JUDGMENT : 1. This writ application has been filed by one dismissed employee of Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF, in short, hereafter). The back ground of the case is as follows. 2. It was alleged against the writ petitioner that on 17th October 2009 at about 6.00 hours the petitioner deserted from his Camp at Salt Lake, Kolkata. As he was not found nearby F.I.R. was lodged against him and a warrant of arrest was issued against him by the Commandant of the concerned Battalion on 21.10.2009. The petitioner was also directed by the employer by sending order at his home address on 26th October, 2009 to report back to his duty immediately. But the petitioner failed to report for duty and remained wilfully absented without any permission of the competent authority. The petitioner on his own reported at the Battalion on 10th November, 2009 and on 11th November, 2009 the warrant of arrest was cancelled. 3. Such desertion was viewed as a serious misconduct of the petitioner and a departmental enquiry was initiated under Rule 27 of Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955. 4. Subsequently an Enquiry Officer was appointed of 21st January, 2010. The petitioner admitted guilty of the charge. 5. The petitioner though stated that he left the camp for her wife's illness he failed to submit any medical document as evidence about such illness of his wife at any stage of the proceeding including his appeal against the order of removal from service. 6. The Commandant being the disciplinary authority found that the charge levelled against him was proved. All statutory formalities in compliance with the principles of natural justice including handing over the report of the Enquiry Officer to the writ petitioner and giving him opportunity to submit written representation/ reply were given but it was found by the disciplinary authority that in the reply to representation dated 09.06.2010 filed by the petitioner against the report of the Enquiry Officer no such material was produced by him which could be considered by the disciplinary authority. While passing the order of removal from service with effect from 8th July, 2010 the disciplinary authority directed that the desertion period from 17th October, 2009 to 10th November, 2009 would be regularized as LHP with no leave salary. 7. This was a major punishment. 8. While passing the order of removal from service with effect from 8th July, 2010 the disciplinary authority directed that the desertion period from 17th October, 2009 to 10th November, 2009 would be regularized as LHP with no leave salary. 7. This was a major punishment. 8. Against the order of removal from service the petitioner filed initially one writ application being W.P. No. 18469 (W) of 2010 which was dismissed on April 11, 2011 giving liberty to the petitioner to file the case before the appropriate forum. The petitioner preferred an appeal dated 1st December, 2011 to the appellate authority and the appellate authority by order No. P.VIII-1/2011-EC-3(RM) dated 03.01.2012 dismissed the appeal on merit and the punishment order of removal from service was not interfered with. 9. Against such order of the appellate authority the petitioner filed the second writ application being W.P. No. 2392(W) of 2012 which was dismissed with the observation of the Court that no reason was there to interfere with the order of the appellate authority. 10. Against the above order of writ Court the petitioner filed a mandamus appeal being M.A.T. No. 1302 of 2012 and connected application being CAN 7800 OF 2012. The appeal Court by its order dated 3rd September, 2012 dismissed the appeal by modifying the order of the writ Court directing the appellate authority to consider the appeal case as to whether the order of dismissal was an extreme punishment etc. Such consideration was directed to be made within a period of eight weeks from the date of communication of the said order after serving notice upon the appellant (i.e. the writ petitioner herein) and by passing a speaking order. 11. In compliance with the said order of the appeal Court dated on 3rd September, 2012 the appeal of the petitioner was again taken into account by the D.I.G. Signal Range, C.R.P.F., New Delhi as per provision of CRPF Rules of 1955. 12. The writ petitioner preferred revision petition on 1st February, 2013 and the Inspector General being the competent authority after considering the revision petition rejected the same, holding that the same is devoid of merit, by passing order of R. XIII-3/2013-C/6 dated 11.04.2013 and the order of removal from service was not interfered with. 12. The writ petitioner preferred revision petition on 1st February, 2013 and the Inspector General being the competent authority after considering the revision petition rejected the same, holding that the same is devoid of merit, by passing order of R. XIII-3/2013-C/6 dated 11.04.2013 and the order of removal from service was not interfered with. Against that order passed in Revision and also the order passed by the commandant dated 8th July, 2010 the present writ application being W.P. 34071 (W) of 2013 has been filed. 13. In the writ application the petitioner has prayed for a mandamus directing the respondent to proceed as per the spirit of the order passed in the mandamus appeal being M.A.T. No.1202 of 2012. In the order of the said appeal Court an observation was made that "After all dismissal from services at this age of the appellant is so to say death sentence in a civil life. The extreme punishment is required to be passed on repeated occurrence of indiscipline and desertion in disciplined Armed Forces. In disciplined Armed Forces the availability of police personnel must be assured at all the time. If there is any wilful infraction of such availability, certainly the disciplinary authority has to take action promptly with appropriate manner". 14. The petitioner has prayed for passing such direction and to proceed as per of the order of the appeal Court. It has been argued before me by the petitioner that the said observation as quoted about was required to be followed by the concerned authority mandatorily. 15. The petitioner also prayed for mandamus directing the respondent to cancel, withdraw, set aside and/ or rescind the order of removal from service dated 8th July, 2010 passed by the Commandant and in passing lenient order considering that the penalty imposed was disproportionate to the alleged misconduct. Mandamus was also prayed directing the respondent to reinstate the petitioner in service and to cancel and recall the impugned order dated 11th April, 2013 passed by the Inspector General, C.R.P.F. New Delhi. 16. During the course of hearing it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner on January 24, 2019 that the petitioner was not interested in getting back his service and his only prayer was to get the pension as he has already completed more than 10 years of service. 16. During the course of hearing it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner on January 24, 2019 that the petitioner was not interested in getting back his service and his only prayer was to get the pension as he has already completed more than 10 years of service. But at the same time the petitioner has relied upon several judgments including the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court reported in AIR 2015 Supreme Court 545 (Union of India and Ors. Vs. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 ). In paragraph 12 of the judgment reported in SCC it has been categorically mentioned what is the power of High Court while hearing an application under Article 226/227 in respect of disciplinary proceeding. Those are enumerated hereinbellow for deciding the present matter by touchstone of the observations of the Supreme Court in Gunasekaran's case wherein it has been held that the High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. In Gunasekaran's case it has also been laid down that under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 17. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 17. The Supreme Court has also quoted paragraph 23 from another judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (In State of A.P. versus Chitra Vekanta Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557 ). Paragraph 23 of the said judgment of Chitra Venkata Rao is also required to be quoted: "The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal". 18. On perusal of the pleading of the writ application I do not find any factual or legal statement in respect of which this Court can exercise the writ jurisdiction. 19. From paragraph 12 to 21 of the petition, factual background of the matter has been stated. Paragraphs 22 to 43 contain submissions which are identical to the 22 No.s of grounds on which the writ application is based. Such submission and grounds, in short are: 20. 19. From paragraph 12 to 21 of the petition, factual background of the matter has been stated. Paragraphs 22 to 43 contain submissions which are identical to the 22 No.s of grounds on which the writ application is based. Such submission and grounds, in short are: 20. The disciplinary authority did not consider the case of the petitioner in proper yardstick; the disciplinary action should not to have been taken against the petitioner after the petitioner reported back; the absence without leave was due to an extreme urgency; the leave of absence have been regularised as it has been treated as LHP by the disciplinary authority; the locality of the petitioner was highly terrorist infested area and his family members faced great trouble; the petitioner could not make proper communication with the respondents as to why the petitioner was compelled to remain in his native place and could not join his duty ; the petitioner was not a deserter ; the appellate authority i.e. I.G. (Comn.), New Delhi ought to have assessed the case of the petitioner with some more lenient view; the petitioner has not committed such an offence several times or the petitioner was not a habitual offender; the petitioner was a disciplined person; his case ought to have been considered leniently; the order passed by the appellate authority dated 3rd September, 2012 in M.A.T. No. 1302 of 2012 was not followed by the appellate authority; the order of the appellate authority is a mechanical and stereotype one; the order of the appellate authority is the outcome of total non application of mind and it has been passed with closed mind; the first order was passed by one Sailendra Kumar who is the same person who decided the revision as Inspector General of Police which is a clear violation of natural justice; the petitioner is a poor person who has been kept in starvation along with his dependant family; the punishment was shockingly disproportionate and harsh; the order passed by the appeal Court was beyond the scope of the order dated 3rd September, 2012 passed by this Court in the appeal; the order of the disciplinary authority for removal from service is a violation of principles of natural justice; passing the order is violative of Article 311 of Constitution of India; there is no reason to impose major punishment of removal as the petitioner himself came back immediately after receiving the direction. 21. The respondents have filed affidavit-in-opposition denying the case made out by the petitioner it has been considered by me. None of the above pleadings shows anything for which this Court can interfere in the disciplinary proceeding keeping in mind the observation made in Gunasekaran's case. 22. I do not find the punishment shocking and disproportionate keeping in mind that the matter related to a highly disciplined force like CRPF and therefore, I do not interfere with the findings of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority but the punishment was imposed and the revisional authority. 23. The unreported judgment relied upon by the petitioner like the judgment delivered by a Single Bench of this Court in W.P. No. 24693 (W) 2012 is not factually similar as in that case the delinquent employee's declaration as a member of " Nomasudra" caste was found to be true by the appellate authority and on that ground the Court interfered in the matter. 24. The other unreported judgment of this Court relied upon by the petitioner delivered by the writ Court in W.P. No. 16097 (W) of 2005 was relating to an act which was inappropriately described by the authority as the heinous offence. In this case the question was of disobedience which the Court decided as not a heinous offence and therefore, the Court came to the conclusion that the punishment of removal from service given to the said delinquent employee was disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. 25. In the other unreported judgment of this Court being W.P. No. 3412 (W) of 2011 relied upon by the petitioner the Court found that the Enquiry Officer considered irrelevant facts and rejected relevant testimony of the witnesses and on the basis of surmise and conjecture the order was passed by the Inquiry Officer. On this ground the writ Court interfered in the findings of the enquiry report and the subsequent dismissal order. 26. The other judgment is Gunasekaran's judgment delivered by the Supreme Court which has been discussed hereinabove and in fact the observation made in this judgment goes against the case made out by the petitioner. 27. On this ground the writ Court interfered in the findings of the enquiry report and the subsequent dismissal order. 26. The other judgment is Gunasekaran's judgment delivered by the Supreme Court which has been discussed hereinabove and in fact the observation made in this judgment goes against the case made out by the petitioner. 27. In the Court at the time of final hearing of the matter it has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that he was not interested in getting back his service and his only prayer was to get the pension as he had already completed more than 10 years of service. 28. In respect of such submission I say that in the facts and circumstances as discussed above the writ application is liable to be dismissed which means that the order of the disciplinary authority affirmed by the appellate authority as to the punishment given to the petitioner i.e. removal from service which has again been affirmed by the Revisional authority and therefore there cannot be any question of considering such submission of the petitioner of getting pension for completion of 10 years of service. 29. The writ application is dismissed without any costs.