JUDGMENT : The defendants 3 and 4 came up with this appeal. Originally a suit for injunction with a prayer not to measure the plaint schedule property or to trespass upon the plaint schedule property was filed against the Survey authorities, the first and second defendants and also against defendants 3 and 4, the appellants herein. That suit was filed on 28.06.2003. Subsequently an amendment application was filed on 06.03.2006, wherein the suit was amended as the one for declaration of prescriptive right of easement of way over 'C' schedule. The 'B' and 'C' schedules were incorporated by way of amendment. Originally the suit was filed with respect to 'A' schedule property alone. After the amendment the suit became one for declaration of easement right over the 'C' schedule property based on the dominant heritage – 'B' schedule. The 'B' and 'C' schedule were subsequently incorporated in the plaint schedule by way of amendment dated 06.03.2006. In fact a new suit was substituted in the place of earlier one by incorporating 'B' and 'C' schedule and a relief of prescriptive easement over 'C' schedule for the convenient user of 'B' schedule. The suit was proceeded with and the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court decreed the suit granting declaration of prescriptive right of easement over 'C' schedule way for the convenient user of dominant heritage – 'B' schedule property. Aggrieved by the said decree and judgment, the defendants 3 and 4 came up with this appeal. 2. It is by virtue of an amendment a claim of prescriptive right of easement incorporated by scheduling dominant tenement and servient tenement. It was not there in the suit at the time when the suit was filed. Inorder to claim prescriptive right of easement, the mandate of user of right for a period of 20 years ending within two years has to be established. The expression 'ending within two years' stands for the time available for instituting a suit based on prescriptive right of easement from the date of interruption. It is an admitted case of both the plaintiff and the defendant that as on the date of amendment, there was an obstruction by the existence of an obstructive fencing at the entrance of C schedule by which its user was completely obstructed. It is an admitted case of both the plaintiff and the defendant that as on the date of amendment, there was an obstruction by the existence of an obstructive fencing at the entrance of C schedule by which its user was completely obstructed. But according to the plaintiff, the obstructive fencing was constructed on 8.4.2005 and the amendment was filed on 6.3.2006, within two years. It was disputed by the defendant stating that the obstructive fencing was constructed immediately after the suit i.e. on 30.6.2003. The suit was filed on 28.6.2003, but the amendment was filed only on 6.3.2006, after the expiry of two years from the date of obstruction, as alleged by the defenant. It was submitted that since there is a complete obstruction to the user of C schedule way, it would come under the purview of an 'interruption' as defined under Section 15 of the Indian Easement Act and took reliance from the decision of this Court in Pankan Soman v. Manoharan C.K. [ 2019 (1) KHC 817 ]. It is settled by this court that “Explanation II attached to S.15 of the Act really explains what actually amounts to an “interruption”, in a negative way that nothing is an interruption within the meaning of this section unless where there is an actual cessation of the enjoyment by reason of any obstruction by the act of some person other than the claimant, and unless such obstruction is submitted to or acquiesced in for one year after the claimant has notice thereof. It stands for an actual cessation of the enjoyment by reason of obstruction made by the person other than the claimant.” Then yet another embargo would also come into play as to whether such obstruction is submitted to or acquiesced in for one year after the claimant has notice thereof. One of the most crucial aspect now emerges from the admission of plaintiff is the date of construction of obstructive fencing which according to the plaintiff is on 8.4.2005, but according to the defendant, it was constructed on 30.6.2003, two years prior to the amendment. There is no dispute that it was constructed during the pendency of the suit. The short question came up for consideration at this juncture is : 3. There is no dispute that it was constructed during the pendency of the suit. The short question came up for consideration at this juncture is : 3. Once amendment to the pleadings are permitted to be incorporated in the suit without saving the question of limitation, what would be the application of 'doctrine of relation back' and whether the amendment allowed and carried out would revert back to the date of suit or would operate from the date of its amendment ? 4. If it revert back to the date of suit, no doubt, it would take away the defence set up by the defendant regarding non-compliance of two year period in bringing a suit and also the question of submission and acquiescence to the act of defendant for a period of one year. 5. An amendment, once allowed, would revert back to the date of suit by the application of 'doctrine of relation back', unless the question of limitation saved by the order allowing amendment. The jurisdiction vested with the court under Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. in dealing with an amendment seeking incorporation of a time barred relief, was taken up in reference to the application of 'doctrine of relation back' by the High court of Bombay in Kisandas Rupchand v. Rachappa Vithoba [ILR 33 Bombay 644 (1900)] and held that the court should apply the test of injustice or prejudice that can be caused to the opposite party while allowing amendment, especially when the amendment sought stood barred by limitation. 6. In Charan Das v. Amir Khan [(1920) 47 I.A. 255], the Privy Council observed : “That there was full power to make the amendment, cannot be disputed, and though such a power should not as a rule be exercised, where the effect is to take away from a defendant a legal right which has accrued to him by lapse of time, yet there are cases where such considerations are outweighed by the special circumstances of the case.” 7. A four Judges Bench of the Apex Court in H.J. Leach and Co. v. Ms.Jardine Skinner and Co. ( 1957 KHC 368 : AIR 1957 SC 357 ) settled the legal position that the court would, as a rule, decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. v. Ms.Jardine Skinner and Co. ( 1957 KHC 368 : AIR 1957 SC 357 ) settled the legal position that the court would, as a rule, decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered, and does not affect the power of the court to order it, if that is required in the interests of justice. 8. A three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil ( AIR 1957 SC 363 ) had laid down the legal position in the very same line that an amendment did not really introduce a new fact at all, nor did the defendant have to meet a new claim set up for the first time after the expiry of period of limitation. 9. In K. Raheja Construction Ltd. and another v. Alliance Ministries and Ors. ( 1995 Supp (3) SCC 17 : AIR 1995 SC 1768 ), the legal position was reiterated by turning down an amendment sought to incorporate a time barred relief which was filed after the lapse of seven years from the date of suit on the ground that the period of limitation available is only three years. 10. The Apex Court in yet another case took the very same view by repelling an amendment sought to incorporate recovery of possession after the lapse of period of limitation in Vishwambhar and Ors. v. Laxminarayan ( Dead) through LRs and another [ (2001) 6 SCC 163 : AIR 2001 SC 2607 ]. It is a case wherein there was omission to sue for setting aside the alienation made by the parents with respect to the property of minors without obtaining permission from the court. It was found that the document being voidable at the instance of minor or any person claiming under him, required to get the alienation set aside if they want to avoid the transfers and to regain the property from the purchasers, and that the relief sought to set aside the document by way of an amendment made after the period of limitation, cannot be allowed. 11. 11. In Siddalingamma and Another v. Mamtha Shenoy [ (2001) 8 SCC 561 : AIR 2001 SC 2896 ],the Apex Court had applied the 'doctrine of relation back' to an amendment made under Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. on the ground that the question of limitation was not raised at the time when the amendment was allowed. 12. In Sampath Kumar v. Ayyakannu and Another ( AIR 2002 SC 3369 : (2002) 7 SCC 559 ), the Apex Court has allowed amendment seeking relief of declaration of title to the suit property and consequential relief of delivery of possession in a suit for injunction simplicitor after the expiry of 11 years. The reasoning made by the Apex Court is as follows: “In our opinion, the basic structure of the suit is not altered by the proposed amendment. What is sought to be changed is the nature of relief sought for by the plaintiff. In the opinion of the trial court, it was open to the plaintiff to file a fresh suit and that is one of the reasons which has prevailed with the trial court and with the High Court in refusing the prayer for amendment and also in dismissing the plaintiff's revision. We fail to understand, if it is permissible for the plaintiff to file an independent suit, why the same relief which could be prayed for in a new suit cannot be permitted to be incorporated in the pending suit. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, allowing the amendment would curtail multiplicity of legal proceedings.” 13. In fact question of limitation did not arise in the factual situation involved in that case as the amendment was sought, though after 11 years, it is based on a subsequent dispossession of plaintiff from the property during the pendency of the suit and what is considered in the said decision is only the question of prejudice that may be caused to the opposite party. The impact of 'doctrine of relation back' in the context of amendment of pleading was also dealt with in paragraph 10 of the judgment as follows: “An amendment once incorporated relates back to the date of the suit. The impact of 'doctrine of relation back' in the context of amendment of pleading was also dealt with in paragraph 10 of the judgment as follows: “An amendment once incorporated relates back to the date of the suit. However, the doctrine of relation back in the context of amendment of pleadings is not one of universal application and in appropriate cases the Court is competent while permitting an amendment to direct that the amendment permitted by it shall not relate back to the date of the suit and to the extent permitted by it shall be deemed to have been brought before the Court on the date on which the applications seeking the amendment was filed.” 14. All these decisions are dealing with the question of jurisdiction of civil court under Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. and laid down the legal position that an amendment sought to incorporate a time barred relief shall not be allowed, though it will not take away the jurisdiction to allow the same when it is found to be necessary for adjudication of dispute involved. But when amendment was allowed without saving the question of limitation, the doctrine of relation back would come into play by bringing the amendment from the date of suit. This would be the legal position wherein the question of limitation was not raised at the time of amendment. A unique feature is well evident from the above said decisions that the cases which were dealt with there under, the amendments sought are based on the same cause of action on which the suit was instituted or on a subsequent development based on the same cause of action in which the suit was instituted. 15. The question now remains for consideration is what would be the legal effect of an amendment introducing a new cause of action, a new relief, based on a new subject matter by way of amendment and whether the doctrine of relation back would come into play when the amendment was allowed without addressing the question of limitation or without reserving/saving the question of limitation. Strictly speaking, the relief which were omitted based on the same cause of action, sought to be incorporated by way of amendment, when resting on same cause of action or on a subsequent event based on the same cause of action has got its own characteristics apart from a new relief, a new cause of action and a new subject matter sought to be incorporated by way of amendment in a suit. In the former one, the area in which it would govern would squarely come under the purview of Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. But in the later case, it would be out of the permissible limit of Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. Hence an introduction of a new cause of action, a new relief by incorporating a new schedule as subject matter of the suit by way of an amendment either in addition or in substitution of what actually sought originally in the suit, would not fall under the ambit of Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. There may not be any application of doctrine of relation back in the later case though the amendment was happened to be allowed either in a wrong notion or without noticing whether it would come under the purview of Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C.. The amendment would not go back to the date of suit, if the amendment satisfies that a new and entirely different cause of action and relief was incorporated or where there is introduction of entirely a new schedule to the suit which are not permissible under Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. 16. At this juncture, the decision drawn in Van Vibhag Karamchari Griha Nirman Sahkari Sanstha Maryadit ( Registered) v. Ramesh Chander and Ors. [ (2010) 14 SCC 596 ] assumes importance wherein the Apex Court had refused to apply the doctrine of relation back with respect to the subject matter of a suit for declaration of ownership and permanent injunction by virtue of subsequent amendment of relief of specific performance which was made about 11 years after the filing of the suit and was allowed after 12 years of the filing of the suit. It was held that the amendment would not relates back to the date of filing of the original plaint in view of the clear bar under Article 54 of the Limitation Act and also on the ground that the amendment virtually alters the character of the suit and its pecuniary jurisdiction had gone up and the plaint had to be transferred to a different court. 17. In Vishwambhar's case (supra), the very same view was taken that if as a result of allowing the amendment, the basis of the suit is changed, such amendment even though allowed, cannot relate back to the date of filing of the suit, to cure the defect of limitation. 18. From the above said discussion, it can be safely concluded that doctrine of relation back would come into play only when amendment was allowed without saving the question of limitation. When there is no such clause incorporated saving the question of limitation, the amendment would go back to the date of suit by the application of doctrine of relation back, but subject to certain exceptions that it would not come into play when the amendment sought alters the nature and character of the suit, irrespective of the fact that the amendment was allowed (either mistakenly or without noticing the change of nature and character of the suit). It is well within the jurisdiction of the court to have a fresh appraisal as to whether the amendment allowed would change the nature and character of the suit and whether it would come under the purview of Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C., so as to address the application of doctrine of relation back and there is no legal impediment in considering the nature and character of the amendment after allowing the same and the order passed at the interim stage would stand as merged in the final decision addressing the question of limitation and hence permissible to have a fresh appraisal regarding the nature and character of the amendment and whether it would alter the nature and character of the suit, irrespective of the fact that amendment was allowed on an earlier occasion. The doctrine of relation back may not have any application when introduces a new cause of action, a new relief based on a different cause of action or on a different subject matter which was sought to be incorporated by way of amendment as the same would fall outside the scope of Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C., irrespective of the fact that the amendment was allowed by exhausting Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. The doctrine of relation back would come into play only with respect to the amendment which is permissible and would come under the purview of Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C., based on the same cause of action and same subject matter. 19. In the instant case, the amendment was incorporated by introducing a new cause of action for the prescriptive right of easement and the dominant and servient heritage were incorporated by the amendment by substituting a new suit in the place of old one. The nature and character of the suit altered by incorporating a new relief of prescriptive right of easement by scheduling the dominant and servient heritage as B and C schedules and hence the amendment though allowed, would not come under the purview of Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. and it will not revert back to the date of suit by the application of doctrine of relation back. The doctrine of relation back is not applicable in the instant case and as such the date of interruption as raised by the defendant and the admission regarding the interruption as on the date of suit by the plaintiff assumes importance. If the date of interruption is prior to two years, the claim of prescriptive right would not stand. If it was submitted to or acquiesced in, for a period of one year from the date of notice, no claim by way of prescriptive right can be maintained. It was brought to the notice of this court that DW1 admitted that it was constructed during the pendency of the suit. The suit was instituted on 28.6.2003. The construction according to DW1 is subsequent to the suit i.e. on 30.6.2003. But according to the plaintiff, it was constructed only on 8.4.2005. It was brought to the notice of this court that DW1 admitted that it was constructed during the pendency of the suit. The suit was instituted on 28.6.2003. The construction according to DW1 is subsequent to the suit i.e. on 30.6.2003. But according to the plaintiff, it was constructed only on 8.4.2005. Neither the trial court nor the first appellate court gone into the above said question and no adjudication was rendered as to the actual date of interruption as defined under Section 15 of the Indian Easement Act. Needless to say that when the plaintiff admits interruption, it is upon the plaintiff to show and establish the date on which interruption came into effect so as to get prescriptive right of easement. Hence the decree and judgment of the trial court and the first appellate court are set aside. The matter is remanded back to the trial court so as to address the above said question and dispose of the matter afresh. The parties are at liberty to adduce additional evidence. The trial court shall dispose of the matter at the earliest. The parties shall appear before the trial court on 18.07.2019. The appeal is allowed in part accordingly. No costs.