K. C. Vijayakumara S/o Late Chikkamallayya v. S. Geetha W/o K. C. Vijayakumara
2019-01-04
B.M.SHYAM PRASAD
body2019
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : 1. The petitioner, father of a minor boy aged about 12 years, has filed these petitions as his applications in G & W.C. No. 36/2015 on the file of the IV Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Bangalore City are rejected. 2. The petitioner’s first application (I.A. No. 4) under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure (for short ‘CPC’) is for amendment of the petition filed by him under the provisions of Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 read with provisions of Section 29 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. The proposed amendment is to substitute the aforesaid provisions with provisions of Sections 7 & 8 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 and to include the circumstances, which according to the petitioner is only a further elucidation of what is already stated in the petition to disqualify the respondent-mother of the child from the custody. This application in IA No. IV is rejected by the learned Family Court judge vide the impugned order dated 7th October, 2016. The petitioner’s other application (I.A. No. 5) filed under Section 151 of CPC for interim custody of the minor child is allowed in part by another impugned separate order dated 7th October, 2016. The petitioner vide this order on IA No. 5 is granted visitation rights to visit the child on alternative Sundays between 10.00 a.m. and 1.00 p.m. with prior intimation to the respondent and at a place that is convenient and closer to the respondent’s residence. 3. This Court, as regards the petitioner’s visitation rights, has granted interim order and the last such interim order is on 25.04.2017. The interim order dated 25.04.2017 reads as under: “This Court by order dated 27.03.2017 has made an interim arrangement for visitation rights during the weekends. Though the same has been exercised there are different versions as to whether the child was comfortable or not. In any event, the effort made by this Court by providing such visitation right was to enable the child to develop affinity and affection towards the petitioner-father. The said process certainly will take some time and in that view even if there are some minor differences, the same will have to be ironed out and the process will have to be smoothened.
The said process certainly will take some time and in that view even if there are some minor differences, the same will have to be ironed out and the process will have to be smoothened. Therefore, it would be appropriate to continue the same arrangement during all the week ends until the petition is taken up once again for consideration. In this regard, it is however made clear that while exercising the visitation right if the child is comfortable with the petitioner and if the child expresses the desire to spend the night with the father on the first day of the week end as granted i.e. Saturday night, the mother shall permit the child. It is further emphasized by way of caution that the same will be at the request of the child and if such request is made by the child, the mother shall not oppose the same. The visitation shall be exercised in the manner as ordered on 27.03.2017. List during the second week of June.” 4. Sri. A.V. Gangadharappa, the learned counsel for the petitioner as regards the rejection of the application for amendment contended that the learned Family Court Judge has rejected the application perfunctorily on the ground that the petitioner is introducing an altogether new case, ignoring the nature of the proposed amendment and the circumstances in which the proposed amendment is sought for. 5. On the other hand Sri. Manjunatha Sreedhara Hegde, the learned Counsel on behalf of Sri. Adarsh Gangal, learned counsel for the respondent supports the impugned order rejecting the application for amendment. The learned counsel firstly contended that the application is filed on the ground that the petition suffers from a formal defect: if indeed a petition suffers from formal defect, the appropriate course for the petitioner would be under the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 1 Sub-Rule (3) of CPC viz. filing an application for permission to withdraw the petition with liberty to file a fresh petition. Secondly, the amendment introduces a new cause of action, and it is settled law that an amendment proposed by a plaintiff/petitioner will have to be treated differently from an amendment proposed by a defendant/respondent i.e. the amendments by the plaintiff/petitioner must be considered strictly.
filing an application for permission to withdraw the petition with liberty to file a fresh petition. Secondly, the amendment introduces a new cause of action, and it is settled law that an amendment proposed by a plaintiff/petitioner will have to be treated differently from an amendment proposed by a defendant/respondent i.e. the amendments by the plaintiff/petitioner must be considered strictly. Thirdly, the proposed amendment is only intended to obliterate the specific defence taken by the respondent in response to the petitioner’s case as against disentitlement from custody of the child. 6. Perused the amendment application and the objections thereto and the impugned order. The learned Family Court Judge while recording that the case is on its Board after transfer from the Court of the District and Sessions Judge, Haveri, has rejected the proposed amendment on the ground that the petition is set-down for evidence and at that stage, the proposed amendment is sought. The amendment tantamount to introducing a new case. The learned Family Court Judge has not dilated on the nature of amendment. As noticed supra, the proposed amendment is on two counts: to amend the provision under which the petition is filed and elaborating those circumstances which according to the petitioner would disentitle the respondent to the custody of the minor child. It is undisputed that the petitioner commenced the petition seeking custody of the child on the ground that the mother-respondent suffers from afflictions which would disentitle her to the custody of the child. 7. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that allowing this amendment would either obliterate or nullify the respondent’s defence is rather misplaced. It is settled that pleadings are only a foundation which needs to be established by cogent and acceptable evidence and one set of pleadings by a party cannot nullify the pleadings of another party, if such pleadings are not supported by evidence. Indeed, the settled law is that an amendment by the plaintiff/petitioner will have to be viewed strictly as against the amendment proposed by the defendant-respondent. It is equally settled, and beyond the pale of dispute that the amendments, so long as they are necessary for effective adjudication of the disputes between the parties, should be generally allowed unless found untenable. The proposed amendment undisputedly is a pre-trial amendment and this would also be one of the factors to be considered while deciding on an amendment application.
The proposed amendment undisputedly is a pre-trial amendment and this would also be one of the factors to be considered while deciding on an amendment application. 8. In these circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the application seeking amendment ought to have been allowed and the learned Family Court did not exercise its jurisdiction in a fair, reasonable and proper manner. Therefore, the impugned order dated 07.10.2016 rejecting I.A. No. 4 under Order VI Rule 17 of CPC is liable to be set-aside, the application be allowed and the petitioner be permitted to carry out the amendment with liberty to the respondent to file necessary rejoinder/further objections. 9. As regards the application I.A. No. 5 for interim custody of the minor child to the petitioner, which is rejected by the impugned order dated 07.10.2016 and the grant of visiting rights, the learned Family Court Judge has granted visiting rights refusing interim custody after its interaction with the child and recorded that the child has been separated from the petitioner-father for more than four years. It would not be appropriate to give temporary custody to the petitioner as the child may find it difficult to adjust to the new environment with the father. 10. The petitioner, after the grant of the interim order by this Court, has filed an affidavit on 29.05.2017. The petitioner has detailed the efforts from his side to exercise the visitation rights and also stated that the child refused to go with him and therefore, he instructed his brother-in-law (respondent’s brother) not to bring the child. As is obvious even from this Affidavit, the child is reluctant to spend time with the petitioner. 11. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner Sri. A.V. Gangadharappa submitted that it is because the child has been brainwashed, there has been undue influence. The circumstances are not congenial for the child to spend time with the petitioner. It would suffice for this Court to consider the reluctance that is obvious in the child.
11. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner Sri. A.V. Gangadharappa submitted that it is because the child has been brainwashed, there has been undue influence. The circumstances are not congenial for the child to spend time with the petitioner. It would suffice for this Court to consider the reluctance that is obvious in the child. For the reasons stated by the learned Family Court and the circumstances stated above, this court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 07.10.2016 by the learned Family Court Judge whereby interim visitation rights on alternative Sundays in the forenoon session is granted, be modified in terms of the interim order granted by this Court with liberty to the petitioner-father to file appropriate application upon being convinced that the child would be inclined to spend more time with the petitioner. Hence, the following order: (a) The impugned order dated 07.10.2016 rejecting I.A. No. 4 under Order VI Rule 17 of CPC in G & W.C. No. 36/2015 is quashed, the application is allowed and the petitioner is permitted to carry out the amendment as sought for in the said IA No. 4 with liberty to the respondent to file necessary rejoinder/further objections. (b) The impugned order dated 07.10.2016 passed on I.A. No. 5 in G & W.C. No. 36/2015 is modified. The petitioner is granted visiting rights to visit the minor child on all Sundays between 10.00 a.m. and 2.30 p.m. (c) The respondent, to facilitate this visiting rights, shall permit the petitioner to collect the child at her residence at 10.00 a.m. on Sundays and the petitioner shall return the child to the respondent at 2:30 p.m. (d) It is clarified that in the event if there is any default, the respective parties shall approach the jurisdictional police and the jurisdictional police shall render all assistance for giving effect to the visiting rights as per the terms of this order. 12. The petition is accordingly disposed of as stated above.