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2019 DIGILAW 52 (MP)

Jeetu Bhai Motwani v. Jekhram Namdeo

2019-01-14

SUJOY PAUL

body2019
ORDER 1. Parties are heard on I.A. No. 324/2017 raising preliminary objection regarding maintainability of appeal. 2. Shri Uttam Maheshwari by placing reliance on 1998 (1) MPLJ 188 (Tulsiram v. Daryaobai) contended that the appellant in the present case has called in question the impugned order whereby the interest was awarded. The appellant had deposited the principal amount before filing this appeal but did not deposit the amount of interest. Resultantly, in the teeth of principle laid down in Tulsiram (supra), the appeal is not tenable. 3. Per contra, Shri Sanjay Verma, learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the language employed in the enabling provision i.e. section 30 of the [Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923-Ed.] Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 and contended that the 3rd proviso makes it clear that amount which needs to be deposited before preparing appeal is flowing from Clause (a) which is confined to the main amount of compensation and does not include interest which is separately covered under Clause (aa). He placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of Karnataka High Court reported in 1992 IILJ 61 (M/s Kap Steel Ltd. v. Smt. R. Sasikala). Lastly, reliance is placed on Rule 16 Chapter X of High Court of Madhya Pradesh Rules, 2008 to contend that this rule also envisages deposit of amount when appeal is preferred against the order confined to Clause (a). 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 5. Before dealing with rival contentions, it is apposite to quote section 30 in its entirety. “30. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 5. Before dealing with rival contentions, it is apposite to quote section 30 in its entirety. “30. Appeals.- (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely : (a) an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum; (aa) an order awarding interest or penalty under section 4A; (b) an order refusing to allow redemption of a half-monthly payment; (c) an order providing for the distribution of compensation among the dependants of a deceased [employee], or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependant; (d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 12; or (e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or registering the same or providing for the registration of the same subject to conditions : Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal, and in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in clause (b), unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than three hundred rupees ; Provided further that no appeal shall lie in any case in which the parties have agreed to abide by the decision of the Commissioner, or in which the order of the Commissioner gives effect to an agreement come to by the parties: Provided further that no appeal by an employer under clause (a) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against. (2) The period of limitation for an appeal under this section shall be sixty days. (3) The provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963)], shall be applicable to appeals under this section.” [Emphasis Supplied] 6. The 3rd proviso makes it clear that it is confined to an appeal preferred under Clause (a). (2) The period of limitation for an appeal under this section shall be sixty days. (3) The provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963)], shall be applicable to appeals under this section.” [Emphasis Supplied] 6. The 3rd proviso makes it clear that it is confined to an appeal preferred under Clause (a). Thus, the 3rd proviso clearly shows that it does not include Clause (aa) which deals with an order awarding interest. The same is the position if rule 16 of Chapter X of the Rules of 2008 aforesaid are taken into account. 7. I find support in my view from the Division Bench judgment of Karnataka High Court in M/s Kap Steel Ltd. (supra). In the light of this Division Bench judgment and on account of the fact that in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ramkishore Mishra and others [ 2012 (III) MPWN 70 = 2012 (4) MPLJ 429 ], the 3rd proviso to section 30 was not reproduced and considered in its entirety, in my view said judgment to the extent it was held that if amount of interest has not been deposited, the appeal is not maintainable is per incuriam in nature. 8. In Subhash Chandra v. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board, 2009 (15) SCC 458 , the apex Court held as under : ‘As a general rule the only cases in which decisions should be held to have been given per incuriam are those decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the Court concerned, so that in such cases some features of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based is found on that account to be demonstrably wrong. This definition is not necessarily exhaustive, but cases not strictly within it which can properly be held to have been decided per incuriam, must in our judgment, consistently with the stare decisis rule which is an essential part of our law, be of the rarest occurrence.’ Rupert Cross and J.W. Harris, Precedent in English Law 149 (4th Edn., 1991)” 101.In an article “Final Appellate Courts Overruling Their Own ‘Wrong’ Precedents: The Ongoing Search For Principle” by B.V. Harris published in (2002) 112 LQR 408-27, it is stated: “A decision may be held to be per incuriam where relevant statutory provisions, or binding case law authority, have been overlooked or misinterpreted in arriving at the holding in the precedent …. [Emphasis Supplied] 9. Apart from this in 2015 (2) SCC 189 (Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. v. State of Orissa), it was held that prior decision of the Court on identical facts and law binds the Court on the same points of law in a later case. In exceptional circumstances, where owing to obvious inadvertence or oversight, a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running counter to the reasoning and result reached, the principle of per incuriam may apply. 10. In the light of aforesaid, I am constrained to hold that to the extent indicate above, the observation of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra), must be treated as per incuriam. 11. Considering aforesaid, I find no reason to entertain the interlocutory application. Accordingly, I.A. No. 324/2017 is disallowed.