JUDGMENT Rongon Mukhopadhyay, J. - Heard Mr. V.P. Singh, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Mr. S.K. Ughal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 2. 2. In this writ application, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the notification dated 03.07.1999 as contained in S.O. No. 7/L.D.-12013/98 LE &T 2277, issued by the Government of Bihar, Department of Labour, Employment and Training, whereby and where under the dispute has been referred to the Labour Court at Jamshedpur for adjudication under Section 10(i)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The petitioner has further prayed for quashing of the entire proceedings in connection with Reference Case No. 10 of 1999 pending before the Labour Court, Jamshedpur including the order dated 06.03.2006 whereby it has been held that the domestic enquiry was not valid as it was conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice and the finding of the Enquiry Officer was not fair and proper. 3. The case of the management as would appear from the writ application is that the petitioner has its Standing Orders duly certified under the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 which provides for disciplinary procedure and illustrative list of misconducts. In accordance with the provisions of the standing orders when an employee is charged for an act of misconduct an enquiry is held by giving the concerned employee a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The respondent no. 2 was offered employment on 15.05.1965 as unskilled mate grade II in the Gen, M.C. Shop in the works of the petitioner''s company on daily wages which offer of employment was accepted along with all the terms and conditions, consequent to which the respondent no. 2 was appointed as a daily wager and he joined on 17.05.1965. A charge sheet was issued to the respondent no. 2 on 12.11.1966 on account of his continuous absence from duty without leave since 29.10.1966 which is a misconduct in terms of Clause 24 (XI) of the Works Standing Orders of the petitioner''s company. An Enquiry Officer was also appointed to enquire into the charges levelled against the respondent no. 2. 4. It is the case of the management that a copy of the charge sheet dated 12.11.1966 was sent to the home as well as local address of the respondent no. An Enquiry Officer was also appointed to enquire into the charges levelled against the respondent no. 2. 4. It is the case of the management that a copy of the charge sheet dated 12.11.1966 was sent to the home as well as local address of the respondent no. 2 by registered post and the charge sheet sent to the local address was subsequently returned back unserved. The charge sheet was subsequently published in Hindi Daily "Azad Mazdoor". Subsequently however the respondent no. 2 had appeared on 02.12.1966 and claimed that he had not received the charge sheet which was made available to him and he was directed to submit his explanation on or before 12.12.1966 and to appear before the Enquiry Officer on 15.12.1966. 5. The further case of the management is that the respondent no. 2 neither submitted any explanation nor had appeared before the Enquiry Officer and ultimately the Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 07.01.1967 recommending discharge of the respondent no. 2 from the services of the company as it was established that he had absented himself without reasonable explanation from 29.10.1966. 6. The disciplinary authority thereafter on considering the enquiry report had passed an order for discharge of the respondent no. 2 from the services of the company pursuant to which an office order was issued on 21.01.1967. 7. The respondent no. 2 after almost 32 years on 09.03.1998 made a request for setting aside the order of discharge as well as for his reinstatement of service with full back wages and other consequential benefits. A subsequent representation was also sent to the management by the respondent no. 2 stating therein that he was not allowed to put forward his case. 8. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent no. 2 in which it has been stated that proper service of notice was never effected on him as notice was never sent to him at his permanent address at Uliyan Basti, P.O. & P.S. Kadma, Jamshedpur. It has further been stated that the Enquiry Officer had not applied his mind and the date of enquiry was fixed before submission of explanation. 9. The Industrial dispute which was raised by the respondent no. 2 was referred for adjudication before the Labour Court at Jamshedpur on the following terms: "Whether the termination of services of Sri Naresh Chandra Dutta, workman, unskilled mate, ticket no. 9. The Industrial dispute which was raised by the respondent no. 2 was referred for adjudication before the Labour Court at Jamshedpur on the following terms: "Whether the termination of services of Sri Naresh Chandra Dutta, workman, unskilled mate, ticket no. 2120/00364/2 of Telco Ltd. Jamshedpur is justified? If not, what relief, the workman is entitled to?" 10. The written statements were submitted on behalf of both the sides and the management had submitted that the disputes itself was stale considering the fact that it was raised after almost three decades. 11. A preliminary issue was formulated as to whether the domestic enquiry conducted by the management was fair and proper. The learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur vide order dated 06.03.2006 had held that the Enquiry Officer during exparte enquiry did not apply his mind on the statement of the management representative and the medical certificate produced before him and therefore it was concluded that the findings of the Enquiry Officer is not fair and proper. The preliminary issue which was decided against the management is the subject matter of the present writ application. 12. Although learned counsel for the respective parties have argued at length with respect to the legality or otherwise of the impugned order dated 06.03.2006 but to answer the said question it would be apt to refer to some of the judicial pronouncements relating to the subject. 13. In the case of "D.P. Maheshwari vs. Delhi Administration and Others" reported in (1983) 4 SCC 293 , the question for consideration was as to whether delay on account of the decision to be taken on a preliminary issue would be adverse to Industrial peace and harmony and as to whether the lis itself should be decided or not. It was indicated in the aforesaid judgment the caution which has to be adopted while dealing with such issues and the same reads as follows: "It was just the other day that we were bemoaning the unbecoming devices adopted by certain employers to avoid decision of industrial disputes on merits. We noticed how they would raise various preliminary objections, invite decision on those objections in the first instance, carry the matter to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and delay a decision of the real dispute for years, sometimes for over a decade. We noticed how they would raise various preliminary objections, invite decision on those objections in the first instance, carry the matter to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and delay a decision of the real dispute for years, sometimes for over a decade. Industrial peace, one presumes, hangs in the balance in the meanwhile. We have now before us a case where a dispute originating in 1969 and referred for adjudication by the Government to the Labour Court in 1970 is still at the stage of decision on a preliminary objection. There was a time when it was thought prudent and wise policy to decide preliminary issues first. But the time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that policy. We think it is better that tribunals, particularly those entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopardise industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues. Nor should High Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before a tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from court to court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Article 226 and Article 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion. Tribunals and courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must therefore ask themselves whether such threshold part-adjudication is really necessary and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences. After all tribunals like Industrial Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner of preliminary objections and journeyings up and down. After all tribunals like Industrial Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner of preliminary objections and journeyings up and down. It is also worthwhile remembering that the nature of the jurisdiction under Article 226 is supervisory and not appellate while that under Article 136 is primarily supervisory but the court may exercise all necessary appellate powers to do substantial justice. In the exercise of such jurisdiction neither the High Court nor this Court is required to be too astute to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by special tribunals at interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues." 14. This writ application is pending since the year 2006 primarily on the question as to whether the preliminary issue regarding fairness or otherwise of the domestic enquiry was correct or not. In view of the directions as indicated in the aforesaid pronouncement without considering the merits of the issues regarding preliminary enquiry raised by the management it would be appropriate that the Labour Court expedites the disposal of the reference itself. 15. It is now to be seen as to whether the management will be stifled in its persuasion of its case once the preliminary issue has been decided by the learned Labour Court to the effect that the domestic enquiry which was conducted was not fair and proper and was violative of the principles of natural justice. 16. In the case of "The workman of M/s. Firestone Tyre and Ruber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. The Management and Others" reported in (1973) 1 SCC 813 , it was explored as to whether in case the domestic enquiry was found to be not fair and proper the management could lead evidence in support of it contention or not and it was held therein: "37. If there has been no enquiry held by the employer or if the enquiry is held to be defective, it is open to the employer even now to adduce evidence for the first time before the Tribunal justifying the order of discharge or dismissal. We are not inclined to accept the contention on behalf of the workmen that the right of the employer to adduce evidence before the Tribunal for the first time recognised by this Court in its various decisions, has been taken away. We are not inclined to accept the contention on behalf of the workmen that the right of the employer to adduce evidence before the Tribunal for the first time recognised by this Court in its various decisions, has been taken away. There is no indication in the section that the said right has been abrogated. If the intention of the legislature was to do away with such a right, which has been recognised over a long period of years, as will be noticed by the decisions referred to earlier, the section would have been differently worded. Admittedly, there are no express words to that effect, and there is no indication that the section has impliedly changed the law in that respect. Therefore, the position is that even now the employer is entitled to adduce evidence for the first time before the Tribunal even if he had held no enquiry or the enquiry held by him is found to be defective. Of course, an opportunity will have to be given to the workman to lead evidence contra. The stage at which the employer has to ask for such an opportunity, has been pointed out by this Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. case (supra). No doubt, this procedure may be time consuming, elaborate and cumbersome. As pointed out by this Court in the decision just referred to above, it is open to the Tribunal to deal with the validity of the domestic enquiry, if one has been held as a preliminary issue. If its finding on the subject is in favour of the management, then there will be no occasion for additional evidence being cited by the management. But if the finding on this issue is against the management, the Tribunal will have to give the employer an opportunity to cite additional evidence justifying his action. This right in the management to sustain its order by adducing independent evidence before the Tribunal, if no enquiry has been held or if the enquiry is held to be defective, has been given judicial recognition over a long period of years. 17. Applying the ratio of the case of "The workman of M/s. Firestone Tyre and Ruber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. The Management and Others" (supra), the management has a right to adduce evidence before the Labour Court regarding the validity of the enquiry proceedings and the respondent no. 17. Applying the ratio of the case of "The workman of M/s. Firestone Tyre and Ruber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. The Management and Others" (supra), the management has a right to adduce evidence before the Labour Court regarding the validity of the enquiry proceedings and the respondent no. 2 will have the opportunity to adduce evidence in counter. 18. So far as the prayer made by the petitioner with respect to quashing of the notification dated 03.07.1999 by which the dispute was referred for adjudication to the Labour Court as well as for quashing of the entire proceedings arising out of Reference Case No. 10 of 1999 is concerned the same cannot be entertained solely for the reason that the reference has been made by the Government of Bihar under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act on being satisfied that an industrial disputes exists and since the Labour Court has already considered the preliminary issue with respect to the validity or otherwise of the domestic enquiry so conducted and in such circumstance therefore this Court cannot accede to the prayer of the petitioner regarding quashment of the notification as well as the proceedings of the reference case. 19. This writ application, therefore, stands disposed of with the aforementioned observations and directions. Writ Petition disposed of with the above mentioned observations and directions.