of Clause-9.3.2 of National Coal Wage Agreement-VI. Examining the case with regard to rationality behind giving compassionate appointment, the apex Court in Haryana State Electricity Board v. Hakim Singh, (1997) 8 SCC 85 , explained the rationale of the rule relating to compassionate appointment in following words: "The rule of appointments to public service is that they should be on merits and through open invitation. It is the normal route through which one can get into a public employment. However, as every rule can have exceptions, there are a few exceptions to the said rule also which have been evolved to meet certain contingencies. As per one such exception relief is provided to the bereaved family of a deceased employee by accommodating one of his dependants in a vacancy. The object is to give succor to the family which has been suddenly plunged into penury due to the untimely death of its sole breadwinner. This Court has observed time and again that the object of providing such ameliorating relief should not be taken as opening an alternative mode of recruitment to public employment. Similar view has also been taken in Director of Education v. Pushpendra Kumar, AIR 1998 SC 2230 , and Commissioner of Public Instructions v. K.R. Vishwanath, (2005) 7 SCC 206 . In State of Haryana v. Ankur Gupta, (2003) 7 SCC 704 : AIR 2003 SC 3797 , the apex Court held that the compassionate appointments cannot be made de hors any statutory policy. In State of Haryana v. Ankur Gupta, (2003) 7 SCC 704 : AIR 2003 SC 3797 , the apex Court held that the compassionate appointments cannot be made de hors any statutory policy. In National Institute of Technology v. Niraj Kumar Singh, (2007) 2 SCC 481 : AIR 2007 SC 1155 , the apex Court held that the grant of compassionate appointment would be illegal in the absence, of any scheme providing there for. Such scheme must be commensurate with the constitutional scheme of equality. 14. Keeping in view the aforesaid law, while considering the case in Bibhuti Bhusan Pattnaik v. State of Orissa & Ors., 2017 (II) ILR 896 this Court even remanded the matter back to the authority for reconsideration of the case of the petitioner therein for appointment on compassionate ground. 15. In view of law discussed above, restriction imposed putting a limitation of five years for making an application for compassionate appointment by the, legal heir of a medically invalidated retired employee as per Clause-VI(h) of Standing order No. 5 of 2001 and prescribing no limitation in case of death of an employee is discriminatory and violates Articles 14 and 21 of Constitution of India. In the instant case, such restriction should be ignored, particularly when the record clearly reveals that as soon as petitioner No. 2 attained majority he applied for compassionate appointment. Therefore, both the orders dated 05.01.2010 and 20.01.2010 in Annexures-4 and 6 respectively cannot sustain in the eye of law and are accordingly quashed. The matter is remitted back to the opposite parties to reconsider the case of petitioners for compassionate appointment of petitioner No. 2, the legal heir of petitioner No. 1, who was struck off from service for being invalidated out on medical ground otherwise the very purpose for grant of compassionate appointment will be defeated. 16. The writ petition is thus allowed. However, there shall be no order as to cost.