JUDGMENT : DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN, J. 1. One of the most potent and effective weapons in the statutory armamentarium of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, to check arbitrary actions of a co-operative Society, is the power to rescind their resolution/s under Rule 176 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules (the KCS Rules for brevity). 2. Every Co-operative Society is a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal as provided under Section 9 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act (the KCS Act for brevity) and they can, therefore, act only as per resolutions adopted by them. The power of a Registrar to rescind such resolutions, albeit, in certain enumerated circumstances, is thus the most effect check on capricious and illegal exercise of discretion by the Societies. 3. The above being indisputably so, a learned Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Sivaprabha vs. Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, W.A. No. 2119/2016, has held as under: “The law is well settled that the power to rescind a resolution under Rule 176 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 cannot be invoked to annul an employment in a co-operative bank. Resort should be had to Section 69(2d) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 by raising a dispute before the C-operative Arbitration Court if there is any illegality in the employment.” 4. Therefore, when this Court is called upon in these cases to consider the validity of the impugned orders issued by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies rescinding the resolutions adopted by various Societies under which appointments were made to their services, I am also fully cognizant that in Akalakunnam Village Service Co-operative Bank Limited and Another vs. Binu N. and Others, (2014) 9 SCC 294 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has spoken quite to the contrary, holding that even in matters relating to resolutions under which illegal appointments have been made, it is not necessary to insist on a person to approach the Arbitration Court under Section 69 of the KCS Act. 5. 5. There can hardly be any doubt that I am bound implicitly by the views and conclusions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and therefore, notwithstanding the observations of the learned Division Bench of this Court as afore, if the declarations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is to the effect that Rule 176 of the KCS Rules can be invoked in these matters, then I am enjoined to follow the same. 6. In such scenario, when I proceed to consider the merits of these writ petitions, I am first obligated to consider whether the conclusions arrived at by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Akalakunnam (supra) would authorise the exercise of jurisdiction by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies under Rule 176 of the KCS Rules even with respect to the resolutions of Societies adopted by them for appointments and employment in their services. 7. The constitutive facts noticed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Akalakunnam (supra) are that certain aspirants for appointment to the various posts notified by the Society challenged the notification issued by it for making selection to these posts on the ground that it did not confirm to the KCS Act and the circulars issued under Rule 182(5) of the KCS Rules. An allegation was made therein that certain other persons were already identified by the Society and that the whole process was only a facade intended to appoint them. A learned single Judge of this Court set aside the notification of the selection process, which judgment was appealed before a Division Bench of this Court, wherein a challenge to the maintainability of the writ petition was also raised, contending that the proper remedy which ought to have been invoked by the petitioners therein was only under Section 69 of the KCS Act. The Hon'ble supreme Court, after considering the facts of the case and the contentions of the Society therein, however, repelled them through the observations and declarations in paragraph 10 of the judgment, as under: “Considering aforesaid provisions of Section 69, we do not find any force in the contention of the appellants regarding availability of alternate remedy by way of filing an arbitration case under Section 69 of the Act since in our opinion dispute between the writ petitioners and the Bank does not come within the provisions of this section. We are also of the view that the Bank has failed to conduct written examination and interview as per the then existing guidelines issued by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies. Indisputably, the respondent - writ petitioners moved the High Court challenging the circulars immediately after the notification and prior to the conduct of examination.” It is, therefore, ineluctable that the views and conclusions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Akalakunnam (supra) certainly authorises this Court as also the concerned statutory authorities in appropriate cases to set right explicit transgressions by Societies even in matters relating to employment of persons in their services, but the further question is whether this can be so done by the statutory authority where complaints are raised by persons making rival or competing claims against the persons who have been appointed/ promoted. 8. The answer to this is obtainable only if Rule 176 of the KCS Rules is examined carefully. This Rule starts with a non-obstante clause mandating that notwithstanding anything contained in the bye-laws of a registered society, it shall be competent for the Registrar to rescind any resolution of any meeting of any society or the committee of any society, if it appears to him that such resolution is ultra vires of the objects of the society, or is against the provisions of the Act, Rules, By-laws or of any direction or instructions issued by the Department, or calculated to disturb the peaceful and orderly working of the society or is contrary to the better interest of the society. 9. On a plain reading of the Rule as afore, it leaves no doubt that the power of the Registrar to rescind a resolution, whatever be its nature, is plenary, as long as it is found to be in contravention of the objects of the society or is against the provisions of the Act, Rules, Bye-laws or any direction issued by the department or is calculated to disturb peace and order of the society or is against its interests. There is no other restrictive qualification under the Rule and therefore, its imperative prescriptions will have to be weighed and measured from the standpoint of the view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Akalakunnam (supra). 10. There is no other restrictive qualification under the Rule and therefore, its imperative prescriptions will have to be weighed and measured from the standpoint of the view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Akalakunnam (supra). 10. Further, it is also without doubt that this Court has, in the past, in several cases approved the exercise of power by the concerned Registrar under Rule 176 of the KCS Rules even in matters relating to employment. One such instance is the judgment of a Division Bench in Purushothaman vs. Registrar, 1996 (2) KLT 26 , wherein the learned Bench declared that even in such cases, the Registrar must hear the affected persons before the concerned resolution is rescinded. The unequivocal view of the learned Division Bench is indicted in paragraph 9 thereof, which reads as under: “Resolution passed by the society admitting members to the staff if rescinded will result in adverse civil consequence to those persons. No provision in the Co-operative Societies Act or the Rules made thereunder deal with the termination of service of a member of the staff of the Society. So it may appear that the Registrar's decision to rescind the resolution will not have the effect of violating the provisions of the Act or the Rules. But as a consequence of his decision under R.176, the person who got the appointment will have to be thrown out of employment and that will necessarily result in adverse civil consequence. Viewed in this light, whenever Registrar takes decisions under R.176 to rescind a resolution passed by the society giving appointment to its staff, the person who will be thrown out should be afforded an opportunity of being heard in the matter. Any contrary view will be violation of the principles of natural justice because the person who got the appointment is deprived of the rights thereunder, without being afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard. A person whose rights are affected must have a reasonable notice of the case he is to face. So also the said person must have reasonable and adequate opportunity to put forth his defence. When the Registrar takes a decision having such a consequence, even if the members of the Managing Committee of the Bank are given a hearing, the person who is affected thereby is denied the opportunity to put forth his defence. So also the said person must have reasonable and adequate opportunity to put forth his defence. When the Registrar takes a decision having such a consequence, even if the members of the Managing Committee of the Bank are given a hearing, the person who is affected thereby is denied the opportunity to put forth his defence. In the instance case, it is admitted case that the Joint Registrar, before rescinding the resolution dated 21.1.95 did not give any notice to the persons who are sent out of employment. Some have resigned their prior employment and joined the Bank. Their civil rights have been adversely affected and they are thrown out of employment as a result of the decision taken by the Joint Registrar in exercise of his power under R.176. The decision so taken is therefore violative of the principle of natural justice.” 11. It is clear that in Purushothaman (supra) the learned Division Bench not only approved the exercise of power by the Registrar under Rule 176 of the KCS Rules in the matter of an illegal appointment by a Society but stipulated adherence to the principles of natural justice before doing so, thus favouring such exercise within a the parameters of law. 12. In fact, a Full Bench of this Court in Aji vs. State of Kerala, 1995 (1) KLT 363 , while dealing with the question whether the Government can interfere with the selection process for appointment in a society, declared emphatically to the contrary, concluding that the power of the Registrar under Rule 176 of the KCS Rules cannot be fettered to confine to any particular class of resolution and that the said authority can rescind any resolution of any meeting of any society or of the committee of any society. These declarations have been made in paragraphs 6 and 11 of the judgment, which are extracted as under: “6. At the outset, it has to be stated that the Government has no power under any provisions of the Act or rules to interfere with the selection process of a co-operative society. As there is no provision under the Act or Rules which authorises the Government to interfere with the selection process of the society, Ext.P-5 order cannot be sustained. At the outset, it has to be stated that the Government has no power under any provisions of the Act or rules to interfere with the selection process of a co-operative society. As there is no provision under the Act or Rules which authorises the Government to interfere with the selection process of the society, Ext.P-5 order cannot be sustained. In Trivandrum District Co-operative Bank Ltd. vs. State of Kerala, 1992 (1) KLT 381 a Division Bench of this Court held that Government has no such power. In Kottayam Co-operative Bank Ltd. vs. State of Kerala, 1988 (1) KLT 827 , it was held that there cannot be an assumption that the Government has got the powers to intervene in the day-to-day administration of the co-operative society. In the said decision it was made clear that Government cannot restrain bank from conducting interview for appointment of clerks. With regard to the power of the Court in Government in issuing Ext P-5 order, counsel on both sides conceded the position that it cannot do it. 11. It is not possible to hold that Registrar's power is limited to the supervision of the financial dealings of the society. Rule 176 chothes the Registrar with the power to rescind any resolution of any meeting of any society or of the committee of any society, if it appears to him that such resolution is ultravires of the objects of the society, or is against the provisions of the Act, Rules, Bye-laws or of any direction or instructions issued by the Department, or calculated to disturb the peaceful and orderly working of the society or is contrary to the better interest of the society. Thus the position is abundantly clear that the Registrar is not a mere passive spectator against an erring society. Registrar is vested with adequate power to rescind resolutions whenever situations demand. Contention that Registrar's power is limited only to supervise the financial dealings of the society is not tenable.” 13. Thus the position is abundantly clear that the Registrar is not a mere passive spectator against an erring society. Registrar is vested with adequate power to rescind resolutions whenever situations demand. Contention that Registrar's power is limited only to supervise the financial dealings of the society is not tenable.” 13. Subsequently, in the year 2015 in Peechi Service Cooperative Bank vs. Tessy Varghese, 2015 (4) KLT 919 , a learned Division Bench again considered the amplitude of the power under Rule 176 of the KCS Rules, wherein, after an exhaustive assessment of the relevant provisions, it was endorsed as under: “It is not necessary to enumerate the various powers which has been entrusted with the Registrar, Rule 176 of the Rules provides power to the Registrar to rescind a resolution either of the society or of the committee. No exception can be taken on conferring of such power to the Registrar. View of the learned Single Judge that Rule 176 is to annihilate an autonomous institution which enjoins a constitutional status cannot be accepted. Statutory regulation has been provided on the functioning of the society and entrusting the Registrar with the power to rescind any resolution which is contrary to the Act cannot be said to be any act towards annihilating the autonomous institution. Observations of the learned Single Judge that Rule 176 does not speak any safeguard cannot also be accepted. Rule 176 itself enumerates the relevant circumstances under which resolution can be rescinded. Thus the parameters of exercise of power under Rule 176 are engrained in the rule. We do not thus approve the view of the learned Single Judge that Rule 176 could not have been resorted against the resolution passed by the Committee of Management or general body of the society.” 14. These observations take it beyond the need for restatement that the parameters of the power under Rule 176 of the KCS Rules are ingrained in the Rule itself and that no exceptions can be drawn in the exercise of such power by the Registrar when the ingredients enumerated therein become available. 15. Normally, therefore, there ought not to be any confusion relating to the authority of the Registrar under Rule 176 of the KCS Rules nor can it be said that this Rule can be invoked only in the case of certain types or categories of resolutions and no other. 15. Normally, therefore, there ought not to be any confusion relating to the authority of the Registrar under Rule 176 of the KCS Rules nor can it be said that this Rule can be invoked only in the case of certain types or categories of resolutions and no other. No such exceptions or categorisation are available in the Rule and even its plain reading luculently postulates that it applies to every resolution, whatever be its nature, adopted by a Society or its Managing Committee. 16. That said, the learned Division Bench in Sivaprabha (supra), as is evident from the judgment, commences stating that the law is well settled that the power to rescind a resolution under Rule 176 of the Rules cannot be invoked to annul an employment in the Cooperative Bank (sic). The various judgments cited therein in support of this are, however, in relation to disputes raised by the existing employees of societies challenging promotions granted to others or where they made a better claim than the persons appointed. In that context, there is no doubt that the learned Division Bench is right and I, resultantly, find no cause to differ from it. 17. However, the position is totally different when the Registrar is given an information or he obtains an information or is reliably informed that a resolution adopted by a society is blatantly and ex facie vitiated for the reasons in Rule 176 of the KCS Rules, in which event, he will be certainly enjoined to act as per the said Rule, since this is the statutory prescription. 18. To make it clearer, when a resolution is found, even without a detailed enquiry but ex facie, to be completely inconsistent with the provisions of law or the bye-laws of the society or being against the directions of a statutory authority or being intended to disturb the peace and order of the society and its interests, then the Registrar has the power to rescind the same, even if it relates to an appointment. Illustratively, if a society appoint a person to a post to which it cannot make appointments, then it does not stand to reason that somebody must approach the statutory authority under Section 69 of the Act and have it set aside through the process of dispute resolution under its prescriptions. 19. Illustratively, if a society appoint a person to a post to which it cannot make appointments, then it does not stand to reason that somebody must approach the statutory authority under Section 69 of the Act and have it set aside through the process of dispute resolution under its prescriptions. 19. I am certain that the distinction between Section 69 of the KCS Act and Rule 176 of the KCS Rules is implicit from the way these are en-drafted because, under Section 69 what is expected is an adversarial adjudication, whereas under Rule 176 what is enjoined upon the Registrar is more an inquisitorial inquiry, since he has to personally verify whether the resolution in question is incompetent for any of the reasons stated therein and hence liable for an action for recession. 20. In contra-distinction to this, when a person approaches the Registrar and stakes a claim, which is in the nature of a dispute, wherein a detailed enquiry is necessitated into the proceedings or processes that preceded the impugned resolution, then it may not be the validity of the resolution per se which is called upon to be adjudicated but the credibility and legality of the preceding processes and action. In such cases, certainly, as the learned Division Bench has held in Sivaprabha (supra), the remedy of the disputant/complainant will be to either approach the competent authority under Section 69 of the KCS Act or for the Registrar of Co-operative Societies to commence proceedings under Section 65 or Section 66 of the KCS Act, which authorises a full fledged enquiry into the affairs of a Society. 21. This is all the more pertinent because, the Registrar indubitably has the obligation under Sections 65 and 66 of the KCS Act, which gives him the authority to look into the affairs of the society and take apposite decision as to whether the processes that preceded the resolution had been done legally and if, for any reason, it is found to be vitiated, then he is fully capable of issuing consequential directions/orders under Section 66(5) or Section 66A of the KCS Act to the Society, which is binding on them and enjoined upon them to be implemented in terms of law. 22. 22. Hence, the apparently inflexible view taken by the learned Division Bench that in service matters Rule 176 of the KCS Rules cannot be involved, tested from the unequivocal declarations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Akalakunnam (supra) can only mean that when a complaint is made by a person, either claiming a residual benefit for himself or where it would require detailed evaluation and factual assessment, the Joint Registrar must refuse to deal with it and relegate the disputant to the proceedings under Section 69 of the KCS Act or deal with it under Sections 65 or 66 thereof. 23. However, if the Registrar is provided with an information, be that by an individual or otherwise, without the informant seeking any residual claim and he/she being totally unaffected by the orders to be issued, then the Registrar must certainly look through such claim and then decide whether it warrants action under Rule 176 of the KCS Rules and if the resolution in question is found ex facie or blatantly to be in violation of law or is seen to be, on its face, vitiated for the reasons stated in Rule 176, then he will be authorised to take necessary action under it, even if it relates to appointments effected in a society. 24. Axiomatically, if the impugned resolution is not ex facie or blatantly in violation of the KCS Act, Rules and Bye-laws but is seen to be adopted pursuant to a preceding process, the validity of which is, in fact, assailed, then the Joint Registrar may not be in a position to invoke Rule 176 of the KCS Rules to rescind the same but will have to use his powers under Section 66 of the KCS Act, either to cause a supervision or inspection into the affairs of the society and if, thereafter, the processes that led to the resolution is found illegal or unlawful, competent necessary orders will have to be directed to be issued by the society rectifying it. This is also because, Rule 176 of the KCS Rules does not postulate a detailed enquiry or investigative process, other than to verify if the resolution is per se vitiated for the enumerated reasons therein, while the mandate of Sections 65, 66 and 69 of the Act would authorise such a mechanism at the hands of the competent authorities under it. 25. 25. Hence, it is irrefragable that the Registrar will have to act on a case-to-case basis, depending upon the facts involved and that a general One-Rule-that-fits-all may not be possible to be laid down. 26. In summation, there cannot be any inflexible statement relating to the exercise of power by the Registrar under Rule 176 of the KCS Rules with respect to any particular class or type of resolution and it will be up to the said authority to take a proper call in each case, depending upon the nuances of the facts and circumstances involved. 27. The law being so noticed I will now proceed to deal with the various cases being considered in this judgment and assess the legality of the impugned orders of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies from the afore touchstone. 28. Among the cases I am considering, W.P.(C) Nos. 10273/2019, 10976/2019, 10729/ 2019 and 11001/2019 have been filed by Mulanthuruthy Service Co-operative Bank and its employees challenging the orders issued by the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies under Rule 176 of the KCS Rules, setting aside the appointments of the employee- petitioners in these writ petitions. Contrary to the reliefs prayed for in these, W.P. (C) No. 15824/2019 has been filed by a member of the said Society seeking that the order of the Joint Registrar be implemented and that the employees, whose appointments have been found irregular, be sent out. 29. As regards as W.P. (C) No. 6166/2018 is concerned, this has been filed by the employees of Kanjirappally Agricultural & Rural Development Bank impugning the order issued therein, namely Exhibit P15, by the competent Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies rescinding the resolution of the said Society appointing them as their employees, while W.P. (C) No. 14939/2017 has been filed by certain employees of the Perinad Lekshmy Vilasam Village Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. impugning a notice issued by the concerned Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies under Rule 176 of the KCS Rules. 30. I propose to deal with these cases with reference to the individual Banks referred above, so as to avoid any confusion. 31. 30. I propose to deal with these cases with reference to the individual Banks referred above, so as to avoid any confusion. 31. As far as Mulanthuruthy Service Co-operative Bank is concerned, as is clear from the impugned order relating to it, the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies has rescinded a resolution adopted by it making appointments to various posts under its services finding that the process, under which such selections were made, being illegal and contrary to the provisions of the KCS Act and Rules. Further, the order also indicates that a decision has been taken by the Joint Registrar, even without hearing the concerned employees, that their appointments are vitiated on account of the various factors mentioned therein. I do not propose to delve deep into the specific issues and aspects mentioned in the impugned orders because, going by my observations above and in particular, the ratio in Purushothaman (supra), it becomes inescapable that the Registrar ought to have, after hearing the employees also, first decided whether he has the competence to exercise jurisdiction under Rule 176 of the KCS Rules in this matter or whether he ought to have initiated action under Section 65 or 66 of the KCS Act or whether the complainants ought to have been relegated to the procedure under Section 69 of the KCS Act. 32. As far as W.P. (C) No. 6166/2018 is concerned, the order impugned therein, namely Exhibit P15, has been issued after hearing the employees concerned and finding that they have been appointed from an expired rank list and to vacancies that were not available. It is thus obvious that if these allegations are true, then going by my observations above, this is a fit where the Registrar can exercise jurisdiction under Rule 176 of the KCS Rules. Of course, I am also fully cognizant of the submissions made on behalf of the employees that the process against them were initiated by the Joint Registrar on the complaint of the sixth respondent therein and that this is a sinister attempt by him to remove them from service, since he was a member of the Committee which appointed them, thus being fully aware of their appointments. Noticing this specific imputation, I had directed the concerned Joint Registrar through order dated 02.07.2019 to inspect the books of the Society and report whether the sixth respondent was a signatory to the resolution taken by the Managing Committee to appoint the petitioners. The learned Senior Government Pleader today informs me that the Joint Registrar has made an enquiry and has found that the sixth respondent was not present in the meeting of the committee that adopted the rescinded resolution nor has he subscribed his signature to it. Not that it makes any vital difference to this case, my attempt through this was to ascertain whether the sixth respondent was appropriating and reprobating between his actions, but the memo filed by the learned Senior Government Pleader establishes that he was not part of the Committee which had appointed the petitioners. 33. That said, it is fully and expressly conceded that the petitioners in W.P. (C) No. 6166/2018 were appointed from an expired rank list and that too to the vacancies notified subsequently. Obviously, therefore, the Bank could have made appointments to such vacancies only under a new notification and not from an expired rank list. I am, therefore, certain that the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies has acted correctly in this case in having issued Exhibit P15 order, even though the resolution in question related to the employment of the petitioners therein in the services of the Bank. 34. Even though I have thus confirmed the order of the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies in W.P. (C) No. 6166/2018, I deem it appropriate not to allow any recovery of the salary and allowances already paid to the petitioners therein, since they worked under an appointment order issued by the Bank and nothing is available on record even to indicate that they were, in any manner, responsible for such appointment. 35. Finally, W.P. (C) No. 14939/2017 has been filed impugning only a notice issued by the concerned Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies under Rule 176 of the KCS Rules. It is needless to say, going by my observations above, that the Registrar will have to first consider whether he obtains jurisdiction in this matter under the said Rule or whether other appropriate action is warranted, before further action is taken by him. It is needless to say, going by my observations above, that the Registrar will have to first consider whether he obtains jurisdiction in this matter under the said Rule or whether other appropriate action is warranted, before further action is taken by him. I do not, therefore, deem it necessary to interdict the notice at this stage because the petitioners have to prefer their objections, if any, before the said authority and to challenge any consequential order that may be issued by it, if so warranted. 36. In summation and in the result: (a) W.P. (C) Nos. 10273/2019, 10976/2019, 10729/2019 and 1101/2019 are allowed, setting aside the impugned orders and the competent Joint Registrar will take further action in terms of the directions in paragraph 31 of this judgment, after affording necessary opportunity of being heard to all parties, as expeditiously as possible but not later than four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. (b) In view of the afore directions, W.P. (C) No. 15824/2019 stands dismissed. (c) W.P. (C) No. 6166/2018 is dismissed in terms of the observations in paragraph 33, however, subject to the interdiction in making recovery against the petitioners as contained in paragraph 34 of this judgment. (d) W.P. (C) No. 14939/2017 is disposed of reserving liberty to the parties as specified in paragraph 35 herein and leave them to act in such terms.