JUDGMENT Hon'ble Ravindra Maithani, J. (Oral) This is an appeal from order against judgment and order dated 07.09.2019, passed by Principal Judge, Family Court, Dehradun in Miscellaneous Case No. 18 of 2019, Rahul Shukla vs. Smt. Mona Shukla (hereinafter referred to as “the case"). 2. The dispute is with regard to the meeting rights to the respondent. In an Appeal from Order No. 495 of 2017, Rahul Shukla vs. Mona Shukla, (for short “the earlier appeal") this Court on 03.10.2017, modified the impugned order, therein, and granted the respondent meeting rights on first, second and fourth Saturday to meet his daughter. When an application was filed by the respondent for enforcement of the meeting rights as granted to him in the earlier appeal, it was objected to by the appellant, on the ground that after order dated 03.10.2017, passed in the earlier appeal, parties had entered into an agreement, whereby, the respondent had relinquished his meeting rights and based on this compromise a petition for dissolution of marriage, on the basis of mutual consent, under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, has already been filed. Therefore, now the appellant cannot insist for enforcement of the meeting rights. 3. After hearing the parties, by the impugned judgment and order, the learned court below, permitted the respondent to exercise the meeting rights and ordered for its enforcement. Aggrieved, the appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant would argue that after order dated 03.10.2017, passed in the earlier appeal, parties had entered into a compromise and based on it, petition for divorce on the basis of mutual consent, has already been preferred. Hence, the respondent cannot now enforce the meeting rights. Learned counsel very fairly concedes that yet marriage has not been dissolved, on the basis of the compromise entered between the parties. 5. Even if any compromise is entered between the parties, unless it has been verified and approved by the Court having jurisdiction, it cannot modify the meeting rights, which have already been granted to the respondent by virtue of order dated 03.10.2017, passed in the earlier appeal. The divorce petition is still pending. Meeting rights have been permitted to the respondent by this Court. The divorce petition is still pending. Meeting rights have been permitted to the respondent by this Court. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the learned court below did not commit any error in enforcing the meeting rights of the respondent in accordance with order dated 03.10.2017 of this Court passed in Appeal from Order No. 495 of 2017. 6. Accordingly, there is no merit in this appeal and this appeal deserves to be dismissed. 7. The appeal is dismissed, in limine.