JUDGMENT : TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN, J. 1. CMP (M) No. 1594/2018 & CMP No. 11488/2018. By medium of these applications, the applicant/petitioner has sought recalling of the order dated 13.12.2017 whereby the appeal was ordered to be dismissed for want of prosecution and has further sought condonation of delay in filing of the said application. 2. The applicant/petitioner has taken the grounds for condonation of delay as set out in para-2 of the application wherein it has been averred that the applicant for the last one year was out of station in connection with treatment of his wife in different hospitals. Thereafter, the applicant himself suffered a serious heart ailment and had to remain out of his native place with his son at Jalandhar. Thereafter, the younger son of the applicant, who was admittedly 38 years of age died on 30.07.2018, resulting the aforesaid delay which is neither intentional nor deliberate, but was due to aforesaid reasons. Even otherwise, the applicant does not stand to gain anything by not pursuing the appeal that was already filed by him. 3. The respondents have contested these applications by filing replies wherein it is averred that the applicant had been granted sufficient time to comply with the orders passed by this Court and having failed to do so, there was no option left with the Court, save and except, dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records of the case. 4. Section 5 of the Limitation Act reads thus:- "5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation - The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section." 5. Explanation - The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section." 5. The law of limitation is based on the legal maxim "interest reipubulicae up sit finis litium" which means that it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation. It is more than settled that no litigant benefits by approaching the Court late. Without any good cause, no one would like to have his claim extinguished. 6. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another vs. Mst. Katiji and Others, (1987) AIR SC 1353, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while laying down certain principles for condonation of delay, made a significant departure from the earlier judgments and observed as under:- "3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on "merits." The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice-that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiable liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: 1. Ordinary a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step motherly treatment when the "State" is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause." So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits......" 7. A three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani and Others, (1996) 3 SCC 132 has held as under: (SCC pp. 135-36, para 7):- "7.....The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so......" 8. In N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 , the scope and ambit of law of limitation was explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following manner:- 9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be un-condonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on whole untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first cut refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior cut would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court. 10. But it is a different matter when the first cut refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior cut would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court. 10. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations in not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain vs. Kuntal Kumari, (1969) AIR SC 575 and State of West Bengal vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality, (1972) AIR SC 749. 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Count should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a looser and he too would have incurred quiet a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss." 9. In S. Ganesharaju (dead) through LRs. and Another vs. Narasamma (dead) through LRs. and Others, (2013) 11 SCC 341 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court in unequivocal terms held that expression "sufficient cause" as appearing in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has to be given a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and unless the opposite party is able to show mala fides in not approaching the Court within the prescribed period of limitation, generally as a normal rule, delay should be condoned. The trend of the Courts while dealing with the matter with regard to condonation of delay has tilted more towards condoning delay and directing the parties to contest the matters on merits, meaning thereby that such technicalities have been given a go-by. The trend of the Courts while dealing with the matter with regard to condonation of delay has tilted more towards condoning delay and directing the parties to contest the matters on merits, meaning thereby that such technicalities have been given a go-by. It is apt to reproduce the following observations:- "12. The expression "sufficient cause" as appearing in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has to be given a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. Unless the respondents are able to show mala fides in not approaching the Court within the prescribed period of limitation, generally as a normal rule, delay should be condoned. The trend of the Courts while dealing with the matter with regard to condonation of delay has tilted more towards condoning delay and directing the parties to contest the matters on merits, meaning thereby that such technicalities have been given a go-by. 14. We are aware of the fact that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing the suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. In fact, it is always just, fair and appropriate that matters should be heard on merits rather than shutting the doors of justice at the threshold. Since sufficient cause has not been defined, thus, the courts are left to exercise a discretion to come to the conclusion whether circumstances exist establishing sufficient cause. The only guiding principle to be seen is whether a party has acted with reasonable diligence and had not been negligent and callous in the prosecution of the matter. In the instant case, we find that the appellants have shown sufficient cause seeking condonation of delay and the same has been explained satisfactorily." 10. In Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others, (2013) 12 SCC 649 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the following guidelines for condonation of delay:- (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact situation. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact situation. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude." 11. A two Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dhiraj Singh (dead) through legal Rep. and Others vs. State of Haryana and Others, (2014) 14 SCC 127 observed as under: (SCC p. 131, para 15). "15.......The substantive rights of the appellants should not be allowed to be defeated on technical grounds by taking hyper technical view of self-imposed limitations....." 12. In B.S. Sheshagiri Setty and Others vs. State of Karnataka and Others, (2016) 2 SCC 123 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that when what is at stake is justice, then a technical or pedantic approach should not be adopted by the Courts to do justice when there is miscarriage of justice caused to a public litigant. It is apt to reproduce the following observations:- "28. If a statute does not prescribe the time limit for exercise of revisional power, it must be exercised within a reasonable time frame. In the instant case, it is evident that constant litigation has been carried on by the appellants, and therefore they cannot be accused of suddenly waking up after 13 years to claim their land. Further, in the context of limitation, it has been held by this Court in a catena of cases that when what is at stake is justice, then a technical or pedantic approach should not be adopted by the Courts to do justice when there is miscarriage of justice caused to a public litigant." 13. It is repeatedly held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that a litigant cannot stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk and it is for this reason that judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 14. Bearing in mind the aforesaid exposition of law, if the facts of the present case are adverted to, I find no material on record whereby the applicant/petitioner can be held guilty of deliberate inaction, lethargic, willful and deliberate negligence. 14. Bearing in mind the aforesaid exposition of law, if the facts of the present case are adverted to, I find no material on record whereby the applicant/petitioner can be held guilty of deliberate inaction, lethargic, willful and deliberate negligence. This Court cannot be oblivious of the fact that the applicant is more than 80 years of age and for the reasons given in the applications which otherwise are duly supported by his affidavits to attribute deliberate inaction on his part is extremely harsh and cruel upon him. This Court has no hesitation to hold that the applicant has done everything that was within his reach and, therefore, his case cannot be thrown out on mere technicalities. 15. Therefore, in the given circumstances where substantial rights are involved, the same cannot be decided on technical grounds where there is no culpable negligence or deliberate inaction on the part of the applicant/ petitioner. Even otherwise, the Court cannot adopt pedantic approach in condonation of the delay. 16. In this view of the matter, I find merit in these applications and the same are allowed. The delay in filing of the application is condoned and the order passed by this Court on 13.12.2017 is recalled. The appeal is ordered to be restored to its original number and the certified copy of the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court is ordered to be taken on record. RSA No. 67 of 2017. 17. List for admission on 07.05.2019.