ORDER : Ved Prakash Vaish, J. 1. Heard Sri A. K. Jauhari, learned counsel for the appellants. 2. This is an appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'C.P.C.') filed by the appellants (plaintiffs in the original suit) against the impugned judgment and decree date 25th January, 2005 passed by the learned Special / Additional District Judge, Rae Bareli in Civil Appeal No. 187/2001 whereby the appeal filed by the appellants against the judgment and decree dated 3rd November, 2001 passed by learned IIIrd Additional Civil Judge (JD), Rae Bareli was dismissed. 3. Succinctly stating the facts of the case are that Sri Ram Chandra (predecessor of the the appellants) filed a suit for permanent injunction bearing original suit No. 238/85 restraining the respondent/defendant from interfering in the peaceful possession of the appellants in land bearing No. 3406(consolidation No. 3514) situated at Village Salon, District Rae Bareily. The plaintiff alleged that an agreement to sell was executed by Smt. Hasan Bandhi daughter of Sri Rahim Khan on 17.02.1968 in his favour, pursuant to said agreement to sell, the possession in respect of 1/6 share of the land bearing No. 3406, consolidation (chakbandi) No. 3514, situated at Village Salon, District Raebareli was given to him and son of plaintiff constructed house on the same; the defendant, Budhai executed sale deed in favour of the plaintiff on 15.10.1968 and handed over possession to him; the defendant started interfering in the possession of the plaintiff. Hence, the suit was filed. 4. The respondent/defendant contested the suit by filing written statement; the defendant denied the allegations made in the plaint and stated that plaintiffs were not in possession of the disputed land; the defendant was in possession of the disputed land No. 3514. The alleged partition was also denied. 5. In para 17 of the additional pleas in the written statement, the defendant also stated that he had not executed the sale deed dated 15.10.1968. 6. During pendency of the suit, the plaintiff, namely, Ram Chandra died and on an application under Order 22 Rule 3 C.P.C. his legal representatives, who are appellants, were substituted. 7. 5. In para 17 of the additional pleas in the written statement, the defendant also stated that he had not executed the sale deed dated 15.10.1968. 6. During pendency of the suit, the plaintiff, namely, Ram Chandra died and on an application under Order 22 Rule 3 C.P.C. his legal representatives, who are appellants, were substituted. 7. On the pleadings of the parties following issues were framed by learned trial court on 16.04.1991:- 1- D;k oknh Áfroknh ds Hkwfe la[;k 3406] ftldk cUnkscLr pdcUnh uEcj 3514 gS] ds 1@6 Hkkx ij tfj;s csukek ekfyd o dkfct gS\ 2- oknh fdl vuqrks"k dk vf/kdkjh gS\ 8. In order to prove their case, the appellants examined Sri Inderpal as PW-1, Sri Ramjan as PW-2, Smt. Asimunisha as PW-3, Sri Jagatpal as PW-4 and Sri S. P. Gupta, hand writing expert as PW-5. The respondent/defendant examined himself as DW-1, Sri Ganga Ram as DW-2, Sri Hari Prakash Khare, hand writing expert as DW-3. The commission report and the site plan have also been proved. 9. After considering the pleadings of the parties and evidence adduced by the parties, the suit was dismissed by learned IIIrd Additional Civil Judge (JD) Rae Bareli, vide judgment and decree dated 3rd November, 2001. 10. Against the said judgment and decree, the appellants filed an appeal bearing Civil Appeal No. 187 of 2001. The said appeal was dismissed vide impugned judgment and decree dated 25th January, 2005 passed by learned Special/Additional District Judge, Raebareli. 11. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the appellants/plaintiffs have preferred the present appeal. 12. Learned counsel for the appellants urges that the father of the appellants, namely Sri Ram Chandra had purchased the disputed land from the defendant vide sale deed dated 15.10.1968, the defendant had handed over possession of the disputed land to him. He also submits that the plaintiffs had proved the sale deed by examining hand writing expert Sri S. P. Gupta who had appeared as PW-5. He also submits that the signatures of the executant can be varied by efflux of time; it was not necessary to prove the sale deed by examining the attesting witnesses. According to learned counsel for the appellants, the appellants had their possession, the appellants were entitled to the relief of injunction. 13. He also submits that the signatures of the executant can be varied by efflux of time; it was not necessary to prove the sale deed by examining the attesting witnesses. According to learned counsel for the appellants, the appellants had their possession, the appellants were entitled to the relief of injunction. 13. I have carefully considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellants and also gone through the material on record. 14. The law regarding right, title and interest over the agriculture land is contained in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act') which is a complete Code in itself. Section 331 of the said Act reads as under:- "331. Cognizance of suits, etc. under this Act. -(1) Except as provided by or under this Act no court other than a court mentioned in Column 4 of Schedule II shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908), take cognizance of any suit, application, or proceedings mentioned in Column 3 thereof [,] [or of a suit, application or proceedings based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application :] [Provided that where a declaration has been made under Section 143 in respect or any holding or part thereof, the provisions of Schedule II insofar as they relate to suits, applications or proceedings under Chapter VIII shall not apply to such holding or part thereof.] [Explanation. -If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil court may not be identical to that which the revenue court would have granted.] [(1-A) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (i), an objection, that a court mentioned in Column 4 of Schedule II, or, as the case may be, a civil court, which had no jurisdiction with respect to the suit, application or, proceeding, exercised jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be entertained by any appellate or revisional court unless the objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.] (2) Except as hereinafter provided no appeal shall lie from an order or [decree] passed under any of the proceedings mentioned in Column 3 of the Schedule aforesaid: [(3) An appeal shall lie from any decree or from an order passed under Section 47 or an order of the nature mentioned in Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) or in Order 43, Rule 1 of the First Schedule to that Code passed by a court mentioned in Column No. 4 of Schedule II to this Act in proceedings mentioned in Column 3 thereof to the court or authority mentioned in Column No. 5 thereof. (4) A second appeal shall lie on any of the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) from the final order or decree, passed in an appeal under sub-section (3), to the authority, if any, mentioned against it in Column 6 of the Schedule aforesaid.]" 15. From a bare perusal of Section 331 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, it is clear that the section specifically ousts the jurisdiction of civil courts in respect of suits, applications etc. enumerated in Scheduled II of the said Act. 16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Shri Ram and Another vs. Ist Appellate District Judge and Others', (2001) 3 SCC 24 considered the scope of Section 331 and Scheduled II of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act observed as under:- "7. enumerated in Scheduled II of the said Act. 16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Shri Ram and Another vs. Ist Appellate District Judge and Others', (2001) 3 SCC 24 considered the scope of Section 331 and Scheduled II of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act observed as under:- "7. On analysis of the decisions cited above, we are of the opinion that where a recorded tenure holder having a prima facie title and in possession files suit in the civil court for cancellation of sale deed having obtained on the ground of fraud or impersonation cannot be directed to file a suit for declaration in the revenue court reason being that in such a case, prima facie, the title of the recorded tenure holder is not under cloud. He does not require declaration of his title to the land. The position would be different where a person not being a recorded tenure holder seeks cancellation of sale deed by filing a suit in the civil court on the ground of fraud or impersonation. There necessarily the plaintiff is required to seek a declaration of his title and, therefore, he may be directed to approach the revenue court, as the sale deed being void has to be ignored for giving him relief for declaration and possession." 17. In another case 'Kamla Prasad and others vs. Krishna Kant Pathak and Others', (2007) 4 SCC 213 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:- "14. In this connection, the learned counsel for the appellant rightly relied upon a decision of this Court in Shri Ram & Anr. v. Ist Addl. Distt. Judge & Ors., (2001) 3 SCC 24 . In Shri Ram, A, the original owner of the land sold it to B by a registered sale deed and also delivered possession and the name of the purchaser was entered into Revenue Records after mutation. According to the plaintiff, sale deed was forged and was liable to be cancelled. In the light of the above fact, this Court held that it was only a Civil Court which could entertain, try and decide such suit. According to the plaintiff, sale deed was forged and was liable to be cancelled. In the light of the above fact, this Court held that it was only a Civil Court which could entertain, try and decide such suit. The Court, after considering relevant case law on the point, held that where a recorded tenure holder having a title and in possession of property files a suit in Civil Court for cancellation of sale deed obtained by fraud or impersonation could not be directed to institute such suit for declaration in Revenue Court, the reason being that in such a case, prima facie, the title of the recorded tenure holder is not under cloud. He does not require declaration of his title to the land. 15. The Court, however, proceeded to observe: "The position would be different where a person not being a recorded tenure holder seeks cancellation of sale deed by filing a suit in the civil court on the ground of fraud or impersonation. There necessarily the plaintiff is required to seek a declaration of his title and, therefore, he may be directed to approach the revenue court, as the sale deed being void has to be ignored for giving him relief for declaration and possession." 16. The instant case is covered by the above observations. The lower Appellate Court has expressly stated that the name of the plaintiff had been deleted from Record of Rights and the names of purchasers had been entered. The said fact had been brought on record by the contesting defendants and it was stated that the plaintiff himself appeared as a witness before the Mutation Court, admitted execution of the sale deed, receipt of sale consideration and the factum of putting vendees into possession of the property purchased by them. It was also stated that the records revealed that the names of contesting defendants had been mutated into Record of Rights and the name of plaintiff was deleted. 17. In the light of the above facts, in our opinion, the Courts below were wholly right in reaching the conclusion that such a suit could be entertained only by a Revenue Court and Civil Court had no jurisdiction. The High Court by reversing those orders had committed an error of law and of jurisdiction which deserves interference by this Court. 18. The High Court by reversing those orders had committed an error of law and of jurisdiction which deserves interference by this Court. 18. In the instant case, learned Additional District Judge has observed that the disputed land is entered in the name of the defendant/respondent in the revenue records and therefore, rightly observed that the suit is barred by Section 331 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. 19. Moreover, the suit is barred by sub Section (5) of Section 34 of The Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1901. 20. It is settled principle of law that this Court will not sit as if it is considering the regular first appeal so as to examine the entire matter on facts and law both. The scope of second appeal under Section 100 of C.P.C. is very limited and this Court shall enter upon only when there is substantial question of law and not otherwise. 21. What is 'Substantial Question of Law' is no more res integra in view of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of 'Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari', (2001) 3 S.C.C. 179 . In the said case it was held as under :- "The phrase 'substantial question of law', as occurring in the amended Section 100 is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying 'question of law', means -of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction to -technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of 'substantial question of law' by suffixing the words 'of general importance' as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance". 22. The same has been followed in the case of 'Thiagarajan and others vs. Venugopalswamy B. Koli and others', AIR 2004 S.C. 1913 , and in the case of 'Govindaraju vs. Mariamman' (2005) 2 S.C.C. 500 . 23. 22. The same has been followed in the case of 'Thiagarajan and others vs. Venugopalswamy B. Koli and others', AIR 2004 S.C. 1913 , and in the case of 'Govindaraju vs. Mariamman' (2005) 2 S.C.C. 500 . 23. A similar view was taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in another case titled as 'Vijay Kumar Talwar vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi', (2011) 1 S.C.C. 673 and 'Union of India vs. Ibrahim Uddin and another', (2012) 8 S.C.C. 148 and 'State of U.P. vs. Shanti Devi and another', 2013 (120) RD 494 . 24. The Supreme Court in the case of 'State Bank of India and others vs. S.N. Goyal', AIR 2008 SC 2594 has laid down the law with respect to 'Substantial Questions of Law'. The relevant para of the judgment of the Supreme Court reads as under:- "9.(1) Second appeals would lie in cases which involve substantial questions of law. The word 'substantial' prefixed to 'question of law' does not refer to the stakes involved in the case, nor intended to refer only to questions of law of general importance, but refers to impact or effect of the question of law on the decision in the lies between the parties. 'Substantial questions of law' means not only substantial questions of law of general importance, but also substantial question of law arising in a case as between the parties. In the context of section 100 CPC, any question of law which affects the final decision in a case is a substantial question of law as between the parties. A question of law which arises incidentally or collaterally, having no bearing in the final outcome, will not be a substantial question of law. Where there is a clear and settled enunciation on a question of law, by this Court or by the High Court concerned, it cannot be said that the case involves a substantial question of law. It is said that a substantial question of law arises when a question of law, which is not finally settled by this court (or by the concerned High Court so far as the State is concerned), arises for consideration in the case. But this statement has to be understood in the correct perspective. It is said that a substantial question of law arises when a question of law, which is not finally settled by this court (or by the concerned High Court so far as the State is concerned), arises for consideration in the case. But this statement has to be understood in the correct perspective. Where there is a clear enunciation of law and the lower court has followed or rightly applied such clear enunciation of law, obviously the case will not be considered as giving rise to a substantial question of law, even if the question of law may be one of general importance...." 25. The appellants have failed to show any perversity or infirmity in the findings recorded by both the courts below. No question of law much less substantial question of law has arisen before this Court. Since, no substantial question of law is shown to have arisen, the appeal deserves to be dismissed at this stage itself. 26. In view of the above, the present appeal is liable to be dismissed and the same is hereby dismissed at this stage itself. 27. Lower court record be sent back forthwith.