Research › Search › Judgment

Karnataka High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 500 (KAR)

Asha K. W/o Sri. T Ravi Kiran Rao v. Associated Broadcasting Co. Pvt. Ltd.

2019-02-22

B.VEERAPPA

body2019
ORDER : The petitioner, a Software Engineer by profession, working at WIPRO, Bengaluru, is before this Court seeking a writ of mandamus directing respondent Nos.1 to 3 not to telecast any information pertaining to the personal life of the petitioner and family members of the petitioner with respondent No.4 and his family members in their TV channel. I. FACTS OF THE CASE: 2. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner got married with the respondent No.4 on 10.02.2005. Out of their wedlock, a female child was born by name Adisha, now aged about 10 years. Thereafter, in the year 2010 they had difference of opinion and respondent No.4 had gone to the extent of exploiting the petitioner both financially and mentally. Therefore, they started living separately from July 2010. Therefore, the petitioner was forced to file an application under Section 13(1)(ia) of Hindu Marriage Act in M.C.No.3036/2010 before Principal Family Court, Bengaluru. She also filed an application for temporary injunction to restrain the respondent No.4 husband from interfering in day-to-day life of the petitioner and her daughter. It is further contended that due to constant harassment and interference, the petitioner lodged police complaint before the Yeshwanthpur Police Station alleging physical and mental harassment given by respondent No.4 and his family members demanding dowry. The jurisdictional police, after registering the complaint, filed chargesheet against respondent No.4 and subsequently he filed Crl.Misc.Petn.No.4847/2011 before the Presiding Officer, Fast Track Sessions Court XVI, Bengaluru, seeking anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Magistrate, by an Order dated 12th October 2011, allowed the petition and granted anticipatory bail subject to the condition that the fourth respondent herein shall not tamper with the prosecution witnesses either directly or indirectly, he shall cooperate with the investigating officer in respect of the investigation concerning him and he shall not commit similar offences. 3. When things stood thus, on 28.11.2011, at 12.30 pm, petitioner’s father who is the power of attorney holder of the petitioner, received an SMS from one Geetha claiming that she is from TV9 channel and wants to talk about petitioner’s daughter and around 1.00 pm, she called up through her mobile No.9008026148 stating that the fourth respondent has lodged a complaint with them that the petitioner is not permitting the fourth respondent to see the minor daughter and making several other allegations. It is further stated that the person who called from the office of the second respondent informed the petitioner’s father that the fourth respondent has also given some materials in the form of video tapes to substantiate his claim relating to relationship with the petitioner and making several other allegations. She also called upon the petitioner’s father to respond to the aforesaid claims made by the fourth respondent. The petitioner’s father replied stating that both civil and criminal cases are pending before the Court and requested the second respondent to have a direct discussion with the lawyer to get more information about the fact that the matter is pending before the Court. 4. It is further case of the petitioner that, inspite of the aforesaid facts, representative of the second respondent called the petitioner’s father and stated that they will proceed with telecasting the information about the petitioner and her father that is provided by the fourth respondent and called upon the petitioner’s father to provide any information in support of the case of the petitioner so that they will be in a position to telecast the controversies. It is further contended that the petitioner’s father is working as a Principal in a reputed Engineering College in Bengaluru. If respondent Nos.1 to 3 are permitted to telecast any information relating to the personal life of the petitioner and her father, same will have an adverse impact on the petitioner and her family and she will be exposed to great humiliation in the eyes of general public and also among her close circle. Therefore, petitioner is before this Court for the relief sought for. II.RESPONDENTS SERVED UNREPRESENTED 5. This Court, by the order dated 30.11.2011, issued emergent notice to the respondents returnable within ten days and granted an interim order directing respondent Nos.2 and 3 to defer telecast of objectionable matter pertaining to the matrimonial affairs involving the secrecy of personal life of the petitioner and the fourth respondent till the next date of hearing. 6. All the respondents are served and unrepresented. III. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER: 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. 8. 6. All the respondents are served and unrepresented. III. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER: 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. 8. Sri A. Madhusudhana Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the proposed acts of respondent Nos.1 to 3 to telecast the information provided by the fourth respondent in respect of personal life of the petitioner with fourth respondent is highly illegal, unjust and same is unconstitutional. He further contended that the fundamental rights of privacy and right to secrecy of petitioner’s personal life is part and parcel of right to personal life and liberty granted under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Respondent Nos.1 to 3 who are running Television News channel and a part of electronic media, have social responsibility and also have public duty to ensure that they do not invade into the personal lives of the private citizens against their will. 9. He further contended that the matrimonial case between the petitioner and fourth respondent is pending in the Family Court. The Family Court has already granted an order of injunction restraining the husband from interfering with the personal life of the petitioner and her child. The husband has obtained an anticipatory bail wherein he has been directed not to tamper with the prosecution witnesses, either directly or indirectly. The fourth respondent is said to have been made a complaint with respondent Nos.1 to 3, in gross violation of orders of the Court. The respondent Nos.1 to 3 ought not to have proposed to telecast any information about the petitioner and fourth respondent which is impermissible in law. 10. He also fairly submits that in view of the interim order granted by this Court, the respondent Nos.1 to 3 have not telecasted anything about the personal life of the petitioner and fourth respondent. The fair submission made by the learned counsel is placed on record. Accordingly, he sought to allow the writ petition. IV. CONSIDERATION: 11. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for petitioner and perused the material available on record, carefully. 12. It is not in dispute that the petitioner and fourth respondent was married on 10.02.2005. Out of their wedlock, a female child was born, now aged about 10 years. IV. CONSIDERATION: 11. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for petitioner and perused the material available on record, carefully. 12. It is not in dispute that the petitioner and fourth respondent was married on 10.02.2005. Out of their wedlock, a female child was born, now aged about 10 years. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner is working as a computer engineer in WIPRO and admittedly there is matrimonial dispute between the petitioner and fourth respondent pending adjudication in M.C.No.3036/2010 filed under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, for divorce and it is informed by the learned counsel for the petitioner that now it is at the stage of cross examination of fourth respondent (husband). When the personal rights are involved between the petitioner and fourth respondent and there is a matrimonial dispute between them and the matter is ceased before the Family court, in all fairness, the respondent Nos.1 to 3 ought not to have proposed to telecast the information provided by the fourth respondent and should not have driven the petitioner to this Court for filing the present writ petition seeking a writ of mandamus. 13. It is no doubt true that the respondent Nos.1 to 3 have a right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India and it is their duty to provide correct information and it is responsibility of the Media to ensure that they are not providing the public with information that is factually wrong based on unverified information. The right to freedom of speech is enshrined under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. However, it is a right restricted under Article 19(2) in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, to maintain public decency and morality. That too when a matrimonial case is pending between couple, the respondent Nos.1 to 3 should not have proposed to interfere with their personal life and liberty. V. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION: 14. The provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India provides for protection of life and personal liberty: No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty, except according to the procedure established by law. VI. THE PROVISIONS OF HINDU LAW: 15. The provisions of Section 22(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, reads as under: “22. The provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India provides for protection of life and personal liberty: No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty, except according to the procedure established by law. VI. THE PROVISIONS OF HINDU LAW: 15. The provisions of Section 22(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, reads as under: “22. Proceedings to be in camera and may not be printed or published: (1) Every proceeding under this Act shall be conducted in camera and it shall not be lawful for any person to print or publish any matter in relation to any such proceeding except a judgment of the High Court or of the Supreme Court printed or published with the previous permission of the Court.” 16. A plain reading of the said provisions make it clear that the legislative intent is to maintain secrecy in respect of certain proceedings or inquiry and protect women and children from invasion of their right of privacy. It is not lawful for any person to print or publish any matter in relation to any proceeding except by a judgment of the High Court or Supreme Court printed or published with the prior permission of the Court. If any person prints, publishes any matter in contravention of the provisions contained in Section 22(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, shall be punishable with fine which may extend to Rs.1,000/. 17. In view of the aforesaid provisions of Section 22 of the Hindu Marriage Act, it clearly depicts that the right of privacy created by the statute has to be preserved. The very inception of the said provision makes it clear that matters pertaining to matrimonial affairs are intended to be conducted ‘in camera’ and not intended to be divulged to others, except publication of the judgment with the leave of the Court. Right of privacy in matrimonial matters between the parties in a litigation under Marriage Act is personal to the litigating parties. Thus it is manifestly clear that the legislature has intended to guard the right of privacy in relation to matrimonial matters and it is a settled legal position that the real meaning and effect should be given to the words employed in the statute. In the light of language employed in the statute, the right of privacy is so fundamental to the individual excepting to the extend provided under the Marriage Acts. In the light of language employed in the statute, the right of privacy is so fundamental to the individual excepting to the extend provided under the Marriage Acts. Of course, we should not forget the role of our independent press and media in coming out with revelations of public interest, resulting in societal changes. As the freedom of the press is for the dissemination of information of public interest and public affairs, those which are not related to the above, but involving the marital relationships of the parties to a litigation should not be published or telecast, as it is prohibited under law. Publication of the proceedings meant to be in cameral will affect the constitutional liberty guaranteed to the individual and it would be an invasion of his/her right of privacy. 18. ‘Privacy’ has been defined as “the rightful claim of an individual to determine to which he wishes to share himself with others and control over the time, place and circumstances to communicate with others.” It means the individual’s right to control dissemination of information about himself or herself. It is his/her own personal possession. It is well accepted that one person’s right to know and be informed may violate another’s right of privacy. In other words, disclosure of certain facts, events, actions, photographs, videotapes, in any form of media, print or celluloid, internet would cause embarrassment, agony emotional stress, to a person of reasonable sensitiveness. ‘Right of Privacy’ in other words can be said “to be let alone”. What is an information to others according to a journalist, could be a personal and sensitive information to an individual in a litigation relating to a matrimonial dispute. 19. The boundary between freedom of press and privacy of individual is the “Lakshman Rekha” and if the media, crosses the line of boundary, the invasion starts. To strike a balance between these two competing interests is difficult. Right of privacy, visavis right of information to be furnished to the general public, in other words, the right of the media, should be with reference to the kind of information which the law permits. We all know that Constitution does not guarantee absolute freedom or absolute protection to the media. Provisions of certain enactments would amply demonstrate the inherent restrictions on freedom of speech and expression, like the one prescribed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. We all know that Constitution does not guarantee absolute freedom or absolute protection to the media. Provisions of certain enactments would amply demonstrate the inherent restrictions on freedom of speech and expression, like the one prescribed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. VII REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS IN CERTAIN STATUTES: 20. The reasonable restrictions imposed in certain statutes is as follows: I. Section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with Court to be open and it reads as follows: "(1) The place in which any Criminal Court s held for the purpose of inquiring or trying any offence shall be deemed to be an open Court, to which the public generally may have access, so far as the same can conveniently contain them; Provided that the Presiding Judge or Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, order at any stage of any inquiry into, or trial of, any particular case, that the public generally, or any particular person, shall not have access to, or be or remain in, the room or building used by the Court. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), the inquiry into and trial of rape or an offence under Section 376, Section 376A, Section 376B, Section 376C or Section 376D of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be conducted in camera. Provided that the Presiding Judge may, if he things fit, or on an application made by either of the parties, allow any particular person to have access to, or be or remain in, the room or building used by the Court. (3) Where any proceedings are held under sub-Section (2), it shall not be lawful for any person to print or publish any matter in relation to any proceedings, except with the previous permission of the Court." II. Sections 3 and 4 of the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition Act), 1980, reads as follows: "3. Prohibition of advertisements containing indecent representation of woman: No person shall publish, or cause to be published, or arrange or take part in the publication or exhibition of, any advertisement which contains indecent representation of women in any form. 4. Sections 3 and 4 of the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition Act), 1980, reads as follows: "3. Prohibition of advertisements containing indecent representation of woman: No person shall publish, or cause to be published, or arrange or take part in the publication or exhibition of, any advertisement which contains indecent representation of women in any form. 4. Prohibition of Publication or sending by post of books, pamphlets, etc., containing indecent representation of women: No person shall produce or cause to be produced, sell, let to hire, distribute, circulate or send by post any book, pamphlet, slide, film, writing, drawing, painting, photograph, representation or figure which contains indecent representation of women in any form: Provided that nothing in this Section shall apply to (a) any book, pamphlet, paper, slide, film, writing, drawing, painting, photograph, representation or figure (i) the publication of which is proved to be justified as being for the public good on the ground that such book, pamphlet, paper, slide, film, writing, drawing, painting, photograph, representation or figure is in the interest of science, literature, art, or learning or other object of general concern; or (ii) which is kept or used bona fide for religious purposes; (b) any representation sculptured, engraved, painted or otherwise represented on or in, (i) any ancient monument within the meaning of the Ancient Monument and Archaeological sites and Remains Act, 1958 (24 of 1958), or (ii) any temple, or on any car used for the conveyance of idols, or kept or used for any religious purposes; (c) any film in respect of which the provisions of Part II of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 (37 of 1952), will be applicable." III. Section 7(1)(c) of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, (34 of 1971) is extracted hereunder: "(c) Prohibit the disclosure, except to such persons and for such purposes as may be specified in such regulations, of intimations given or information furnished in pursuance of such regulations." IV. Section 7(1)(c) of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, (34 of 1971) is extracted hereunder: "(c) Prohibit the disclosure, except to such persons and for such purposes as may be specified in such regulations, of intimations given or information furnished in pursuance of such regulations." IV. Section 22 of the Hindu Marriage Act deals with the proceedings to be held in camera and they shall not be printed and published and it reads as follows: "(1) Every proceeding under this Act shall be conducted in camera and it shall not be lawful for any person to print or publish any matter in relation to any such proceeding except a judgment of the High Court or of the Supreme Court printed or published with the previous permission of the Court. (2) If any person prints or publishes any matter in contravention of the provisions contained in subsection (1), he shall be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees." V. Section 33 of the Special Marriage Act (43 of 1954) deals with the proceedings to be in camera and may not be printed or published and it is extracted below: "(1) Every proceeding under this Act shall be conducted in camera and it shall not be lawful for any person to print or publish any matter in relation to any such proceeding except a judgment of the High Court or of the Supreme Court printed or published with the previous permission of the Court. (2) If any person prints or publishes any matter in contravention of the provisions contained in sub Section (1), he shall be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees." VI. Section 36 of the Children Act, 1960 deals with the Prohibition or publications of names, etc., of children involved in any proceeding under the Act and it reads as follows: "(1) No report in any newspaper, magazine or news sheet of any inquiry regarding a child under this Act shall disclose the name, address or school or any other particulars calculated to lead to the identification of the child, nor shall any picture of any such child be published: Provided that for reasons to be recorded in writing the authority holding the inquiry may permit such disclosure, if in its opinion such disclosure is in the interest of the child. (2) Any person contravening the provisions of subsection (1) shall be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees." 21. The Apex Court, in the case of Mr. X vs. Hospital Z reported in 1998(8) SCC 296 , at paragraph 15, held as under: 15. “Right” is an interest recognized and protected by moral or legal rules. It is an interest the violation of which would be a legal wrong. Respect for such interest would be a legal duty. This is how Salmond has defined “right”. In order, therefore, that an interest becomes the subject of a legal right, it has to have not merely legal protection but also legal recognition. The elements of a “legal right” are that the “right” is vested in a person and is available against a person who is under a corresponding obligation and duty to respect that right and has to act or forbear from acting in a manner so as to prevent the violation of the right. If, therefore, there is a legal right vested in a person, the latter can seek its protection against a person who is bound by a corresponding duty not to violate that right.” 22. In view of the aforesaid statutory provisions, visualizing the adverse effect on the women and children and exploitation of the vulnerable section of the Society, the legislators have imposed reasonable restriction on the freedom of the media and press. Reading of these provisions makes it clear that the intention of the legislation is to maintain secrecy in respect of certain proceedings or inquiry and protect women and children from invasion of their right of privacy. These statutory restrictions are to protect their basic human right to lead life without hindrance from anyone in such of those enumerated matters and the media should not impinge upon the right of privacy, in otherwords, they should be allowed "to be let alone". "Right of Privacy" is now recognised as a right which flows from right to life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. VIII. DUTY OF THE MEDIA/PRESS: 23. Media attention should be towards exposing corruption, nepotism, law breaking, abuse or arbitrary exercise of power, law and order, economy, health, science and technology etc., which are matters of public interest. VIII. DUTY OF THE MEDIA/PRESS: 23. Media attention should be towards exposing corruption, nepotism, law breaking, abuse or arbitrary exercise of power, law and order, economy, health, science and technology etc., which are matters of public interest. The "Lakshman Rekha" or the "line of control", should be that the publication of comments/information should not invade into the privacy of an individual, unless outweighed by bona fide and genuine public interest. Right of information is a facet of freedom of speech and expression, enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. Right of Information has been recognised as a Fundamental Right and the Right of Press to furnish the information or facts or opinion should be only to foster public interest and not to encroach upon the privacy of an individual. The public at large has no fundamental or legal right to get any information or intrude into the personal life of the other individual. Statutes empower the authorities to examine the parties, under exceptional circumstances, contained therein. When the public at large has no legal right to impinge upon the marital privacy, the press or any other media cannot claim a better right to publish in newspaper, magazine or any other form of media, in exercise of freedom of speech and expression. 24. Shrouds Judicial Dictionary, Vol.4 (IV Edition), defines "Public Interest" as "A matter of public or general interest, does not mean that which is a interesting as gratifying curiosity or a love of information or amusement but that in which a class of community have a pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liability are affected. 25. In Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition), 'Public Interest', is defined as follows: "Public Interest Something in which the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. It does not mean anything so narrow as mere curiosity, or as the interest of the particular localities, which may be affected by the matters in question. Interest shared by citizens generally in affairs of local State or national government.................." 26. It does not mean anything so narrow as mere curiosity, or as the interest of the particular localities, which may be affected by the matters in question. Interest shared by citizens generally in affairs of local State or national government.................." 26. The Apex Court, while considering the provisions of Section 22(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, in the case of Babu Lal v. Hazari Lal Krishori Lal reported in (1982) 1 SCC 525 , held that the word "proceeding" is a very comprehensive term and generally speaking means a prescribed cause of action for enforcing a legal right. It is not a technical expression with a definite meaning attached to it, but one the ambit of whose meaning will be governed by the statute. Again in P.L.Kantha Rao v. State of A.P., reported in (1995) 2 SCC 471 , the Apex Court held that the word, "proceeding" would depend upon the scope of the enactment wherein the expression is used to a particular context to which it occurs. It means a course of action for enforcing a legal right. 27. The expression "any matter in relation to any such proceeding" should be given the widest import and it has to be given full effect to, when it is read in conjunction with the words "every proceeding" occurring in the beginning of the section. Considering the scope of the Act, i.e., Hindu Marriage Act, which governs marriage between the Hindus, relief of divorce and Judicial separation, alimony, temporary or permanent, the lis being purely interse, reading of the Section in its entirety in its context, reflect the intention of the legislation, primarily sought to be achieved. The language employed in Section is plain and unambiguous and it covers every proceeding under the Act. 28. The Apex Court, while considering the provisions of Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21 of the Constitution of India, in the case of R.Rajagopal alias R.R.Gopal and another vs. State of T.N. and others reported in AIR 1995 SC 264 (1), at paragraph 26, has held as under: “26. We may now summarise the broad principles flowing from the above discussion: (1) The right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a "right to be let alone". We may now summarise the broad principles flowing from the above discussion: (1) The right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a "right to be let alone". A citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, childbearing and education among other matters. None can publish anything concerning the above matters without his consent whether truthful or otherwise and whether laudatory or critical. If he does so, he would be violating the right to privacy of the person concerned and would be liable in an action for damages. Position may, however, be different, if a person voluntarily thrusts himself into controversy or voluntarily invites or raises a controversy. (2) The rule aforesaid is subject to the exception, that any publication concerning the aforesaid aspects becomes unobjectionable if such publication is based upon public records including court records. This is for the reason that once a matter becomes a matter of public record, the right to privacy no longer subsists and it becomes a legitimate subject for comment by press and media among others. We are, however, of the opinion that in the interests of decency [Article 19(2) an exception must be carved out to this rule, viz., a female who is the victim of a sexual assault, kidnap, abduction or a like offence should not further be subjected to the indignity of her name and the incident being publicised in press/media. (3) There is yet another exception to the rule in (1) aboveindeed, this is not an exception but an independent rule. In the case of public officials, it is obvious, right to privacy, or for that matter, the remedy of action for damages is simply not available with respect to their acts and conduct relevant to the discharge of their official duties. This is so even where the publication is based upon facts and statements which are not true, unless the official establishes that the publication was made (by the defendant) with reckless disregard for truth. In such a case, it would be enough for the defendant (member of the press or media) to prove that he acted after a reasonable verification of the facts; it is not necessary for him to prove that what he has written is true. In such a case, it would be enough for the defendant (member of the press or media) to prove that he acted after a reasonable verification of the facts; it is not necessary for him to prove that what he has written is true. Of course, where the publication is proved to be false and actuated by malice or personal animosity, the defendant would have no defence and would be liable for damages. It is equally obvious that in matters not relevant to the discharge of his duties, the public official enjoys the same protection as any other citizen, as explained in (1) and (2) above. It needs no reiteration that judiciary, which is protected by the power to punish for contempt of court and Parliament and legislatures protected as their privileges are by Articles 105 and 104 respectively of the Constitution of India, represent exceptions to this rule. (4) So far as the Government, local authority and other organs and institutions exercising governmental power are concerned, they cannot maintain a suit for damages for defaming them. (5) Rules 3 and 4 do not, however, mean that Official Secrets Act, 1923, or any similar enactment or provision having the force of law does not bind the press or media. (6) There is no law empowering the State or its officials to prohibit, or to impose a prior restraint upon the press/media. 29. It is also not in dispute that this Court, at the inception, by the order dated 30.11.2011, directed the respondent Nos.2 and 3 to defer telecast of objectionable matter pertaining to the matrimonial affairs involving the secrecy of personal life of the petitioner and fourth respondent till the next date of hearing. IX CONCLUSION: 30. The fact remains that the respondent Nos.1 to 4 though served, remained unrepresented, as already stated supra. The learned counsel for the petitioner fairly submits that after the interim order granted by this Court, respondent Nos.1 to 3 have not telecasted anything about the personal life of the petitioner and fourth respondent. 31. In view of the aforesaid peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, the writ petition is allowed. Respondent Nos.1 to 3 are hereby directed not to telecast any information pertaining to the life of the petitioner with fourth respondent their family members, since the matter is ceased in M.C.No.3036/2010 before the Family Court. 32. 31. In view of the aforesaid peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, the writ petition is allowed. Respondent Nos.1 to 3 are hereby directed not to telecast any information pertaining to the life of the petitioner with fourth respondent their family members, since the matter is ceased in M.C.No.3036/2010 before the Family Court. 32. The Registry is directed to circulate a copy of this Order to all the Presiding Officers of the Family Courts in the State. Ordered accordingly.