JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. The moot question that arises for consideration in this petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is whether the notice under Section 76 of the Himachal Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1968 (for short 'Act'), even if held to be mandatory in the given facts and circumstances of the case, can be waived of by a party. 2. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff/respondent filed a suit for recovery of Rs.19,36,189/- and the same is now pending adjudication before the learned Senior Civil Judge, Kinnaur at Reckong Peo. 3. The petitioner/defendant not only filed the written statement, but thereafter filed a counter-claim also. However, the further admitted position is that neither in the counter-claim nor in the written statement was the objection with regard to non-service of notice under Section 76 of the Act taken by the petitioner/defendant. It is only when the case was listed for recording of the statement of Dev Singh, plaintiff that the petitioner/defendant filed an application for rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) read with Section 151 of CPC. It is averred that since the suit had been instituted without serving the notice as required under Section 76 of the Act, therefore, the plaint deserves to be rejected. 4. The learned trial Court vide its order dated 4.5.2018 rejected the application by according the following reasons: "So far as business of the society is concerned, the matter is already at the stage of leading Pws and constitution or bye-laws of society has not been placed with the application so that this could come to the conclusion as to whether the present suit pertains to the business of the society or not. Therefore, to my mind, the application under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) read with Section 151 of the C.P.C. at this stage is not maintainable. However, defendant, in his written statement has nowhere taken such a defence that suit is bad in law for non-submission of notice to the Registrar, Co-operative Societies as per the mandate of Section 76 of H.P. State Co-operative Societies Act. However, defendant, in his written statement has nowhere taken such a defence that suit is bad in law for non-submission of notice to the Registrar, Co-operative Societies as per the mandate of Section 76 of H.P. State Co-operative Societies Act. Therefore, to my mind, the present application seems to be without any merit and the same is dismissed without issuing any notice to the other party as the case is very old one and required to be disposed of on priority basis and such notice is also not called for." 5. Assailing the said order, it is vehemently argued by learned counsel for the petitioner/defendant that the order passed by the learned trial Court is contrary to law and, therefore, deserves to be set-aside. 6. On the other hand, Mr. B.C. Negi, Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Nitin Thakur, Advocate, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff would argue that even if it is assumed without conceding that the notice was mandatory, the petitioner has waived of such right and, therefore, the present petition ought to be dismissed. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the case carefully. 7. Section 76 of the Act reads thus: "76. Notice necessary in suits : No suit shall be instituted against a society or any of its officers in respect of any act touching the constitution, management or the business of the society until the expiration of two months after notice in writing has been delivered to the Registrar or left at his office, stating the cause of action, the same description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the relief which he claims; and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 72, a suit cannot be instituted against a society or any of its officers (concerning the constitution, management or business of the society) unless two months period has expired after notice in writing has been delivered to the Registrar stating the cause of action. The object is to save the societies from unnecessary involvement in litigation and further to apprise the Registrar of the prospective disputes in which the society would be a party." 8. The object is to save the societies from unnecessary involvement in litigation and further to apprise the Registrar of the prospective disputes in which the society would be a party." 8. Without going into the question and assuming that the dispute involved in the present lis pertaining to the suit which launches or related to the constitution, management and business of the society for which a notice was mandatory required to be served under Section 76 of the Act. Admittedly, such notice has not been served, so therefore, can the plaint be rejected as prayed for by learned counsel for the petitioner. 9. The answer to the same is a big 'No'. 10. It is more than settled and rather there can be no quarrel with the proposition that the requirement of notice can always be waived. Equally settled is the proposition of law that the provision of Section 80 CPC, which is akin to Section 76 of the Act is mandatory, but right can be waived by a party. 11. As a matter of fact, as early as in the year 1945, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Vellayan Chettiar vs. Province of Madras, (1947) AIR PC 197, unequivocally held that there is no reason why the notice under Section 80 could not be waived if the authority thinks it fit to waive the said benefit. In that case, it was argued on the basis of the observations of Lord Sumner in an earlier decision in Bhagchand vs. Secretary of State, (1927) AIR PC 176 that the provisions of Section 80 were express, explicit and mandatory, a notice under Section 80 could not be waived. Distinguishing Bhagchand, Lord Simonds stated: "The observations of Lord Sumner in delivering the opinion of the Board were directed solely to the construction of the section and cannot in their Lordship's opinion be regarded as deciding that it is not competent for the authority, for whose benefit the right to notice is provided, to waive that right. There is no inconsistency between the propositions that the provisions of the section are mandatory and must be enforced by the Court and that they may be waived by the authority for whose benefit they are provided." 12. There is no inconsistency between the propositions that the provisions of the section are mandatory and must be enforced by the Court and that they may be waived by the authority for whose benefit they are provided." 12. Reliance was also placed in Gaekwar Baroda State Railway vs. Hafiz Habib-ul-Haq, (1938) AIR PC 165 in which the Privy Council considered the provisions of Sections 86 and 87 of the Code relating to suits against Rulers, etc., observing that the said decision was not governing authority, the Judicial Committee observed: "The condition to which Sections 86 and 87 relate is created not, or not merely, for the benefit of the Sovereign Prince, but to serve an important public purpose. It is for that reason that the consent of the Governor-General in Council is required, and for that reason that there can be no waiver of his consent by a Sovereign Prince. On the other hand, there appears to their Lordships to be no reason why the notice required to be given under Section 80 should not be waived if the authority concerned thinks fit to waive it. It is for his protection that notice is required; if in the particular case he does not require that protection and says so, he can lawfully waive his right. 13. In Dhian Singh vs. Union of India, (1958) AIR SC 274, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that when objection as to validity of notice was not taken in the written statement nor an issue framed by the trial Court, an inference could be drawn that the objection under Section 80 had been waived. 14. In a leading decision in Dhirendra Nath vs. Sudhir Chandra, (1964) AIR SC 1300 the Hon'ble Supreme Court after referring to various decisions, observed as under: "Where the Court acts without inherent jurisdiction, a party affected cannot by waiver confer jurisdiction on it, which it has not. Where such jurisdiction is not wanting, a directory provision can always be waived. But a mandatory provision can only be waived if it is not conceived in the public interest, but in the interests of the party that waives it." 15. An objection as to the validity of the notice can be taken at the earliest stage of the proceedings. Where such jurisdiction is not wanting, a directory provision can always be waived. But a mandatory provision can only be waived if it is not conceived in the public interest, but in the interests of the party that waives it." 15. An objection as to the validity of the notice can be taken at the earliest stage of the proceedings. If such objection is not taken at the initial stage, an inference can be drawn that the defendant had waived his objection against non-service or validity of the notice (See: Sivaramakrishna vs. Executive Engineer, (1978) AIR A.P. 389). 16. Learned Full Bench of Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Vasant Ambadas Pandit vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others, (1981) AIR Bombay 394 held that no suit can be instituted without service of notice if such service of notice is required statutorily as a condition precedent. The giving of notice is a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. But, this being a mere procedural requirement, the same does not go to the root of jurisdiction in a true sense of the term. The same is capable of being waived by the defendants and on such waiver, the Court gets jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. The plea of waiver can always be tried by the Civil Court. In fact it is not suggested who else can try. The question whether, in fact, there is waiver or not would necessarily depend on facts of each case and is liable to be tried by the same Court if raised. 17. In Bishandayal and sons vs. State of Orissa and others, (2001) 1 SCC 555 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with a question as to whether the amendment suit was not maintainable for want of notice under Section 80 CPC. 17. In Bishandayal and sons vs. State of Orissa and others, (2001) 1 SCC 555 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with a question as to whether the amendment suit was not maintainable for want of notice under Section 80 CPC. Placing reliance upon the cases of Amar Nath Dogra vs. Union of India, (1963) AIR SC 424, State of Punjab vs. Geeta Iron & Brass Works Ltd., (1978) 1 SCC 68 , Ghanshyam Dass vs. Dominion of India, (1984) 3 SCC 46 and Vasant Ambadas Pandit vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1981) AIR Bombay 394, wherein it was held that a notice under Section 80 CPC or equivalent notices under Section 527 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act are for the benefit of the respondents and the same can be waived as they do not go to the root of jurisdiction in the true sense of the term. 18. In State of A.P. and others vs. Pioneer Builders, A.P., (2006) 12 SCC 119 , it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that where the plea of want of notice under Section 80 CPC was not raised by the Government in the written statement or additional written statement, such defect will be deemed to have been waived and it was observed as under: "19......Accordingly, we decline to interfere with the finding recorded by the High Court on this aspect of the matter. The High Court has held that having participated in the original proceedings, it was not now open to the State to raise a fresh issue as to the maintainability of the suit, in view of waiving the defect at the earliest point of time. The High Court has also observed that knowing fully well about non-issuance of notice under Section 80 CPC the State had not raised such a plea in the written statement or additional written statement filed in the suit and, therefore, deemed to have waived the objection. It goes without saying that the question whether in fact, there is waiver or not necessarily depends on the facts of each case and is liable to be tried by the Court, if raised, which, as noticed above, is not the case here." 19. It goes without saying that the question whether in fact, there is waiver or not necessarily depends on the facts of each case and is liable to be tried by the Court, if raised, which, as noticed above, is not the case here." 19. In a case relating to claim for compensation under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, it was held by the Gauhati High Court that where maintainability of the claim application was challenged by the opposite party, but no specific ground was taken as to why the application was not maintainable and at no stage, the State took the plea of non-service of notice under Section 80 CPC. The requirement of notice may be safely held to have been waived. (Refer: Smt. Maya Rani Ghosh etc. vs. State of Tripura and others, (2007) AIR Gauhati 76). 20. To be fair to the learned counsel for the petitioner, he has placed strong reliance on the judgment of this Court in The Jawali Harijan Co-operative Agriculture Society vs. Chet Ram, (1991) 2 ShimLC 142 , more particularly, in para-8, which reads thus: "8. The trial Court expected the appellant Society to prove by way of evidence a negative fact that such a notice was not issued and on that assumption, it proceeded to decide that issue against the Society for want of evidence. To the contrary, it was incumbent for the plaintiff to have made appropriate averments in the plaint and prove the fact that notice as required under Section 76 of the Act had been duly served upon the Registrar. The lower Appellate Court also failed to consider the objection which was raised before it. In vview of this, when no notice had been served as required under Section 76 of the Act above, upon the Registrar, therefore, the suit was barred and plaint ought to have been rejected under Section 7, Rule 11 (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Courts ought not to have proceeded to determine issues on merits. The judgment and decrees of the courts below as such are vitiated." 21. Obviously, there can be no quarrel with the proposition as laid down in the aforesaid case, but then the Court was not dealing with the plea of waiver as is canvassed in the present case. Therefore, the aforesaid case is clearly distinguishable and not applicable to the present case. 22. Obviously, there can be no quarrel with the proposition as laid down in the aforesaid case, but then the Court was not dealing with the plea of waiver as is canvassed in the present case. Therefore, the aforesaid case is clearly distinguishable and not applicable to the present case. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also cited number of judgments of the various High Courts and also Hon'ble Supreme Court to canvass with support of application for rejection of plaint can be filed at any time. Here again there cannot be any quarrel with the proposition, but such proposition does not arise for consideration in this case. 23. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the present revision petition is bereft of any merit and consequently, the same is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.