ORDER : 1. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking quashing and setting aside the order dated 13.10.2004 whereby, he has been removed from the service as well as the order passed by the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal, Gandhinagar ('the Tribunal' for short) dated 19.09.2005 and further prayed for quashing and setting aside the inquiry report prepared by V.R.Jadav, Inquiry Officer vide communication dated 25.08.2003. 2. The facts leading to the case of fling of the present writ petition are as under: 2.1 The petitioner was appointed as a Teacher on 04.10.1983 and was working as an Assistant Teacher and was also holding charge of the Principal (In-charge Principal) of Adarsh Nivasi Shala, Gandhidham with effect from 10.12.1992. The petitioner was issued a show cause notice dated 02.04.2002 by the Disciplinary Authority calling upon his explanation as to why disciplinary action should not be taken on the complaint filed by one Shri V.V.Patel on 16.09.2002, inter alia, alleging that the petitioner had misappropriated a sum of Rs.1,609/-, which was payable to him towards the payment made by him in respect of certain purchases for said Shree Adarsh Nivasi Shala. 2.2 On 18.04.2002, the petitioner filed reply to the said show cause notice denying the charges leveled against him by said Shri V.V. Patel. The petitioner had explained in detail the entire facts and circumstances of the case and thereby denied the allegation leveled against him. 2.3 After holding a departmental inquiry, the petitioner was removed from service vide order dated 13.10.2004. 2.4 After the order of removal, the petitioner approached this Court by filing Special Civil Application No.4110 of 2005 challenging the same, however, vide order dated 14.03.2005, the same was not entertained by this Court in view of the alternative remedy. The petitioner thereafter, challenged the punishment order before the Tribunal by filing Appeal No.80 of 2005. The same was rejected by the order dated 19.09.2005. 3. Learned advocate Mr.Nishant Lalkiya on behalf of learned advocate Mr.Buch appearing for the petitioner has submitted that even after filing the aforesaid reply, the petitioner was served upon with a copy of the charge-sheet for holding disciplinary inquiry against him for the charges leveled against him. He has submitted that on 11.10.2002, statement of defence was filed in reply of the aforesaid charge-sheet, wherein also the petitioner denied the charges leveled against him. He has submitted that on 11.10.2002, statement of defence was filed in reply of the aforesaid charge-sheet, wherein also the petitioner denied the charges leveled against him. 3.1 He has further submitted that on 27.01.2003, the Inquiry Officer started recording of the evidence of Shri V.V. Patel, the complainant in this case. He has submitted that on 02.06.2003, one Shir Navnit Hargovind Acharya, Proprietor of Navanit Gas Agency was examined in Gandhidham in the said inquiry. 3.2 He has submitted that after the aforesaid inquiry was completed, a show cause notice was issued again and was served to the petitioner on 23.03.2004, whereby he was asked to show cause as to why he should not be punished for the allegations as per the findings arrived at by the Inquiry Officer stood proved. He has submitted that on 14.04.2004, the petitioner submitted reply to the aforesaid notice dated 23.03.2004. 3.3 Learned advocate Mr.Lalkiya has submitted that the Inquiry Officer has violated the departmental inquiry in view of the provisions of Rule 9(16) of the Gujarat Civil Services (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules, 1979 as the entire inquiry is based on the evidence of Shri V.V. Patel, the complainant. It is further submitted that the other witnesses, who were called upon by the petitioner, are not examined in the inquiry. It is further submitted that the documentary evidence, more particularly the photocopies of Bill Nos.17 and 18 are not proved as required under the law. 3.4 Lastly, it is submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioner that looking to the meager amount of Rs.1,609/-, penalty of removal is disproportionate and hence, the same is required to be set aside. He has submitted that the petitioner has reached the age of superannuation in the year 2012 and the penalty of removal may be modified to the penalty of voluntary retirement so that the petitioner may not be deprived of the retirement benefits. 3.5 In support of his submissions, the learned advocate for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank and Ors., (2009) 2 SCC 570 . 4. Per contra, learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms. Calla has submitted that no leniency can be shown to the petitioner, who is involved in such misappropriation. Punjab National Bank and Ors., (2009) 2 SCC 570 . 4. Per contra, learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms. Calla has submitted that no leniency can be shown to the petitioner, who is involved in such misappropriation. She has invited the attention of this Court to the impugned order passed by the Director wherein, it is referred that the petitioner was also earlier involved in misappropriation of the amount of Rs.2,004.80/- and though he was issued the notice for dismissal of service, the higher authorities by taking a lenient view had placed him in the minimum pay-scale. 4.1 She has submitted that the Disciplinary Authority has considered the submissions of the petitioner as well as the findings of the Inquiry Officer's report and instead of dismissal of service, he is removed which cannot be said to be harsh. She has submitted that the petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to produce the defence witness cited by him and on the contrary, at his request, the inquiry of the departmental proceedings was shifted from Gandhinagar to Gandhidham, where the defence witnesses were residing. She has submitted that though the inquiry was shifted to Gandhidham for enabling the petitioner to bring his defence witnesses, no one appeared on behalf of the petitioner, except one witness, whose deposition is not found relevant and in favour of the petitioner. She has invited the attention of this Court to the statement recorded on 02.06.2003 of the defence witness, Navneet Hargovind Acharya (Exh. 26), wherein he has stated that he does not remember anything. Thus, nothing comes out from the deposition of his witness and hence, no cross-examination was needed. 4.2 She has submitted that the Inquiry Officer's report was never challenged before the Tribunal and it is not alleged before the Tribunal that there was any violation of principal of natural justice or statutory rules in holding the departmental proceedings. She has submitted that the contention of delay was raised before the Tribunal which is dealt appropriately since at the relevant time, it came to the notice that such misappropriation was committed by the petitioner and hence, a complaint was filed on 16.09.2000 by Shri V.V. Patel and the charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner. Thus, she has submitted that the impugned order does not require any interference. 5. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced by the learned advocates for the respective parties. Thus, she has submitted that the impugned order does not require any interference. 5. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced by the learned advocates for the respective parties. The documents are cited by them are also perused. 6. The petitioner was issued a memo on 07.08.2002 inter alia containing charges of misappropriation of Rs.1,609/-.The disciplinary authority placed reliance on the six vouchers of different amount and after holding the inquiry, the charges were proved against the petitioner. 7. It is the case of the respondents that the petitioner had tampered with the vouchers and misappropriated the amount. The primary contention of the petitioner is that such vouchers were required to be proved in the departmental proceedings by examining the persons who were cited by the petitioner as defence witness, however, since the defence witnesses cited by the petitioner were not examined, the entire departmental proceedings were vitiated and hence, the impugned order of penalty is required to be set aside. It is pertinent to note that the Inquiry Officer in his report has recorded the day-to-day proceedings. A perusal of the findings of the Inquiry Officer would reveal that the inquiry was shifted from Gandhinagar to Gandhidham at the request of the petitioner to enable him to produce the defence witnesses mentioned by him since they were residing at Gandhidham. The proceedings were held at Gandhidham on 02.06.2003, however, despite giving the opportunity to the petitioner, the defence witnesses did not turn up. 8. It is the case of the petitioner that the notices, which were issued to the defence witnesses, were not served and hence, they could not remain present, however, the said contention does not merit acceptance since, the notices were issued from Gandhinagar to the witnesses. Thereafter, at the request of the petitioner the inquiry was shifted to Gandhidham. It was the duty of the petitioner to enable him to bring the defence witnesses when at his request the entire proceedings were shifted to the place where they were residing. The inquiry proceedings reveal that the Inquiry Officer waited till 2:15 p.m. and had given the opportunity to the petitioner to bring the defence witnesses however, except one Navnit Hargovind Acharya, other three witnesses did not chose to remain present. The inquiry proceedings reveal that the Inquiry Officer waited till 2:15 p.m. and had given the opportunity to the petitioner to bring the defence witnesses however, except one Navnit Hargovind Acharya, other three witnesses did not chose to remain present. The defence witness - Navnit Hargovind Acharya was examined by the Inquiry Officer on 02.06.2003 at Exh.26, which is produced at Annexure-R2 in the present writ petition. The deposition of the defence witness Navnit Hargovind Acharya reveals that he does not recollect anything and the record of the Bill is lost in earthquake. Hence, his deposition in no manner helps the petitioner. Looking to the deposition of this witness, the respondent– Presenting Officer on behalf of the respondent authority did not think it fit to cross-examine him. The amount referred therein only pertains to one Voucher No.10273; and from his deposition, it is not proved that petitioner had paid the amount, though the witness has stated that it is received without the availability of record. 9. The only witness, the complainant Shri V.V.Patel, was examined and cross-examined by both the parties. The inquiry proceedings reveal that the deposition of Shri V.V. Patel remained intact and the same is not tainted with any infirmity . 10. Reliance placed in the judgment in the case of Roop Singh Negi (Supra) could not help to the petitioner since admittedly in the present case, the petitioner is unable to point out any violation of statutory rules or violation of principles of natural justice. The petitioner has been given abundant opportunity to pursue his case and the same has been done. 11. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Registrar General, High Court of Patna Vs. Pandey Gajendra Prasad and Ors., (2012) 6 SCC 357 . The Supreme Court in the judgment has laid down the principles of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of an order punishment passed in the departmental proceedings. The Supreme Court has held thus in Paragraphs No.18, 19, 20, 21. “18. It is trite that the scope of judicial review, under Article 226 of the Constitution, of an order of punishment passed in departmental proceedings, is extremely limited. The Supreme Court has held thus in Paragraphs No.18, 19, 20, 21. “18. It is trite that the scope of judicial review, under Article 226 of the Constitution, of an order of punishment passed in departmental proceedings, is extremely limited. While exercising such jurisdiction, interference with the decision of the departmental authorities is permitted, if such authority has held the proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such inquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by consideration extraneous to the evidence on the merits of the case, or if the conclusion reached by the authority, on the face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. (See: Shashikant S. Patil & Anr. (supra)). 19. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, this Court made the following observations: “7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 262 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.” 20. Elaborating on the scope of judicial review of an assessment of the conduct of a judicial officer by a Committee, approved by the Full Court, in Syed T.A. Naqshbandi & Ors. v. State of J & K this Court noted as follows: “7. … As has often been reiterated by this Court, judicial review is permissible only to the extent of finding whether the process in reaching the decision has been observed correctly and not the decision itself, as such. v. State of J & K this Court noted as follows: “7. … As has often been reiterated by this Court, judicial review is permissible only to the extent of finding whether the process in reaching the decision has been observed correctly and not the decision itself, as such. Critical or independent analysis or appraisal of the materials by the courts exercising powers of judicial review unlike the case of an appellate court, would neither be permissible nor conducive to the interests of either the officers concerned or the system and institutions of administration of justice with which we are concerned in this case, by going into the correctness as such of ACRs or the assessment made by the Committee and approval accorded by the Full Court of the High Court.” 21. In Rajendra Singh Verma v. Lt. Governor (NCT of Delhi), reiterating the principle laid down in Shashikant S. Patil, this Court observed as follows: “191. … in case where the Full Court of the High Court recommends compulsory retirement of an officer, the High Court on the judicial side has to exercise great caution and circumspection in setting aside that order because it is a complement of all the Judges of the High Court who go into the question and it is possible that in all cases evidence would not be forthcoming about integrity doubtful of a judicial officer.” It was further observed that: “192. … If that authority bona fide forms an opinion that the integrity of a particular officer is doubtful, the correctness of that opinion cannot be challenged before courts. When such a constitutional function is exercised on the administrative side of the High Court, any judicial review thereon should be made only with great care and circumspection and it must be confined strictly to the parameters set by this Court in several reported decisions. When the appropriate authority forms bona fide opinion that compulsory retirement of a judicial officer is in public interest, the writ court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32 would not interfere with the order.” 12. Thus, as per the observations by the Supreme Court, the judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, of an order of punishment passed in the departmental proceedings, is extremely limited. Thus, as per the observations by the Supreme Court, the judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, of an order of punishment passed in the departmental proceedings, is extremely limited. While exercising such jurisdiction, it is held that the same is only permitted, if the departmental authority has held the proceedings in violation of principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such inquiry or if the decision of such authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence on merits of the case, or if the conclusion reached by the authority, on the face of it, is so wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such conclusion. 13. In the present case, the petitioner has already challenged the impugned order before the Tribunal and the judicial review would be extremely limited since it is not shown by the petitioner while holding the departmental proceedings, any statutory rules are violated. Though a statement has been made in the writ petition that the provisions of Rule 9(16) of the Gujarat Civil Services (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules, 1979 are violated, nothing is pointed out from the departmental proceedings about such violation. The perusal of the order of the Tribunal reveals that no such contentions of violation of statutory rules were canvassed before the Tribunal. 14. The contention of the petitioner, that penalty of removal is required to be modified to voluntary retirement, does not merit acceptance since from the order of the removal, it is revealed that earlier also the petitioner had engaged himself in misappropriation and the authorities had also issued notice for dismissal, however, instead of imposing major penalty of dismissal, he was placed in the lower pay-scale. Be that as it may, the order of the removal from service cannot be said to be disproportionate to the misconduct of removal. 15. Before the Tribunal the primary contention raised was of delay in initiating the departmental proceedings. The departmental proceedings cannot be vitiated on the ground of delay as it is revealed from the record that there is no considerable delay and only after two years, the complaint was made by Mr.V.V. Patel about the misappropriation and accordingly, the charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner after seeking his explanation. The departmental proceedings cannot be vitiated on the ground of delay as it is revealed from the record that there is no considerable delay and only after two years, the complaint was made by Mr.V.V. Patel about the misappropriation and accordingly, the charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner after seeking his explanation. The order of the Tribunal is based on the appreciation of the facts and the Tribunal, after examining the inquiry proceedings has held that despite giving sufficient opportunity to the petitioner to produce his defence witness, he was unable to do so and the Inquiry Officer has not committed any infirmity in proceeding with the inquiry and placed reliance on the deposition of the complainant, Mr.V.V. Patel. The Tribunal has further held that tampering with the vouchers has been proved in the departmental proceedings. 16. Thus, in light of the foregoing observations while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, this Court does not find any perversity or infirmity either in the departmental proceedings or in the order of the Tribunal. Hence, the writ petition fails legal scrutiny and the same is dismissed. Rule discharged.