JUDGMENT : K.M. THAKER, J. 1. The appellant Gujarat Electricity Board has challenged common judgment and order dated 7.9.2006 passed by learned Single Judge in SCA Nos. 19145/2006, 19146/2006 with SCA No. 17971/2006 to SCA No.17986/2006 and SCA No. 10306/2006 to 10319/2006 and prayed that the said common judgment as well as awards passed by learned Labour Court, Valsad in Reference Cases may be set aside. 2. The details of the awards passed by learned Labour Court which were challenged by present appellant in above mentioned SCAs are mentioned in Para 2 of common judgment dated 7.9.2006 in above mentioned SCAs. The said details read thus: “2. In SCA No.19145/2006, the petitioners have challenged the award passed by Labour Court, Valsad in Reference No.848/1990 dated 21.1.2006, whereby, the Labour Court has granted reinstatement with continuity of service with 20 % back wages of interim period. In SCA No.19146/2006, the petitioners have challenged the award passed by Labour Court, Valsad in Reference No.849/1990 dated 23.1.2006, whereby, the Labour Court has granted reinstatement with continuity of service with 20% back wages of interim period. In SCA No.17971 to 17986 of 2006, the petitioners have challenged the award passed by Labour Court, Valsad in Reference No.832/1990, 839/1990, 824/1990, 844/1990, 847/1990, 833/1990, 834/1990, 835/1990, 843/1990, 836/1990, 837/1990, 842/1990, 840/1990, 841/1990 and 845/1990 dated 14.12.2005, whereby, the Labour Court has granted reinstatement with continuity of service with 20% back wages of interim period. In SCA No.10306 to 10319 of 2006, the petitioners have challenged the award passed by Labour Court, Valsad in Reference No.816/1990 dated 27.10.2005, whereby, the Labour Court has granted reinstatement with continuity of service with 20 % back wages of interim period”. 3. By the said awards the learned Labour Court directed present appellant to reinstate all claimants with 20% backwages. Feeling aggrieved by the said directions present appellant filed above mentioned SCAs which came to be rejected by learned Single Judge vide above mentioned common judgment. The Board is aggrieved by said judgment. Hence present Appeals. 4. The appellant and the learned advocate for the respondent have submitted a Tabular Statement which reflect the details of number of appeals, the number of corresponding Special Civil Applications, names of the original claimants and the respective reference cases. The said detail reads thus: No. LPA No. SCA NO. Name Ref. No. Date. Hence present Appeals. 4. The appellant and the learned advocate for the respondent have submitted a Tabular Statement which reflect the details of number of appeals, the number of corresponding Special Civil Applications, names of the original claimants and the respective reference cases. The said detail reads thus: No. LPA No. SCA NO. Name Ref. No. Date. 1 1634/2006 10306/2006 Babubhai Barsurbhai 816/1990 20.10.2005 2 1635/2006 10307/2006 Chhotubhai Patel 820/1990 08/12/05 3 1636/2006 10308/2006 Amrut Veljibhai Patel 821/1990 19.11.2005 4 1637/2006 10309/2006 Ramesh Fuljibhai Patel 822/1990 21.11.2005 5 1638/2006 10310/2006 Jaysing Vallabhbhai Patel 817/1990 29.10.2005 6 1639/2006 10311/2006 Ramesh Khushalbhai 818/1990 28.10.2005 7 1640/2006 10312.2006 Khushalbhai Krupalbhai Patel 8.9.1990 10.11.2005 8 1641/2006 10313/2006 Kantibhai Vajirbhai Patel 823/1990 23.11.2005 9 1642/2006 10314/2006 Natubhai Dhuriyabhai Patel 925/1990 1.12.2005 10 1643/2006 10315/2006 Khandubhai Jivlabhai 826/1990 3.12.2005 11 1644/2006 10316/2006 Bhikhabhai Jivlabhai 827/1990 5.12.2005 12 1645/2006 10317/2006 Champakbhai Chharilyabhai 828/1990 6.12.2005 13 1646/2006 10318/2006 Rameshbhai Ukadbhai 829/1990 8.12.2005 14 1647/2006 10319/2006 Bahadur Naranbhai Patel 831/1990 9.12.2005 15 1648/2006 10145/2006 Masan Chhaganbhai Patel 848/1990 21.1.2006 16 1649/2006 19146/2006 Jaysukhbhai Karsanbhai Patel 849/1990 23.1.2006 17 1650/2006 17971/2006 Bhagubhai Naginbhai Patel 832/1990 14.12.2006 18 1651/2006 17972/2006 Chimanbhai Parshottambhai 839.1990 29.12.2006 19 1652/2006 17973/2006 Bhagubhai Jivanbhai 824/1990 28.11.2005 20 1653/2006 17974/2006 Vajirbhai Bapudbhai Patel 844/1990 9.1.2006 21 1654/2006 17975/2006 Babubhai Narsinhbhai Patel 847/1990 16.1.2006 22 1655/2006 17976/2006 Kantilal Motibhai Patel 846/1990 13.1.2006 23 1656/2006 13977/2006 Gamanbhai Ukkadbhai Patel 833/1990 12.12.2005 24 1657/2006 17978/2006 Jhaverbhai Chhaniyabhai Patel 834/1990 15.12.2005 25 1658/2006 17979/2006 Babubhai Jivlabhai Patel 835/1990 16.12.2005 26 1659/2006 17980/2006 Gulabbhai Chhanabhai Patel 843/1990 7.1.2006 27 1660/2006 17981/2006 Balubhai Mandabhai Patel 836/1990 19.12.2005 28 1661/2006 17982/2006 Ratanbhai Naranbhai Patel 835/1990 22.12.2005 29 1662/2006 17983/2006 Shankarbhai Magjibhai Patel 842/1990 6.1.2006 30 1663/2006 17984/2006 Ishwarbhai Khushalbhai Patel 840/1990 3.1.2006 31 1664/2006 17985/2006 Ramanbhai Bediyabhai Patel 841/1990 31.1.2006 32 1665/2006 17986/2006 Bhikhabhai Jamlabhai Patel 845/1990 12.1.2006 5. So far as the factual backdrop is concerned, it has emerged from the record and submissions by learned advocates that the appellant (original appellant before learned Labour Court and the petitioner before learned Single Judge) is Electricity Board incorporated and registered as limited company. The provision under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) are applicable to the appellant and the appellant is “industry” within the meaning of the said term defined under Section 2(j) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The provision under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) are applicable to the appellant and the appellant is “industry” within the meaning of the said term defined under Section 2(j) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 5.1 Present Respondents (Original claimants/ workmen) raised industrial dispute against present appellant with the allegation that the Electricity Board illegally terminated their services. Appropriate government passed separate but similar orders of reference and referred the disputes raised by the claimants for adjudication to learned Labour Court at Valsad. The learned Labour Court registered the reference cases as Reference Case No.816/90 to 819/90, 823/90, 925/90, 826/90 to 829/90, 831/90 to 836/90, 839/90 to 849/90. 5.2 The claimants filed their respective statements of claim wherein they asserted that they were working as regular employees of Electricity Board. They also claimed that opponent Electricity Board engaged them for its regular, permanent and perennial activities and that they served regularly and continuously for about 10 years before the Board terminated their service on 1.6.1987 by oral instruction and without following procedure prescribed by law, in violation of principles of natural justice as well as in breach of statutory provisions and without notice/ without payment of notice pay and without payment of compensation. The claimants demanded that the opponent board should be directed to reinstate them with continuity of service and all consequential benefits. 5.3 The opponent Board opposed the said demand as well as the allegations by the claimants. The Board claimed that the claimants were engaged on temporary and adhoc basis as “nominal muster roll employees”. The claimants were engaged for digging the pits, erection of poles and such other works/ activities but they were not permanent and regular employees of the Board. The Board also claimed that the claimants had not worked for 240 days in any year during their tenure with the Board and the Board also claimed, in its written statement (reply) that the claimants did not work with the Board after 15.2.1987. The Board claimed that they were engaged on adhoc basis and therefore question of termination did not arise. With such submissions the opponent Board demonstrated that the reference cases should be rejected. 5.4 The learned Labour Court recorded evidence, heard and considered rival submissions and upon adjudication of the reference, the learned Labour Court partly allowed the reference cases. The Board claimed that they were engaged on adhoc basis and therefore question of termination did not arise. With such submissions the opponent Board demonstrated that the reference cases should be rejected. 5.4 The learned Labour Court recorded evidence, heard and considered rival submissions and upon adjudication of the reference, the learned Labour Court partly allowed the reference cases. Having reached to the conclusion that it was the Board who terminated the services of the claimants and that the service of the claimants were terminated without complying of statutory provisions and by way of illegal retrenchment, learned Labour Court directed the opponent Board to reinstate the claimants on their original post with continuity of service and 20% backwages. 5.5 Feeling aggrieved with the said direction Electricity Board filed above mentioned petitions which came to be rejected by learned Single Judge vide above mentioned common judgment. 6. Mr. K.M.Patel, learned Senior Counsel with Ms. Bhaya, learned advocate for the appellant Electricity Board assailed the judgment and submitted that the learned Single Judge committed error in not appreciating the contentions against the awards passed by learned Labour Court and that the judgment by learned Single Judge is erroneous and unjust. Mr. Patel, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the learned Labour Court committed error in shifting the burden of proof on the employer. According to the appellant the workmen failed to discharge their burden. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant claimed that the impugned judgment and the awards are vitiated by wrong approach and incorrect appreciation and construction of evidence and the learned Labour Court as well as learned Single Judge have committed error in applying relevant law and legal position. He submitted that though the registers were placed on record the learned Labour Court committed error in discarding/ disbelieving said record and in drawing inference against the Board viz. that the claimants had worked for 240 days and rendered continuous service. According to the Appellant the decision to draw such inference is not only unjust and unwarranted but it is unsustainable. Mr. Patel, learned Senior Counsel also submitted that relevant documents (registers) have not been considered and the learned Labour Court disbelieved the attendance register on wrong premise and the learned Single Judge failed to take note of the said error. Mr. Mr. Patel, learned Senior Counsel also submitted that relevant documents (registers) have not been considered and the learned Labour Court disbelieved the attendance register on wrong premise and the learned Single Judge failed to take note of the said error. Mr. Patel, learned Senior Counsel claimed that the learned Single Judge erred in confirming the observations, findings and conclusion by learned Labour Court. Mr. Patel, learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the learned Labour Court erred in proceeding on the premise that the Electricity Board did not place on record complete set of attendance registers/ wage registers for the relevant period but the Board placed on record only part of the Registers with gaps of substantial and long span. According to the appellant the Board had placed complete set of attendance registers/ wage registers of the relevant period however learned Labour Court erred by concentrating only on serial number/ chronological numbers of the registers and that merely because serial/ chronological numbers of the registers reflected some gaps and the chain was broken/ not complete, the Court held that the Board did not place complete set of documents for entire period on record but the said inference are unwarranted and conjectures. According to learned Senior Counsel the learned Labour Court should have, instead, taken into account the month/ period of the registers. Learned Senior Counsel for the Electricity Board further submitted that the learned Labour Court and learned Single Judge committed error in rejecting appellant's case that the claimants were engaged for adhoc work and for temporary period and that the claimants did not work continuously and regularly for entire year and the Board had to discontinue the work during monsoon and that therefore the claimants were not engaged during said period. According to learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner the learned Single Judge also failed to appreciate the said aspect and committed error while confirming the said observation by the learned Labour Court and the decision by learned Single Judge to confirm the observations, findings and award by Labour Court have resulted into erroneous decision and injustice. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the learned Labour Court and learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the ratio in the case of Umadevi. The final directions by the learned Labour Court based on such erroneous findings are unsustainable and should be set aside. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the learned Labour Court and learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the ratio in the case of Umadevi. The final directions by the learned Labour Court based on such erroneous findings are unsustainable and should be set aside. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant also submitted that now the work is being executed through Contractor (outsourcing method) and that therefore it is not possible for the Board to reinstate the claimants and even otherwise the direction to reinstate the claimants after more than 20 years is even otherwise not justified and it deserves to be set aside. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant also submitted that before learned Labour Court the claimants did not allege breach of Section 25(G) and/ or Section 25(H) of Industrial Disputes Act and that therefore in absence of such pleadings, alleged violation of said provisions could not have been considered and the relief should not have been granted on said basis. 7. Per contra learned advocate for the claimants submitted that in the statement of claim the claimants specifically alleged and contended that the termination is completely illegal and that before terminating their service notice was not issued, inquiry was not conducted and compensation was not paid and though they continued to report for work, they were not engaged. He also submitted that even during their evidence the claimants asserted that service cannot be terminated by oral order and without payment of any rights and compensation and without following any legal procedure/ procedure prescribed by law. Therefore the contentions by the appellant that such case was not made out by the claimants before learned Labour Court is incorrect and unjustified. The learned advocate for the claimants further submitted that the appeals against concurrent findings recorded by learned Labour Court and learned Single Judge do not deserve to be entertained. According to the claimants the learned Labour Court has not committed any error either in recording the observation with regard to the documentary and oral evidence or in the matter of finding of fact. The findings are based on oral and documentary evidence available on record and there is no error in the final conclusion and the decision. According to the claimants the learned Labour Court has not committed any error either in recording the observation with regard to the documentary and oral evidence or in the matter of finding of fact. The findings are based on oral and documentary evidence available on record and there is no error in the final conclusion and the decision. The Respondent would submit that after proper analysis and appreciation of award passed by learned Labour Court, the learned Single Judge reached to the conclusion that the learned Labour Court has not committed any error in respect of finding of facts and that the conclusion reached by the learned Labour Court are based on evidence available on record. It is also claimed that actually the claimants were not daily wagers and they were not engaged casually or intermittently and that therefore there was no need or obligation to prove that they had worked for 240 days. Learned counsel for the respondent would submit that in view of the fact that the claimants were not casual or temporary employees but they worked continuously, question of establishing that they worked for 240 days do not arise. The claimants would submit that even otherwise entire documentary evidence including best evidence viz. wage register and attendance record was in custody with the employer (appellant). He also claimed that such record, when seen in totality, demonstrate and establish attendance of 240 days. Learned advocate for the workmen contended that actually it is the appellant Board which raised the said issue and defence (i.e. that the claimants are not entitled for any relief since they did not work for 240 days in a year) and since such contention was raised by the appellant Board the obligation to prove the factual aspect was on the Board and not on the workmen. It is further claimed by the respondents that despite this position the claimants demonstrated that they had worked for 240 days in period of 12 months and the contention that the claimants had not worked for 240 days in a period of 12 months and/ or that the learned Labour Court committed error in shifting the burden of proof are incorrect and misconceived. The respondents would contend that on examination of attendance registers and wage registers the learned Labour Court reached to the conclusion that the claimants had worked for 240 days. The respondents would contend that on examination of attendance registers and wage registers the learned Labour Court reached to the conclusion that the claimants had worked for 240 days. The learned Labour Court has recorded the said findings of fact on the basis of documents available on the record. The counsel for the workmen submitted that the Board illegally terminated services of the claimants in breach and violation of Statutory provision i.e. without payment of compensation and without following seniority. According to the respondents since the findings of fact are based on evidence on record and they are not incorrect or contrary to the evidence available on record or perverse the decision by learned Single Judge holding, inter alia that the awards passed by learned Labour Court are just, correct and supported by cogent evidence and satisfactory reasons, is correct and should not be interfered with. The learned advocate for the claimants would also submit that the claimants performed duties, work and function which are of regular, permanent and perennial nature and that this Court may not enter into the process of reappreciation of evidence. He also submitted that appellant Board did not issue attendance card or wage slips or appointment order and did not supply any document to the claimants and that therefore they were unable to place the documents on record. He further submitted that the attendance was marked in the muster roll and wages were paid by obtaining signature in the register however the attendance register and wages register are always retained in exclusive possession of the appellant Board and that therefore it was the duty of the Board to place the same on record and the appellant Board is not justified in its submission that the burden to prove the attendance was not on the Board and learned Labour Court committed error in shifting the burden of proof on the appellant Board. According to learned advocate for the respondent the conclusion by learned Labour Court about attendance of the claimants is a finding of fact and not mere inference and the said findings are based on appreciation, evaluation and analysis of the documentary and evidence available on record. According to learned advocate for the respondent the conclusion by learned Labour Court about attendance of the claimants is a finding of fact and not mere inference and the said findings are based on appreciation, evaluation and analysis of the documentary and evidence available on record. According to learned advocate for the respondents neither the learned Single Judge nor learned Labour Court has committed any error and the judgment by the learned Single Judge or the awards by the learned Labour Court do not deserve to be quashed. Learned advocate for the claimants would also submit that the appellant Board should not be permitted to escape from its obligation only on the ground that now the work is outsourced and the Contractor is executing the work. 8. We have considered impugned award by learned Labour Court and the impugned judgment by learned Single Judge whereby the award came to be confirmed. We have also considered material available on record, the decisions on which the learned advocates placed reliance and other material available on record as well as rival contentions. 9. Before proceeding further it is relevant to note that after detailed and proper scrutiny of oral and documentary evidence learned Labour Court reached to the conclusion and held that the claimants did not voluntarily stop reporting for work as alleged and claimed by the appellant but their service were terminated/ they were disengaged and discontinued. 9.1 The said finding of facts is recorded by the learned Labour Court after scrutiny, evaluation, appreciation and assessment of documentary and oral evidence available on record. 9.2 Further the appellant’s challenge against the said finding of facts and conclusion by learned Labour Court, has failed before learned Single Judge. After considering present appellant’s objection and all contentions against the said findings, the learned Single Judge has, for reasons recorded in impugned judgment, rejected the appellant’s contention and approved/ confirmed the finding of facts and conclusion recorded by learned Labour Court. After considering present appellant’s objection and all contentions against the said findings, the learned Single Judge has, for reasons recorded in impugned judgment, rejected the appellant’s contention and approved/ confirmed the finding of facts and conclusion recorded by learned Labour Court. 9.3 Moreover, even in the course of hearing of present appeals, the applicant could not show any material which would either demolish the finding of facts recorded by learned Labour Court and/ or which would demonstrate that the finding of facts and conclusion recorded by learned Labour Court are perverse and contrary to the evidence which was available on record before the Learned Labour Court and that learned Single Judge has committed any error in confirming the awards viz. the findings, the conclusions and final directions. 9.4 The appellant has failed to show any material from the record which would convince us to hold and declare that the finding of facts and conclusion recorded by learned Labour Court and subsequently approved and confirmed by learned Single Judge are perverse and against the weight of evidence (documentary and/ or oral) available on record. 10. Before proceeding further it is also relevant to recall that the service of original claimants undisputedly came to an end on the same day. 10.1 In this background though specifically asked by the Court, the appellant failed to give any reply, much less satisfactory and convincing reply or explanation, as to what was or what could be the reason/ circumstance which compelled as many as 32 claimants to voluntarily stop reporting for work on the same day except repeating that the Board did not discontinue/ terminate service of the claimants but the said 32 claimants stopped reporting for work voluntarily. 10.2 The appellant accepted that any intimation and/ or Notice were not issued. The appellant failed to show any material and also failed to offer satisfactory and convincing explanation or reply as to why as many as 32 workmen would, without any reason or cause, abruptly stopped reporting for work on the same day. 10.3 Therefore we again asked the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant to show any material from the record which would explain such alleged conduct of as many as 32 workmen who, as alleged by the Board, abruptly and without any reason, stopped reporting for work though they were working with the appellant for more than 8 years. 10.3 Therefore we again asked the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant to show any material from the record which would explain such alleged conduct of as many as 32 workmen who, as alleged by the Board, abruptly and without any reason, stopped reporting for work though they were working with the appellant for more than 8 years. 10.4 The Court even asked whether appellant had issued any notice and called for explanation from the claimants for not reporting for work and/ or whether the appellant asked the claimants to report for work. However, the appellant could not and did not offer any satisfactory much less convincing reply or explanation and the appellant also could not show any material to support its claim that all 32 workmen voluntarily stopped reporting for work and they on their own left the work service. 10.5 This would be possible only if by any overt or covert action or by oral instruction the services are discontinued. The appellant also could not show any material e.g. any notice etc. from the record to support and justify its contention that the workmen had stopped reporting for work. 10.6 Undisputedly, the appellant did not issue any Notice to the claimants asking them to report for work and / or calling for their explanation. The appellant could not show, from record, any material to establish that intimation or notice conveying that absence will be treated as abandonment were issued and served to the workmen. 10.7 On the contrary from the record and from the appellant's reply an important aspect and fact emerged in this context viz. according to appellant’s own admission, around the same time the appellant had engaged contractor and awarded contract for executing the same work (which the claimants performed) through contract labourers. 10.8 There is nothing on record to even indicate, much less demonstrate and establish, the reason which would persuade or lure and tempt as many as about 30 + workmen to abandon their work/ service without any hope for other/ fresh job or work or source of income. The claimants had no reason to abandon the work/ service where they were engage since last about 10 years. It is also relevant that in their deposition the claimants/ witnesses asserted that their services were terminated by oral order. The claimants had no reason to abandon the work/ service where they were engage since last about 10 years. It is also relevant that in their deposition the claimants/ witnesses asserted that their services were terminated by oral order. 10.9 Having regard to the evidence and above mentioned aspects and other related details learned Labour Court reached the conclusion that the workmen did not voluntarily abandon the work/ service and they did not stop to report for the work but their service were terminated. 10.10 On proper appreciation of evidence Labour Court has reached to the conclusion that the Board discontinued and relieved the workman and it terminated their service. 10.11 Thus, the factum of termination is established and the allegation by the Board that the claimants stopped reporting for duty is neither proved nor accepted by Labour Court or learned Single Judge. 11. When above mentioned facts are considered conjointly, it comes out that the labour Court did not commit any error either in recording finding of facts and conclusions or final directions. 11.1 The finding of fact and conclusion by Labour Court that the service of the claimants were terminated are derived from oral evidence of workmen and documents on record and said conclusion cannot be faulted. 11.2 It has also emerged that the appellant failed to demonstrate and establish that the finding of facts and conclusion recorded by learned Labour Court and approved/ confirmed by learned Single Judge are perverse or incorrect. 12. Once the said fact viz. the service of the claimants have been terminated and the Board's claim about abandonment is not tenable is established, then; as corollary, it follows that the termination of service of workmen amounts to “retrenchment”. 13. In this context it would be appropriate to take into account at this stage Section 2(oo), Section 25(F), Section 25(G) and Section 25(H) of Industrial Disputes Act and Rule 81 of the above mentioned Rules. 13. In this context it would be appropriate to take into account at this stage Section 2(oo), Section 25(F), Section 25(G) and Section 25(H) of Industrial Disputes Act and Rule 81 of the above mentioned Rules. Section 2(oo):”retrenchment" means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include - (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or (b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the nonrenewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or;] (c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health;] Section 25F: “Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen- No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay [for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government [or such authority as may be specified by appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.]” Section 25G:”Procedure for retrenchment-Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman. Section 25H: “Reemployment of retrenched workmen-Where any workmen are retrenched, and the employer proposes to take into his employ any persons, he shall, in such manner as may be prescribed, give an opportunity a [to the retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to offer themselves for reemployment, and such retrenched workmen] who offer themselves for reemployment shall have preference over other persons. Rule 81: maintenance of seniority list of workmen:( 1) The employer shall, prepare a list of all workmen in the particular category from which retrenchment is contemplated arranged according to the seniority of their service in that category and cause a copy thereof to be pasted on a notice board in conspicuous place in the premises of the industrial establishment at least seven days before the actual date of retrenchment.” 13.1 After considering said provision in case of State Bank of India v. N. Sunder Money, (1976) 1 SCC 822 , Hon’ble Apex Court observed and held that : “8. Without further ado, we reach the conclusion that if the workman swims into the harbour of Sec. 25F, he cannot be retrenched without payment, at the time of retrenchment, compensation computed as prescribed therein read with Section 25B (2). But argues the appellant, all these obligations flow only out of retrenchment, not termination outside that species of snapping employment. What, then, is retrenchment ? The key to this vexed question is to be found in S.2 (oo) which reads thus: "2 (oo) "retrenchment" means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include ( a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or (b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or (c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health;" For any reason whatsoever very wide and almost admitting of no exception. Still, the employer urges that when the order of appointment carries an automatic cessation of service, the period of employment works itself out by efflux of time, not by act of employer. Such cases are outside the concept of 'retrenchment' and cannot entail the burdensome conditions of Section 25F. Still, the employer urges that when the order of appointment carries an automatic cessation of service, the period of employment works itself out by efflux of time, not by act of employer. Such cases are outside the concept of 'retrenchment' and cannot entail the burdensome conditions of Section 25F. Of course, that a ninedays' employment, hedged in with an express condition of temporariness and automatic cessation, may look like being in a different street (if we may use a colloquialism) from telling a man off by retrenching him. To retrench is to cut down. You cannot retrench without trenching or cutting. But dictionaries are not dictators of statutory construction where the benignant mood of a law and, more emphatically, the definition clause furnish a different denotation. Section 2 (oo) is the master of the situation and the Court cannot truncate its amplitude. 9. A break down of Sec. 2 (oo) unmistakably expands the semantics of retrenchment. Termination... for any reason whatsoever' are the key words. Whatever the reason, every termination spells retrenchment. So the sole question is has the employees's service have been terminated ? Verbal apparel apart, the substance is decisive. A termination takes place where a term expires either by the active step of the master or the running out of the stipulated term. To protect the weak against the strong this policy of comprehensive definition has been effectuated. Termination embraces not merely the act of termination by the employmer, but the fact of termination howsoever produced. May be, the present may be a hard case, but we can visualise abuses by employers, by suitable verbal devices, circumventing the armour of Section 25F and Section 2 (oo). Without speculating on possibilities, we may agree that 'retrenchment' is no longer terra incognita but area covered by an expansive definition. It means 'to end, conclude, cease'. In the present case the employment ceased, concluded, ended on the expiration of nine days automatically may be, but cessation all the same. That to write into the order of appointment the date of termination confers no moksha from Sec. 25F(b) is inferable from the proviso to Section 25F (1) (sic) (Section 25F (a)?). It means 'to end, conclude, cease'. In the present case the employment ceased, concluded, ended on the expiration of nine days automatically may be, but cessation all the same. That to write into the order of appointment the date of termination confers no moksha from Sec. 25F(b) is inferable from the proviso to Section 25F (1) (sic) (Section 25F (a)?). True, the section speaks of retrenchment by the employer and it is urged that some act of volition by the employer to bring about the termination is essential to attract Section 25F and automatic extinguishment of service by effluxion of time cannot be sufficient. An English case R. v. Secretary of State, (1973) 2 All ER 103 was relied on, where Lord Denning, M.R. observed: "I think that the word 'terminate' or 'termination' is by itself ambiguous. It can refer to either of two things either to termination by notice or to termination by effluxion of time. It is often used in that dual sense in landlord and tenant and in master and servant cases. But there are several indications in this paragraph to show that it refers here only to termination by notice." Words of multiple import have to be winnowed judicially to suit the social philosophy of the statute. So screened, we hold that the transitive and intransitive senses are covered in the current context. Moreover, an employer terminates employment not merely by passing an order as the service runs. He can do so by writing a composite order, one giving employment and the other ending or limiting it. A separate, subsequent determination is not the sole magnetic pull of the provision. A preemptive provision to terminate is struck by the same vice as the post appointment termination. Dexterity of diction cannot defeat the articulated conscience of the provision. 10. What follows ? Had the State Bank known the law and acted on it, half-a-month's pay would have concluded the story. But that did not happen. Any now, some years have passed and the Bank has to pay, for no service rendered. Even so, hard cases cannot make bad law. Reinstatement is the necessary relief that follows. At what point? What follows ? Had the State Bank known the law and acted on it, half-a-month's pay would have concluded the story. But that did not happen. Any now, some years have passed and the Bank has to pay, for no service rendered. Even so, hard cases cannot make bad law. Reinstatement is the necessary relief that follows. At what point? In the particular facts and circumstances of this case, the respondent shall be put back where he left off, but his new salary will be what he would draw were he to be appointed in the same post today de novo. As for benefits, if any, flowing from service he will be ranked below all permanent employees in that cadre and will be deemed to be a temporary hand upto now. He will not be allowed to claim any advantages in the matter of seniority or other priority inter se among temporary employees on the ground that his retrenchment is being declared invalid by this Court. Not that we are laying down any general proposition of law, but make this direction in the special circumstances of the case. As for the respondent's emoluments, he will have to pursue other remedies, if any.” 13.2 On this count it is relevant and appropriate to take into account observation by Apex Court in the decision in case of Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd, Chandigarh v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh and Others, (1990) 3 SCC 682 . The Hon'ble Apex Court has observed, inter alia, that: “14. The precise question to be decided, therefore, is whether on a proper construction of the definition of "retrenchment" in Section 2(00) of the Act, it means termination by the employer of the service of a workman as surplus labour for any reason whatsoever, or it means termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, and those expressly excluded by the definition. In other words, the question to be decided is whether the word "retrenchment" in the definition has to be understood in its narrow, natural and contextual meaning or in its wider literal meaning. 33. Next comes the decision in State Bank of India v. Shri N. Sundara Money, reported [1976] 3 SCR 160, (Y.V. Chandrachud, V.R. Krishna lyer and A.C. Gupta, JJ.). 33. Next comes the decision in State Bank of India v. Shri N. Sundara Money, reported [1976] 3 SCR 160, (Y.V. Chandrachud, V.R. Krishna lyer and A.C. Gupta, JJ.). In an application under Article 226, the respondent on automatic extinguishment of his service consequent to the preemptive provision as to the temporariness of the period of his employment in his appointment letter claiming to have been deemed to have had continuous service for one year within the meaning of Section 25(B) (2) of the Act, the Single Bench of the High Court having allowed his writ petition and the writ appeal of the appellant having also failed, this Court in appeal found as fact that the appointment was purely temporary one for a period of 9 days but might be terminated earlier, without assigning any reason therefor at the petitioner's discretion; and the employment unless terminated earlier, would automatically cease at the expiry of the period i.e. 18.11.1972. This 9 days' employment added on to what had gone before ripened to a continuous service for a year "on the antecedent arithmetic of 240 days of broken bits of service" and considering the meaning of 'retrenchment' it was held that the expression for any reason whatsoever 134 was very wide and almost admitting of no exception. The contention of the employer was that when the order of appointment carried an automatic cessation of service, the period of employment worked itself out by efflux of time, not by act of employer and such cases were outside the concept of retrenchment. This Court observed that to retrench is to cut down and one could not retrench without trenching or cutting, but "dictionaries are not dictators of statutory construction where the benignant moo & of a law and, more emphatically, the definition clause furnish a different denotation." 34. Accepting the literal meaning, Krishna Iyer, J. observed: "A break down of Section 2(00) unmistakably expands the semantics of retrenchment. 'Termination ..... for any reason whatsoever' are the key words. Whatever the reason, every termination spells retrenchment. So the sole question is, has the employee's service been terminated? Verbal apparel apart, the substance is decisive. A termination takes place where a term expires either by the active step of the master or the running out of the stipulated term. To protect the weak against the strong this policy of comprehensive definition has been effectuated. So the sole question is, has the employee's service been terminated? Verbal apparel apart, the substance is decisive. A termination takes place where a term expires either by the active step of the master or the running out of the stipulated term. To protect the weak against the strong this policy of comprehensive definition has been effectuated. Termination embraces not merely the act of termination by the employer, but the fact of termination howsoever produced. May be, the present may be a hard case, but we can visualise abuses by employers, by suitable verbal devices, circumventing the amount of Section 25F and Section 2(00). Without speculating on possibilities, we may agree that 'retrenchment' is no longer terra incognita but area covered by an expansive definition. It means 'to end, conclude, cease.' In the present case the employment ceased, concluded, ended on the expiration of 9 days automatically may be, but cessation all the same. That to write into the order of appointment the date of termination confers no mokshas from Section 25F(b) is inferable from the proviso to Section 25F(1). True, the section speaks of retrenchment by the employer and it is urged that some act of volition by the employer to bring about the termination is essential to attract Section 25F and automatic extinguishment of service by effluxion of time cannot be sufficient."(emphasis supplied) 81. As we have mentioned, industrial and labour legislation involves social and labour policy. Often they are passed in conformity with the resolutions of the International Labour Organisation. In Duport Steels v. Sirs, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 142. the House of Lords observed that there was a difference between applying the law and making it, and that judges ought to avoid becoming involved in controversial social issues, since this might affect their reputation in impartiality. Lord Diplock said: "A statute passed to remedy what is perceived by Parliament to be a defect in the existing law may in actual operation turn out to have injurious consequences that Parliament did not anticipate at the time the statute was passed; if it had, it would have made some provision in the Act in order to prevent them ..... But if this be the case it is for Parliament. not for the judiciary, to decide whether any changes should be made to the law as stated in the Acts 82. But if this be the case it is for Parliament. not for the judiciary, to decide whether any changes should be made to the law as stated in the Acts 82. Applying the above reasonings; principles and precedents, to the definition in Section 2(00) of the Act, we hold that "retrenchment" means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever except those expressly excluded in the section. 14. Thus, in light of undisputed fact the service of the claimants did not come to end on account of termination for misconduct/ as disciplinary action or on account of resignation or on account of superannuation / retrenchment. 14.1 Differently put the “termination” does not fall within any of the three exceptions. Consequently the said termination amount to “retrenchment”. 14.2 In this context it will not be out of place to note that above quoted observation by Apex Court clarify and clearly bring out that the termination which do not fall within the 3 exempted category (under Section 2(oo) of the Act) amount to retrenchment. 14.3 Hence the termination of service of the claimants is a case of “retrenchment'. This conclusion is fortified in by above quoted observation. 14.4 When it has emerged that the findings of fact, the conclusion and the decision by learned Labour Court, which is also confirmed and approved by learned Single Judge viz. that 32 claimants did not voluntarily stop reporting for work but their service came to be terminated are justified and not perverse and when the said facts are considered in light of above quoted observation by Apex Court it would follow that such termination amounts to “retrenchment”. 15. The question which would arise is that whether the termination of service of claimants or their discontinuation is legal and in accordance with law and sustainable. 15.1 In this context it is relevant to note that according to the claimants each one of them had worked for more than 240 days in a year; whereas the appellant Board claims that the claimants never completed service for 240 days in any year and the claimants were engaged during particular season and they were engaged as daily wager and the claimants were not regular workmen and therefore there was no obligation to comply Section 25F and to pay retrenchment compensation. 15.2 On this count it is also necessary to note that there is no dispute about the fact that the appellant did not fulfill and did not comply Section 25F (i.e. either Section 25F(a) or 25F(b) or 25F(c) of I.D.Act) and did not pay the retrenchment compensation. 15.3 Further, from the evidence (by the claimants before Labour Court) it comes out that the claimants asserted that they were regular employees and they worked regularly without any break and that they were engaged for regular, perennial and permanent work of the appellant company however the appellant adopted illegal practice of not issuing appointment order and/ or salary slips and/ or attendance card or any other documents/ material evidencing their employment with the company and they were also shifted from one taluka/ District place to another taluka district place. However separate registers were maintained. Such evidence establish that the Board created artificial division and adopted unhealthy practice. 16. In light of the dispute and rival contentions, obviously, the attendance register and wage register would be relevant evidence. Undisputedly the said documents are in exclusive custody and possession of the appellant. 16.1 It is pertinent that undisputedly the appellant did not issue appointment order and also did not serve termination order or even salary slips and identity card or attendance card. However, the factum of employment i.e. the fact that all 32 workmen worked with and for the appellant company is not in dispute. The work for which the claimants were engaged and the work which they executed is necessary and essential or integral activity work for the business and activities of the appellant company. The appellant however claims that the claimants were not regular and permanent employees but they were casual employees and were being engaged during particular period. 16.2 In this context it is necessary to note that the learned Labour Court has held that the workmen had worked for 240 days as required under the Act and their service has to be treated “continuous” service as provided under Section 25B of the Act. 16.3 The appellant assails said finding of fact on the ground that the learned Labour Court has drawn inference and the said inference is unjustified and incorrect. 16.3 The appellant assails said finding of fact on the ground that the learned Labour Court has drawn inference and the said inference is unjustified and incorrect. The Board claims that to demonstrate that the workman had not worked for 240 days it had placed on record attendance registers however Labour Court erred in verifying the said fact and merely on the basis of serial number, instead of taking into account the months/ period of the register, the Court erroneously held that the Board did not place on record complete set of registers. 16.4 However from the material on record it emerges that the learned Labour Court has recorded such decision in light of the fact that the company did not place all attendance and / or registers for the period in question. 16.5 The learned Labour court arrived at the said finding of facts and the conclusion after physically examining all attendance registers/ wage registers which were placed on record and having undertaken said process learned Labour Court reached to the conclusion that the chain is broken and selected registers are placed on record. 16.6 The appellant Board claims that the findings with regard to attendance registers and wage registers viz. that the company did not place on record all attendance registers and wage registers, is not correct or justified. 16.7 According to the learned Labour Court, the Company submitted attendance register and wage register however it was not complete set inasmuch as the registers submitted by the Board are not in seriatim and not in continuation i.e. the Board did not maintain link and chain of serial and consecutive numbers and/ or continuity of registers with consecutive number for consecutive and successive months and area (site, location) and district. 16.8 The objection against the said conclusion of Labour Court has been examined by learned Single Judge and the same has been turned down. Learned Single Judge did not find any error in the conclusion by the learned Labour Court. 16.9 The learned Labour Court found that the Board conveniently submitted only those documents which would support the stand it had taken and the Board kept back some of the registers which broke the chain with regard to either the period / month or the district etc.. 16.9 The learned Labour Court found that the Board conveniently submitted only those documents which would support the stand it had taken and the Board kept back some of the registers which broke the chain with regard to either the period / month or the district etc.. 16.10 It was in this backdrop, in light of such facts and evidence and on said premise that the learned Labour Court held that all registers are not produced and chain is not maintained. The Court, therefore, considered it proper to draw adverse inference. 16.11 It is relevant to note the company failed to satisfy not only the learned Labour Court but learned Single Judge as well. The learned Single Judge has dealt with company's objection and after verification of relevant material rejected the contention and confirmed trial Court's conclusion. The company failed to demonstrate that continuous chain (with regard to period / month as well as the district / location/ site) is maintained and the finding in incorrect and perverse. 16.12 It is pertinent that the workmen worked in small teams. The teams were deployed and the workmen worked in different districts and area and various locations. The distribution of persons in teams of allotment of teams to different locations resulted into the situation whereby the claimants had to work at different locations (i.e. in different talukas and different districts) as well. 16.13 Therefore it was necessary that all Registers for relevant period and all locations where the claimants were deployed should have been submitted on record and continuous chain with regard to not only period/ month but also with regard to area (district/ site/ location) should have been maintained and established. 16.14 However the gap has brought out and emphasized not only break in continuous chain/ serial numbers but also the fact that registers of all locations were not placed before the Labour Court. 16.15 Important aspect of this issue is that the Board had exclusive possession of relevant registers. Therefore it was Board's duty and obligation to place on record the Registers. 16.16 Further, the Board failed to successfully assail the conclusion and decision are correct and just by learned Single Judge. The concurrent decision cannot be termed perverse. Before us the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the decision by learned Single Judge or the conclusion by learned Labour Court are perverse and incorrect. 16.16 Further, the Board failed to successfully assail the conclusion and decision are correct and just by learned Single Judge. The concurrent decision cannot be termed perverse. Before us the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the decision by learned Single Judge or the conclusion by learned Labour Court are perverse and incorrect. We do not find any reason or justification or basis to take a different or contrary view. 17. Now, so far as the issue whether the termination is legal and sustainable, is concerned it is necessary to note that when service of the claimants came to end and when the claimants came to be discontinued and disengaged the appellant company did not follow any procedure whatsoever, much less the procedure prescribed under Industrial Disputes Act. 17.1 It has emerged from the facts of present case and from the material available on record and after considering rival submission that:- (a) service of all claimants came to be terminated or all the claimants came to be disengaged and discontinued on the same day; (b) the service of the claimants came to be terminated or all claimants came to be disengaged / discontinued by oral instruction; (c) until the date on which the service of the claimants came to be terminated or they came to be disengaged, they were engaged by and serving with the appellant Board; (d) after the service of all claimants came to be terminated or after they came to be disengaged, the work which they performed (while they worked with the Board) continued but the appellant started to get the work executed through contractor/ contract labourer. (e) The said fact is borne out and has emerged from the defence setup by the appellant and from the appellant's admission; (f) the service of any claimant did not end/ were not disengaged/ discontinued on account of or on allegation of misconduct or on account of resignation or on account of retirement/ superannuation. (e) The said fact is borne out and has emerged from the defence setup by the appellant and from the appellant's admission; (f) the service of any claimant did not end/ were not disengaged/ discontinued on account of or on allegation of misconduct or on account of resignation or on account of retirement/ superannuation. (g) Differently put the termination of their service amount to retrenchment inasmuch as their service were not discontinued on account of any of the exceptions provided under Section 2(oo) of the Act; (h) It has also emerged from the record and from the submission that undisputedly the notice as contemplated under Section 25(F)(a) or Section 25(F)(c) were not issued and served to the workman/ submitted to the authority and the seniority list was not prepared and displayed in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Rule 81 of Industrial Disputes (Gujarat) Rules, 1966; (i) there is nothing on record to establish or even suggest or indicate that the applicants were informed (by means of contract or appointment order or any other means) that the appointments are contractual and / or time bound inasmuch as any order/ contract agreement specifying any special or peculiar term of appointment e.g. suggesting or indicating that appointment is contractual and/ or that the appointment is for specified work/ project only and/ or that the appointment is for specified and limited period and it will come to end on completion of specified work or project or on completion of specified period/ time limit, were not issued. 17.2 In light of the facts of the case learned Court has held and learned Single Judge has confirmed the finding that the disengagement of the claimants amounts to termination and the Board terminated the service of the claimants. Further, the facts of the case, above mentioned provisions and above quoted observation by Apex Court bring out that the claimants' termination amounts to retrenchment. 18. Further, the facts of the case, above mentioned provisions and above quoted observation by Apex Court bring out that the claimants' termination amounts to retrenchment. 18. In this backdrop it is pertinent to note that:- (a) the appellant, undisputedly, did not serve termination order to the claimants; and (b) the appellant also did not issue and serve the notice, as provided for under Section 25F(a) to the claimants or did not pay salary in lieu of the notice; and further (c) the appellant also did not serve notice under Section 25F(c); (d) the appellant Board, undisputedly, did not prepare and publish/ display seniority list in accordance with and in compliance of requirement prescribed by Rule 81; and (e) the Board also did not follow the principle of seniority (last come first go) as provided under Section 25G of the Act. 18.1 With reference to Section 25G and Rule 81 it is relevant to note at this stage that it is not the case of the appellant company that the said 32 claimants were the only persons engaged/ employed in particular section or particular department and there was no other employee engaged in said Section/ Department for the work which the claimants executed. 18.2 Therefore, the obligation to prepare and publish seniorty list as well as the obligation to observe seniority is attracted and applicable in present case. 18.3 In this context, it is necessary to keep in focus that the appellant Board is engaged, inter alia, in the activity of transmission of electricity and for that purpose the appellant has to dig trenches, lay cables, erect poles and conduct such other connected activities as part of its principal activity. The said work and activities are regular work and activities for the Board and its business. The Board, admittedly, undertakes the said work at different locations throughout the State. 18.4 The claimants were engaged for said work and they were executing diverse jobs connected with the said work. The claimants executed such jobs in teams at different sites in different talukas/ districts. 18.5 Under the circumstances the requirement to maintain seniority list is applicable to the Board and at the material time it was attracted and applicable in present case as well. 18.6 Despite this position the Board, undisputedly, did not prepare and publish the seniority list as prescribed under Rule 81. 19. 18.5 Under the circumstances the requirement to maintain seniority list is applicable to the Board and at the material time it was attracted and applicable in present case as well. 18.6 Despite this position the Board, undisputedly, did not prepare and publish the seniority list as prescribed under Rule 81. 19. Moreover, for the same work which the respondent-opponent workmen performed the Board employer other workmen however the Board did not maintain and follow seniority as prescribed and required by law (Section 25G). 19.1 The Board also did not issue and serve Notice as prescribed and required by Section 25F(c) and/ or Section 25F(a). 20. In light of these facts and such fact-situation there cannot be and there is no escape from the conclusion that the termination or discontinuation of the service of the claimants (i.e. the retrenchment) is in breach of said provision. 21. Despite such position, the appellant Board would, however, claim that the claimants did not work for 240 days in and that therefore it was not necessary to pay retrenchment compensation and/ or wages in lieu of Notice. 21.1 The said claim of the Board is rejected by Labour Court and it is not accepted even by learned Single Judge. The said decision does not warrant interference. 22. 21.1 The said claim of the Board is rejected by Labour Court and it is not accepted even by learned Single Judge. The said decision does not warrant interference. 22. In this context it is necessary to note that even if it is assumed that the appellant had placed on record all registers for the period in question and even if we assume that the claimants had not worked for 240 days in preceding 12 months, then also the facts:- (a) that the appellant Board did not issue and did not serve, to the workmen, Notice prescribed by Section 25F(a) or did not pay wages in lieu of that notice; and the fact that (b) the Board did not pay retrenchment compensation; and the fact that (c) the Board also did not serve Notice to the appropriate Government as prescribed by Clause-c of Section 25F as well as the fact that (d) the Board also did not display seniority list in accordance with Rule 81 and did not follow seniority as required by Section 25G and thereby the Board did not comply said provision i.e. Rule 81 of the Rules and/ or Section 25G stare in the face of the appellant and the said irregularity and noncompliance of statutory obligation invalidate and vitiate the discontinuation of the claimants/ termination of service of the claimants, that being in violation of statutory obligation (viz. 25F(a) &/ or 25F(c) & 25G and Rule 81) 22.1 Thus, even if such fact (i.e. the workmen did not work for 240 days in preceding year) are assumed then also the Board would not get any escape route in respect of its obligation prescribed under sub-clause (c) of Section 25F which mandates that in case of retrenchment appropriate advance notice in prescribed form should be served to appropriate government. It is so in light of the provision viz. Section 25(F) (c) and the Scheme of the Act. 22.2 The requirement prescribed by subsection (c) of Section 25F is applicable in case of all retrenchment and the said requirement is not subject to or not dependent on rendition of service by concerned workmen for 240 days. It is so in light of the provision viz. Section 25(F) (c) and the Scheme of the Act. 22.2 The requirement prescribed by subsection (c) of Section 25F is applicable in case of all retrenchment and the said requirement is not subject to or not dependent on rendition of service by concerned workmen for 240 days. The condition prescribed by Section 25F(c) is relevant and applicable not only in the cases where the workman rendered service for 240 days and his service came to terminated after rendition of service for 240 days but it is applicable to all cases of retrenchment which stand covered under Section 2(oo) of the Act. The said provision does not prescribe that notice to appropriate government would be necessary in case of only those workmen who have rendered service for 240 days. The said provision postulates that the requirement (to serve the notice to appropriate government) is applicable in all cases of retrenchment. 22.3 Further, as explained by Apex Court, the requirement prescribed by subsection (c) of Section 25F is mandatory. In the decision in case of Mackinnon Mackenzie and Company Ltd. v. Mackinnon Employees Union, (2015) 4 SCC 544 , Hon’ble Apex Court has held and explained that the requirement prescribed by Clause (a) and Clause (c) are mandatory. In Para-34 of the said decision in case of Mackinnon Mackenzie and Company Ltd. v. Mackinnon Employees Union (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that: “34. Further, with regard to the allegation against the appellant-Company that its action of retrenchment of the concerned workmen is in contravention with the provisions of Section 25F clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the I.D. Act. Section 25F clause (a) states that no workmen employed in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched until the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of notice. In the case on hand, the workmen were served with the retrenchment notice on 27.07.1992 stating that their services stand retrenched from the close of business hours on 04.08.1992 in terms of the reasons appended to the said notice and further stated the amount of retrenchment compensation and one month's salary in lieu of notices that would be due to the concerned workmen. However, no cogent evidence has been brought before us by the appellant-Company to prove that the above referred one month's salary of the concerned workmen in lieu of the retrenchment notice has been actually paid to them. Further, the concerned workmen were given notice of retrenchment with Statement of Reasons appended therewith by the appellant-Company only on 27.07.1992 which was effective from 4.08.1992. Therefore, one month notice was not given to the concerned workmen before their retrenchment came into effect nor one month's salary in lieu of the retrenchment notice was paid to the concerned workmen. Therefore, the said action by the appellant-Company is a clear cut breach of the above said provision of condition precedent for retrenchment of the workmen as provided under Section 25F clause (a) of the I.D. Act. The Industrial Court after examining the facts and evidence on record has rightly answered the question of breach of Section 25F clause (b) in the negative since no evidence has been produced by the respondent-Union to prove the same and further no calculation is brought to our notice as to the amount received by way of retrenchment compensation and also the actual amount sought to have been paid to the retrenched workmen. Further, with regard to the provision of Section 25F clause (c), the appellant-Company has not been able to produce cogent evidence that notice in the prescribed manner has been served by it to the State Government prior to the retrenchment of the concerned workmen. Therefore, we have to hold that the appellant-Company has not complied with the conditions precedent to retrenchment as per Section 25F clauses (a) and (c) of the I.D. Act which are mandatory in law”.(emphasis supplied) 22.4 Despite such position; said condition and requirement is, undisputedly, not complied and the said obligation is not discharged by the appellant Board. The said condition, as explained by Hon’ble Apex Court, is mandatory. Consequently the requirement and procedure prescribed by Section 25(F)(c) should have been complied in present case. The said condition, as explained by Hon’ble Apex Court, is mandatory. Consequently the requirement and procedure prescribed by Section 25(F)(c) should have been complied in present case. In view of undisputed breach the termination is invalid for want of compliance of said condition. 22.5 In this view of the matter, even if it is assumed that the claimants had not worked for 240 days, the termination or discontinuation of their service tantamounts to retrenchment and attracts provision under Section 25F(c) and since the said obligation is not discharged the retrenchment of the claimants are in violation of mandatory provision viz. Section 25F(c). 23. Similar is the position with regard to Rule 81 and Section 25G. As mentioned above, the appellant company undisputedly did not prepare and did not display the seniority list and thereby the Company committed breach and violation of Rule 81 of the Industrial Disputes (Gujarat) Rules, 1966. 23.1 It is relevant to note that though Section 25F, Section 25G and Section 25H fall under the same chapter of Industrial Disputes Act and though they can be termed as provisions of same family, Section 25G is not subject to or dependent on applicability or operation of Section 25F. 23.2 Section 25G is applicable in respect of all “retrenchment” which fall within the purview of Section 2(oo), and not only those retrenchment where the workmen have completed service of 240 days at the time of retrenchment but even in respect of those cases of retrenchment where workmen did not render/ complete service for 240 days. 23.3 Actually the provision under Section 25G is applicable in respect of all retrenchment which fall within purview of Section 2(oo) of the Act. 23.4 For the reasons discussed and mentioned above, it has emerged clearly that the case of the claimants fall within purview of Section 2(oo) of the Act. Further, in light of the decision in case of State Bank of India v. N. Sunder Money (supra) and the decision in case of Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh and Others (Supra) it is clear that the case of present claimants amount to “retrenchment” and fall within the purview of Section 2(oo) of the I.D.Act. 23.5 Under the circumstances the provision under Section 25G is also applicable and attracted in present case. 23.5 Under the circumstances the provision under Section 25G is also applicable and attracted in present case. Therefore, the appellant Board was under obligation to comply and it should have complied the requirement/ condition viz. “Last come First go” (i.e. principle of Seniority) prescribed by Section 25G. For said purpose the appellant Board should have also complied the procedure prescribed by Rule 81 of Industrial Disputes (Gujarat) Rules, 1966. The said Rule imposes obligation on the employer to display, in case of “Retrenchment” Seniority list. 23.6 Undisputedly, the Board did not display the seniority list (Rule 81) and did not follow principle of seniority as prescribed by Section 25G (i.e. last come first go). 23.7 Therefore in view of breach of Section 25G read with Rule 81 the termination or discontinuation of service of the claimants should be termed illegal for want of compliance with Section 25(G) read with Rule 81 as well as Section 25(F)(c) i.e. in violation of statutory provision. 24. It has also emerged from the record and also from submission-admission by the appellant Board that for carrying on and for executing the same work which the claimants performed the Company has engaged Contractor and such work is awarded on contract basis. 24.1 Undisputedly the said work (i.e. the jobs/activities which the claimants performed) are directly connected with and necessary for carrying on business and activities of the Board and the said work are permanent and perennial work. 24.2 Thus, merely because the Board decided to outsource the work and to get the work executed through contract workers / outside agency, the Board cannot claim that now the work is not available and/ or that there is no possibility to accommodate the claimants. On such ground the Court cannot permit the Board to escape from its obligation which arise on account of and flow from the awards and the judgment by learned Single Judge. 24.3 Actually, the Board cannot frustrate the award by assigning such regular and permanent work of the Board to outside agency contract and get the work executed through contract labourers on such ground the Board cannot claim that it is unable to accommodate the claimants. 24.4 The Board cannot take advantage of self created situation to avoid or to escape from the consequences of illegal and unjustified termination of service of the workmen/ discontinuing or disengaging them without following procedure prescribed by law. 24.4 The Board cannot take advantage of self created situation to avoid or to escape from the consequences of illegal and unjustified termination of service of the workmen/ discontinuing or disengaging them without following procedure prescribed by law. 25. It is relevant to note that the learned Senior Counsel also tried to find fault with the decision of the learned Labour court and learned Single Judge on the ground that the pleadings of the claimants are defective inasmuch as any of the essential allegation (about breach of Section 25F or 25G) have not been mentioned in the Statements of Claim. 25.1 However, on reading the statements of claim filed by the claimants it comes out clearly that the claimants alleged (in their statements of claim), inter alia, that:- (i) their service came to be terminated on and with effect from 1.6.1987; (ii) their service came to be terminated on account of victimization; (iii) before terminating their service the employer did not issue/ serve any notice; (iv) before terminating their service any departmental inquiry was not conducted; (v) before terminating their service any compensation was not paid; (vi) even after termination of their service they were reporting for duty but the appellant did not provide work and did not engage them; (vii) their service came to be terminated completely illegally. 25.2 When the claimants expressly alleged that their service came to be terminated illegally and that at the time when their service came to be terminated any compensation was not paid, then it means and follows that such pleadings encompass all types of illegality or irregularity including violation of statutory obligation, in the matters related to termination of their service. 25.3 When above mentioned details emerge from the statements of claim, then it cannot be said that merely because the claimants did not separately (or expressly) mention each of the provisions under the Act (e.g. Section 25F and / or Section 25G and/ or Section 25H and/ or Rule 81) they failed to plead violation of Statutory provisions and it also cannot be said that the case should not be examined in light of breach of any statutory provision because such breach was specifically not alleged. 25.4 Actually allegation about breach of statutory provision are found, in substance, from the statements of claim. 25.4 Actually allegation about breach of statutory provision are found, in substance, from the statements of claim. Further, above mentioned submission/ statement by the claimants – in their statements of claim demonstrate and establish that the contention on the premise that proper or adequate averments are not made in the pleadings and therefore the case cannot be examined or decided on the premise that appellant Board committed breach of statutory provision, is misconceived and unsustainable and contrary to the record. 25.5 In this context, it is also relevant to take into account oral evidence (affidavit in lieu of Chief examination) by the claimants. The claimants asserted, in their evidence, that:- (i) their service was regular/ permanent; (ii) they worked under Valsad, Subdivision, Vapi Division as well as Dharampur Division and they rendered service at other places also where they were asked to perform duty. (iii) their service also came to be terminated without any fault on their part; (iv) their service came to be terminated by oral instruction / order on 1.6.1987; (v) before terminating their service any notice was not issued' (vi) before terminating their service any payment towards any right/ benefit have not been paid; (vii) before terminating their service any procedure required by law was not followed and not undertaken; (viii) after their service came to be terminated they served notice dated 18.11.1987 wherein they also requested to take them back in service, the appellant did not give any reply to their intimation and also did not engage them; (ix) their service came to be terminated illegally; (x) they were informed that since the work was awarded to contract their service are not required. 25.6 In light of above mentioned averments and statements in the Statements of Claim and the details mentioned in the evidence (affidavit in lieu of Chief Examination) it cannot be accepted that the claimants did not raise plea about breach of violation of Statutory obligation. The said contention is not sustainable. 25.7 The illiterate claimants categorically alleged and asserted that their service came to be terminated in blatant and illegal manner without following any procedure and without any notice and without payment of any compensation. The said allegations and averments encapsule allegation and assertion about breach of statutory provisions. The allegation that services are terminated illegally and without following any procedure prescribed by law would encompass breach of provisions under Industrial Disputes Act. The said allegations and averments encapsule allegation and assertion about breach of statutory provisions. The allegation that services are terminated illegally and without following any procedure prescribed by law would encompass breach of provisions under Industrial Disputes Act. Thus, the contention that the pleadings did not specifically mention particular provision and that therefore the provision under Section 25F or Section 25G or Rule 81 cannot be taken into account, are not sustainable. 26. Now so far as the decisions on which the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner relied are concerned, it is appropriate to note that to support his submission that the burden of proof regarding completion of service for 240 days during precedent 12 months is on the workmen the learned Senior Counsel relied on the decision in case of Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani, (2002) 3 SCC 25 , M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram, (2004) 8 SCC 246 , Surendranagar District Panchayat v. Jethabhai Pitembarbhai, (2005) 8 SCC 450 , Surendranagar District Panchyat v. Dahyabhai Amarsinh, (2005) 8 SCC 750 and The Executive Engineer (Mechanical) v. Shri C.P. Oza, (2005) 2 G.L.H 742 . 26.1 On conjoint reading of the above mentioned decisions, it comes out that in present case the proceedings were consolidated and common evidence for all reference cases was recorded, with consent of both sides. Accordingly representative evidence of workmen claimants & Board were recorded. Witnesses specifically mentioned that their service was regular and permanent. Besides this, the workmen also asserted that they had worked with the Board continuously for almost 10 years. More important fact is that the witnesses specifically asserted that the Board did not issue/ did not give attendance card, salary slip, identity card, leave record card or any other document. The said assertion by the workmen has not been refuted by the Board/ Board’s witnesses. The assertion that such evidence/ documents were not provided to the workmen remained uncontroverted. 26.2. On the other hand, it also came on record that the attendance of the workmen were recorded/ maintained in register. The wage register as well as attendance registers were in exclusive custody of the employer (appellant Board). The assertion that such evidence/ documents were not provided to the workmen remained uncontroverted. 26.2. On the other hand, it also came on record that the attendance of the workmen were recorded/ maintained in register. The wage register as well as attendance registers were in exclusive custody of the employer (appellant Board). 26.3 Under the circumstances the obligation to place the relevant document on record would be on the employer since it held exclusive possession of the registers coupled with the fact that the employer did not provide any document to the workmen and the workmen clearly asserted in their deposition that their service was regular/ permanent and that they had worked continuously for about 10 years. 26.4 In this view of the matter above mentioned decisions on which the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance do not render assistance to the petitioner. 26.5 Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner then relied on the decision in case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vinod Kumar Tiwari, (2015) 9 Scale 483, Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board, (2009) 15 SCC 327 , Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan Development Corporation v. Gitam Singh, (2013) 5 SCC 136 and District Development Officer v. S.K. Amreli, (2018) 12 SCC 298 to support the submission that if this Court holds that the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal are justified and do not warrant any interference then atleast the final order directing reinstatement with backwages may be set aside and modified and instead direction for appropriate compensation may be issued. Differently put, the appellant seeks that the award directing reinstatement of workmen with backwages be modified and substituted by direction to pay compensation. 26.6 When the decision and observation on which the learned Senior Counsel placed reliance are examined, it emerges that the said decision do not render any assistance to the petitioner. In case of M/s. Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Employees of M/s. Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. AIR 1979 SC 75 , Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows: "9....Ordinarily, therefore, a workman whose service has been illegally terminated would be entitled to full backs except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced idleness. That is the normal rule." In present case there is nothing on record to even indicate that the workmen were gainfully employed in the interregnum. That is the normal rule." In present case there is nothing on record to even indicate that the workmen were gainfully employed in the interregnum. 26.7 In case of Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED.) (2013) 10 SCC 324 Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that in cases where the termination of service of workman is found to be illegal, then compelling circumstances are established, the direction to reinstate the workman should follow. In the said decision Hon'ble Apex Court has observed, inter alia, that: 38.1 In cases of wrongful termination of service, reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is the normal rule. 38.2 The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that while deciding the issue of back wages, the adjudicating authority or the Court may take into consideration the length of service of the employee/workman, the nature of misconduct, if any, found proved against the employee/workman, the financial condition of the employer and similar other factors. 38.3 Ordinarily, an employee or workman whose services are terminated and who is desirous of getting back wages is required to either plead or at least make a statement before the adjudicating authority or the Court of first instance that he/she was not gainfully employed or was employed on lesser wages. If the employer wants to avoid payment of full back wages, then it has to plead and also lead cogent evidence to prove that the employee/workman was gainfully employed and was getting wages equal to the wages he/she was drawing prior to the termination of service. This is so because it is settled law that the burden of proof of the existence of a particular fact lies on the person who makes a positive averments about its existence. It is always easier to prove a positive fact than to prove a negative fact. Therefore, once the employee shows that he was not employed, the onus lies on the employer to specifically plead and prove that the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same or substantially similar emoluments. It is always easier to prove a positive fact than to prove a negative fact. Therefore, once the employee shows that he was not employed, the onus lies on the employer to specifically plead and prove that the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same or substantially similar emoluments. 38.4 The cases in which the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal exercises power under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and finds that even though the enquiry held against the employee/workman is consistent with the rules of natural justice and / or certified standing orders, if any, but holds that the punishment was disproportionate to the misconduct found proved, then it will have the discretion not to award full back wages. However, if the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal finds that the employee or workman is not at all guilty of any misconduct or that the employer had foisted a false charge, then there will be ample justification for award of full back wages. 38.5 The cases in which the competent Court or Tribunal finds that the employer has acted in gross violation of the statutory provisions and/or the principles of natural justice or is guilty of victimizing the employee or workman, then the concerned Court or Tribunal will be fully justified in directing payment of full back wages. In such cases, the superior Courts should not exercise power under Article 226 or 136 of the Constitution and interfere with the award passed by the Labour Court, etc., merely because there is a possibility of forming a different opinion on the entitlement of the employee/workman to get full back wages or the employer’s obligation to pay the same. The Courts must always be kept in view that in the cases of wrongful / illegal termination of service, the wrongdoer is the employer and sufferer is the employee/workman and there is no justification to give premium to the employer of his wrongdoings by relieving him of the burden to pay to the employee/workman his dues in the form of full back wages. 38.6 In a number of cases, the superior Courts have interfered with the award of the primary adjudicatory authority on the premise that finalization of litigation has taken long time ignoring that in majority of cases the parties are not responsible for such delays. Lack of infrastructure and manpower is the principal cause for delay in the disposal of cases. 38.6 In a number of cases, the superior Courts have interfered with the award of the primary adjudicatory authority on the premise that finalization of litigation has taken long time ignoring that in majority of cases the parties are not responsible for such delays. Lack of infrastructure and manpower is the principal cause for delay in the disposal of cases. For this the litigants cannot be blamed or penalised. It would amount to grave injustice to an employee or workman if he is denied back wages simply because there is long lapse of time between the termination of his service and finality given to the order of reinstatement. The Courts should bear in mind that in most of these cases, the employer is in an advantageous position visàvis the employee or workman. He can avail the services of best legal brain for prolonging the agony of the sufferer, i.e., the employee or workman, who can ill afford the luxury of spending money on a lawyer with certain amount of fame. Therefore, in such cases it would be prudent to adopt the course suggested in Hindustan Tin Works Private Limited v. Employees.” 26.8 The facts of the case and findings by Labour Court, which are confirmed and approved by learned Single Judge and we also do not find said concurrent decision incorrect or perverse, make it clear that this case is covered by Para-38.1 of said decision. The Service were not terminated for misconduct, thus Para-38.2 do not come in picture. Since the workmen asserted that they were not gainfully engaged Para-38.3 is the beacon for deciding the issue about final relief. The facts of these cases also bring in picture Para-38.5. For all these reasons we do not find it just to disturb the decision by Labour Court and learned Single Judge. 26.9 In light of the facts of present case and above quoted observation, the decisions on which the learned Senior Counsel placed reliance do not render any assistance to the petitioner. 27. In this context, it is relevant to note that the learned Labour Court came to the conclusion that Board terminated service of the claimants and that the said termination is in breach of statutory provisions and therefore illegal and invalid. 27.1 The said conclusion is confirmed and approved by learned Single Judge. 28. 27. In this context, it is relevant to note that the learned Labour Court came to the conclusion that Board terminated service of the claimants and that the said termination is in breach of statutory provisions and therefore illegal and invalid. 27.1 The said conclusion is confirmed and approved by learned Single Judge. 28. Having regard to the facts of the case learned Labour Court also considered it appropriate to direct the Board to reinstate the claimants. The said direction also came to be approved by learned Single Judge. 29. Now, before us, plea is raised on the ground that the appellant Board has taken recourse to outsourcing i.e. in our view the said plea is not strong enough to deprive the claimants from the result of their long drawn battle against illegal action of the employer. 29.1 The work which the claimants performed is available. 29.2 Only modification is that now the employer gets the said work executed through outside agency/ contractor and contract labourers. 29.3 In such circumstances, the employer's plea that the relief may be moulded and modified by awarding compensation instead of reinstatement, does not appeal to us. 30. When it has emerged that the termination of the service of the claimants is in violation of statutory and mandatory provisions and when it has also emerged that there was no justification to discontinue the service of the claimants and in view of the fact that since the work ( which the claimants performed) continued, existed and survived the Board has taken recourse to outsourcing and has engaged manpower on contract basis, we find the appellant's request, to say the least, absolutely insensitive, selfish and unjustified. 30.1 We refuse to deprive the workman of the natural consequences of proceedings. 30.2 The claimants have, only on the strength of sheer will power and the spirit to fight against injustice, survived for almost 2 decades and have faced the proceedings for such long period. 30.3 Merely because the employer has taken recourse to outsourcing, it cannot be allowed to take benefit or advantage of its self created situation. 31. In light of foregoing discussion and for reasons mentioned above, we are of the view that captioned appeals cannot be and do not deserve to be accepted. 30.3 Merely because the employer has taken recourse to outsourcing, it cannot be allowed to take benefit or advantage of its self created situation. 31. In light of foregoing discussion and for reasons mentioned above, we are of the view that captioned appeals cannot be and do not deserve to be accepted. 31.1 The appellant has failed to make out any strong, convincing and compelling justification to disturb and upset concurrent findings, decisions and directions recorded by the learned Labour Court and confirmed and approved by learned Single Judge. 31.2 The appellant failed to show anything from the material available on record to convince us to take a view different from concurrent findings and decisions recorded by learned Labour Court and learned Single Judge and the Appellant also failed to demonstrate that the concurrent decisions are incorrect and perverse. In our view, the Appeals fail and do not deserve to be granted. Consequently, the Appeals are dismissed. We, however, desist from passing any order as to cost. In the facts of the case the parties to bear their own cost. FURTHER ORDER At this stage Mr. Patel, learned Senior Counsel prays for suspension of the implementation of the judgment. He submitted that during pendency of the appeals, the operation of the award and judgment by learned Single Judge was suspended. Mr. Chaudhari, learned advocate for the workmen initially submitted that for the same reason namely that the workmen have not received fruit of the award which came to be passed in 2006 in reference cases instituted in 1990 and therefore the operation may not be stayed. However he fairly submitted that until 31.7.2019 the claimants/ workmen will not take any steps for execution of the award. In view of the said submission and statement by Mr. Chaudhari, learned advocate for the claimants, any order is not required.