JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. This criminal revision petition is directed against the judgment dated 14.06.2018, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (II), Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. (Sarkaghat Court), in Cr. Appeal No. 4 of 2018, whereby he affirmed the judgment dated 17.01.2018, passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 1, Sarkaghat, District Mandi in Case No. 50- III/2014, whereby the petition filed by the respondent for providing residence came to be allowed and the petitioner was further directed not to commit any domestic violence. 2. It is not in dispute that the respondent is legally wedded wife of petitioner No. 1 and petitioners No. 2 and 3 are father-in-law and mother-in-law of the respondent. From the wedlock, one son was born, who is a minor. Due to matrimonial discord, the respondent approached the Judicial Magistrate by filing an application under Section 12 of the Protection of women from Domestic Violence Act, on the allegations that every time the petitions commit domestic violence against her and in October, 2013 when her mother had come to her matrimonial home, the petitioners abused her. The respondent took up the matter with the Zila Parishad Member Vijay Luxami, who requested petitioner No. 1 to behave properly with the respondent but he refused. A compromise also took place between them, but petitioner No. 1 did not mend his ways. 3. In the reply filed by petitioner No. 1, he admitted the marriage as also the birth of the child but claimed that the respondent had left the matrimonial home without any reasonable cause. 4. The learned Magistrate after recording evidence and evaluating the same allowed the petition and directed the petitioner No. 1 to provide residence to the respondent. 5. The matter was unsuccessfully carried in appeal before the learned Additional Sessions Judge (II), Mandi, who vide judgment dated 14.06.2018 dismissed the appeal, constraining the petitioners to file the instant petition. 6. It is vehemently argued by Shri Ajay Sharma, Senior Advocate, duly assisted by Shri Rakesh Chaudhary, Advocate, that, in case, the evidence, as led by the respondent is scrutinised, the same would depict that she has utterly failed to substantiate the allegations set out in her complaint and, therefore, the orders passed by the learned Courts below, deserve to be set aside. 7. 7. On the other hand, Shri Ajay Chandel, Advocate, would submit that since the orders passed by the learned Courts below do not suffer from any perversity, therefore, they warrant no interference. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records of the case. 8. However, before I deal with the contentions put-forth by the learned counsel for the petitioners, it would be necessary to delineate the scope and power of this Court while dealing with revision petition of the instant kind. 9. In Amur Chand Agrawal vs. Shanti Bose and another, (1973) AIR SC 799, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the revisional jurisdiction should normally be exercised in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the proceedings or there is a manifest error of point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. 10. In State of Orissa vs. Nakula Sahu, (1979) AIR SC 663, the Hon'ble Supreme Court after placing reliance upon a large number of its earlier judgments including Akalu Aheer vs. Ramdeo Ram, (1973) AIR SC 2145, held that the power, being discretionary, has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily or lightly. The Court held that "judicial discretion, as has often been said, means a discretion which is informed by tradition methodolised by analogy and discipline by system". 11. In Pathumma and another vs. Muhammad, (1986) AIR SC 1436, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that High Court "committed an error in making a re-assessment of the evidence" as in its revisional jurisdiction it was "not justified in substituting its own view for that of the learned Magistrate on a question of fact". 12. In Bansi Lal and others vs. Laxman Singh, (1986) AIR SC 1721, the legal position regarding scope of revisional jurisdiction was summed up by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following terms: "It is only in glaring cases of injustice resulting from some violation of fundamental principles of law by the trial court, that the High Court is empowered to set aside the order of the acquittal and direct a re-trial of the acquitted accused. From the very nature of this power it should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. From the very nature of this power it should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. The mere circumstance that a finding of fact recorded by the trial court may in the opinion of the High Court be wrong, will not justify the setting aside of the order of acquittal and directing a re-trial of the accused. Even in an appeal, the Appellate Court would not be justified in interfering with an acquittal merely because it was inclined to differ from the findings of fact reached by the trial Court on the appreciation of the evidence. The revisional power of the High Court is much more restricted in its scope." 13. In Ramu @ Ram Kumar vs. Jagannath, (1994) AIR SC 26, Hon'ble Supreme court cautioned the revisional Courts not to lightly exercise the revisional jurisdiction at the behest of a private complainant. 14. In State of Karnataka vs. Appu Balu, (1993) AIR SC 1126 = II (1992) CCR 458 (SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in exercise of the revisional powers, it is not permissible for the Court to reappreciate the evidence. 15. In Ramu alias Ram Kumar and others vs. Jagannath, (1994) AIR SC 26 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "It is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court should not be lightly exercised particularly when it was invoked by a private complaint." 16. In Kaptan Singh and others vs. State of M.P. and another, (1997) AIR SC 2485 = II (1997) CCR 109 (SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered a large number of its earlier judgments, particularly Chinnaswami vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1962) AIR SC 1788; Mahendra Pratap vs. Sarju Singh, (1968) AIR SC 707; P.N. G. Raju vs. B.P. Appadu, (1975) AIR SC 1854 and Ayodhya vs. Ram Sumer Singh, (1981) AIR SC 1415 and held that revisional power can be exercised only when "there exists a manifest illegality in the order or there is a grave miscarriage of justice". 17. In State of Kerala vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "In Its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. 17. In State of Kerala vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "In Its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of Supervisory Jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate Court nor can it be treated even as a second Appellate Jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice." 18. In State of A.P. vs. Rajagopala Rao, (2000) 10 SCC 338 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "The High Court in exercise of its revisional power has upset the concurrent findings of the Courts below without in any way considering the evidence on the record and without indicating as to in what manner the courts below had erred in coming to the conclusion which they had arrived at. The judgment of the High Court contains no reasons whatsoever which would indicate as to why the revision filed by the respondent was allowed. In a sense, it is a non-speaking judgment." 19. Bearing in mind the aforesaid exposition of law, it would be noticed that there is no quarrel between the parties regarding the relationship of petitioner No. 1 and respondent being that of a husband and wife. 20. Keeping in view this relationship, this Court had directed the couple to appear before this Court on 12.11.2018. On that date, the respondent (wife) categorically stated that she was ready and willing to accompany petitioner No. 1 (husband) but petitioner No. 1 categorically stated that he was not ready to take the respondent. 21. Once the relationship between the parties is not denied, then obviously no fault can be found with the orders passed by the learned Courts below holding the respondent to be entitled to residence. 22. 21. Once the relationship between the parties is not denied, then obviously no fault can be found with the orders passed by the learned Courts below holding the respondent to be entitled to residence. 22. Even though Shri Ajay Sharma, learned Senior Counsel, would vehemently argue that the testimonies of the witnesses examined in this case are full of contradictions, however, I really did not find any such contradiction so as to dis-entitle the respondent claim of residence, as admittedly petitioner No. 1 is not at all interested or ready to keep the respondent as his wife or give her accommodation in his own house. In such circumstances, the order of residence passed by the learned trial Magistrate and as affirmed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (II), is perfectly in accordance with law and calls for no interference. 23. Petitioner No. 1 is directed to pay Rs.3,000/- per month towards the expenses of rental accommodation of the respondent in terms of the order passed by the learned Trial Magistrate. Since, there is no perversity in the orders passed by the learned Courts below, therefore, this petition is devoid of merit and dismissed as such, leaving the parties to bear their costs.