JUDGMENT : RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY, J. 1. Heard Mr. Anoop Kumar Mehta, learned counsel for the petitioner. No one appears for the respondent no. 2. 2. In this writ application, the prayer of the petitioner is for quashing the order dated 19.10.2000 passed in W.C. No. 2/99 by the respondent no. 1 whereby and whereunder the petitioner has been directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 1,50,260/- as compensation. A further prayer has been made by the petitioner for quashing the order dated 12.12.2000 by which the application preferred by the petitioner for recall of the order dated 19.10.2000 has been rejected by the respondent no. 1. 3. The petitioner-M/s. BCCL owns industrial collieries situated in the district of Dhanbad. The respondent no. 2 was a workman working as Mining Sirdar in the industrial colliery under the petitioner. The respondent no. 2 had alleged that an accident had occurred on 19.07.1993 in the industrial colliery as a result of which he had sustained injuries on the left side of head, left ankle joint and consequently his left eye-sight and hearing on the left ear got impaired for which an application was preferred by the respondent no. 2 before the Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation, Dhanbad in which a claim of Rs. 1,44,000/- was made for compensation. The petitioner had appeared on being noticed on 15.04.1999 and submitted its show-cause wherein it was claimed that the accident had occurred on 19.07.1993 as per the respondent no. 2, but the claim application was filed in the year 1999. It was further asserted that the petitioner had no knowledge about the accident as alleged by the respondent no. 2. It is also the case of the petitioner that the respondent no. 2 was directed to appear before the Medical Board, but he did not appear, and therefore, the petitioner claims that the respondent no. 2 is not entitled to any compensation. In the show-cause filed by the petitioner reference was also made to the injury report, but since respondent no. 2 had already superannuated on 10.03.1999, he was sent to All India Institute of Medical Sciences for better treatment. An order was passed in W.C. No. 2/99 on 19.10.2000 in which the application preferred by the respondent no. 2 was allowed and the petitioner was directed to deposit Rs. 1,50,260/- as compensation. 2 had already superannuated on 10.03.1999, he was sent to All India Institute of Medical Sciences for better treatment. An order was passed in W.C. No. 2/99 on 19.10.2000 in which the application preferred by the respondent no. 2 was allowed and the petitioner was directed to deposit Rs. 1,50,260/- as compensation. On coming to know of order dated 19.10.2000, the petitioner filed an application for recall/review of the said order which however was rejected on 12.12.2000. 4. Mr. Anoop Kumar Mehta, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that there has been delay of 6 years in making an application for compensation. Even if it is assumed that an accident had indeed taken place on 19.07.1993 but the said application was neither accompanied by a separate application for condonation of delay nor the respondent no. 1 had applied its mind with respect to the delay and had straightway granted compensation to the tune of Rs. 1,50,260/- in favour of the respondent no. 2. Learned counsel submits that the proviso to Section 10 of the Employees’ Compensation Act categorically reveals the reasons found to be given for condonation of delay irrespective of the fact as to whether the claim application is accompanied with a condonation application or not. Learned counsel further submits that in course of hearing before the respondent no. 1, the date was fixed for 28.11.2000, but behind the back of the petitioner an order was already passed on 19.10.2000. It has also been submitted that the application for recall preferred by the petitioner was also not appropriately considered nor the petitioner was given an opportunity of hearing. It has thus been submitted that the impugned orders deserve to be quashed and set aside considering the apparent illegality which appears on the face of such orders. 5. Although, no one appeared on behalf of the respondent no. 2, but the counter affidavit submitted by the respondent no. 2 has been perused. 6. It has been stated that there is no dispute with respect to the respondent no. 2 having suffered an accident on 19.07.1993 leading to extensive damage on several parts of his body including his left eye and left ear. It has also been asserted that the matter was informed to the authorities of the petitioner and the respondent no. 6. It has been stated that there is no dispute with respect to the respondent no. 2 having suffered an accident on 19.07.1993 leading to extensive damage on several parts of his body including his left eye and left ear. It has also been asserted that the matter was informed to the authorities of the petitioner and the respondent no. 2 had apart from being treated at Central Hospital, Dhanbad was also referred for treatment to AIIMS on 21.01.1998. The respondent no. 2 further stated in his counter affidavit that he was declared fit for light duties since 13.09.1993, but he was not given light duties and in fact he was declared unfit for working underground on 08.06.1998 as per the medical treatment slip. 7. The factual aspects therefore would reveal that the primary question for consideration is as to whether the impugned order dated 19.10.2000 was passed behind the back of the petitioner and whether the respondent no. 1 committed an error of law in not applying his mind or for that matter condoning the delay in filing the claim application before straightway passing an order directing payment of compensation to the respondent no. 2. The most important aspect which is to be considered is whether this court can entertain this writ application when an alternative remedy already exists before the petitioner for filing an appeal in terms of Section 30 of the Employees’ Compensation Act. 8. This case was admitted on 04.03.2002 and it is to be seen as to whether once a writ application is admitted, the question of availing of an alternative remedy to the petitioner survives or not. In this context, reference may be made to the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and Another vs. Uttar Pradesh Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam Sangharsh Samiti and Others, (2008) 12 SCC 675 . In the said case, consideration was made to the case of Suresh Chandra Tewari vs. District Supply Officers, AIR 1992 All. 331 and it was held as follows: “38. With respect to the learned Judge, it is neither the legal position nor such a proposition has been laid down in Suresh Chandra Tewari that once a petition is admitted, it cannot be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. 331 and it was held as follows: “38. With respect to the learned Judge, it is neither the legal position nor such a proposition has been laid down in Suresh Chandra Tewari that once a petition is admitted, it cannot be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. It is no doubt correct that in the head-note of All India Reporter (p. 331), it is stated that “petition cannot be rejected on the ground of availability of alternative remedy of filing appeal”. But it has not been so held in the actual decision of the Court. The relevant para 2 of the decision reads thus: (Suresh Chandra Tewari case, AIR p. 331) “2. At the time of hearing of this petition a threshold question, as to its maintainability was raised on the ground that the impugned order was an appealable on and, therefore, before approaching this Court the petitioner should have approached the appellate authority. Though there is much substance in the above contention, we do not feel inclined to reject this petition on the ground of alternative remedy having regard to the fact that the petitioner has been entertained and an interim order passed.” (Emphasis supplied) Even otherwise, the learned Judge was not right in law. True it is that issuance of rule nisi or passing of interim orders is a relevant consideration for not dismissing a petition if it appears to the High Court that the matter could be decided by a writ court. It has been so held even by this Court in several cases that even if alternative remedy is available, it cannot be held that a writ petition is not maintainable. In our judgment, however, it cannot be laid down as a proposition of law that once a petition is admitted, it could never be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. If such bald contention is upheld, even this Court cannot order dismissal of a writ petition which ought not to have been entertained by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in view of availability of alternative and equally efficacious remedy to the aggrieved party, once the High Court has entertained a writ petition albeit wrongly and granted the relief to the petitioner.” 9. It was therefore held that once a petition is admitted, it cannot be held as a proposition of law that it can never be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. 10. There is an equal and efficacious remedy available to the petitioner by way of filing an appeal before appropriate forum. Merely because the writ has been admitted, the same would not dissuade the petitioner in preferring an appeal. It was therefore premature on the part of the petitioner to approach this Court assailing the order passed by respondent no. 1. The order impugned can very well be assailed before the appellate forum, if the petitioner intends to do so. There are instances, however where writ applications are entertained in spite of availability of alternative remedy in certain extraordinary circumstances. This case would not fall in such categories as whatever has been argued can very well be agitated before the appropriate forum which can conveniently look into the issue, correct errors if any committed by the respondent no. 1 and decide the appeal accordingly. 11. In view of what has been held in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and Another (supra), the present writ petition in the facts and circumstances of the case becomes unsustainable and is accordingly disposed of with a liberty to the petitioner to prefer an appeal in terms of Section 30 of the Employees’ Compensation Act before the appropriate authority. Although, the factual aspects of the case and the assertions of both the parties have been recorded, but this court is not making any observations on such aspects in view of the alternative remedy available to the petitioner and it is best left for the appellate court to decide the issues raised by the petitioner and countered by the respondent no. 2 appropriately and within the legal parameters, if any appeal is preferred by the petitioner. The appellate authority in case of an appeal being preferred by the petitioner shall while considering the delay keep in mind that the petitioner had preferred a writ application in the year 2001 and shall accordingly consider such application. 12. This writ application stands disposed of with the aforementioned observations and directions. Writ Application disposed of.