JUDGMENT : (Prayer in C.M.P.No.18780 of 2017 : Civil Miscellaneous Petition is filed to condone the delay of 3047 days in filing the Second Appeal in S.A.S.R.No.73847 of 2017. Prayer in C.M.P.No.20306 of 2017:Civil Miscellaneous Petition is filed to bring the second respondent on record as the legal representative of the first respondent in C.M.P.No.20306 of 2017 in S.A.S.R.No.73852 of 2017.) The applications are filed for condoning the delay of 3047 days in filing the respective Second Appeals. The defendant is the appellant before this Court. Since the issue involved in both the appeals are similar a common order is being pronounced. The brief facts necessary to dispose of this application briefly alluding to the merits of the case are as follows: 2. The respondent in SA.SR.No.73847 of 2017 had filed O.S.No.1490 of 2003 and the respondent in SA.SR.73852 of 2017 had filed O.S.No.1488 of 2003 before the I Additional District Munsif, Coimbatore, for the following relief: “Declaring that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit property and passing a decree of consequential injunction restraining the defendant from any way disturbing the plaintiff's peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property.” 3. The suit after contest was decreed on 26.06.2007 and both the decrees were challenged by the appellants herein by filing A.S.No.114 of 2007 and 113 of 2007 which are the subject matter of SA.SR.No.73847 and 73852 of 2017 respectively. The appeals were filed before the III Additional Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, who by Judgment and Decree dated 23.01.2009 was pleased to dismiss the appeals. 4. The appellant has challenged both the Judgments and Decree by filing the above SA.SR's . Considering the fact that the delay of over 3047 days had crept in, the appellants have filed C.M.P.No.18780 in SA.SR.No.73847 of 2017 and C.M.P.No.20306 of 2017 in SA.SR.No.73852 of 2017 respectively. The reasons adduced for the delay in both the affidavits are the same. The appellant corporation would contend that in the year 2008, in accordance with the Government order, the Corporation's Jurisdiction was realigned and the suit property which originally fell within the Jurisdiction of the North Zone was brought within the Jurisdiction of the Central Zone and in the course of the transfer the entire file got misplaced. The appellant corporation would contend that in the year 2008, in accordance with the Government order, the Corporation's Jurisdiction was realigned and the suit property which originally fell within the Jurisdiction of the North Zone was brought within the Jurisdiction of the Central Zone and in the course of the transfer the entire file got misplaced. In addition to the above, between the years 2009 to 2010 there was no suit clerk and there was none to take care of the legal files as well as taking care of the public spaces. 5. It was only on 11.08.2016, when the appellant had received the representation from both the respondents seeking the issue of a No Objection for name transfer of the suit property and to remove the name board of the corporation from the suit property in alignment with the Judgment and Decree of the Courts below that the appellant corporation came to know about the dismissal order; that the delay was neither wilful nor wanton but for the reasons stated above. 6. The counter affidavit has been filed in C.M.P.No.18780 of 2017 wherein the respondent would contend that the reasons given in the affidavit for condoning the delay of 8 years 4 months 7 days lacks bonafides and sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. The respondent would contend that the appellant had engaged a counsel and therefore papers could have been obtained from him since he had appeared for them both in the suit as well as in the appeal and therefore there was no question of the appellant Corporation not being able to obtain copies of the papers. 7. The respondent would contend that the reasons narrated in the affidavit is nothing but a concocted story and there is no explanation from the year 2010 as to what steps were taken by the appellant to prosecute the case to file an appeal. The respondent has referred to various Judgments of the Court relating to the delay of the state in the counter. 8. They have also quoted Judgments where the Courts had laid down guidelines as regards the condonation of delay in cases involving the state and its instrumentalities who are applicants seeking condonation of delay. 9. Heard Mr. K. Magesh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant corporation. 8. They have also quoted Judgments where the Courts had laid down guidelines as regards the condonation of delay in cases involving the state and its instrumentalities who are applicants seeking condonation of delay. 9. Heard Mr. K. Magesh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant corporation. The learned counsel would contend that the appellant has Substantial Questions of Law to be urged in the Second Appeal, since the property involved had been reserved for public purpose and which the respondents were seeking to take over and convert. He would contend that the respondents in both the CMP's who were original owners had formed layouts in which the suit properties have been allocated for public purpose and it is this site which the appellants are claiming a right to. 10. It is his argument that once the lands have been reserved for public purpose it vests with the government and the land owners cannot raise a claim with reference to the same. He would further submit that the delay in filing the appeal had occured only on account of the realignment of the various Zones and the lack and paucity of staff in the corporation. He would further contend that since the issue involves a public purpose the Court should adopt a more liberal view and condone the delay. In support of his argument with reference to the sale/conversion of reserved sites the learned counsel has relied upon the following Judgments: (i) Ammani Vs. The Tiruchengode Municipality, rep. By its Commissioner, Tiruchengode reported in 2004 3 CTC 251 . (ii) Sri Devi Nagar Residences Welfare Association, by its President, Coimbatore Vs. Subbatha and others reported in (2007) 3 MLJ 1990. (iii) T.Gnanamani Ammal Vs. The Avaniappuram Town Panchayat, rep. By its Executive Officer Avanipuram, Madurai reported in 2007 (4) CTC 67. (iv) Kirubakaran and others Vs. The Commissioner (East), Corporation of Coimbatore, Coimbatore reported in 2013 (6) CTC 441 . 11. The learned counsel has also relied upon the following Judgments in support of his contentions that the Court should adopt a liberal view while condoning the delay: (i) N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 . (ii) State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok Ao and others reported in (2005) 3 SCC 752 . (iii) State of Karnataka Vs. Y.Moideen Kunhi (Dead) by Lrs. And others reported in 2009 13 SCC 192 . M. Krishnamurthy reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 . (ii) State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok Ao and others reported in (2005) 3 SCC 752 . (iii) State of Karnataka Vs. Y.Moideen Kunhi (Dead) by Lrs. And others reported in 2009 13 SCC 192 . (iv) Imrat Lal and others Vs. Land Acquisition Collector and others reported in (2014) 14 SCC 133 (v) Executive Officer, Antiyur Town Panchayat Vs. G.Arumugam (Dead) By Legal Representatives reported in (2015) 3 SCC 569 and (vi) The Revenue Divisional Officer Vs. M.S.A. Ibrahim (Died) and others reported in 2011 (3) CTC 337. 12. Per contra, Mr. V. Lakshmi Narayanan, appearing on behalf of Mr. J. Karthikeyan for the respondent would contend that the appellant has not given any reasons what so ever for condoning the delay and the reasons that has been given are very sketchy and does not constitute “Sufficient Cause”. He would contend that the condonation of delay is no different in the case of the State that the necessity for providing sufficient cause to condone the delay pales into oblivion where in the case of the application being moved by the State or its instrumentalities they do not have to provide sufficient reasons for condoning the delay. The State and its instrumentalities also fall within the same frame as a private litigants and an absence of providing sufficient cause for the delay, the Courts should not condone the delay. He would submit that not only has the delay not been explained properly it is also an inordinate delay spread over a period of 8 years 4 months and 7 days. In support of his contentions that the application should be dismissed for want of sufficient cause and on the ground of inordinate delay involving the state he has relied upon the following Judgments: (i) Pundlik Jalam Patil (Dead) By Lrs. Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and another reported in 2008 17 SCC 448 . (ii) Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan reported in 2012 5 SCC 157 and (iii) H.Dohil Constructions Company Private Limited Vs. Nahar Exports Limited and another reported in (2015) 1 SCC 680 . Discussion: 13. Having heard the submissions of the counsels this Court is passing the following order. (ii) Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan reported in 2012 5 SCC 157 and (iii) H.Dohil Constructions Company Private Limited Vs. Nahar Exports Limited and another reported in (2015) 1 SCC 680 . Discussion: 13. Having heard the submissions of the counsels this Court is passing the following order. The reason for the delay that has been put forward by the appellant corporation are as follows: (a) In the year 2008 there was a realignment of the Zones and in the course of the above transfer bundles have been misplaced. (b) 2009 – 2010 there was no suit clerk to take care of the legal cases as well as the maintenance of reserved sites. 14. A Close scrutiny of the pleadings would indicate that the Judgments in the first appeal has been pronounced a year after the realignment of the Zones; that is, in the year 2009. That apart, the affidavit is totally silent about the reasons for the delay from the period 2010 till the date of filing of the appeal. Further, as rightly pointed out by the counsel for the respondent it is the very same counsel who had appeared on behalf of the appellant both before the learned I Additional District Munsif, Coimbatore in the suit as well as the III Additional Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore in the first appeal. Given the above facts it can be presumed that the counsel would have intimated the dismissal of the appeal in time to the appellant Corporation. When the Judgments was pronounced in the appeal the Zones had already been realigned and therefore it would have definitely reached the table of the concerned clerk. Even if there is no suit clerk till 2010 thereafter some one must have been appointed and the affidavit is silent about what had transpired thereafter. 15. However, the counsel for the appellant would submit that on the merits of the case he has Substantial Questions of Law since the suit properties, when the layout was formed, had been reserved for public purpose and the respondent/plaintiff are seeking to declare themselves as absolute owners of this property which has been earmarked for public purpose. The appeal involved public interest and should therefore be condoned. 16. The appeal involved public interest and should therefore be condoned. 16. Considering the fact that the public purpose is involved it is necessary for this Court to briefly touch upon the facts of the case and the Judgment and Decree in challenge while dealing with these applications to condone the delay. 17. The two land owners who are the plaintiffs in O.S.No.1488 of 2004 and O.S.No.1490 of 2003 had developed their lands into house sites, the plan was approved in 1971 by the Deputy Director of Town Planning, Coimbatore and conversion was effected in the year 1972. The land owners had executed an agreement in favour of the appellant Corporation agreeing to execute gift deeds in respect of the lands which have been reserved for laying out roads on 12.08.1971. Thereafter the order granting permission for the formation of the layout was issued by the Deputy Director of Town Planning, Coimbatore and Nilgris. As per terms of the order the roads had to be gifted by the owners to the Municipality and the approved layout plan had indicated certain areas had been reserved for public purpose. 18. However there was no condition that was imposed to transfer the same to the municipality. The plaintiffs who are the respondents herein would contend that on 17.08.1987 there was a Government Order which permitted the conversion of areas that were earmarked for public purpose into house sites however no permission was granted to convert sites which had been earmarked as children's play ground/ park. 19. The respondent/plaintiff in O.S.No.1490 of 2007 would contend that he had leased out one portion of the land to the Lions Club of Coimbatore Sidhapudur Charitable Trust, Coimbatore and one portion which were described as Item No.2 was sold to one Yasodha and in the other portion the plaintiff was residing and the remaining portion according to him was already sold to one R.Krishnasamy Naidu and one Pappayee. The plaintiff in O.S.No.1488 of 2003 had retained the reserved space without making any conversions. It was when the purchaser had attempted to put up construction that the appellant/defendant had obstructed the same constraining the plaintiff to approach this Court. 20. The plaintiff in O.S.No.1488 of 2003 had retained the reserved space without making any conversions. It was when the purchaser had attempted to put up construction that the appellant/defendant had obstructed the same constraining the plaintiff to approach this Court. 20. It is seen that the defendant corporation had filed a written statement in which they had submitted that the house sites had been purchased by various persons by contributing for the open space and further the circular dated 17.08.1987 has been totally misconstrued by the plaintiff/respondent since there is a mandatory requirement of 10% of the total approved layout being reserved for public purpose like Parks, play grounds, children's area etc., The circular had stated that areas which have been reserved for parks, play grounds, Children's area etc., should be handed over to the municipality whereas the other areas reserved for the public purpose could be given to the owners. The land owners should retain the same only for the public purpose and not put it for any other use. The circular also stated that where the land area is over 10 acres then 50% should be allotted for play grounds, parks etc., and 50% for other open areas. 21. The trial Court appears to have relied upon the circular dated 24.05.1985 to come to the conclusion that it was only the areas which are reserved for play grounds that had to be handed over and other areas were not required to handed over to the land owners. 22. The learned Judge has also taken note of the fact that the municipality had permitted the construction to be put up by P.W.4 who was the purchaser from the plaintiff in O.S.No.1490 of 2007 and the learned Judge had also quoted Section 38 of the Act which provided that if there is no publication in respect of the reserved land or the land not having been acquired within three years from the date of the notice in the Gazette it is deemed to be released from reservation. With this view the suit has been decreed and the Appellate Court has also followed the suit. 23. The entire question of law therefore revolves around whether the areas that had been reserved for public purpose could be put to any other use other than that for public purpose by the plaintiffs and whether the same could be sold to third parties. 23. The entire question of law therefore revolves around whether the areas that had been reserved for public purpose could be put to any other use other than that for public purpose by the plaintiffs and whether the same could be sold to third parties. Therefore there exists a Question of law to be canvassed in the Second Appeal. Further, that it is a Substantial Question of law is evident from the Judgments quoted here in below. 24. In the Judgment in Ammani Vs. The Tiruchengode Municipality, rep by its Commissioner, Tiruchengode Municipality, Tiruchengode Town, Namakkal District reported in 2004 (3) CTC 251 this Court has held that once a site is reserved for public purpose the owner seizes to be the legal owner of the site. The learned Judge has relied upon the Judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in Pt.Chet Ram Vashist (dead) by Lrs Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi reported in AIR 1995 SC 430 and the Judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in Bangalore Medical Trust Vs. B.S.Muddappa reported AIR 1991 SC 1902 . Besides relying upon the Judgment, the Learned Judges had observed that once the land is reserved for public purpose the owners cease to be the owner and holds the land for the benefit of the society as a trustee and he had to execute the gift deed to discharge the function. This Judgment has been followed in the Judgment in T.Gnanamani Ammal Vs. The Avaniappuram Town Panchayat, represented by its Executive Officer, Avaniapuram, Madurai reported in 2007 (4) CTC 67. 25. The Division Bench of this Court in a Judgment in Sri Devi Nagar Resident's Welfare Association, a registered Society, Coimbatore Vs. Subbathal and other reported in (2007) 3 MLJ 990 following the Judgment in Pt.Chet Ram Vashist (dead) by Lrs Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi reported in AIR 1995 SC 430 has held that the open space in a residential area is considered as lung space of the area and once the same has been reserved for public purpose it cannot be put to any other use and cannot be transferred for any other purpose. 26. The Division Bench relying upon the various Judgments both of the Supreme Court and this Court had held that the power to release the land, even to the government, would be available only till such time as the layout is approved. 26. The Division Bench relying upon the various Judgments both of the Supreme Court and this Court had held that the power to release the land, even to the government, would be available only till such time as the layout is approved. Once the layout is approved and the area is reserved for public use thereafter, the same cannot be released for any other purpose. The Division Bench infact disagrees with the argument that without the land being acquired, it should be deemed that the land had been released. 27. The Division Bench went on to hold that since there was no gift deed in favour of the Municipal Corporation, the Municipal corporation would only be a custodian of the open space and was bound to maintain the open space for the purpose it was earmarked. Similar was the view taken in the Judgment in V.N.R.Nagar Welfare Association, a registered Society represented by its President S.Joseph Anthonyraj, Coimbatore Vs. K.K.Babu and another reported in 2013 (5) MLJ 503 and another Judgment in Kirubakaran and others Vs. The Commissioner (East), Corporation of Coimbatore, Coimbatore reported in 2013 (6) CTC 441 . The Division bench of this Court relied on the Judgment in Bangalore Medical Trust Vs. B.S.Muddappa reported in (1991) 4 SCC 54 and has observed that though public purpose has not been defined the definition given in the Land Acquisition Act may be relied upon which reads as follows: “3(f)(vi)the provisions of land for carrying out any educational, housing, health or slum clearance scheme sponsored by Government or by any authority established by Government for carrying out any such scheme, or, with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a Local Authority, or a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (XXXI of 1860), or under any correspondent law for the time being in force in a state, or a cooperative Society within the meaning of any law relating to Cooperative Societies for the time being in force in any State; (vii) the provision of land for any other scheme of development sponsored by Government, or, with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a local authority; (viii )the provision of any premises or building for locating a public office.” and the Bench had gone on to observe that the Corporation was a custodian of the land reserved for public purpose. In the instant case though under the approved layout, the lands have been reserved for public purpose, from the photos it appears that portion of the same has been converted into house sites and only a small portion remains vacant. 28. Therefore, there is Substantial Question of Law available to the Corporation to urge in this Second Appeal. Having come to the conclusion that there is a Substantial Question of Law to be urged in the Second Appeal this Court has to now consider whether the enormous delay of 3,047 days should be condoned and whether the appellant has come forward with a sufficient cause for the condonation. The Judgment which was relied upon by the respondent is Pundlik Jalam Patil (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Executive Engineer Jalgaon Medium Project and another reported in (2008) 17 SCC 448 where the Honourable Supreme Court has held that the public authority had taken to falsehood in order to get over the bar of limitation the Court cannot encourage such falsehood by condoning the delay. 29. The counsel would also rely upon the Judgment in Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai reported in (2012) 5 SCC 157 where the Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai was the applicant seeking condonation of delay. The reasons for the delay that was given according to the Honourable Supreme court was non specific and appeared to be concocted and in the absence of an explanation, the Honourable Supreme Court was of the view that the same was held unspecified therefore the condonation of delay was erroneous. 30. The last of the Judgments which has been cited by the respondent is the one in H.Dohil Constructions company Private Limited Vs. Nahar Exports Limited andanother reported in (2015) 1 SCC 680 which was again the case where the delay of 1727 days had not been explained with sufficient cause and was therefore not condoned. 31. The appellants on their part have relied upon the Judgment in N.Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 where the Honourable Supreme Court has held that the Court should generally be liberal in condoning the delay and should be vigilant in coming down heavily in cases where there is a deliberate delay and delay is a form of dilatory tactics. The Judgment in State of Nagaland Vs. M. Krishnamurthy reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 where the Honourable Supreme Court has held that the Court should generally be liberal in condoning the delay and should be vigilant in coming down heavily in cases where there is a deliberate delay and delay is a form of dilatory tactics. The Judgment in State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok Ao and others reported in (2005) 3 SCC 752 has also been referred to where the Honourable Supreme Court has stated if sufficient cause has been shown the length of the delay does not matter as the Court should be concerned in rendering substantial Justice. The Honourable Supreme Court has considered the interpretation of sufficient Cause and has also held that the law of limitation is the same for private citizen as for the Government Authorities. However, the Honourable Supreme Court had held that a different complexion is imparted to a case where public interest is shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of their officers. 32. The Bench has also held that certain amount of latitute in the case of matters where the Government is the litigant should be adopted. As already submitted in the instant case it is seen that property which has been reserved for public purpose has admittedly been put to some other use which gives raise to the Substantial Question of Law. However the delay on the part of the appellant Corporation should be borne in mind as also its reasons. 33. It is seen that after the decree in the year 2009 the first attempt that has been made by the respondent/plaintiff was in the year 2016 and as soon as the letter for issue of a No objection had been given the appellant corporation has woken up to the fact that they have not challenged the Judgment and Decree in the respective first appeals and without any further delay the application has been moved. However this Court is also conscious of the fact that the respondents who have obtained a decree in their favour should be compensated. However this Court is also conscious of the fact that the respondents who have obtained a decree in their favour should be compensated. Considering the fact that an inordinate delay has occurred on account of the lapse on the side of the appellant but however considering the fact that a Substantial Question of law involving public interest arises this Court is of the View that each of the Civil Miscellaneous Petition for condonation of delay may be ordered on condition that the appellant corporation pays a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- each to the respective respondents in the two suits within a period of 3 weeks from date. The Civil Miscellaneous Petitions are ordered on the above lines.