JUDGMENT : The present petition has been filed for quashing the entire criminal proceedings in connection with Lohardaga P.S. Case No. 161 of 2011 (G.R Case No. 546 of 2011) for the offences under Sections 406/420/467/468/471/34 IPC, now pending in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lohardaga. 2. The brief background of the case is that an agreement was entered into between the petitioner and the Nagar Parishad, Lohardaga through its Executive Officer for supply and installation of a ‘Toy Train’ in a park named ‘Ajay Udyan’ on 17.12.2008. An FIR being Lohardaga P.S Case No. 161 of 2011 was lodged under Sections 406/420/467/468/471/34 IPC on the basis of the written report of the Junior Engineer, Nagar Parishad, Lohardaga dated 14.10.2011 wherein it was alleged that in spite of repeated directions, the work had not been completed by the petitioner as yet, though it was agreed that the same would be completed within 75 days. It was further alleged that the work done by the petitioner had not been found up to the mark. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner had carried out necessary works and handed over the keys of the ‘Toy Train’ in running condition after the trial run on 26.02.2009 within the stipulated period of 75 days. On the day the petitioner handed over the keys of the ‘Toy Train’, the work awarded to the petitioner was amended and enhanced for which an additional amount was also sanctioned. The enhanced work was to carry out levelling of the passage where the ‘Toy Train’ was to run and also to carry out Eco-friendly Security Circle, which was also constructed by the petitioner within the time allowed to it. The ‘Toy Train’ installed by the petitioner however could not run due to the dispute between the Managing Committee of the Park ‘Ajay Udyan’ and the local administration. Since the considerable period had lapsed and the rainy season had also passed by, the railway track on which the ‘Toy Train’ was to run, got lowered down. However, the same was also repaired. In November, 2010 the petitioner received a letter of complain from the office of the Nagar Parishad, Lohardaga through its Executive Officer alleging certain defects in the materials supplied by the petitioner which was replied by the petitioner denying all the allegations. However, the same was also repaired. In November, 2010 the petitioner received a letter of complain from the office of the Nagar Parishad, Lohardaga through its Executive Officer alleging certain defects in the materials supplied by the petitioner which was replied by the petitioner denying all the allegations. It is further submitted that the allegations levelled against the petitioner are purely civil in nature and the ingredients of “cheating” are not attracted in the present case and as such the continuance of the present criminal proceeding would amount to an abuse of the process of Court. 4. Per-contra, the learned counsel for the O.P.No.2 submits that the installation of the ‘Toy Train’ by the petitioner was of inferior quality and as such he was directed to rectify the defects. However, the petitioner did not comply the said direction and as such he committed fraud by withdrawing Rs.7,61,534/- from Nagar Parishad in connection with the said work. The Nagar Parishad Board in its meeting held on 27.09.2011 unanimously passed a resolution to lodge an F.I.R against the petitioner-firm and as such the O.P.No.2 lodged an F.I.R against the petitioner being Lohardaga P.S. Case No. 161 of 2011 for the offences under Sections 420, 406,467,468, 471 & 34 of IPC. The averments made in the present petition are false, concocted and fabricated, as the petitioner neither installed the ‘Toy Train’ within the stipulated period nor handed over the key of the same to any of the authorized person of the Nagar Parishad. It is further submitted that pursuant to the agreement entered into between the petitioner and the Nagar Parishad, the petitioner realized money on different dates on false promise and fabricated documents and illegally retained the said money without completing the work. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant materials available on record. The thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the O.P.No.2 is trying to improve his case by inserting the words and the allegations in the shape of the counter affidavit, inasmuch as, it has never been the case of the O.P.No.2 that the petitioner did not complete the work as would be evident from the F.I.R itself, rather what has been alleged is that the repairing and maintenance works were not being carried out by the petitioner. Even if the allegation of non-fulfilment of the terms and conditions is taken to be true on the face of it, the case registered under Sections 420/406/467/468/471 IPC and Section 34 IPC is not made out against the petitioner, inasmuch as, the basic ingredients for attracting the alleged offences are missing. 6. To appreciate the said contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, I have perused the contents of the written report of the O.P.No.2 leading to lodging of the present F.I.R. It has been alleged in the written report that an agreement was executed between the petitioner and Nagar Parishad to install a ‘Toy Train’ at ‘Ajay Udyan’. However, the work done by the petitioner was not found to be up to the mark and in spite of repeated letters for removing the defects, the same were not rectified by the petitioner. 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of International Advanced Research Centre for Powder Metallurgy and New Materials (ARCI) & Ors. Vs. Nimra Cerglass Technics (P) Ltd. & Anr., reported in (2016) 1 SCC 348 , has held as under:- “13. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is, as to whether uncontroverted allegations as made in the complaint establish the offence. The High Court being superior court of the State should refrain from analysing the materials which are yet to be adduced and seen in their true perspective. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The power under Section 482 CrPC is to be used sparingly only in rare cases. In a catena of cases, this Court reiterated that the powers of quashing criminal proceedings should be exercised very sparingly and quashing a complaint in criminal proceedings would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. (Vide State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] , State of T.N. v. Thirukkural Perumal [ (1995) 2 SCC 449 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 387] and CBI v. Ravi Shankar Srivastava [ (2006) 7 SCC 188 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 233] .) 15. (Vide State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] , State of T.N. v. Thirukkural Perumal [ (1995) 2 SCC 449 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 387] and CBI v. Ravi Shankar Srivastava [ (2006) 7 SCC 188 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 233] .) 15. The essential ingredients to attract Section 420 IPC are: (i) cheating; (ii) dishonest inducement to deliver property or to make, alter or destroy any valuable security or anything which is sealed or signed or is capable of being converted into a valuable security; and (iii) mens rea of the accused at the time of making the inducement. The making of a false representation is one of the essential ingredients to constitute the offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC. In order to bring a case for the offence of cheating, it is not merely sufficient to prove that a false representation had been made, but, it is further necessary to prove that the representation was false to the knowledge of the accused and was made in order to deceive the complainant.” 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dalip Kaur & Ors. Vs. Jagnar Singh & Anr. reported in (2009) 14 SCC 696 , has held as under:- “10. The High Court, therefore, should have posed a question as to whether any act of inducement on the part of the appellant has been raised by the second respondent and whether the appellant had an intention to cheat him from the very inception. If the dispute between the parties was essentially a civil dispute resulting from a breach of contract on the part of the appellants by non-refunding the amount of advance the same would not constitute an offence of cheating. Similar is the legal position in respect of an offence of criminal breach of trust having regard to its definition contained in Section 405 of the Penal Code. (See Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. [ (2003) 3 SCC 11 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 703] ) 11. Similar is the legal position in respect of an offence of criminal breach of trust having regard to its definition contained in Section 405 of the Penal Code. (See Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. [ (2003) 3 SCC 11 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 703] ) 11. There cannot furthermore be any doubt that the High Court would exercise its inherent jurisdiction only when one or the other propositions of law, as laid down in R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta [ (2009) 1 SCC 516 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 567] is attracted, which are as under: (SCC p. 523, para 15) “(1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and, in particular, a first information report unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence. (2) For the said purpose the Court, save and except in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to any document relied upon by the defence. (3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence, the court shall not go beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens rea or actus reus. (4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue.” 12. Yet again, in Hira Lal v. State of U.P. [ (2009) 11 SCC 89 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1247 : (2009) 5 Scale 418 ] this Court held: (SCC p. 92, para 12) “12. The parameters of interference with a criminal proceeding by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code are well known. One of the grounds on which such interference is permissible is that the allegations contained in the complaint petition even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, commission of an offence is not disclosed. The High Court may also interfere where the action on the part of the complainant is mala fide.” (See also Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab [ (2009) 7 SCC 712 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 620 : (2009) 7 Scale 85 ] .)” 9. The High Court may also interfere where the action on the part of the complainant is mala fide.” (See also Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab [ (2009) 7 SCC 712 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 620 : (2009) 7 Scale 85 ] .)” 9. Further, in the case of Binod Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Anr. reported in (2014) 10 SCC 663 , the question fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court as to whether the charges under Section 406 IPC and the criminal complaint for criminal breach of trust for allegedly retaining the bill amount payable to the contractor is liable to be quashed. Their Lordships quashed the criminal proceeding by observing as follows:- “18. In the present case, looking at the allegations in the complaint on the face of it, we find that no allegations are made attracting the ingredients of Section 405 IPC. Likewise, there are no allegations as to cheating or the dishonest intention of the appellants in retaining the money in order to have wrongful gain to themselves or causing wrongful loss to the complainant. Excepting the bald allegations that the appellants did not make payment to the second respondent and that the appellants utilised the amounts either by themselves or for some other work, there is no iota of allegation as to the dishonest intention in misappropriating the property. To make out a case of criminal breach of trust, it is not sufficient to show that money has been retained by the appellants. It must also be shown that the appellants dishonestly disposed of the same in some way or dishonestly retained the same. The mere fact that the appellants did not pay the money to the complainant does not amount to criminal breach of trust. 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Devendra & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr. reported in (2009) 7 SCC 495 , has held as under:- “24. There is no dispute with regard to the aforementioned propositions of law. However, it is now well settled that the High Court ordinarily would exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the allegations made in the first information report, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, do not make out any offence. However, it is now well settled that the High Court ordinarily would exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the allegations made in the first information report, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, do not make out any offence. When the allegations made in the first information report or the evidences collected during investigation do not satisfy the ingredients of an offence, the superior courts would not encourage harassment of a person in a criminal court for nothing.” 11. In the present case, the complainant has in fact alleged against the petitioner that the work done by the petitioner was not up to the mark, however, that by itself is not sufficient ground for alleging an offence under Section 420 IPC. In order to attract an offence under Section 420 IPC, it is required to be alleged that the accused had an intention to cheat from the very inception. The contents of the written report of the O.P.No.2, however, do not attract the offences as registered by the police. Thus, I find substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the O.P.No.2 has improved his case in the counter affidavit so as to attract the criminal culpability on the part of the petitioner. Prima facie, the dispute raised by the O.P.No.2 appears to be civil in nature, which is required to be adjudicated in an appropriate civil proceeding. The petitioner is claiming that the work has been completed within the stipulated period in terms with the agreement, however, some amount is still due to be paid by the Nagar Parishad with regard to execution of the said work. On the contrary, it is alleged by the O.P.No.2 that the work done by the petitioner is not up to the mark. Thus, both the parties have their own case to contend, which is required to be adjudicated in an appropriate civil proceeding so as to fix the civil liability of the respective parties. 12. There is no iota of material indicating that the intention of the petitioner was fraudulent at the time of execution of the agreement, rather the specific case of the petitioner is that the work was awarded to it after having found it as the lowest tenderer. 12. There is no iota of material indicating that the intention of the petitioner was fraudulent at the time of execution of the agreement, rather the specific case of the petitioner is that the work was awarded to it after having found it as the lowest tenderer. It is true that at the stage of lodging of an F.I.R, the adequacy of evidence is not required to be seen by the Court, but there has to be at least some cogent material for implicating in a criminal case. To take a contrary view would only lead to harassment of a person by unnecessarily forcing him/her to face the rigours of criminal trial. 13. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the present petition is allowed. The entire criminal proceeding initiated against the petitioner in connection with Lohardaga P.S. Case No. 161/2011 (G.R. Case No. 546 of 2011) is hereby quashed.