JUDGMENT : Anjuli Palo, J. This petition has been filed for quashing of the charge-sheet filed under section 363 read with section 366 of the Indian Penal Code by the Police Station, Piplani against the petitioner. 2. The respondent No.2 lodged a complaint on 29.09.2016 at Police Station, Piplani, Bhopal for that some unknown person had kidnapped his daughter, namely, Munmun who is a student of Millennium College at Bhopal. During the investigation the Police received affidavits of Munmun and the petitioner, which were sworn on 30.9.2016, wherefrom it is reflected that Munmun had married with the petitioner and she would stay with him throughout his life. On 30.9.2016, she was minor and hence Police filed charge-sheet against the petitioner under sections 363 & 366 of the Indian Penal Code before the Court. 3. In compliance of order dated 17.12.2018 the petitioner alongwith Munmun is persent in person before the Court. Respondent No.2-Radha Mohan Patnaik is also present in person. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in the present case the ingredients of offences punishable under sections 363 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code are missing against the petitioner. He drew attention of this Court on the First Information Report (Annexure-P-15), in which, there is no allegation against the present petitioner. In the statements recorded by the Police under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the respondent No.2 has not stated anything against the petitioner. Munmun also gave statement which shows that she was willing to marry with the petitioner. Hence, after leaving her hostel, she went to the petitioner. At that point of time the petitioner told Munmun as she is a minor, he is not ready to marry her. Thereafter, Munmun resided at several other places and earned her livelihood by working as maid. The documents brought on record as AnnexuresP-6, P-7 & P-8 reflect that after attaining majority, the petitioner and Munmun got married at Arya Samaj Temple in Raipur. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decisions in the cases of S. Vardarajan vs. State of Madras, (1965) AIR SC 942, Parul @ Divakar Yadav and 2 others vs. State of U.P. and others, 2015 SCC OnlineAll 7490 and Dileep Sharma and others vs. State of U.P. and others, 2015 SCC OnlineAll 7951. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decisions in the cases of S. Vardarajan vs. State of Madras, (1965) AIR SC 942, Parul @ Divakar Yadav and 2 others vs. State of U.P. and others, 2015 SCC OnlineAll 7490 and Dileep Sharma and others vs. State of U.P. and others, 2015 SCC OnlineAll 7951. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents strongly opposed the contentions of the petitioner and submitted that when affidavits were filed by the petitioner and Munmun, at that point of time, Munmun was a minor. 6. On the basis of aforesaid documents, in Writ Petition No.8575/2017, being habeas corpus petition, the Coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 19.2.2018 found that Munmun as well as petitioner in the present case are major and are free to take their own decision. Munmun informed the Court that she is willing to go with her husband, and accordingly, the habeas corpus petition was dismissed. 7. The birth certificate of Munmun (Annexure-P1) shows that her date of birth is 12.8.1999. The same is also mentioned in her Primary School Certificate and Middle School Certificate (Annexures-P-4). Arya Samaj Temple also issued a marriage certificate in favour of petitioner and Munmun. Prima facie it appears that the petitioner performed marriage after attaining the majority. Not only before the Coordinate Bench, but also before this Court she is not willing to reside with her parents. She is wife of the petitioner and presently is in family way and is an expectant mother. This Court finds that on the date of affidavit i.e. 30.9.2018 Munmun was 18 years 1 month & 14 days. Her marriage was performed when she attained majority. 8. In the case of S. Varadarajan (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraphs 9 & 10 held as under:- "9. It must, however, be borne in mind that there is a distinction between "taking and allowing a minor to accompany a person. The two expressions are not synonymous though we would like to guard ourselves from laying down that in no conceivable circumstances can the two be regarded as meaning the same thing for the purposes of section 361 of the Indian Penal Code. The two expressions are not synonymous though we would like to guard ourselves from laying down that in no conceivable circumstances can the two be regarded as meaning the same thing for the purposes of section 361 of the Indian Penal Code. We would limit ourselves to a case like the present where the minor alleged to have been taken by the accused person left her father's protection knowing and having capacity to know the full import of what she was doing voluntarily joins the accused person. In such a case we do not think that the accused can be said to have taken her away from the keeping of her lawful guardian. Something more has to be shown in a case of this kind and that is some kind of inducement held out by the accused person or an active participation by him in the formation of the intention of the minor to leave the house of the guardian. 9. It would, however, be sufficient if the prosecution establishes that though immediately prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no active part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so. In our opinion, if evidence to establish one of those things is lacking it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian merely because after she has actually left her guardian's house or a house where her guardian had kept her, joined the accused and the accused helped her in her design not to return to her guardian's house by taking her alongwith him from place to place. No doubt, the part played by the accused could be regarded as facilitating the fulfillment of the intention of the girl. That apart, in our opinion, falls short of an inducement to the minor to slip out of the keeping of her lawful guardian and is, therefore, not tantamount to "taking". 10. In the light of above discussion, it can easily be pointed out that in the present case no active part or role has been played by the accused. That apart, in our opinion, falls short of an inducement to the minor to slip out of the keeping of her lawful guardian and is, therefore, not tantamount to "taking". 10. In the light of above discussion, it can easily be pointed out that in the present case no active part or role has been played by the accused. May be, at earlier stage, he had met with the girl or persuaded her for marriage, but there is lacuna in the prosecutrix case to establish that the petitioner is guilty of taking the minor out of keep from her guardian of her father. 11. In the case of Dileep Sharma (supra) the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court has referred to another decision of Allahabad High Court in the case of Shaheen Parveen vs. State of U.P. [Writ Petition No.3519 (M/B) of 2015] wherein in paragraphs 7 to 9 & 16 it has been held as under:- "7. Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code inheres that whoever kidnaps any person from lawful guardianship shall be punished in terms of sentence provided in the provision. 8. "Kidnapping from lawful guardianship" has been defined under section 361 of the Indian Penal Code. The provision when extracted reads as under:- "Whoever takes or entices any minor under sixteen years of age if a male or under eighteen years of age if a female, or any person of unsound mind, out of the keeping of the lawful guardian or such minor or person of unsound mind, without the consent of such guardian, is said to kidnap such minor or person from lawful guardianship. Explanation:- The words "lawful guardian" in this section include any person lawfully entrusted with the care or custody or such minor or other person. Exception:- This section does not extend to the act of any person who in good faith believes himself to be the father of an illegitimate child, or who in good faith believes himself to be entitled to the lawful custody of such child, unless such act is committed for an immoral or unlawful purpose." 9. Exception:- This section does not extend to the act of any person who in good faith believes himself to be the father of an illegitimate child, or who in good faith believes himself to be entitled to the lawful custody of such child, unless such act is committed for an immoral or unlawful purpose." 9. Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code inheres that whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman with intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled to marry any person against her will, or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, shall be punished with a sentence, as provided in the provision. 16. If the statement of the prosecutrix, above noted, is taken into account, it becomes evident that ingredients of the offence under sections 363/366 of the Indian Penal Code in regard to coercion, kidnapping or abduction allegedly committed by Sarfaraj, are not satisfied. The provisions of section 363 of the Indian Penal Code are required to be considered in context of provisions of section 361 of the Indian Penal Code. So as to satisfy the ingredients of section 361 of the Indian Penal Code, it has to be established by the prosecuting agency that the accused/Sarfaraj took or enticed the prosecutrix out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of the prosecutrix, without the consent of the guardian/respondent no.4. In the case at hand, it is the case of the prosecutrix herself that she of her free will went with Sarfaraj, lived with him, wants to live with him and is expecting his child. Element of coercion and enticement by Sarfaraj is absent, although consent of the guardian had not been taken." 12. Similarly, in the case of Parul @ Divakar Yadav (supra) the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court observed in paragraphs 22 to 24 as under:- "22. If a minor, of her own, abandons the guardianship of her parents and joins a boy without any role having been played by the boy in her abandoning the guardianship of her parents and without her having been subjected to any kind of pressure, inducement, etc. If a minor, of her own, abandons the guardianship of her parents and joins a boy without any role having been played by the boy in her abandoning the guardianship of her parents and without her having been subjected to any kind of pressure, inducement, etc. and without any offer or promise from the accused, no offence punishable under section 363 I.P.C. will be made out when the girl is aged more than 17 years and is mature enough to understand what she is doing. Of course, if the accused induces or allures the girl and that influences the minor in leaving her guardian's custody and the keeping and going with the accused, then it would be difficult for the Court to accept that minor had voluntarily come to the accused. In case the victim/prosecutrix willingly, of her own accord, accompanies the boy, the law does not cast a duty on the boy of taking her back to her father's house or even of telling her not to accompany him. 23. A girl who has attained the age of discretion and was on the verge of attaining majority and is capable of knowing what was good and what was bad for her, cannot be said to be a victim of inducement, particularly when the case of the victim/girl herself is that it was on her initiative and on account of her voluntary act that she had gone with the boy and got married to him. In such circumstances, desire of the girl/victim is required to be seen. Ingredients of section 361 I.P.C. are required to be considered accordingly, and not in mechanical or technical interpretation. 24. Ingredients of section 361 I.P.C. cannot be said to be satisfied in a case where the minor having attained age of discretion, allegedly to have been taken by the accused person, left her guardian's protection knowingly (having capacity to know the full import of what she was doing) and voluntarily joins the person. In such a case, it cannot be said that the victim had been taken away from the keeping of her lawful guardian." 13. For the above mentioned reasons in the case of Parul @ Divakar (supra), the Court quashed the FIR, lodged as Case Crime No.609/2015 under Sections 363, 366, 504, 506 I.P.C. and section 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act. 14. For the above mentioned reasons in the case of Parul @ Divakar (supra), the Court quashed the FIR, lodged as Case Crime No.609/2015 under Sections 363, 366, 504, 506 I.P.C. and section 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act. 14. The facts of the present case are similar. At the time of lodging of the report by the respondent No.2, he was not aware as to whether his daughter had went on her own. The name of the petitioner is also not mentioned in the FIR. There is no evidence available on record that the petitioner had either taken away Munmun or compelled her to leave the guardianship of her parents. There is also no evidence that after leaving her parental home, Munmun had resided with the petitioner. After going through the above discussion, this court has come to the conclusion that no case for offences under sections 363 & 366 of the Indian Penal Code is made out against the petitioner. Hence, he is liable to be discharged. Accordingly, the charge-sheet filed against the petitioner is quashed. The petitioner is hereby discharged from the aforesaid offences u/s 363 & 366 of I.P.C. 15. In the result, the petition is allowed.