JUDGMENT : Sangeeta Chandra, J. 1. The case was called out in the pre-lunch Session. It has been listed peremptorily. Mr. Akhilesh Kumar Srivastava was present as counsel for the petitioner. However, there was a request on behalf of Mr. Bagish Kumar Shukla that the matter be taken up in the revised call. It has been taken up in the revised call. Mr. Bagish Kumar Shukla has appeared and has prayed for adjournment. This Court does not find any good ground to adjourn the matter as the counsel for the petitioner has been heard and the matter has been listed peremptorily. 2. It has been submitted by Shri Akhilesh Kumar Srivastava that the opposite party No. 2 was engaged as a driver in the Corporation and due to rash and negligent driving the bus met with an accident on 14.8.1997. Under the Service Rules applicable, he was put under suspension by an order of the competent authority on 18.8.1997 and a charge-sheet was issued to him to which he submitted his reply. After regular disciplinary proceedings the allegations were found proved and the Inquiry Officer submitted his report. A copy of the inquiry report was served upon the opposite party No. 2 to which he submitted his reply. A show-cause notice was also issued to him as to why payment of his dues for suspension period may not be forfeited. The opposite party No. 2 replied to the same, but his explanation was not found satisfactory and he was reinstated but for the period he remained under suspension, he was not granted full pay under the principle of "no work no pay". 3. Instead of challenging the order passed by the competent authority in appeal, the opposite party No. 2 filed an application under the Payment of Minimum Wages Act saying that wrongful deduction of salary had been made for the period starting w.e.f. 18.8.1997 to 25.9.1997. A notice was issued to the petitioner, but the same was never received by the petitioner Corporation. The opposite party No. 1 proceeded on the basis of the presumption of service and by an ex parte order allowed the application on 15.7.2004. When the order dated 15.7.2004 was communicated to the petitioner, it filed an application for recall through its counsel Shri Arvind Bihari Srivastava. The opposite party No. 1 proceeded on the basis of the presumption of service and by an ex parte order allowed the application on 15.7.2004. When the order dated 15.7.2004 was communicated to the petitioner, it filed an application for recall through its counsel Shri Arvind Bihari Srivastava. Some mistake was there in the application and an amendment application was moved, which was allowed on the cost of Rs. 100/- being deposited. The cost was not deposited, nor the amendment was carried out in the application. 4. The opposite party No. 1 by an order dated 31.10.2006 rejected the application for recall. The order dated 31.10.2006 was also not communicated by the counsel for the Corporation. Only when the new counsel inspected the file, it transpired that the recall application has been rejected. Another application for recall of the order dated 31.10.2006 was moved supported by an affidavit. Notices were issued to the opposite party No. 2 who did not file any counter-affidavit contradicting the submissions made in the application for recall. However, by an order dated 12.4.2007 the application for recall was rejected. 5. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for petitioners that the services of opposite party No. 2 were governed by the Service Rules applicable to the employees of the Corporation and deduction was made in the pay of the opposite party No. 2 for the period he remained under suspension in furtherance of the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him for negligent and rash driving. It has been submitted that even if the petitioner Corporation failed to file any counter-affidavit, it was duty of the opposite party No. 1 to adjudicate the claim under Section 20 of the Payment of Wages Act as a quasi judicial authority. Since under sub-section - 2 of Section 20 of the Act a claim petition can be moved in respect of a claim as provided under clause (b) or (c) of Sub-section 1 of Section 13 or under Section 14 of the Act and the claim raised by the opposite party No. 2 did not fall within the category as mentioned either under Section 13 or Section 14, it should not have been entertained by the opposite party No. 1. The opposite party No. 1 assumed the jurisdiction where there was none. 6. This Court has carefully perused the pleadings on record. The opposite party No. 1 assumed the jurisdiction where there was none. 6. This Court has carefully perused the pleadings on record. It is apparent that the impugned order dated 16.4.2004 has been passed assuming that service of summons was made on the Corporation and they have refused to file their written statement against such claim intentionally. However, in view of the law settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in District Basic Shiksha Adhikari v. Dhananjay Kumar Shukla, 2008 (3) SCC 481 , a duty is cast upon a quasi judicial authority to first determine the admissibility of the claim. Even in the cases where no counter-affidavits are filed, it is expected that the admissibility of the relief claimed by a litigant has to be weighed on the basis of the statutory provisions. No order can be passed without referring to the statutory provisions. 7. In the case of the petitioner Corporation it has not been disputed that the order passed for deduction in salary was made in pursuance of the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the opposite party No. 2 forfeiting the remainder of the salary for the suspension period on the basis of the principle of "no work no pay". Such order should have been challenged under the Service Rules. It was not done by the opposite party No. 2. The opposite party No. 2 found out a novel method not known to law by filing an application under Section 20 (2) of the Payment of Minimum Wage Act, 1948 saying that a total sum of Rs. 29,419/- and odd had been paid to him less than what he ordinarily would have got as salary for the period starting w.e.f. 30.5.2002 to 31.7.2002. 8. In view of the fact that the order passed by the Prescribed Authority dated 16.4.2004 is completely without jurisdiction, it is set aside. Consequences to follow. 9. The writ petition stands allowed.