JUDGMENT : 1. When the matter was listed before us on 02.08.2019, neither was Mr. Jitendra Chaudhary, Advocate for the appellant-writ petitioner, present nor was there any representation on his behalf. Since the matter was coming up for the first time, we thought it appropriate to give the counsel for the appellant one more opportunity to file objections. Even today, when the matter is listed, no objections have been filed to the application seeking condonation of delay. 2. The delay in preferring this review application is of 103 days i.e. a period of around three and a half months. The delay is not so inordinate as to non-suit the review applicant, and deny them the opportunity to put forth their submissions on merits. The application to condone the delay is allowed, and the delay is condoned. 3. This application is filed seeking review of the order passed by a Division Bench of this Court in SPA No. 542 of 2014 dated 12.09.2018. The respondent, both in the Writ Petition and in the Special Appeal, has invoked our jurisdiction seeking review of the aforesaid order. The appellant-writ petitioner had filed WPSS No. 487 of 2010 questioning the termination of his services, on the charge of his having submitted a forged medical bill of ' 20/- regarding the medical claim of his son, and for receiving salary for the full day though he was on half day leave on that particular day, as arbitrary and illegal. 4. The appellant-writ petitioner had initially filed a writ petition before Allahabad High Court, which was dismissed on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy of an appeal. On the appellant-writ petitioner preferring a departmental appeal, the order passed by the appointing authority was upheld. He, subsequently, invoked the jurisdiction of the Allahabad High Court and, on the matter being transferred to this Court, a learned Single Judge of this Court found the punishment imposed on him to be shockingly disproportionate, and remanded the matter to the Disciplinary Authority. The Special Appeal preferred by the review applicant was dismissed by order dated 09.05.2008, and the Special Leave to Appeal preferred there-against was dismissed by the Supreme Court by its order dated 11.08.2008. 5. Consequent thereto, the review applicant modified the order of punishment from that of dismissal to removal. The Special Appeal preferred by the review applicant was dismissed by order dated 09.05.2008, and the Special Leave to Appeal preferred there-against was dismissed by the Supreme Court by its order dated 11.08.2008. 5. Consequent thereto, the review applicant modified the order of punishment from that of dismissal to removal. On the appellant-writ petitioner again invoking the jurisdiction of this Court, the learned Single Judge observed that though, technically, there was a difference between the punishment of dismissal and removal, the consequences of both punishments was not different. While setting-aside the order of punishment of removal from service, the learned Single Judge opined that the punishment of withholding of increments for one year with cumulative effect would meet the ends of justice. 6. On the claim of the appellant-writ petitioner, for payment of back-wages, the learned Single Judge observed that he was gainfully employed during this period, for which he had himself filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court, wherein he had admitted that he had been working as a Surveyor with the Life Insurance Corporation. While directing reinstatement of the petitioner, the learned Single Judge expressed his disinclination to grant him the benefit of back-wages. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant-writ petitioner preferred a Special Appeal resulting in the order under review being passed. 7. In the said order (SPA No. 542 of 2014 dated 12.09.2018), a Division Bench of this Court observed that the punishment of withholding increments of the appellant was still disproportionate; the penalty, which is imposed, must be commensurate with the alleged misconduct; the appellant-writ petitioner was denied back-wages solely on the ground that he was working as a Surveyor with the Life Insurance Corporation; and the post of Surveyor was not a permanent post in the Life Insurance Corporation, but was a simple engagement. 8. The Division Bench, thereafter, referred to the judgment of the Kerala High Court in The Travancore Rubber & Tea Co. Ltd., Manickal Estate, Mundakayam P.O. Vs. Secretary, National Union of Plantation Staff and Non Staff Employees (AITUC), Peermade and others (Order in WP (Civil) No. 24813 of 2003), which arose against an award passed by the Labour Court awarding 50% back-wages to the workman after taking note of the fact that he had, for a short period, worked as an L.I.C. Agent, and had conducted business in his wife's name. After holding that such engagement was not permanent, and no regular monthly income was derived from such engagement, the Labour Court had directed payment of 50% back-wages. Relying on this order of the learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court, the Division Bench had modified the order of penalty to that of censure, and had held that the appellant-writ petitioner was entitled to 60% back-wages from the date of termination i.e. 29.05.1991 along with interest at 9% per annum. The Division Bench also observed that mere taking of voluntary retirement would have no bearing in the case. 9. Mr. Chetan Joshi, learned counsel for the review applicant, would submit that, consequent on the appellant-writ petitioner taking voluntary retirement on 21.05.2016, the relationship of master and servant ceased thereafter, and the Division Bench could, therefore, not have directed payment of back-wages to a person, who was no longer an employee of the review applicants; the judgment of the Kerala High Court was against an award passed by the Labour Court directing payment of 50% back-wages; the Kerala High Court had held that it would not interfere with the conclusions arrived at by the fact finding authority, or substitute such findings with alternative conclusions; and, unlike in the case before the Kerala High Court, in the present case, the petitioner had directly invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and had not approached the Labour Court. 10. It is unnecessary for us to examine the consequences of the order, permitting the appellant-writ petitioner to voluntarily retire during the pendency of appellate proceedings before this Court, for the Supreme Court, in Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh Warehousing Corporation and another Vs. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee, has opined: " .. There appears to be force in this contention. It must be remembered that in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court acts only in a supervisory capacity and not as an Appellate Tribunal. It does not review the evidence upon which the inferior tribunal proposed to base its conclusion; it simply demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or manifestly erroneous, but does not, as a rule, substitute its own view for those of the inferior tribunal. It does not review the evidence upon which the inferior tribunal proposed to base its conclusion; it simply demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or manifestly erroneous, but does not, as a rule, substitute its own view for those of the inferior tribunal. In other words, the offending order of the impugned illegal proceeding is quashed and put out of the way as one which should not be used to the detriment of the writ petitioner. Thus, in matters of employment, while exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, over the orders and quasi-judicial proceeding of an administrative authority - not being a proceeding under the Industria1/Labour Law before an Industria1/Labour Tribunal - culminating in dismissal of the employee, the High Court should ordinarily, in the event of the dismissal being found illegal, simply quash the same and should not further give a positive direction for payment to the employee full back wages (although as a consequence of the annulment of the dismissal, the position as it obtained immediately before the dismissal is restored); such peculiar powers can properly be exercised in a case where the impugned adjudication or award has been given by an Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court. The instant case is not one under Industrial/ Labour Law. The respondent employee never raised any industrial dispute, nor invoked the jurisdiction of the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal. He directly moved the High Court for the exercise of its special jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for challenging the order of dismissal primarily on the ground that it was violative of the principles of natural justice which required that his public employment should not be terminated without giving him a due opportunity to defend himself and to rebut the charges against him. Furthermore, whether a workman or employee of a statutory authority should be reinstated in public employment with or without full back wages, is a question of fact depending on evidence to be produced before the tribunal. If after the termination of his employment the workman/ employee was gainfully employed elsewhere, that is one of the important factors to be considered in determining whether or not the reinstatement should be with full back wages and with continuity of employment. If after the termination of his employment the workman/ employee was gainfully employed elsewhere, that is one of the important factors to be considered in determining whether or not the reinstatement should be with full back wages and with continuity of employment. For these twofold reasons, we are of opinion that the High Court was in error in directing payment to the employee full back wages." (emphasis supplied) 11. In the light of the law declared by the Supreme Court in Vijay Narayan Vajpayee, on the order of termination being quashed, the High Court, in the exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would, ordinarily, not direct payment of back-wages. 12. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the appellant-writ petitioner was engaged as a Surveyor with the Life Insurance Corporation. His claim not have earned enough to sustain himself, is a disputed question of fact, which this Court would, ordinarily, not examine in summary proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Division Bench has not only erred in substituting the punishment to that of mere censure, but has also exceeded its jurisdiction in directing that he be paid 60% back wages. 13. We are satisfied, therefore, that the order under review suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record. The order of the Division Bench dated 12.09.2018 is set-aside, and the review application is allowed. However, in the circumstances, without costs.