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2019 DIGILAW 537 (PAT)

Suman Mahto v. State of Bihar

2019-04-08

ADITYA KUMAR TRIVEDI

body2019
ORDER Apart from other subject, as per roster, the Criminal Appeal arising out of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (Short as Act) have also been assigned excluding the bail matters. When the respective file has been gone through in consonance with the submission having at the end of the learned respective counsels, some of the records even divulge an incidence of conversion from Criminal Miscellaneous Petition purported to be under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to Criminal Appeal under waled of Section 14-A of S.C./S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. A query has been made whether the prayer (detailed hereinafter) would really attract its adjudication under Criminal Appeal exclusively under the guise of Section 14-A of the S.C./S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The nature of prayer, which has been made and perceived relating to different memo of appeal, so far relevant to the present episode is as follows: – (1) Quashing of the prosecution (2) Quashing of the order of the cognizance (3) Quashing of the charge/ Rejection of prayer of discharge (4) Refusal of prayer under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. (5) Refusal of prayer/ allow of prayer under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. (6) Consideration of Delay in filing Appeal, provision for Condonation of Limitation. 2. With great respect to the learned Co-ordinate Bench, I did not carry the same view. As per direction given by the Apex Court in Om Prakash Agarwal Since Deceased Thr. LRS and others vs. Vishan Dayal Rajpoot and another reported in A.I.R. 2018 SC 5486, observing that whenever there happens to be difference of opinion amongst Co-ordinate Bench, the matter is to be referred to Larger Bench. On that score alone, would have come up before the Division Bench. However, I am inclined to record the reasons, though, summarily, as I do not want to make the reference cumbersome, as after all, on reference the Division Bench has to answer. So, only relevant points are being sketched. 3. The first step needs incorporation of Section 14(A) of the Act, the relevant provisions so prescribed under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, guiding the issue is to be quoted below. “[14A. Appeals. So, only relevant points are being sketched. 3. The first step needs incorporation of Section 14(A) of the Act, the relevant provisions so prescribed under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, guiding the issue is to be quoted below. “[14A. Appeals. – (1) Notwithstand-ing anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal shall lie, from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court, to the High Court both on facts and on law. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court granting or refusing bail. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of ninety days from the date of the judgment, sentence or order appealed from: Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of ninety days: Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of the period of one hundred and eighty days. (4) Every appeal preferred under sub-section (1) shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within a period of three months from the date of admission of the appeal.] 4. Two more provisions are also relevant to be taken note of. The first one is: – “Section- 2(b) “Code” means the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section-2(bd) “Exclusive Special Court” means the Exclusive Special Court established under subsection (1) of section 14 exclusively to try the offences under this Act; Section2(d) “Special Court” means a Court of Session specified as a Special Court in section 14; Section-2(f) the words and expressions used but not defined in this Act and defined in the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872) or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), as the case may be, shall be deemed to have the meanings respectively assigned to them in those enactments.]” And the Second one is:- “Section-1 [14. Special Court and Exclusive Special Court. Special Court and Exclusive Special Court. – (1) For the purpose of providing for speedy trial, the State Government shall, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, establish an Exclusive Special Court for one or more Districts: Provided that in Districts where less number of cases under this Act is recorded, the State Government shall, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify for such Districts, the Court of Session to be a Special Court to try the offences under this Act: Provided further that the Courts so established or specified shall have power to directly take cognizance of offences under this Act. (2) It shall be the duty of the State Government to establish adequate number of Courts to ensure that cases under this Act are disposed of within a period of two months, as far as possible. (3) In every trial in the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court, the proceedings shall be continued from day-to-day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded in writing: Provided that when the trial relates to an offence under this Act, the trial shall, as far as possible, be completed within a period of two months from the date of filing of the charge sheet.]” 5. The other aspect is exclusion of some of the specific provisions of the Cr.P.C. and those are, as per Section 18 of the Act, the privilege having in favour of accused with regard to pre-arrest bail in accordance with Section 438 of the Cr.P.C. has been seized and in likewise manner, as per Section 19, after conviction, the application of Section 360 of the Cr.P.C. as well as Probation of Offenders Act would not be available in case convict is found more than 18 years of age. So far preferential aspect is concerned, Section 20 of the Act gives overriding effect and for better appreciation, the same is quoted below: – “20. Act to override other laws. So far preferential aspect is concerned, Section 20 of the Act gives overriding effect and for better appreciation, the same is quoted below: – “20. Act to override other laws. – Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any custom or usage or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law.” 6. At the present moment, it looks pertinent to reckon the corresponding provision so laid down under the Code of Criminal Procedure acknowledging the procedure so laid down under the Special Law and for better appreciation, the same is quoted below: – “Section-4 of the Cr.P.C.:- Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws. – (1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860 ) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained. (2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. Section-5 of the Cr.P.C.: Saving. – Nothing contained in this Code shall, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any special or local law for the time being in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in force.” 7. That means to say, any kind of procedure so prescribed under the Special Law will have its prerogative and will command the procedure of since inception, and the said perception is found properly shaped after having conjoint reading of Section 4, Section 5 of Cr.P.C. in consonance with Section 20 of the Act. When such accessibility is recognized, then the following events found impeded : – (I) Power of cognizance (II) No privilege of anticipatory bail (III) No provision of revision (IV) No application for provision of Section 360 Cr.P.C. nor Probation of Offenders Act at post conviction stage where convict is about 18 years. 8. When such accessibility is recognized, then the following events found impeded : – (I) Power of cognizance (II) No privilege of anticipatory bail (III) No provision of revision (IV) No application for provision of Section 360 Cr.P.C. nor Probation of Offenders Act at post conviction stage where convict is about 18 years. 8. From plain reading of Section 20 of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, it is manifest that its empowerment is acknowledged only in such circumstance where there happens to be inconsistency, otherwise, as is evident, the procedure so prescribed for sailing the trial under the Criminal Procedure Code will follow, as no separate procedure is found so prescribed under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act relating thereto. 9. Furthermore, as is evident, the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is not at all impounding the inherent power of the High Court, nor the aim and object of the Act does suggest so, though some power, so envisaged under Cr.P.C. has been imbeciled and substituted by proper enactment having duly engrafted under Section 14(A) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, and those are: – (I) The judgment, sentence or order not being an interlocutory order will be appealable before the High Court passed by the Special or Exclusive Special Court. (II) Any order passed by Special or Exclusive Special Court concerning bail will be appealable. (III) Limitation has been prescribed normally-ninety days, which may extend to further ninety days without any relaxation furthermore. (IV) Appeal has to be disposed of within three months on admission. 10. That means to say, though the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act properly identify the forum to be approached against a judgment, sentence or order not an interlocutory order, save and except, an exception that the bail order, out and out an interlocutory order has also been made appealable. In likewise manner, having obstinate clause, 14(A) (B) has got some sort of bearing over ceasing the right by efflux of time, maximum to the extent of 180 days, without having any kind of reference to Limitation Act. Moreover, the amendment is found enforceable since 26.01.2016 and that being so, needs proper adjudication with regard to its implication, having two different contingency, pre-amendment, post-amendment. 11. Now, coming to post-amendment stage, the question for consideration now remains: – 1. How there would be the classification of an order; 2. The condonation of limitation; 3. Moreover, the amendment is found enforceable since 26.01.2016 and that being so, needs proper adjudication with regard to its implication, having two different contingency, pre-amendment, post-amendment. 11. Now, coming to post-amendment stage, the question for consideration now remains: – 1. How there would be the classification of an order; 2. The condonation of limitation; 3. The power of the High Court; 4. Application of the amended Act; 12. Neither under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, there happens to be definition of the order classifying the final order nor interlocutory order. In absence thereof, the said interpretation is to be borrowed from the Cr.P.C. It is apparent that there also happens to be complete absence of definition under Cr.P.C. with regard to final order or interlocutory order. The classification of the order as an interlocutory is found under Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C., but again without any proper mode of identification. It simply suggests as: – “397. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision. – xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub- section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxx” 13. At an earlier occasion, the Apex Court in Amar Nath and others vs. State of Haryana and others reported in 1977 CRI.L.J. 1891 considered the same and held as follows: – “6. Let us now proceed to interpret the provisions of s. 397 against the historical background of these facts. Sub- section (2) of s. 397 of the 1973 Code may be extracted thus: "The powers of revision conferred by Sub- section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed ;in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding." The main question which falls for determination in this appeal is as to, the what is the connotation of the term "interlocutory order" as appearing in subs. (2) of s. 397 which bars any revision of such an order by the High Court. The term "interlocutory order" is a term of well-known legal significance and does not present any serious diffident. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Webster's New World Dictionary "interlocutory" has been defined as an order other than final decision. The term "interlocutory order" is a term of well-known legal significance and does not present any serious diffident. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Webster's New World Dictionary "interlocutory" has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide 'the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to, us thatthe term "interlocutory order" in s. 397(2) of the 1973 Code has beenused in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense.It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights, or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the, right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in s. 397 of the, 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under s. 397 (2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be. outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. 7. In Central Bank of India vs. Gokal Chand (1) this Court while describing the incidents of an interlocutory order, observed as follows "In the context of s. 38(1), the words "every order of the Controller made under this Act", though very wide, do not include interlocutory orders, which are. merely procedural and do not affect the rights or liabilities of the parties. In a pending proceeding the Controller, may pass many interlocutory orders under ss. merely procedural and do not affect the rights or liabilities of the parties. In a pending proceeding the Controller, may pass many interlocutory orders under ss. 36 and 37, such as orders regarding the summoning of witnesses, discovery, production and inspection of documents, issue of a commission for examination of witnesses, inspection of premises, fixing a date of hearing and the admissibility of a document or the relevancy of a question. All these interlocutory orders are steps taken towards the final adjudication and for assisting the parties in the prosecution of their case in the pending proceeding; they regulate the procedure only 'and do not affect any right or liability of the parties." The aforesaid decision clearly illustrates the nature and incidents of 'an interlocutory order and the incidents given by this Court constitute sufficient guidelines to interpret the connotation of the. word "interlocutory order" as appearing in sub-s. (2) of s. 397 of the 1973 Code. 8. Similarly in a later case in Mohan Lal Magan Lal Thacker vs. State of Gujarat (1968) 2 SCR 685 : ( AIR 1968 SC 733 ) this Court pointed out that the finality of an order could not be judged by co-relating that order with the controversy in the complaint. The fact that the controversy still remained alive was irrelevant. In that case this Court held that even though it was an interlocutory order, the order was a final order. 9. Similary in Baldevdas vs. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd., ( AIR 1970 SC 406 ) while interpreting the import of the words "case decided" appearing in S. 115 of the. Code of Civil Procedure, this Court observed as follows: "A case may be said to be decided, if the Court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy;" Apart from this it would appear that under the various provisions of the Letters Patent of the High Courts in India, an appeal lies to a Division Bench from an order passed by a Single Judge and some High Courts have held that even though the order may appear to be an interlocutory one where it does decide one of the aspect of the rights of the parties it is, appealable. For instance, an order of a Single Judge granting a temporary injunction was held by a Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in Standard Glass Beads Factory and Anr.vs. Shri Dhar & Ors. AIR 1960 All 692 , as not being an interlocutory order having decided some rights of the parties and was, therefore, appealable. To, the same, effect are the decisions of the Calcutta High Court in Union of India vs. Khetra Mohan Banerjee AIR 1960 Cal 190 , of the Lahore High Court in Gokal Chand vs. Sanwal Das and others; AIR 1920 Lah 326 of the Delhi High Court in Begum Aftab Zamani vs. Shri Lal Chand Khanna AIR 1969 Delhi 85 (FB) and of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in Har Parshad Wali and Anr. vs. Naranjan Nath Matoo and others AIR 1959 J & K 139. 14. That means to say, the Hon’ble Apex Court not only dealt with the status of an interlocutory order, final order rather also invented a new terminology with regard to an order being interlocutory, but adjudicating the issue in its finality, as an intermediary order. The two Judges Bench Decision of Amar Nath Case has been subject to consideration in three Judges Bench decision of Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra reported in A.I.R. 1978 SC 47 (with some disapproval), wherein it has observed as follows: – “7. For the reasons stated hereinafter we think that the statement of the law apropos point No.1 is not quite accurate and needs some modulation. But we are going to reaffirm the decision of the Court on the second point and gave its finding in following way: – 8. Under Section 435 of the 1898 Code the High Court had the power to "call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court 'situate within the local limits of its jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed. and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court", and then to pass the necessary orders in accordance with the law engrafted in any of the sections following Section 435. and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court", and then to pass the necessary orders in accordance with the law engrafted in any of the sections following Section 435. Apart from the revisional power, the High Court possessed and possesses the inherent powers to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do the real and the substantial 'justice for the administration of which alone Courts exist. In express language this power was recognized and saved in Section 561A of the old Code. Under Section 397(1) of the 1973 Code, revisional power has been conferred on the High Court in terms which are identical to those found in Section 435 of the 1898 Code. Similar is the position apropos the inherent powers of the High Court. We may read the language of Section 482 (corresponding to Section 561A of the old Code) of the, 1973 Code. It says: – "Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." At the outset the following principles may be noticed in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court which have been followed ordinarily and generally, almost invariably, barring a few exceptions : – (1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party ; (2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; (3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. 9. In most of the cases decided during several decades the inherent power of the High Court has been invoked for the quashing of a criminal proceeding on one ground or the other. 9. In most of the cases decided during several decades the inherent power of the High Court has been invoked for the quashing of a criminal proceeding on one ground or the other. Sometimes the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court has also been resorted to for the same kind of relief by challenging the order taking cognizance or issuing processes or framing charge on the grounds that the Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance and proceed with the trial, that the issuance of process was wholly illegal or void, or that no charge could be framed as no offence was made out on the allegations made or the evidence adduced in Court. In the background aforesaid we proceed to examine as to what is the correct position of law after the introduction of a provision like sub section (2) of Section 397 in, the 1973 Code. 15. So far nature of order is concerned, on that very score, it has been held: – “12. Ordinarily and generally the expression 'interlocutory order' has been understood and taken to mean as a converse of the term 'final order'. In volume 22 of the third edition of Halsbury's Laws of England at page 742, however, it has been stated in para 1606 "....... a judgment or order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another, or final as to part and interlocutory as to part. The meaning of two words must therefore be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required." In para 1607 it is said : "In general a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed "final"." In para 1608 at pages 744 and 745 we find the words: "An order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but either (1) is made before judgment, and gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, but is merely on a matter of procedure, or (2) is made after judgment, and merely directs how the declarations of right already given in the- final judgment are to be worked out, is termed "interlocutory". An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals." 13. An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals." 13. In S. Kuppuswami Rao vs. The King, 1947 FCR 180: (AIR 1949 FC Kania C. J., delivering the judgment of the Court has referred to some English decisions at pages 185 and 186 (of FCR) (at p.3 of AIR). Lord Esher M. R. said in Salaman vs. Warner (1891) 1 QB 734 "If their decision, whichever way it is given, will, if it stands, finally dispose of the matter in dispute, I think that for the purposes of these rules it is final. On the other hand, if their decision, if given in one way, will finally dispose of the matter in dispute, but, if given in the other, will allow the action to go on, then I think it is not final, but interlocutory." To the same effect are the observations quoted from the judgments of Fry L. J. and Lopes L. J. Applying the said test, almost on facts similar to the ones in the instant case, it was held that the order in revision passed by the High Court (at that time, there was no bar like section 397 (2) was not a "final order" within the meaning of section 205 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935. It is to be noticed that the test laid down therein was that if the objection of the accused succeeded, the proceeding could have ended but not vice versa. The order can be said to be a final order only if, in either event, the action will be determined. In our opinion if this strict test were to be applied in interpreting the words 'interlocutory order" occurring in Section 397(2), then the order taking cognizance of an offence by a Court, whether it is so done illegally or without jurisdiction, will not be a final order and hence will be an interlocutory one. Even so, as we have said above, the inherent power of the High Court can be invoked for quashing such a criminal proceeding. Even so, as we have said above, the inherent power of the High Court can be invoked for quashing such a criminal proceeding. But in our judgment such an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified If it were so it will render almost nugatory the revisional power of the Sessions Court or the High Court conferred on it by Section 397(1). On such a 'strict interpretation, only those orders would be revisable which are orders passed on the final determination of the action but are not appealable under Chapter XXIX of the Code. This does not seem to be the intention of the Legislature when it retained the revisional power of the High Court in terms identical to the one in the, 1898 Code. In what cases then the High Court will examine the legality or the propriety of an order or the legality of any proceeding of an inferior Criminal court? Is it circumscribed to examine only such proceeding which is brought for its examination after the final determination and wherein no appeal lies? Such cases will be very few and far between. It has been pointed out repeatedly, vide, for example, The River Wear Commissioners vs. William Adamson(1) and R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla vs. The Union of India ( 1957 SCR 930 :) that although the word occurring in a particular statute are plain and unambiguous, they have to be interpreted in a manner which would fit in the context of the other provisions of the statute and bring about the real intention of the legislature. On the one hand, the legislature kept intact the revisional power of the High Court and, on the other, it put a bar on the exercise of that power in relation to any interlocutory order. In such a situation it appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression "interlocutory order" as invariably being converse of the words "final order". There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami's case (supra), but, yet it may not be an interlocutory order-pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami's case (supra), but, yet it may not be an interlocutory order-pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we, think that the bar in sub-section (2) of Section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be final orders for the purposes of Article 134 of the Constitution, yet it would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of Section 397(2). It is neither advisable, nor possible, to make a catalogue of orders to demonstrate which kinds of orders would be merely, purely or simply interlocutory and which kinds of orders would be final, and then to prepare an exhaustive list of those types of orders which will fall in between the two. The first two kinds are well-known and can be culled out from many decided cases. We may, however, indicate that the type of order with which we are concerned in this case, even though it may not be final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory so as to attract the bar of subsection (2) of Section 397. In our opinion it must be taken to be an order of the type falling in the middle course. 14. In passing, for the sake of explaining ourselves, we may refer to what has been said by Kania C. J. in Kuppuswami's case (1947 FCR 180 at p. 187): (AIR 1949 FC 1 at p. 3) by quoting a few words from Sir George Lowndes in the case of Abdul Rahman vs. D. K. Cassim and Sons (60 Ind App 76: ( AIR 1933 PC 58 ). The learned law Lord said with reference to the order under consideration in that case : "The effect of the order from which it is here sought to appeal was not to dispose finally of the rights of the parties. It no doubt decided an important, and even a vital, issue in the case, but it left the suit alive, and provided for its trial in the ordinary way. It no doubt decided an important, and even a vital, issue in the case, but it left the suit alive, and provided for its trial in the ordinary way. Many a time a question arose in India as to what is the exact meaning of the phrase "case decided" occurring in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Some High Courts had taken the view that it meant the final order passed on final determination of the action. Many others had however, opined that even interlocutory orders were covered by the said term. This Court struck a mean and it did not approve of either of the two extreme lines. In Baldevdas vs. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd. ( AIR 1970 SC 406 ) it has been pointed out (at p. 410) : "A case may be said to be decided, if the Court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy :" We may give a clear example of an order in a civil case which may not be a final order within the meaning of Article 133 (1) of the Constitution, yet it will not be purely or simply of an interlocutory character. Suppose for example, a defendant raises the plea of jurisdiction of a particular Court to try the suit or the bar of limitation and succeeds, then the action is determined finally in that Court. But if the point is decided against him the suit proceeds. Of course, in a given case the point raised may be such that it is interwoven and interconnected with the other issues in the case, and that it may not be possible to decide it under Order 14 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure as I preliminary point of law. But, if it is a pure point of law and is decided one way or the other, then the order deciding such a point may not be interlocutory, albeit-may not be final either. Surely, it will be a case decided, as pointed out by this Court in some decisions, within the meaning of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We think it would be just and proper to apply the same kind of test for finding out the real meaning of the expression 'interlocutory order' occurring in section 397(2).” 16. Surely, it will be a case decided, as pointed out by this Court in some decisions, within the meaning of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We think it would be just and proper to apply the same kind of test for finding out the real meaning of the expression 'interlocutory order' occurring in section 397(2).” 16. In Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Private Limited and another vs. Central Bureau of Investigation reported in (2018) 16 SCC 299 , discussing majority of the earlier judgments, the Apex Court properly identified the inherent power as embedded in the High Court in accordance with Section 482 Cr.P.C. as well as unbridled power falling under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and further, held that those powers are preserved without any infringement: – “64. Insofar as petitions under Articles 226 and 227 are concerned, they form part of the basic structure of the Constitution as has been held in L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India and others, (1997) 3 SCC 261 at 301. Here again, the judgment of a Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 at 714, puts it very well when it says: “368. ...(17) Though it cannot be said that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an application for bail under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass orders either way, relating to the cases under the Act 1987, that power should be exercised sparingly, that too only in rare and appropriate cases in extreme circumstances. But the judicial discipline and comity of courts require that the High Courts should refrain from exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction in such matters.” This aspect of Kartar Singh (supra) has been followed in Girish Kumar Suneja ( (2017) 14 SCC 809 ) in paragraph 40 thereof and we respectfully concur with the same. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that the Delhi High Court judgment’s conclusions in paragraph 33 (a), (b) and (d) must be set aside.” 17. In the aforesaid background, insisting or directing that the petition having been filed under the guise of Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be converted as an appeal in terms of Section 14A of the S.C./S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act will not tantamount to encroach upon the absoluteness of the High Court. 18. In the aforesaid background, insisting or directing that the petition having been filed under the guise of Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be converted as an appeal in terms of Section 14A of the S.C./S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act will not tantamount to encroach upon the absoluteness of the High Court. 18. In likewise manner, the scope of sub-section 3 also needs in depth scrutiny in the background of divergent view in consonance with the forbidding clause. Furthermore, whether Sub-section-3 would be the subject of subversion in the background of relevant provisions of the Limitation Act guiding the issue coupled with the power of the High Court . 19. Similar issue was subject to consideration by the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in Criminal Writ (Public Interest Litigation) No.08 of 2018 with Criminal Miscellaneous No.38755 of 2017 Satyendra and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh with Criminal Writ (Public Interest Litigation) No.11 of 2018, Vishnu Behari Tiwari vs. Union of India and others reported in 2018 CRI.L.J. 5010 and during consideration of the same, the Full Bench on its own framed, the following points for adjudication: – A. Whether provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 14- A and the second proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 14-A of the Amending Act, are violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, being unjust, unreasonable and arbitrary? B. Whether in view of the provisions contained in Section 14-A of the Amending Act, a petition under the provisions of Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India or a revision under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short Cr.P.C.) or a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is maintainable. OR in other words, whether by virtue of Section 14- A of the Amending Act, the powers of the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution or its revisional powers or the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. stand ousted? C. Whether the amended provisions of Section 14-A would apply to offences or proceedings initiated or pending prior to 26 January 2016? D. Whether upon the expiry of the period of limitation for filing of an appeal as specified in the second proviso to Section 14-A (3), Section 439 Cr.P.C. and the powers conferred on the High Court in terms thereof would stand revived? D. Whether upon the expiry of the period of limitation for filing of an appeal as specified in the second proviso to Section 14-A (3), Section 439 Cr.P.C. and the powers conferred on the High Court in terms thereof would stand revived? E. Whether the power to directly take cognizance of offences shall be exercisable by the existing Special Courts other then the Exclusive Special Courts or Special Courts to be specified under the amended Section 14?” And answered one by one by concluding under Para-115 as follows: – “115. In light of the above discussion, our answer to the Questions formulated are as follows: A. Whether provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 14A and the second proviso to sub- section (3) of Section 14A of the Amending Act, are violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, being unjust, unreasonable and arbitrary? While we reject the challenge to section 14-A (2), we declare that the second proviso to Section 14A (3) is clearly violative of both Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. It is not just manifestly arbitrary, it has the direct and unhindered effect of taking away the salutary right of a first appeal which has been recognised to be an integral facet of fair procedure enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. The absence of discretion in the Court to consider condonation of delay even where sufficient cause may exist renders the measure wholly capricious, irrational and excessive. It is consequently struck down. B. Whether in view of the provisions contained in Section 14 A of the Amending Act, a petition under the provisions of Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India or a revision under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is maintainable. OR in other words, whether by virtue of Section 14 A of the Amending Act, the powers of the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution or its revisional powers or the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. stand ousted? We therefore answer Question (B) by holding that while the constitutional and inherent powers of this Court are not “ousted” by Section 14A, they cannot be invoked in cases and situations where an appeal would lie under Section 14A. We therefore answer Question (B) by holding that while the constitutional and inherent powers of this Court are not “ousted” by Section 14A, they cannot be invoked in cases and situations where an appeal would lie under Section 14A. Insofar as the powers of the Court with respect to the revisional jurisdiction is concerned, we find that the provisions of Section 397 Cr.P.C. stand impliedly excluded by virtue of the special provisions made in Section 14A. This, we hold also in light of our finding that the word "order" as occurring in subsection(1) of Section 14A would also include intermediate orders. C. Whether the amended provisions of Section 14-A would apply to offences or proceedings initiated or pending prior to 26 January 2016? We hold that the provisions of Section 14A would be applicable to all judgments, sentences or orders as well as orders granting or refusing bail passed or pronounced after 26 January, 2016. We further clarify that the introduction of this provision would not effect proceedings instituted or pending before this Court provided they relate to a judgment, sentence or order passed prior to 26 January 2016. The applicability of Section 14A does not depend upon the date of commission of the offence. The determinative factor would be the date of the order of the Special Court or Exclusive Court. D. Whether upon the expiry of the period of limitation for filing of an appeal as specified in the second proviso to Section 14 A (3), Section 439 Cr.P.C. and the powers conferred on the High Court in terms thereof would stand revived? We hold that the powers conferred on the High Court under Section 439 Cr.P.C. do not stand revived. We find ourselves unable to sustain the line of reasoning adopted by the learned Judge in Rohit that the provisions of Section 439 Cr.P.C. would remain in suspension during the period of 180 days and thereafter revive on its expiry. The conclusion so arrived at cannot be sustained on any known principle of statutory interpretation. We are therefore, constrained to hold that both Janardan Pandey as well as Rohit do not lay down the correct law and must, as we do, stand overruled. The conclusion so arrived at cannot be sustained on any known principle of statutory interpretation. We are therefore, constrained to hold that both Janardan Pandey as well as Rohit do not lay down the correct law and must, as we do, stand overruled. E. Whether the power to directly take cognizance of offences shall be exercisable by the existing Special Courts other than the Exclusive Special Courts or Special Courts to be specified under the amended Section 14?” The existing Special Courts do not have the jurisdiction to directly take cognisance of offences under the 1989 Act. This power stands conferred only upon the Exclusive Special Courts to be established or the Special Courts to be specified in terms of the substituted section 14. However it is clarified that the substitution of Section 14 by the Amending Act does not have the effect of denuding the existing Special Courts of the authority to exercise jurisdiction in respect of proceedings under the 1989 Act. They would merely not have the power to directly take cognizance of offences and would be bound by the rigours of Section 193 Cr.P.C. Even if cognizance has been taken by the existing Special Courts directly in light of the uncertainty which prevailed, this would not ipso facto render the proceedings void ab initio. Ultimately it would be for the objector to establish serious prejudice or a miscarriage of justice as held in Rati Ram ( AIR 2012 SC 1485 ).” 20. Because of the fact that during course of consideration of aforesaid legal jugglery, the virus of Section 14A of the Act along with other relevant Sections would also be the major issue apart from difference of opinion as indicated above, therefore, the matter is required to be considered properly by the Division Bench and for that, questionnaire has been framed under Para-1 coupled with Para-19, and for that, office is directed to place before the Division Bench after taking permission from Hon’ble the Chief Justice.