ORDER : 1. Rule. Learned APP, Ms.Moxa Thakkar and learned advocate, Mr.Vivek Bhamare waives service of notice of rule on behalf of respondent nos.1 and 2 respectively. 2. By filing this application, the applicant has prayed to condone delay of 734 days caused in filing Criminal Appeal (F) No.26188 of 2018 (now numbered as Criminal Appeal No.1317 of 2018) challenging order dated 13.6.2016 passed below Exh.75 in Criminal Misc. Application No.333 of 2013 by learned Family Court, Surat. 3. The respondent herein had filed an application seeking maintenance under section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code. That being aggrieved by the amount of maintenance the respondent herein preferred a revision application before this Honourable Court, which is pending. It is stated that the appeal preferred by the applicant herein against the impugned order of the trial Court is only with regard to false and misleading statements made by the respondent on oath before the concerned trial Court at the time of deciding the application for maintenance. Since there is a delay of 734 days in preferring such appeal present application for condonation of delay is filed. 4. Mr.Bhadrish Raju, learned advocate for the applicant submits that since this is a family dispute, the applicant herein was trying to settle the dispute with the respondent herein. He further submitted that the applicant could not succeed in his efforts. Thereafter, the applicant herein filed Special Criminal Application No.449 of 2018, before this Court for quashing of the order, however, on 22.1.2018 the same was withdrawn in view of the fact that a statutory appeal under section 341 of the Criminal Procedure Code is available against the order passed by the court below rejecting the application filed by the applicant Exh.43. At the time of withdrawal of such application, since this Court granted liberty to file appeal, present appeal is filed and in filing such appeal delay is caused due to aforesaid reasons. He further submitted that the applicant is working in a company and he is required to travel abroad, therefore also delay is caused in filing present appeal. He further submitted that the applicant is having a good case on merits and if the claim of the applicant is rejected on the ground of delay, it will cause irreversible loss and prejudice to the applicant. He further submitted that the applicant is having a good case on merits and if the claim of the applicant is rejected on the ground of delay, it will cause irreversible loss and prejudice to the applicant. He further submitted that the words “sufficient cause” should be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice. In support of this submission, he relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Others reported in (1996) 3 SCC 132 , wherein it held that sufficient cause should be construed with pragmatism in justice oriented manner. He has also relied upon the following decisions and prayed to allow present application. (i) N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 (ii) Hajara Gani Umar Shekh v. State of Gujarat and Another, Special Criminal Application No.2275 of 2007 decided on 14.5.2009 by this High Court. (iii) Sejalben Tejasbhai Chovatiya v. State of Gujarat, Special Criminal Application No.7666 of 2016 decided on 20.10.2016 by this High Court. 5. On the other hand, Mr.Vivek Bhamare, learned advocate for respondent no.2 has opposed present application. He submitted that the applicant has not shown sufficient cause for condoning delay caused in filing the appeal. He submitted that no talks of settlement were going on between the parties. He also submitted that the impugned order was passed on 13.6.2016, while Special Criminal Application No.449 of 2018 was filed in the year 2018. Therefore, there was delay even in filing the aforesaid Special Criminal Application. He submitted that the applicant is not paying maintenance to respondent no.2 and only as a delaying tactic present appeal filed by him. He also submitted that ignorance of law resulting in inaction on the part of the litigant is not a valid explanation for delay. He also submitted that the delay is inordinate and it is not sufficiently explained, therefore, present application may be dismissed. In support of his submissions, he has relied upon following decisions. (i) Smt.Shanti Devi v. Shri Bhan Raj and Others, AIR 1989 Delhi 276. (ii) Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others, (2013) 12 SCC 649 . (iii) Civil Application No.4011 and 4052 of 2011 in LPA No.565 of 2011 decided on 27.7.2011 by this High Court. 6. (i) Smt.Shanti Devi v. Shri Bhan Raj and Others, AIR 1989 Delhi 276. (ii) Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others, (2013) 12 SCC 649 . (iii) Civil Application No.4011 and 4052 of 2011 in LPA No.565 of 2011 decided on 27.7.2011 by this High Court. 6. In reply to the aforesaid submissions, Mr.Bhadrish Raju, learned advocate for the applicant submitted that condonation of delay is not likely to affect the respondent prejudicially. He also submitted that the challenge in appeal is limited only to the false and misleading statements made by the respondent on oath before the concerned trial Court at the time of deciding the application for maintenance and the applicant has not challenged the order of maintenance passed by the lower Court in the appeal. He also submitted that the decisions relied upon by the learned advocate for respondent no.2 are not applicable in the facts of the present case. He, therefore, prayed to allow present application. 7. Learned APP has submitted that the State is a formal party and appropriate order may be passed by this Honourable Court. 8. Having regard to the facts and circumstances and submissions made by learned advocate for the applicant and by learned advocate for the respondent no.2, it is clear that main contention of the applicant in the appeal against impugned order dated 13.6.2016 passed below Exh.75 in Criminal Misc. Application No.333 of 2013 is that respondent no.2 is guilty of the offence of perjury. It is the case of the applicant in the appeal that respondent no.2 has filed a false affidavit stating that she had no source of income though she is earning to maintain herself. Therefore, it is clear that the appeal is not filed against the order of maintenance but it is filed to show that offence of perjury is committed by respondent no.2 to get the order of maintenance in her favour. In N.Balakrishnan (supra), the Apex Court observed as under:- “8. The appellant's conduct does not on the whole warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant. What he did in defending the suit was not very much far from what a litigant would broadly do. Of course, it may be said that he should have been more vigilant by visiting his advocate at short intervals to check up the progress of the litigation. What he did in defending the suit was not very much far from what a litigant would broadly do. Of course, it may be said that he should have been more vigilant by visiting his advocate at short intervals to check up the progress of the litigation. But during these days when everybody is fully occupied with his own avocation of life an omission to adopt such extra vigilance need not be used as a ground to depict him as a litigant not aware of his responsibilities, and to visit him with drastic consequences. 9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in reversional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on whole untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first cut refuses to condone the dela. In such cases, the superior cut would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court. 10. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Time limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations in not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. 11. Rule of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. 11. Rule of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be putt to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari [ AIR 1969 SC 575 ] and State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality [ AIR 1972 SC 749 ]. 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Could should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a looser and he too would have incurred quiet a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.” 9. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee (supra), the Apex Court observed as under:- “21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justiceoriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10 (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11 (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12 (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13 (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: - 22.1 (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 10. Considering the facts of the present case, it is clear that the applicant was prosecuting another litigation before this High Court, which came to be withdrawn later on. Not only that as stated by learned advocate for the applicant that the appeal is filed only against the false statement made on oath by respondent no.2 and it is not filed against the order of maintenance, therefore, no prejudice is likely to be caused to respondent no.2 if present application for condonation of delay is allowed. 11. Considering the facts of the present case and the decisions, as above, present application is allowed. Delay of 734 days caused in filing Criminal Appeal (F) No.26188 of 2018 (now numbered as Criminal Appeal No.1317 of 2018) against order dated 13.6.2016 passed below Exh.75 in Criminal Misc. Application No.333 of 2013 by learned Family Court, Surat, is hereby condoned, on the condition that, within a period of one month from today, the applicant herein shall deposit an amount of Rs.10,000/- before the registry of this Court, which, in turn, be paid to respondent no.2 herein after due verification. If such amount is not deposited within the period, as aforesaid, the appeal shall stand automatically dismissed. Rule is made absolute accordingly.