ORDER : The petitioners claiming to be the legal representatives of the grantee aggrieved by the order at Annexure-B dated 29.09.2015 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru whereby, the appeal came to be allowed setting aside the order of the Assistant Commissioner, Bengaluru North Division, Bengaluru dated 25.09.2014, have filed the present petition. 2. The relevant facts are that the land is said to have been granted on 25.02.1932 and the first sale came to be executed by the original grantee on 03.06.1946. Subsequently, there have been other sale transactions and it is stated that the respondent No.5 had purchased the property through a sale deed dated 05.06.2010. The proceedings for resumption and restoration of the granted land are said to have been initiated before the Assistant Commissioner on 13.06.2011. The Assistant Commissioner has allowed the application filed by the grantees on 25.09.2014 and has recorded a finding that the grantees belong to Scheduled Caste and that the period of non-alienation as per applicable Rules, Mysore Land Revenue Code, 1888 is 20 years and has found that the period of non-alienation has been violated by virtue of the sale transaction entered on 03.06.1946. 3. The Assistant Commissioner has also adverted to the contention of limitation and states that the question of limitation in such matters does not arise and has referred to the judgment in the case of G.M.Venkata Reddy and Another v. The Deputy Commissioner, Kolar District, Kolar and Others reported in (2012) 3 KCCR 1999 . 4. The order of the Assistant Commissioner has been taken up in appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, who has reversed the order of the Assistant Commissioner and has stated that, as the sale transaction took place 30 years prior to coming into force of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (‘the Act’ for brevity), the purchaser had perfected his title by adverse possession. The Deputy Commissioner has also referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.3131/2007 and has stated that the application that was filed by the grantees was belated. The Deputy Commissioner has also referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.3131/2007 and has stated that the application that was filed by the grantees was belated. Though the Deputy Commissioner has also recorded the findings on merits of the matter, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents states that the present petition ought to be dismissed taking note of the judgment of the Apex Court, which has laid down the law that the proceedings initiated after an unreasonable long period of time ought not to be entertained. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners states that the proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner had been proceeded exparte and that fraud was played insofar as no power of attorney was produced alongwith the appeal memorandum before the Deputy Commissioner. 6. The petitioner contends that principle of not entertaining stale claims conferring rights on the purchaser has been recognised in the case of Manchegowda and Others v. State of Karnataka and Others reported in AIR 1984 SC 1151 7. Having heard learned counsel on both the sides, it is to be noted that the undisputed facts being that the grant was on 25.02.1932 and the first sale having been made on 03.06.1946, the proceedings were initiated only on 13.06.2011, it is clear that on the basis of admitted facts, the delay was of 65 years from the date of first sale deed and 32 years after the Act has come into force. 8. The Apex Court, in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi v. State of Karnataka and Another reported in 2018 (6) Kar.L.J. 792 (SC) at para-8 while referring to the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav & Others v. Hari Kishore Yadav (dead) through L.Rs. & Others reported in (2017) 6 Scale 459 and in the case of Ningappa v. Deputy Commissioner & Others reported in Civil Appeal No.3131/2007 decided on 14.07.2011 has stated that where a statute does not provide for a period of limitation, the provisions of the statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. The Apex Court, in the facts of the said case while observing that application for restoration was made after 24 years had held that such delay could be described to be an unreasonable delay and proceedings ought not to have been entertained after such unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground itself. The Apex Court, in the facts of the said case while observing that application for restoration was made after 24 years had held that such delay could be described to be an unreasonable delay and proceedings ought not to have been entertained after such unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground itself. In fact, the Apex Court has also referred to the judgment in the case of Manchegowda (supra),which has been relied upon by the petitioners. 9. The Apex Court in the case of Vivek M.Hinduja and Others v. M.Ashwatha and others reported in 2018 (1) Kar.L.R 176 (SC), has also laid down the law on similar lines and while referring to the case of Manchegowda (supra)has also opined that the party seeking to enforce the rights ought to approach the competent Court or Authority within a reasonable time. 10. In light of the law laid down by the Apex Court without adverting to the merits of the matter, it is clear that in the present facts, the statutory remedy is sought to be invoked after an unreasonable period of delay. If it is that the first sale transaction took place on 13.06.1946, clearly cause of action insofar as the grantee is concerned has accrued immediately thereafter and not having initiated the proceedings till 2011, without any explanation clearly defeats the rights of the petitioners. The said fact of unreasonable delay has also been raised specifically in the pleadings of the respondents at paras-22 to 24 of their statement of objections filed before the Assistant Commissioner. 11. In light of the law laid down by the Apex Court, it is clear that the present application ought to have been rejected by the Assistant Commissioner, as application made after a reasonable delay would operate as a bar to consider such application in the absence of any reason forthcoming as to why such remedy was not invoked at an earlier point of time. 12. Though contentions are raised that in the proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner the petitioners were exparte, it is clear from the order of the Deputy Commissioner that petitioners herein had participated in the proceedings and reference to the same has been made at para-2 of the order of Deputy Commissioner, which reads as follows: xxx xxx 13. 12. Though contentions are raised that in the proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner the petitioners were exparte, it is clear from the order of the Deputy Commissioner that petitioners herein had participated in the proceedings and reference to the same has been made at para-2 of the order of Deputy Commissioner, which reads as follows: xxx xxx 13. The observations made in para-2 of the impugned order also reveals that the petitioners herein having filed vakalath and have also filed the statement of objections before the Deputy Commissioner and there is no reason to doubt the veracity of such observations. 14. As regards the contention of fraud, there are no other pleadings to record finding on such contention. Though learned counsel for the petitioners states that the power of attorney was not accompanied with the appeal memorandum as per the Rules governing appeals, it is noticed that the cause-title of the appeal filed before the Deputy Commissioner itself describes that the petitioners herein have been represented by the power of attorney holder. 15. In light of the law laid down by the Apex Court, no ground is made out to interfere with the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner. Petition is accordingly dismissed.