ORDER : 1. Heard Shri Ashish Kumar, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners and Shri Satish Chaturvedi for the respondent-bank. 2. This petition has been filed by 70 persons seeking to challenge the order dated 24.5.2011 passed by the Appropriate Government namely respondent no. 1 in refusing to make a reference in conciliation case filed by the petitioners. 3. It appears that the petitioners raised a dispute alleging illegal termination of their services by the management. On failure of the conciliation report dated 24.9.2010, the respondent no. 1 had examined as to whether the dispute was to be referred for adjudication. It was found that it was not a fit case for making reference and the reason given therein is that the dispute was belated highly and after lapse of more than 9 years, such a dispute had no merits and was not maintainable. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner placing reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Ajaib Singh vs. Sirhind Cooperative Marketing Cum Processing Service Society Limited and Another, AIR 1999 SC 1351 : (1999) 6 SCC 82 : LNIND 1999 SC 366 and Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar Civil Appeal No. 8434 of 2014 as also the judgment of this Court in Indian Farmers Fertiliser Cooperative Ltd. vs. State of U.P. and Others, Writ Petition No. 38949 of 2009 decided on 15.10.2009 has submitted that the law of limitation has no application to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short ‘the Act, 1947’) and the relief sought therein cannot be denied merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay, if raised, by the employee is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing a real prejudice and not as merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be jointly questioned on the ground of delay alone. Section 10(1) of the Act, 1947 enables the Appropriate Government to make reference of an industrial dispute which exists or is apprehended "at any time" to one of the authorities mentioned in the Section. How and in what manner or through what machinery the Government was appraised of the dispute is wholly irrelevant. The requirement of Section 10(1) is that there must be some material before the Government which will enable the Appropriate Government to form an opinion that the industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. How and in what manner or through what machinery the Government was appraised of the dispute is wholly irrelevant. The requirement of Section 10(1) is that there must be some material before the Government which will enable the Appropriate Government to form an opinion that the industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. This is an administrative function of the Government and is in contradistinction to judicial or quasi judicial function. What is implicit in the said principle is that in case of delay in raising the industrial dispute, the Appropriate Government under Section 10(1) of the Act, 1947 has a power to make reference to either labour court or industrial tribunal, if it is of the opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended at any time between the workman and the employer. 5. Reference has been made to the judgment of the Apex Court in S.M. Niljkar vs. Telecom District Manager, AIR 2003 SC 3553 : (2003) 4 SCC 27 : LNIND 2003 SC 368 to submit that the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute. Placing paragraph 10' of Ajaib Singh vs. Sirhind Cooperative Marketing Cum Processing Service Society Limited and Another (supra), it was submitted that even in a case where the delay is shown to be existing, the labour court or tribunal dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant backwages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The Labour Court, thus, in an appropriate case may direct payment of part of the backwages instead of full backwages or completely deny the same. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, placing reliance on Nedungadi Bank Ltd. vs. K.P. Mahdavankutty and Others, AIR 2000 SC 839 : (2000) 2 SCC 455 : LNIND 2000 SC 184, U.P. State Road Transport Corporation vs. Babu Ram, (2006) 5 SCC 433 : LNIND 2006 SC 1216 and Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Another vs. State of West Bengal and Others, AIR 2009 SC 120 : (2008) 14 SCC 589 : LNIND 2008 SC 1919 submits that though law does not prohibit any time limit for the Appropriate Government to exercise its power under Section 10 of the Act but such a power is to be exercised reasonably in a rational manner. It cannot be exercised at any point of time so as to revive matters which had since been settled. The appropriate Government has to satisfy itself, at the time of making of reference as to whether the industrial dispute exists or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Before examining the facts of the instant case, the undisputed legal position with regard to power of the Appropriate Government to make a reference under Section 10 of the Act is relevant to be noted here. Relevant observations in paragraph 6' of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. vs. K.P. Mahdavankutty and Others (supra) reads hereunder:- "6. Law does not prescribe any time limit for the appropriate government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after lapse of about seven years of order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent." 8. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent." 8. In Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Another vs. State of West Bengal and Others (supra), the Apex Court has noted down the observations in paragraph 6' of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. vs. K.P. Mahdavankutty and Others (supra) as followed in the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation vs. Babu Ram (supra) and observations of the Apex Court in S.M. Niljkar vs. Telecom District Manager (supra) to hold that the reference made by the Appropriate Government seeking requisition of services of members of the Union who were working as contract labour on a dispute raised in the year 2001 and 2002 was highly impermissible. It was held in the facts of that case that the representations were moved in the year 1987 and the State Government issued prohibition notification in the year 1989 for employment of the contract labour. Some workers had filed writ petition before the Calcutta High Court seeking regularisation/absorption in view of the prohibition notification of the year 1989. The Calcutta High Court had allowed the writ petitions in the year 1994 directing the employer to absorb and regularise the writ petitioners in any establishment under their control, subject to their suitability and experience. The Special Leave Petitions were disposed of in the year 2000. Other similarly situated workers raised industrial dispute under Section 10(1) of the Act in the year October 2001 and 2002. The Appropriate Government had proceeded to make a reference which was challenged before the High Court. The challenge was turned down by the Division Bench and the matter had travelled to the Apex Court. Other similarly situated workers raised industrial dispute under Section 10(1) of the Act in the year October 2001 and 2002. The Appropriate Government had proceeded to make a reference which was challenged before the High Court. The challenge was turned down by the Division Bench and the matter had travelled to the Apex Court. In the aforesaid circumstances, in Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Another vs. State of West Bengal and Others (supra), it was held that the proceedings initiated pursuant to the reference made by the State Government in the year 2003 was liable to be quashed in view of the accepted position by the Union and the employees that they were contract labourers under a valid contract and after a long lapse of time it was not permissible to raise such a dispute purportedly in view of certain observations made in the Special Leave Petition filed by some other contract labours. 9. In Kuldeep Singh vs. G.M. Instrument Design Development and Facilities Centre and Another, Civil Appeal No. 10231 of 2010, the Apex Court having examined the legal position in Nedungadi Bank Ltd. vs. K.P. Mahdavankutty and Others (supra) and two judgments of the Apex Court in Haryana State Coop. Land Development Bank vs. Neelam, AIR 2005 SC 1843 : (2005) 5 SCC 91 : LNIND 2005 SC 207, Supan Kumar Pandit vs. U.P. State Electricity Board and Others, AIR 2001 SC 2562 : (2001) 6 SCC 222 : LNIND 2001 SC 1433 and S.M. Niljkar vs. Telecom District Manager (supra) has summarised the legal position in paragraph 21' as under:- "27. In view of the above, law can be summarized that there is no prescribed time limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is more so in view of the language used, namely, if any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the appropriate government "at any time" refer the dispute to a Board or Court for enquiry. The reference sought for by the workman cannot be said to be delayed or suffering from a lapse when law does not prescribe any period of limitation for raising a dispute under Section 10 of the Act. The reference sought for by the workman cannot be said to be delayed or suffering from a lapse when law does not prescribe any period of limitation for raising a dispute under Section 10 of the Act. The real test for making a reference is whether at the time of the reference dispute exists or not and when it is made it is presumed that the State Government is satisfied with the ingredients of the provision, hence the Labour Court cannot go behind the reference. It is not open to the Government to go into the merit of the dispute concerned and once it is found that an industrial dispute exists then it is incumbent on the part of the Government to make reference. It cannot itself decide the merit of the dispute and it is for the appropriate Court or Forum to decide the same. The satisfaction of the appropriate authority in the matter of making reference under Section 10(1) of the Act is a subjective satisfaction. Normally, the Government cannot decline to make reference for laches committed by the workman. If adequate reasons are shown, the Government is bound to refer the dispute to the appropriate Court or Forum for adjudication. Even though, there is no limitation prescribed for reference of dispute to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, even so, it is only reasonable that the disputes should be referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after conciliation proceedings have failed, particularly, when disputes relate to discharge of workman. If sufficient materials are not put forth for the enormous delay, it would certainly be fatal. However, in view of the explanation offered by the workman, in the case on hand, as stated and discussed by us in the earlier paragraphs, we do not think that the delay in the case on hand has been so culpable as to disentitle him any relief. We are also satisfied that in view of the details furnished and the explanation offered, the workman cannot be blamed for the delay and he was all along hoping that one day his grievance would be considered by the Management or by the State Government." 10. In U.P. State Road Transport Corporation vs. Babu Ram (supra), it is said by the Apex Court that in a case of delay in seeking reference, no formula of universal application can be laid down. In U.P. State Road Transport Corporation vs. Babu Ram (supra), it is said by the Apex Court that in a case of delay in seeking reference, no formula of universal application can be laid down. It would depend on the facts of each individual case. It was held therein in the facts of that case that the workman had not placed any material to show that he had raised dispute within a reasonable time or that he was not responsible for delayed decision, if any, in the conciliation proceedings. The High Court on a hypothetical basis could not have assumed that the dispute might have been raised promptly but delayed by the State Government and the workman cannot be penalised for the delay in finalising the conciliation proceedings and the reference. 11. In the light of the legal position stated above, while appreciating the facts of the instant case, this Court finds that the claim of the petitioners (70 in numbers) was that they were engaged on temporary/daily wage basis by the respondents 3 and 4 in different branches at the Kanpur City in the year 1974. Their services were orally terminated on 31.12.1990 without applying the provisions of Section 25-F or 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The contention is that all the petitioners had worked continuously from the date of their engagement till the date of termination of their services, with the bank and had rendered for more than 240 days continuous service in each and every year. Their services had been wrongly terminated without giving any opportunity of fresh appointment. They were agitating the matter and the respondents 3 and 4 had assured that their cases would be considered very soon. In the year 2009 i.e. on 26.2.2009, the Secretary of the Union had submitted a written demand letter to the respondent no. 3. A reminder dated 8.4.2009 was submitted to respondent no. 3. Vide letter dated 22.7.2009, the Assistant General Manager H.R. Lucknow had refused to consider the demand of the petitioners. The submission is that the cause of action for raising industrial dispute arose on 22.7.2009 when for the first time the bank officer had refused to consider the demands of the petitioners. The petitioners then on 23.3.2010 had raised industrial dispute against the termination of service before the Regional Labour Commissioner, Kanpur. The Conciliation case has been registered by the Regional Commissioner. The petitioners then on 23.3.2010 had raised industrial dispute against the termination of service before the Regional Labour Commissioner, Kanpur. The Conciliation case has been registered by the Regional Commissioner. However, no settlement was arrived, a report dated 24.9.2010 was submitted to respondent no. 1. The respondent no. 1 has, however, illegally refused to make a reference on the ground that the dispute had been raised belatedly after a period of 9 years and there was no merit in the case. 12. In the light of the said fact, it is evident that the claim of the petitioners for continuance as daily wager/temporary employee was raised after approximately 19 years. The question in the case is of existence of industrial dispute on the date of reference. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent-bank in reply has invited attention of the Court to the stand taken in the counter affidavit and submits that the petitioners cannot be said to be retrenched employees within the meaning of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was submitted that a settlement of All India S.B.I. Staff Federation and S.B.I on 17.11.1987 had been arrived under Section 2(p) read with Section 18 (a) of the Act 1947 read with Section 58 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, wherein it was agreed that the eligible temporary employees who had completed 240 days of temporary service and also those who had put in service for the period ranging from 30 days to 240 days would be given a chance for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank, in case, they had worked in such temporary capacity up to 31.12.1987. By subsequent settlement dated 16.7.1998, modifications were made to the extent that the period of qualifying service was extended upto 31.7.1988. Vacancies arose between 1987 and 1992 were to be made available for appointment under the earlier settlement. Thus, by the subsequent settlement the scope of the first settlement was extended to daily wagers and casual employees and it was agreed that the panel was to be kept alive upto 31.3.1997 for filing up the vacancies existing/arising on 31.12.1994. In terms of the above settlement, the temporary employee/daily wagers were considered and waitlisted. The petitioners could not be appointed for want of vacancies which were identified up till 31.12.1994 and the waitlist/panel had lapsed on 31.3.1997. In terms of the above settlement, the temporary employee/daily wagers were considered and waitlisted. The petitioners could not be appointed for want of vacancies which were identified up till 31.12.1994 and the waitlist/panel had lapsed on 31.3.1997. After the panel had lapsed on 31.3.1997, no right for appointment had survived with the present petitioners whose names were included in the said panel. The petitioners did not make any demand prior to 26.2.2009 and the reminder dated 8.4.2009. On the dispute raised after a long lapse of 13 years, since the panel had already lapsed on 31.3.1997, it was not possible for the respondent-bank to entertain their claim. The order of rejection of their claim dated 24.9.2010 by itself would not revive their stale claim nor the same can be taken as a ground to say that the industrial dispute existed as on 23.3.2010, when the conciliation application was filed by the petitioners. For the facts noted in the matter that the panel for absorption of daily wagers/temporary employee prepared by the bank had lapsed on 31.12.1997, no infirmity can be attached to the decision of the Appropriate Government, refusing to make a reference. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner in rejoinder, vehemently, contends that the petitioners were pursuing their claim diligently with the bank and on the promise given by the Officers of the bank, they were quite hopeful and as such did not raise the industrial dispute. The petitioners being poor employees cannot be non-suited for the lapses on the part of the bank. Submission is that the petitioners were empanelled and kept in the list. The act of the bank in not absorbing them, is not bonafide. The petitioners were interviewed and had been empanelled. 15. On these submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners, suffice it to note that when the petitioners were interviewed and empanelled, it cannot be accepted that they were not aware of the fact that the panel would be exhausted or lapsed on 31.3.1997. It is not the case of the petitioners that anyone who was below them in the said panel was absorbed, out of turn. It is also not the case of the petitioners that the vacancies which occurred after 31.12.1994 were filled up from the said panel lapsed on 31.3.1997. It is not the case of the petitioners that anyone who was below them in the said panel was absorbed, out of turn. It is also not the case of the petitioners that the vacancies which occurred after 31.12.1994 were filled up from the said panel lapsed on 31.3.1997. In the crux, there is no whisper in the present petition or the conciliation application that the claims of the petitioners were illegally ignored or they were prejudiced in any manner by the lapse of the panel, which ceased to be operative on 31.3.1997. This apart being aware of the process of absorption adopted by the bank, in case of any denial it was incumbent upon them to raise industrial dispute at that point of time. After lapse of 19 years, the Appropriate Government having examined the said facts brought before it has rightly concluded that no industrial dispute existed as on the date of consideration nor any such industrial dispute was apprehended. With the panel having lost its life, the claim for absorption of the daily wagers/temporary employees could not have been referred. The law laid in the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner would, therefore, be of no help. 16. No infirmity is found in the decision of the Appropriate Government. The writ petition is found devoid of merits and hence dismissed.