JUDGMENT : Sureshwar Thakur, J. The instant petition, is, directed against the orders recorded by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P., upon, execution petition No.4/10 of 2013, on 28.7.2017, wherethrough, he after dismissing the objections raised therebefore by the petitioners herein, (a) rather proceeded to order for attachment of the immovable properties of the JDs/petitioners herein, (b) and, also drew a schedule for putting to sale through public auction, the attached immovable assets of the JDs/petitioners herein. 2. The assumption of jurisdiction, upon, the afore application, was, in pursuance to a conclusive, and, binding judgment, standing rendered by the learned Additional District Judge, Chandigarh. The afore conclusive verdict recorded by the learned Additional District Judge, Chandigarh, whereby, the plaintiffs/decrees holders, were, held entitled for a sum of Rs.77,35,073/- alongwith interest @ 6% per annum, immediately before filing of the execution petition till date of realization, was put for execution, before the learned Additional District Judge, Chadigarh. Furtheronwards, the afore execution application was received by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Nalagarh, upon, its transfer to him, by the afore learned executing Court concerned. The learned counsel appearing for the aggrieved petitioners/judgment debtors concerned submits, (a) that since the objection appertaining to the assumption of jurisdiction thereon, by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Nalagarh, was contested, by the JDs/petitioners herein, on anvil, of the decree strived to be put into execution, rather containing a decretal amount, apparently falling outside the pecuniary limits of jurisdiction, of, the transferee Court, (b) and, when, a, decision thereon, hence, adversarial to the petitioners/JDs, was, recorded in the impugned order, thereupon, the res-controversia engaging the parties at contest, before this Court, is, squarely grooved, in, the trite factum, whether the afore objections, hence, hold any validity. 3. For determining the afore factum probandum, it is imperative to bear in mind, the, mandate borne in Section 39 of the CPC, provisions whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- “39. Transfer of decree. 3. For determining the afore factum probandum, it is imperative to bear in mind, the, mandate borne in Section 39 of the CPC, provisions whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- “39. Transfer of decree. (1) The Court which passed a decree may, on the application of the decree-holder, send it for execution to another Court 1[of competent jurisdiction],- (a) if the person against whom the decree is passed actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business, or personally works for gain, within the local limits of the jurisdiction of such other Court, or (b) if such person has not property within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court which passed the decree sufficient to satisfy such decree and has property within the local limits of the jurisdiction of such other Court, or (c) if the decree directs the sale or delivery of immovable property situate outside the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court which passed it, or (d) if the Court which passed the decree considers for any other reason, which it shall record in writing, that the decree should be executed by such other Court. (2) The Court which passed the decree may of its own motion send it for execution to any subordinate Court of competent jurisdiction. 1[ (3) For the purposes of this section, a Court shall be deemed to be a Court of competent jurisdiction if, at the time of making the application for the transfer of decree to it, such Court would have jurisdiction to try the suit in which such decree was passed.] 2[ (4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise the Court which passed a decree to execute such decree against any person or property outside the local limits of its jurisdiction.]” The relevant sub-section (3) whereof, is, of utmost importance. A perusal thereof, makes a marked display qua assumption, of, jurisdiction by the transferee Court, vis-a-vis, the decree sent therebefore, for its coercive enforcement, would hold validity, (a) upon, the imperative statutory canon borne therein, qua, at the time of making the application for the transfer, of the decree, vis-a-vis, the transferee court, the latter Court also thereat or in contemporaneity therewith, rather holding, the, pecuniary jurisdiction to render, a judgment, and, decree, vis-a-vis, the decretal sums, as stood, transferred thereto, for, its/their coercive realization. The learned counsel appearing for the aggrieved petitioners, has contended (b) that the parlance borne by the coinage, “a court shall be deemed to be a court of competent jurisdiction, if, at the time of making the application for the transfer to it, such court would have jurisdiction to try the suit in which such decree was passed,” as, existing in sub-section (3) of Section 39 of the CPC, (c) holding no connotation than the transferee executing Court, in contemporaneity, vis-a-vis, its assuming jurisdiction, upon the execution petition rather also holding the pecuniary limits, of jurisdiction, hence, commensurate, to, the decretal amount (s). The afore submission has vigour, as, the afore coinage, does carry, the imperative import (d) qua the transferee Court/executing court, necessarily being enjoined, to hold the pecuniary jurisdiction, especially in contemporaneity, vis-a-vis, its striving to put, to, coercive realization, the, decretal amounts, hence to also render a judgment, and, decree, in commensuration therewith, and, importantly, and, reiteratedly qua its pecuniary jurisdiction, rather bearing commensuration, vis-a-vis, the decretal sums, as strived, to be, put to coercive realization. Any other connotation, if is ascribed thereto, would lead to a disastrous consequence, qua the transferee executing court, rather proceeding to assume jurisdiction, upon, the transfered execution application, even when the decretal sums, as, concerted, to be realized therethrough, rather holding a value hence, evidently beyond the limits, of, its pecuniary jurisdiction, (e) and, when the decretal sums were never amenable, for, any affirmative rendition, vis-a-vis, the plaintiff/decree holders, in the latters' suit, as cast therebefore, thereupon, the transferred execution application, would also be unamenable, for, any assumption, of, any valid jurisdiction thereon. In coming to the afore conclusion, this Court finds strength from a verdict, rendered by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in a case titled as Khatu Bai and another v. Khatija Bai and others, reported in AIR 1973 Andhra Pradesh 35, the relevant pragraph No.9 whereof stands extracted hereinafter:- “9. So far as the first point is concerned Shri Subbaraydu relies upon the decisions of Calcutta, Bombay and Patna High Courts and submits that there is a sharp difference in the views expressed in Judgments of the said High Courts and the judgments of the Madras High Court Court, which were referred to and approved by the Allahabad High Court. So far as the first point is concerned Shri Subbaraydu relies upon the decisions of Calcutta, Bombay and Patna High Courts and submits that there is a sharp difference in the views expressed in Judgments of the said High Courts and the judgments of the Madras High Court Court, which were referred to and approved by the Allahabad High Court. So far as this High Court is concerned, the rulings of Madras High Court rendered prior to 5th July, 1954 have binding effect on this High Court. On this point, the long catena of cases decided by the Madras High Court had clearly taken a view that for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the executing court, it is only the amount involved in execution that has to be considered and not the value of the subject matter of the suit. In Narasayya v. Venkatakrishnayya (1884) ILR 7 Mad 397, it was held by Ayyar. J. as follows:- “although by the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873 the ordinary jurisdiction of Munsif's is limited in suits and applications of a civil nature to those in which the subject matter does not exceed in value Rs.2,500/-. Section 223 of the old Code of Civil Procedure gives jurisdiction to a Munsif's Court to execute a decree in a suit beyond its jurisdiction which has been transferred to it for execution by a District Court.” 4. Be that as it may, the learned counsel appearing for the decree holders/respondents herein, (i) has also contended with much vigour before this Court, that, any objection, vis-a-vis, the lack of assumption, of, any jurisdiction by the transferee executing Court, was required to be raised, at the initial stage, (ii) and, when the JDS/petitioners herein had acceded to the transfer, of execution application, vis-a-vis, the court of learned Senior Civil Judge, Nalagarh, thereupon, the statutory embargo, created in sub-section (3) of Section 21 of the CPC, provisions whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- “21. Objections to jurisdiction 1[ (1)] No objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues or settled at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. 2[ (2) No objection as to the competence of a Court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity, and in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. (3) No objection as to the competence of the executing Court with reference to the local limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the executing Court at the earliest possible opportunity, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.]” rather stands attracted, (iii) and, thereupon, the, order impugned before this Court, hence, assumes an aura, of, validation. However, the afore contention raised before this Court, by the learned counsel for the respondents/decree holders, is, anvilled, upon, a gross misreading of the provisions of Section 21 CPC, given sub-section (1) thereof, making, a, graphic display qua no objection, as to the place suing, being acceptable by any Appellate or Revisional Court, unless, such objection was taken in the Court, of first instance at the earliest, however, with an exception qua for avoiding the failure of justice. The words, “ as to the place of suing” occurring therein, (ii) carry no other signification than the one, qua theirs appertaining to the territorial limits, of jurisdiction of the court, wherebefore the plaint, is, presented, and, with sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the CPC, containing a clear mandate qua objection, vis-a-vis, assumption of jurisdiction, by the Court of first instance, and, it appertaining, to, the pecuniary limits of jurisdiction also being barred to be raised, before the Appellate or Revisional Court, rather the afore objection, vis-a-vis, the afore facet, being raisable only at the first instance, and, however with an exception, qua for avoiding failure of justice, (iii) thereupon, the occurrence of the coinage “ No objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any Appellate Court or Revisional Court unless such objections was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest”, in sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the CPC, (iv) does carry, an obvious connotation, qua it, operating, vis-a-vis, the territorial limits of jurisdiction, of the learned trial Judge, and, all the succeeding thereto provisions borne in the other sub-sections also working only at the initial stage, of presentation of plaint, and, thereafter being not workable at the stage, of, filing of an execution petition. Furthermore, when sub-section (3) of Section 21 of the CPC also rears a bar against objections, vis-a-vis, assumption of jurisdiction, by the executing Court, and, with the afore objection appertaining to the local limits of jurisdiction, being unrearable before the Appellate or Revisions Court. Furthermore, when sub-section (3) of Section 21 of the CPC also rears a bar against objections, vis-a-vis, assumption of jurisdiction, by the executing Court, and, with the afore objection appertaining to the local limits of jurisdiction, being unrearable before the Appellate or Revisions Court. However, with an exception obviously for avoiding failure of justice, (v) thereupon, upon, a combined reading, of, apt sub-sections (1), (2), and (3), and, given, upon sub-section (2), on its being read, alone with sub-section (1), rather creating bar qua rearing of objections, appertaining to the territorial jurisdiction, and, sub-section (2) in contradistinction thereof, rather creating bar against, the, rearing, of, apposite objection, vis-a-vis, the pecuniary limits, of, jurisdiction, of, the court concerned, to hence try the suit, (vi) thereupon, rather sub-section (3) is to be concomitantly concluded, to be appertaining, to, and, it creating a bar against the rearing of objection, vis-a-vis, the local limits, of, jurisdiction of the executing Court and, hence, the play of sub-section (3) of Section 21 of the CPC, is, uninvocable for hence leveraging, the, submission, made by the learned counsel appearing, for the respondents/decree holders, that it, also envelopes therewithin, the necessity of raising, of, objection, vis-a-vis, the pecuniary jurisdiction, of, the transferee executing court, (vii) and, is also unworkable for succoring, the afore submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs/decree holders, that, with the plaintiffs/decree holders acquiescing, vis-a-vis, the transfer of the execution application, vis-a-vis, the transferee court, thereupon, the aggrieved defendants/judgment debtors, being barred to raise objections, vis-a-vis, the pecuniary limits of jurisdiction, of, the transferee executing court, to, hence render the impugned order. Pre-eminently also acquiescence, if any, does not cloth, the, transferee executing Court, with, any jurisdiction, importantly when it lacked, the, requisite jurisdiction, and, conspicuously also when the mandate, of the afore provisions, is working only at, the outset, and, is unworkable at, an, advanced stage, of drawing, of, execution proceedings. In coming to the afore conclusion, this court finds support from a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in a case titled as Jai Narain Ram Lundia versus Kedar Nath Khetan and others, reported in AIR 1956 SC 359 , relevant paragraph No. 25 whereof stands extracted hereinafter:- “25. In coming to the afore conclusion, this court finds support from a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in a case titled as Jai Narain Ram Lundia versus Kedar Nath Khetan and others, reported in AIR 1956 SC 359 , relevant paragraph No. 25 whereof stands extracted hereinafter:- “25. Then it was argued that this objection to execution should have been taken by the plaintiff in the Calcutta High Court when the defendant asked for transfer of the decree to Motihari and that as that was not done it is too late now. But here also the answer is same. The only question before the Calcutta High Court on the application made to it was whether the decree should be transferred or not. Whether the plaintiff might or could have taken the objection in the High Court is beside the point because it is evident that he need not have done so on the only issue which the application for transfer raised, namely, whether the decree should be transferred or not; at best it could only be said that the plaintiff had a choice of two forums. But normally this sort of question which involves an enquiry into fact would not be tried by an appellate court. It would be more appropriate for an original court to which the decree is transferred for execution to enquire into it. In any case, if the appellant's contention is pushed to its logical conclusion it would mean that whenever a decree is transferred all objection to execution must cease unless the order of the court directing the transfer expressly enumerates the issues that the transferring court is at liberty to determine. In our opinion Section 42 of the Civil Procedure Code is a complete answer to this contention.” 5. Consequently, the instant petition is allowed, and, the impugned order is set aside. However, it is open to the decree holders/respondents herein to move afresh, to, the Court of first instance, for modifying or for reviewing, the order for transferring the apposite execution petition, vis-a-vis, the transferee executing court or to challenge the order made by the learned Additional District Judge, Chandigarh, before the High Court concerned. All pending applications also stand disposed of. Records be sent back forthwith.