JUDGMENT : Sureshwar Thakur, J. The instant appeal stands directed, against, the verdict rendered by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, upon, criminal complaint bearing No. 102/3 of 2010. 2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the accused approached the complainant in its factory at Moginand, and expressed her desire to purchase, non-woven fabric from the complainant. On the basis of order placed by the accused, non-woven fabric was sold to the accused vide invoice No. 120 dated 1.10.2010 amounting to Rs. 5,07,062/-. The material was sent to the accused in truck No. HR-38G-5607 and after receiving by her, in lieu of which she issued a cheque bearing No. 323930 dated 15.10.2010, in favour of the complainant in order to discharge her liability. The complainant presented the cehque for encashment before State Bank of India, Branch, Kala Amb, but the same was dishonoured on the ground of insufficient finds in the account of the accused. The cheque was returned vide memo, dated 19.10.2010, from Punjab National Bank, Karnal. A legal notice dated 29.10.2010 was sent to the complainant on two addresses. The accused refused to receive the notice deliberately in order to evade her liability. She failed to make the payment and hence, the present complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, (hereinafter, referred to as, "the Act") was preferred by the complainant against the accused. 3. The complainant led preliminary evidence, before the learned trial Magistrate, and, thereafter the accused was directed to be summoned, for, his committing, an, offence punishable, under, Section 138 of the Act. After securing the presence of accused, the learned trial Magistrate, put, notice of accusation, vis--vis the accused, for an offence, allegedly committed by her, under, Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, whereto, she pleaded not guilty, and, claimed trial. 4. The complainant, in substantiation of the complaint, hence examined three witnesses. On conclusion, of, recording of complainants' evidence, the statement of the accused, under, Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was, recorded by the trial Court, wherein, the accused claimed innocence, and, pleaded false implication in the case. However, she did not lead any evidence, in defence. 5. On an appraisal of evidence on record, the learned trial Court, recorded findings of acquittal upon the accused/ respondent herein. 6. The complainant, is aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal, recorded by the learned trial Court. However, she did not lead any evidence, in defence. 5. On an appraisal of evidence on record, the learned trial Court, recorded findings of acquittal upon the accused/ respondent herein. 6. The complainant, is aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal, recorded by the learned trial Court. The learned counsel for the appellant/complainant, has concertedly and vigorously contended qua the findings of acquittal, recorded by the learned trial Court standing, not, based on a proper appreciation, by it, of the evidence on record, rather, theirs standing sequelled by gross mis-appreciation, by it, of the material on record. Hence, he contends qua the findings of acquittal, being reversed by this Court, in, the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and, theirs being replaced by findings of conviction. 7. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, has with considerable force and vigour, contended that the findings of acquittal, recorded by the learned Court below rather standing based on a mature and balanced appreciation, by it, of evidence on record, and, theirs not necessitating interference, rather theirs meriting vindication. 8. This Court with the able assistance of the learned counsel on either side, has, with studied care and incision, evaluated the entire evidence on record. 9. The respondent/accused, issued a cheque, borne in Ext. C-1, vis--vis, the complainant. The afore cheque bears No. 323930, and, carries, therein a sum of Rs. 5,07,062/-. The factum, of, Ext. C-1, upon its presentation, rather being dishonoured, for want of sufficient funds, in the accounts of respondent/complainant, stands proven, by CW-1. CW-1 has, during the course of his examination- in chief, has hence proven Ext. C-2, where under Ext. C-1, stood returned, wherefrom it is palpably imminent qua, upon presentation of Ext. C-1, before the Bank concerned, whereon it was drawn, it, for want of sufficient funds, hence thereat, in the accounts, of the respondent/complainant, rather standing refused to be honoured. CW-1 has, during the course of his examination- in chief, has hence proven Ext. C-2, where under Ext. C-1, stood returned, wherefrom it is palpably imminent qua, upon presentation of Ext. C-1, before the Bank concerned, whereon it was drawn, it, for want of sufficient funds, hence thereat, in the accounts, of the respondent/complainant, rather standing refused to be honoured. The learned trial Magistrate, had proceeded, to record an order of acquittal, upon, the respondent/accused, upon, hers alluding to evidence, existing on record, and, hence, there from made a conclusion, qua the statutory presumption, embodied in Section 139 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, provisions, whereof stand extracted hereinafter, rather standing rebutted; "Presumption in favour of holder:- It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 of the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability." (i) and wherein an explicit voicing, hence occurs, qua the apt statutory presumption being leveraged, vis--vis, the, holder of a cheque, conspicuously, qua his being, hence presumed to be holding it, for, hence there through, the apt discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability, arising interse the person, issuing it, and, the holder thereof, rather ensuing. However, the occurrence therein, of, the coinage "unless contrary is proved", rather, purveys the apt leeway and latitude, to the respondent/accused, or the person issuing it, to disprove or rebut the afore presumption. 10. The afore inference, and, conclusion, is rested upon a statement, rendered by the accused, hence, in proceedings drawn under Section 313 Cr. P.C., (i) wherein she renders a communication qua a salesman, of, the complainant partnership concerned, hence, meeting her at Karnal, and, showing to her, certain products of the firm, and, hers', rendering an order for supply thereof to him, and, hers also issuing a cheque borne in Ext. C-1, rather only as a security, towards supply thereof, (i) and, that, the material ordered to be supplied to her, remaining un-supplied, and, hence, a communication being meted to the Bank concerned, to decline the encashment, of, the apposite cheque. C-1, rather only as a security, towards supply thereof, (i) and, that, the material ordered to be supplied to her, remaining un-supplied, and, hence, a communication being meted to the Bank concerned, to decline the encashment, of, the apposite cheque. Furthermore, another reason, in addition to the afore, as stands, ascribed by the learned trial Magistrate concerned, to hence pronounce an order of acquittal, upon the accused, and also hers, concluding, that, the afore statutory presumption, standing rebutted, is, rested upon the complainant, (a) though testifying qua the goods being transported, to the accused, through truck, bearing No. HR-38G-5607, and, the goods being received by her, yet, with the complainant not adducing any documentary evidence rather making hence bespeakings, qua the goods being received, by the accused at Karnal, (ii) and, further with the complainant, also failing to adduce documentary proof, vis--vis, the date whereat the respondent/accused, had, received, the supply of goods, (iii) besides the driver of the truck, engaged for, transporting the goods to Karnal, namely Karam Singh, rather remaining un-examined, vis--vis, the goods being carried in the afore truck, upto Karnal, hence, concluded that the statutory presumption, coming under a cloud, and, rather it working obviously against the complainant. 11. For the reasons to be ascribed, hereinafter, all the afore reasons, as ascribed by the learned trial Magistrate, to, pronounce an order of acquittal, upon the accused, are rather hinged, (i) upon, gross mis-appreciations, of, the mandate of Section 139 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, (ii) and, also upon a gross-mis-application, thereon, vis--vis, the afore material, and emphatically, hence she has committed a gross fallibility, (iii) qua, hence, on anvils thereof, the afore statutory presumption, rather being rebutted, (iv) undisputedly, the signatures, occurring on Ext.C-1, and, also all the other scribings, borne thereon, remained un-disputed. Whether, the afore-referred statutory presumption, bestow able, vis--vis, the complainant, hence works qua him or, whether here at exists adequate rebuttal thereto evidence, is, the trite conundrum, besetting this Court. Whether, the afore-referred statutory presumption, bestow able, vis--vis, the complainant, hence works qua him or, whether here at exists adequate rebuttal thereto evidence, is, the trite conundrum, besetting this Court. The apposite statutory important coinage, "unless contrary is proved", has immense import, and, relevance, for, determining, whether rebuttal or disproof, of, the afore statutory presumption, hence enjoins the respondent/accused, to lead cogent evidence, for hence his there through being construed to rather discharge, the, onus (v) or whether the latter part of Section 139 of the Act, leveraging, vis--vis, the holder, of, the Negotiable Instrument, a presumption, qua his holding it, in discharge of, in whole or in part of the liability, (vi) rather hence enjoins him, to also, adduce further cogent proof, hence, in consonance therewith. Necessarily, a plain reading of the coinage, "unless contrary is proved", as occurs, in the opening part of Section 139 of the Act, naturally renders it, to, galvanize a signification, (vii) qua the accused being statutorily injuncted to adduce, hence, evidence, whereupon he would rather, be hence construed, to, there through rather discharge the rebuttal onus, (viii) the apt corollary there from, is, that the holder of a negotiable instrument, when, is statutorily leveraged, to draw succor, from, the statutory presumption, qua his holding, the negotiable instrument, in discharge, in whole or in part of any debt or any other liability, rather not being statutorily injuncted, to, after, proving that the apposite instrument, holds hence the authentic writings, and, signatures, of the accused, (ix) to also thereafter fortify the afore statutory presumption, by adducing hence strengthened proof, qua it being issued, in discharge, of any, enforceable debt, or other liability, (x) if any, contrary therewith, construction is made, upon, an incisive reading, of, the subtle innate mandates of Section 139, of the Negotiable Instrument Act, it would tantamount, to rather untenably injuncting the complainant , to adduce evidence, beyond the mandate, of, the afore statutory presumption, even when it holds leanings, vis--vis, him (xi) also would tantamount, qua his being untenably injuncted, to, adduce cogent proof, vis--vis, in its issuance, it, working towards, discharge in whole, or in part, of, any legally enforceable debt or any other liability, (xii) whereupon rather the efficacy and import, of the afore statutory presumption, hence would be rather rendered redundant, besides the afore imports, and, significations as afore made vis--vis, the prior thereto statutory coinage, "unless contrary is proved", would be diluted, (xiii) whereupon the accused, though, is statutorily injuncted to lead cogent proof, for disproving, the apt statutory presumption, would, render the afore injunction, to, suffer untenable detraction, and, also dilution, and, hence would also, preclude the befallments, upon him, of the afore statutory entailments, rather statutorily exclusively encumbered upon him. 12. 12. Since, as aforesaid, the signatures of the accused, and, also all the scribings, thereon, are, in the hands of, the accused, thereupon, the veracity, of, the communications made by the complainant, in his testification, comprised, in her examination-in-chief, wherein he made echoings, qua the accused, visiting, the factory premises, of, the complainant firm, and, hers after inspecting the products, hers ordering them to be supplied, and thereafter, bills of 1.10.2010, comprised in Ext. C-3, being prepared, and, the goods being transported to Karnal, rather being enjoined to be tested. The complainant was subjected, to, an incisive cross-examination, qua therewith, and, readings thereof, hence unfold qua his being put suggestions in the affirmative, qua the goods being dispatched, on 1.10.2010, to the respondents, and thereto, rather an affirmative echoing, emanated from him, (i) and also his, making a further echoing, qua his being equipped to prove the afore factum, from the requisite records, as brought thereat by him, and, before the Court concerned, records whereof remained un-inspected by the learned defence counsel. In sequel, the effects, of the afore affirmative echoings, emanating from CW-1, vis--vis, the affirmative thereto suggestions, being put to him, during the course of his cross-examination, rather remained un-alluded, to, by the learned trial Magistrate, nor the effect thereof, came to be fathomed, (ii) whereas, the afore echoings make a vivid display, vis--vis, the afore goods being dispatched, at Karnal, by the complainant, (iii) and, rather merely qua the date of theirs being received at Karnal, by the respondent, remaining not cogently proven by adduction of documentary evidence, hence the trial Magistrate, concluded qua theirs', not, being dispatched there upto, (iv) hence pronounced an order of acquittal upon the accused, (v) and, further for non-examination of the driver of the truck, she proceeded to conclude, qua the goods, never being received at Karnal, by the respondent/complainant. Further more, given, in the last part of the cross-examination of CW-1, as conducted, by the learned defence counsel, a suggestion being meted to him, qua the cheque being issued, as security, for the supply, of, goods and with, the complainant, not, dispatching the ordered goods, (vi) thereupon, in, the dishonour of the negotiable instrument, it is projected, qua no statutory sustenances, being hence thereupon drawable by the complainant, nor it being concludable qua its issuance, working towards, discharge, of, any legally enforceable debt, or liability, existing or substing interse both. The afore suggestion, though, was denied, yet the trial Magistrate, drew succor there from, on anvil, of the accused, in her statement, recorded, under, proceedings drawn, under Section 313 Cr. P.C., denying the factum, qua hers visiting the factory premises, with the complainant, rather her employee visiting the afore premises. However, placing any reliance thereon, is both gross, and, inappropriate, as the appropriate motion, for rebutting the afore echoings, as emanated in the examination-in-chief, of the complainant, rather stood comprised in meteing, of, suggestions, to CW-1, during, the course of his being held to cross-examination, (vii) however, with no apt therewith suggestions, being meted to him, during, the course of his cross-examination, by, the learned defence counsel. (viii) Consequently, the afore echoings, as occurs in the statements, made by the accused, in proceedings, drawn under Section 313 Cr. P.C., were discardable, nor credence was meteable thereto, rather, upon, prior thereto, afore admissions, hence emanating and, visibly at an appropriate stage, (ix) thereupon, the respondent rather is to be concluded to acquiesce, qua the afore testified factum, qua hers, visiting the factory premises, and hers, making an order for supply of goods. In aftermath, her prevarications, are, to be dis-countenanced. Since, for all the aforesaid reasons, the complainant had, apart from his holding, the, apt statutory leverage, sparked by his, holding the dishonoured negotiable instrument, qua it hence being issued to him, in satisfaction of part or in whole, of, the entire enforceable contractual liability, (x) rather had also remained un-scathed, during, the course of his cross-examination, as conducted by the learned defence counsel, (xi) wherein, suggestions, were put to him, wherethrough, the afore statutory presumption was rather unsuccessfully, strived to be rebutted, (xii) importantly, also, when a perusal of his exacting cross-examination, unfolds, qua all the apt rebutting suggestions, available, vis--vis, the erosions, hence befalling afore statutory presumption, being purveyed, to him, and, all coming to be denied, (xiii) and with Ext. C-3, being placed on record, and it making articulations, qua the engagement, of, services of a transport company, by the complainant/firm, for there through the booked goods, being transported hence at Karnal, (xiv) thereupon, merely, for any suggestion, being put, to him, qua the date of its issuance, being incorrectly reflected as 26.10.2010, no initialed corrections being made thereto, hence, no probative sustenance can be drawn there from, by the accused, given (xv) for the reasons aforestated, the accused acquiescing qua the goods being received by her, on 1.10.2010, at Karnal, (xvi) and also, when hence accepting the afore contention of the accused, would rendered effaced, the, afore inferences, drawn, from the affirmative suggestions, being put to the complainant, during, the course of his examination, in-chief, and, whereto the afore apposite affirmative answers emanated from him, (xvii) and also, hence there through the edifice, of, the statutory presumption, rather, begets fortification, and, also conclusivity. Reiteratedly, and conspicuously, proof qua the falsity, of, preparation of Ext. C-3, was rather enjoined to be adduced by the accused, or proof qua therewith, was to be adduced by the accused, by his eliciting from the transport company, the originals, thereof, (xviii) strikingly, and imperatively, when thereupon the afore signification as made to the apt statutory coinage, "unless contrary is proved", as occurs in the first part, rather would, there through beget, hence deference, and, as a corollary, qua Ext. C-3, being inefficaciously drawn, whereas with the proof, qua it being not efficaciously drawn, rather remaining unadduced, by the accused, (xix) thereupon when within the ambit of the signification acquired by the coinage, "unless contrary is proved", rebuttal evidence, vis--vis, the Negotiable Instrument Act, being not issued, rather towards satisfaction in whole or in part of debt, or any other contractual liability, hence remains not adduced, (xx) thereupon dehors, the afore purported in corrected embossed reflections borne therein render, the, apt statutory presumption, to remain uneroded, vis--vis, its vigor. However, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/accused, has placed reliance, upon, a judgment rendered by this Court in, case titled as, State Bank of India versus Anil Kumar Sharma, (2009) 2 BankCas 374 : 2008 SCC Online HP 228, wherein, in paragraph-15, paragraph whereof is extracted hereinafter: "It has been held in M.S. Narayana Menon Alias Mani Vs. However, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/accused, has placed reliance, upon, a judgment rendered by this Court in, case titled as, State Bank of India versus Anil Kumar Sharma, (2009) 2 BankCas 374 : 2008 SCC Online HP 228, wherein, in paragraph-15, paragraph whereof is extracted hereinafter: "It has been held in M.S. Narayana Menon Alias Mani Vs. State of Kerala, (2006) 3 CurCriR 76 (SC): V (2006) SLT 252:III (2006) BC 433 (SC): (2006) 6 SCC 39 , that the presumption both under Sections 118 (a) and 139 of the Act are rebuttable in nature. For rebutting such presumption, what is needed is to raise a probable defence. Even for the said purpose, the evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant could be relied upon. It is not necessary for the defendant to disprove the existence of consideration by way of direct evidence. The standard of proof evidently is preponderance of probabilities. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials on record but also by reference to the presumption case in its entirety. Moreover, the onus on an accused is not as heavy as that of the prosecution. It may be compared with that on a defendant in a civil proceeding. Thus, only the accused is only required to discharge the initial onus of proof. He is not necessarily required to disprove the prosecution case. (xxi) it is mandated, that, the statutory presumption, cast in Section 139 of the Act, being rebut table, through rearing, of, a probable defence, (xxii) the standards of proof, being preponderance of probabilities, and, there from he contends, that the suggestions, existing in the cross-examination, of, the complainant, rather being sufficiently, construable, to, (xxiii) constitute hence material, personificatory of evidence, rather rebutting the afore presumption, and, hence, the accused is to be concluded to be disproving, the factum, qua in the holding of Ext. C-1, by the complainant, his not holding it, in discharge of any contractual or legally enforceable liability, existing or subsisting interse the complainant, and, the accused, (xxiv) however, the dependence made by the respondent, upon, the hereinafter extracted paragraph, would be, of immense succor, in case, the hereinbefore extracted paragraph, is read, in consonance with the preceding thereto paragraphs 12, 13, and 14, paragraphs whereof are extracted hereinafter: '12. The respondent has not disputed the issuance of cheque Ext. The respondent has not disputed the issuance of cheque Ext. P1 for a sum of Rs. 7,93,538.80, however, the defence raised by the respondent is that it was a post-dated cheque issued in favour of M/s Wadhwa Pharmochem Pvt. Ltd, as a security for the supply of 1100 kgs. Mebendazole (Ex. D1) and vide letter Ext.D2 M/s. Wadhwa Pharmochem Ltd., had acknowledge the receitof post dated cheque Ext. P1 for the above amount aforesaid against part payment of the supply of Mebendasole and assured the supply by 3.6.1996, but the order for its supply was subsequently, cancelled vide letter Ext.D3, dated 6.6.1996, as the quality of the sample ofl the aforesaid item was not found satisfactory, as such the respondent had made the request to return the cheque vide letter Ex.D2 informed the respondent that cheque aforesaid had already been presented for clearance with State Bank of India, Kala Amb, and it would be returned as soon as they would get it back. Further letter Ext. P-12, dated 10.6.1996, referred to the above cheque No. 928960, dated 6.6.1996 for Rs. 7,93,538.90 (Ex. P1) having been issued by the respondent, for the Bill Nos 18-A and 20-A whereas the appellant Bank latter produced on record the Bill Nos 18 and 20 as against their original case set up for 18-A and 20-A and no copies of the Bil Nos 18-A and 20-A were even placed on record. 13. PW- S.S. Randhawa, the Branch Manager of the appellant Bank in his earlier statement testified that the cheque was issued for Bill Nos. 18-A and 20-A dated 31.1.1996 and 3.2.1996 for discharging its liability by the respondent. Further, vide legal notice Ext. P-2 dated 10.7.1996 sent through its Advocate by the appellant Bank requested the respondent to pay the amount of Rs. 7,93,538.90 within 15 days from the receipt of the notice, but the appellant did not specify against which liability the cheque in question was issued.If this notice is read with the statement of PW-1 S.s. Randhawa , it makes crystal clear that it is with respect ot Bil Nos 18-A and 20-A. After the remand of the case finding itself at a tight corner, in his statement dated 17.1.2001, Mr.S.S.Randhawa when re-examined, totally backed out from the earlier contentions made in the complaint and his statement and took U-turn that the disputed bills were Exts. A/3 and A/1 which are Bill Nos 18 and 20 were alleged to havge been purchased from M/s Wadhawa Pharmochem Pvt.Ltd. for which they had paid 75% amount to the said concern and further that no payment to the extent of 75% qua the amount of Bill Nos 18-A and 20-A were ever credited to their account and there was no distinct entry regarding the payment in their account. However, in his cross-examination conducted by the learned Counsel for the appellant-Bank,he stated that the letter Ext. P-12 was wrongly given by M/s Wadhawa Pharmochem Pvt. Ltd, whereby they had made the reference of Bill Nos 18-A and 20-A which was credited to their accounts since there was no distinct entry regarding this payment, but again theis statement appears to be prima-facie incorrect as the letter aforesaid (Ex. P-12) makes the distinct entry of Bills Nos 18 and 20, dated 15.11.1995 and 19.11.1995 with respect to a sum of Rs. 2, 92,001 and Rs. 2,20,497.35, respectively and the Bills No 18-A and 20-A have been distinctly shown as aforesaid in the name of the respondent. 14. Further Mr. Yash Pal Jain (DW-1) of M/s Wadhawa Pharmochem Pvt. Ltd, has caused a severe dent to the case of the appellant Bank, by admitting the case of the respondent that the cheque Ext. P-1 was taken by them as a security amount and proved his letters, Ext. D2- to D4 which substantiated the plea of respondent. He has also proved the letter of confirmatiove Ext. D5 dated 19.9.1996 whereby it was certified to him that there were no dues towards the respondent and M/s. Wadhawa Pharmochem Limited owed all liabilities of the appellant Bank against the bounced cheque. Thus the above facts which have emerged from the evidence, the legal presumption attached to the cheque stands rebutted. (xxv) whereas, reading it in isolation there from, and, reading paragraph- 12, in a fragmentary manner, would not enable hence eruptions, of all the efficacys, and, imports thereof and also, would erode, the afore signification made by this Court, vis--vis, all the coinages, occurring, in Section 139 of the Act, (xxvi) besides would untenably render paragraph-15 of the judgment(supra), to hold absolute generalized overriding effect, dehors, the prior thereto discussion, held, in paragraphs No. 12, 13, and 14 of the judgment (supra). 13. 13. A reading of paragraphs No. 12, 13 and 14, paragraphs whereof, hence precedes paragraph-15, unfold, that the evidence adduced, by the accused, hence making palpable echoings, qua the purported existing or legally enforceable liabilities, rather being indemnified or liquidated, thereupon this Court, proceeding to render the subsequent thereto paragraph-15, of, the judgment(supra), and it hence concluding qua rather adequate rebuttal evidence, in dis-proof, of, the statutory presumption, hence being adduced. However, extantly, the complainant apart from meteing, the afore suggestion, to the complainant while holding him, to cross-examination, and, with this Court, in the afore discussion, dwindling the force of the afore suggestion, meted to the complainant, during, his cross-examination, and, it concluding qua, the statutory presumption, striven to hence there through, being belittled, rather suffering futility. Contrarily, when a complete connected, and, harmonious readings of paragraphs 12, 13 and 14, along with paragraph-15 of the judgment (supra) underscores, qua hence there from, no firm ratio-decideni, rather emerging, nor in isolation rather paragraph-15 of the judgment (supra), (a) holding therein any omnibus, and, all prevailing clout in all situations, dehors, incisive readings being made, of, preceding thereto paragraphs 12, 13 and 14, (b) conspicuously, when hence isolated and fragmentary reading of paragraph-15, of the judgment would rather spark contradiction, vis--vis, the apt provisions, of the Negotiable Instrument Act, (c) where through, the apt statutory presumption, is, abundantly, leveraged, vis--vis, the holder of the Negotiable Instrument, and, when the afore statutory presumption, enjoins adduction of rebuttal thereto evidence, by the accused, and, not by the complainant. 14. For the reasons which have been recorded hereinabove, this Court holds that the learned trial Court has not appraised the entire evidence on record in a wholesome and harmonious manner and the analysis of the learned trial Court hence suffers from a perversity or absurdity of mis-appreciation and non-appreciation of evidence on record. 15. There is merit in the appeal, and the same is allowed. The impugned judgment is quashed and set aside. The accused/respondent be produced before this Court, for hers being heard on quantum of sentence, on 14.5.2019.