JUDGMENT : R. DEVDAS, J. 1. Though the matter is listed for "Hearing - Interlocutory Application", with the consent of the learned counsel on both sides, the mater is heard and disposed of finally. 2. The petitioner and the 4th respondent filed application for the post of Gram Sahayaka. After enquiry in the village, the 3rd respondent-Revenue Inspector submitted a report to the Tahsildar recommending the petitioner for appointment as Gram Sahayaka. It is also reported by the Revenue Inspector that with respect to the 4th respondent herein a criminal case is registered in Crime No.233/2012 in Huliyurudurga Police Station, therefore the 4th respondent was not recommended. Consequently, the petitioner herein was appointed as Gram Sayahaka at Paduvagere Circle, Amruthuru Hobli, Kunigal Taluk of Tumakur District, by order dated 11.11.2016. 3. Being aggrieved by the rejection of the 4th respondent's application, the 4th respondent approached the 1st respondent-Assistant Commissioner invoking the Provisions of Section 49 read with Section 25 of Karnataka Land Revenue Act. Notice was issued to the petitioner and the petitioner filed objections before the Assistant Commissioner. After consideration of the case of the petitioner and the 4th respondent, the Assistant Commissioner allowed the appeal filed by the 4th respondent and cancelled the appointment of the petitioner herein. The Assistant Commissioner further directed the Tahsildar to call for fresh applications for appointment of Gram Sahayaka. The petitioner being aggrieved by the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner, is before this Court. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Section 49 is not a provision which would provide for an appeal against an order of appointment made by the Tahsildar. In this regard, the learned counsel relies upon a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shri. Beerappa Vs. Assistant Commissioner and Others, in W.A.No.100174/2017, decided on 08.11.2017 at the Dharwad Bench of this Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Division Bench has considered the question as to whether an appeal under Section 49 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, could be invoked calling in question an order of appointment made by the Tahsildar, while appointing Gram Sahayaka. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Division Bench has considered the question as to whether an appeal under Section 49 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, could be invoked calling in question an order of appointment made by the Tahsildar, while appointing Gram Sahayaka. It is submitted that having considered the said question, the Division Bench has come to conclusion that Section 49 of the Act, which contemplates that an appeal shall lie from every original order passed under this Act or the rules made there under and from every order made in exercise of the powers confined by Section 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 5. It is submitted that the Division Bench has categorically held that the Assistant Commissioner has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal under Section 49 of the Act to set-aside an order of appointment made by the Tahsildar. It is also pointed out that the Division Bench has held that a remedy available is only to approach this Court under Article, 226 of the Constitution of India. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the 4th respondent submits that the 4th respondent did not file an 'appeal' under Section 49 of the Act, on the contrary a 'petition' was filed under Section 49 of the Act. It was also submitted by the learned counsel for the 4th respondent that the Division Bench did not consider the circular dated 22.03.1979, issued by the Revenue Department of the State Government clarifying that the Assistant Commissioner was empowered to scrutinize the selection made by the Tahsildar, revise or modify the order passed by the Tahsildar in cases of violation of any of the conditions imposed in the circular issued by the State Government. It is therefore submitted that power was vested with the Assistant Commissioner and the 4th respondent rightly approached the Assistant Commissioner. However, even though there is no other provision except Section 49 and Section 25 in the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, the 4th respondent has approached the Assistant Commissioner while filing a 'petition' under Section 49 and not an appeal under Section 49. 7. However, even though there is no other provision except Section 49 and Section 25 in the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, the 4th respondent has approached the Assistant Commissioner while filing a 'petition' under Section 49 and not an appeal under Section 49. 7. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel for the 4th respondent that another circular dated 23.10.2007, was also issued by the Regional Commissioner, Belagavi, wherein it was once again reiterated that in cases where complaints are received with respect to orders of appointments of Gram Sahayaka made by the Tahsildar, the Assistant Commissioner is empowered to look into the complaints and pass suitable orders, in accordance with law. It is was further submitted by the learned counsel for the 4th respondent that the Division Bench has not taken into consideration those circulars, which were issued subsequent to the circular dated 16.09.1978. 8. In the light of the above, what needs to be decided by this Court is as to whether the impugned order passed by the Assistant Commissioner could be sustained. As seen in the order of the Division Bench in the case of Shri. Beerappa (supra), the Division Bench has noticed the Government Order dated 16.09.1978 and the circular issued by the Regional Commissioner, Belagavi on 23.10.2007. However, the circular dated 22.03.1979 has not been notice by the Division Bench. 9. However, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Amareshappa Vs. State of Karnataka, (1985) ILR(Kar) 2092 has held that a learned Single Judge of the High Court is bound by the decisions of the larger Benches such as the Division Benches and Full Benches. The learned Single Judge has to follow the decision of the larger Bench. That is the position, even if the learned Single Judge is inclined to take a view different from one taken by the Division Bench. This is the discipline with all the judges of the High Court are bound to follow. It has also been held that if the decision is rendered by the learned Single Judge, the parties are entitled to take up the matter before the appellate Bench and then canvass before the Divisions Bench about the correctness of the view taken by another Division Bench. It would be for the Division Bench, if it is persuaded, to doubt the correctness of the view taken by another Division Bench. It would be for the Division Bench, if it is persuaded, to doubt the correctness of the view taken by another Division Bench. It was therefore opined that reference made by a Single Judge to Division Bench was not justified. 10. This view has also been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Official Liquidator Vs. Dayanand, (2008) 10 SCC 1 . At paragraph No.90 it has been held as follows: "90. We are distressed to note that despite several pronouncements on the subject, there is substantial increase in the number of cases involving violation of the basics of judicial discipline. The learned Single Judges and Benches of the High Courts refuse to follow and accept the verdict and law laid down by coordinate and even larger Benches by citing minor difference in the facts as the ground for doing so. Therefore, it has become necessary to reiterate that disrespect to the constitutional ethos and breach of discipline have grave impact on the credibility of judicial institution and encourages chance litigation. It must be remembered that predictability and certainty is an important hallmark of judicial jurisprudence developed in this country in the last six decades and increase in the frequency of conflicting judgments of the superior judiciary will do incalculable harm to the system inasmuch as the courts at the grass roots will not be able to decide as to which of the judgments lay down the correct law and which one should be followed." 11. In that view of the matter, the writ petition is required to be allowed, and is therefore allowed, while quashing the impugned order dated 10.10.2018, passed by the Assistant Commissioner, at Annexure-F. However, in the light of the observation made above, the petitioner herein shall not take benefit of this order for a period of four weeks. This is to enable the respondents either to approach the Division Bench or to file a fresh writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as observed by the Division Bench in the case of Shri. Beerappa (supra).