JUDGMENT : Hariprasad, J. Quintessential question arising for decision in this appeal preferred by the State Government, against the decision by a Tribunal, constituted under Section 9 of the Kerala Forest (Vesting and Management of Ecologically Fragile Lands) Act, 2003 (in short, “the EFL Act”), is whether it has jurisdiction to remand a case to the Custodian, as defined under Section 2(a) of the EFL Act, to comply with the formalities under Section 3(2) of the said Act. Essentially the question is one relating to the Tribunal's jurisdiction to remand a case to the Custodian on the premise that the Tribunal exercises an appellate jurisdiction on the Custodian's decision. 2. Heard the learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the appellants and learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 3. Relevant facts, in nut shell, are as follows: Respondent filed an application under Section 10(1) of the EFL Act before the Tribunal praying to declare that two parcels of lands having extent of 8 acres and 7 acres comprised in re-survey No.574 in Vellamunda in Mananthavady Taluk in Wayanad District, covered by notification No. C4-21437/2000, are not ecologically fragile lands. It is contended that the lands are not vested in the Government under the EFL Act. It is pertinent to note that the EFL Act came into force with effect from 02.06.2000. 4. State Government opposed the application by contending that the lands satisfy the definition of “ecologically fragile land” in Section 2(b) of the EFL Act and became therefore vested in the Government under Section 3(1) of the said Act, thereby depriving the respondent of his right, title and interest over the properties. 5. It may be apposite to take note of the fact that the original applicant (respondent herein) had earlier filed an application before the Custodian on 07.02.2007 under Section 19(3)(b) of the EFL Act to scrutinise the notification declaring the said lands as ecologically fragile lands and to revise the notification finding that the lands are not so. As there was some mistake in the form of application, the respondent had to file another application with supporting documents. Pursuant to the application, a committee constituted under Rule 18 of the Kerala Forest (Vesting and Management of Ecologically Fragile Land) Rules, 2007 (in short, “the EFL Rules”) visited the property and submitted Ext.A34 report. As there was some mistake in the form of application, the respondent had to file another application with supporting documents. Pursuant to the application, a committee constituted under Rule 18 of the Kerala Forest (Vesting and Management of Ecologically Fragile Land) Rules, 2007 (in short, “the EFL Rules”) visited the property and submitted Ext.A34 report. The committee in its report observed as follows: “On verification in the field by Committee it is found that land claimed by Sri.Muhammad Nisar is outside the area having the natural vegetation. A stone crusher unit is seen set up in this land. This is bounded by Vested Forests and partly by private land belonging to Annamma Thomas on the North, private land belonging to Stephan and Chandran on the East, EFL land taken from Chandran on the Southern side and private land and partly EFL land taken from C.M.Rajan on the Western side. This land contains two quarries of size 103x47 M and 87x11 M, 7 buildings, 1 generator room, crusher building, explosive storage room, 3 water tanks, tarred road having approximate length of 200 M, 3 yards of storage of finished metal etc. The tree growth in the land is very sparse. The area was planted previously with rubber and coffee but those are totally absent now. 11 KV electric line is seen stretched along 4 KM and connected to the crusher unit. Since the tree growth is sparse, this land is not predominantly supporting any tree growth. Hence this land doesn't attract the definition of EFL as defined in the Act.” Thereafter, it concluded the report thus: “It is seen that some mistake has been occurred in notifying the land under EFL Act while land with good tree growth is excluded from the purview; land with sparse tree growth is seen included. Therefore, the Committee recommended for detailed survey of the land qualifying EFL definition and publish erratum notification to rectify the mistake occurred in the matter. A sketch showing the location of EFL areas in the notified land is enclosed for ready reference.” 6. The Custodian, as per order No.EFL-3-1007/2007 dated 30.09.2008 (Ext.A35), considered the materials, including the report submitted by the committee, and entered a finding that the lands in question are not ecologically fragile lands. A sketch showing the location of EFL areas in the notified land is enclosed for ready reference.” 6. The Custodian, as per order No.EFL-3-1007/2007 dated 30.09.2008 (Ext.A35), considered the materials, including the report submitted by the committee, and entered a finding that the lands in question are not ecologically fragile lands. However, the Custodian found that the applicant has no locus standi to approach him claiming exemption of 15 acres of land mentioned above from the EFL Act as his assignment was subsequent to the appointed day, viz., 02.06.2000. For that sole reason, the applicant's request was rejected by the Custodian. 7. The Tribunal, noticing the contentions raised by both sides, thought that the Custodian failed in his duty in adjudicating the matter properly. Further, the Custodian denied natural justice to the applicant, which prompted him to approach the Tribunal. It is also observed by the Tribunal that drawing power from Order XLI Rule 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short, “the Code”) the Tribunal has jurisdiction to remand the case to the Custodian for a fresh decision. The Tribunal placed reliance on Rule 6 of the Kerala Forest (Vesting and Management of Ecologically Fragile Land) Tribunal Rules, 2007 (in short, “the Tribunal Rules”) to infer a power of remand. This order of remand is seriously challenged in this appeal. 8. In order to appreciate the issues involved, it is essential to consider the scheme of the EFL Act and the two Rules. Tribunal is constituted under Section 9 of the EFL Act. It reads as follows: “Constitution of Tribunals.-(1) The Government may, by notification in the Gazettee constitute one or more Tribunal for the purpose of this Act. (2) The Tribunal shall be a Judicial Officer not below the rank of a District Judge. (3) Where more than one Tribunal is constituted under sub-section (1), the Government shall define the areas within which each Tribunal shall exercise jurisdiction. (4) The Tribunal shall decide all matters within its competence and may review any of its decisions in the event of there being an error on the face of the record of correct any arithmetical or clerical error therein. (5) The Tribunal shall, in exercising its powers, follow such procedure as may be prescribed.” The purpose of establishing a Tribunal is for settlement of disputes enumerated in Section 10 of the EFL Act. (5) The Tribunal shall, in exercising its powers, follow such procedure as may be prescribed.” The purpose of establishing a Tribunal is for settlement of disputes enumerated in Section 10 of the EFL Act. The provision is quoted hereunder for clarity: “Settlement of dispute by the Tribunal.-(1) Where any dispute arises as to whether, - (a) any land is an ecologically fragile land or not; or (b) any ecologically fragile land or portion thereof has vested in the Government or not; or (c) the compensation determined under section 8 is insufficient or not. The person who claims that the land is not an ecologically fragile land or that the ecologically fragile land has not vested in the Government, or that the compensation is not sufficient, may, within five years from the date of commencement of this Act or within six months from the date of the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 declaring the land to be an ecologically fragile land, or the date of communication of compensation under Section 8, as the case may be, or within such time as the Government may notify in this behalf apply to the Tribunal for settlement of the dispute. (2) An application under sub-section (1) shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed. (3) If the Tribunal decides that any land is not an ecologically fragile land or that an ecologically fragile land or portion thereof has not vested in the Government and (a) no appeal under Section 11 has been preferred against the decision of the Tribunal within the period specified therein; or (b) such appeal having been preferred under Section 11 has been dismissed by the High Court, the custodian shall, as soon as may be, after the expiry of the period referred to in clause (a) or, as the case may be, after the date of the order of the High Court dismissing the appeal, restore possession of such land or portion, as the case may be, to the owner of such land. (4) If the Tribunal decides that the compensation determined under Section 8 is not adequate and revises the amount of compensation and,- (a) no appeal under Section 11 has been preferred against the decision of the Tribunal within the period specified therein; or (b) such appeal having been preferred under Section 11 has been dismissed by the High Court, the custodian shall, as soon as may be, after the expiry of the period referred to in clause (a) or, as the case may be, after the date of the order of the High Court dismissing the appeal, pay such compensation, to the owner of such land.” Section 19 of the EFL Act deals with the validation and transitory provisions. We may be required to take note of the law in Section 19(3), which reads as follows: “xxxxxxxxxxx (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the said Ordinance or in any judgment, decree or order of any court. (a) no land other than the ecologically fragile land as defined in this Act, whether notified under sub-section (3) of section 3 of the said Ordinance or not, shall be deemed to have vested or ever to have been vested in Government and (b) every notification issued in respect of any land under sub-section (3) of section 3 of the said Ordinance shall be scrutinized by the custodian suo-motu or on an application made by the owner or any person having the right of possession or enjoyment of such land and if necessary, such notification shall be revised and issued in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” 9. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the Tribunal is justified in drawing power of remand from Rule 6 of the Tribunal Rules, which reads as follows: “Proceedings in General.-In all proceedings before the Tribunal the procedure prescribed in respect of applications in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or the Rules made thereunder, shall, as far as practicable be made applicable, except as otherwise provided in the Act or in these Rules.” On the above premise, it is argued that the Tribunal has power to remand a matter to the Custodian for further consideration. We are unable to agree with this submission for myriad reasons. 10. First of all, we may refer to Section 12 of the EFL Act, which deals with the powers of a Tribunal. We are unable to agree with this submission for myriad reasons. 10. First of all, we may refer to Section 12 of the EFL Act, which deals with the powers of a Tribunal. It reads as follows: “Power of Tribunal.-The Tribunal shall, for the purpose of exercising any power conferred by or under this Act, have all the powers of a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908), in respect of the following matters, namely:- (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of any document; (c) receiving evidence on affidavit; (d) issuing commission for the examination of witnesses or for local investigation; (e) inspecting any property or thing concerning which any decision has to be taken; (f) requisitioning of any public record or copy thereof from any court or office; and (g) any other matter which may be prescribed.” It is very evident from the provision that the Tribunal, although it possesses certain powers of a civil court exercisable while trying a suit under the Code, can only exercise those powers, traceable to the Code, as enumerated in the statute, for discharging its duties and functions. In otherwords, the Code in its entirety is not made applicable to the Tribunal. 11. Another reason for supporting the view that the Tribunal cannot be regarded as an appellate authority over the Custodian's decision is discernible from the phraseology employed in Sections 10 and 19(3)(b) of the EFL Act. On a close scrutiny of the above provisions, it will be clear that Sections 10 and 19(3)(b) of the EFL Act provide independent and separate remedies to a person aggrieved by notifying his land as ecologically fragile land. We do not find any insistence in the statute that an aggrieved person should first approach either the Tribunal or Custodian and apparently that is left to his choice. We also notice that Custodian, by virtue of the above provision, has a power to scrutinise suo motu every notification issued in respect of any land under Section 3(3) of the Ordinance. This is in addition to his power to scrutinise a notification on an application by an aggrieved person (owner or any person having the right of possession or enjoyment of a notified land). 12. This is in addition to his power to scrutinise a notification on an application by an aggrieved person (owner or any person having the right of possession or enjoyment of a notified land). 12. In this context, it is relevant to mention about Rule 17 of the EFL Rules falling under Chapter V prescribing the manner in which an application has to be filed before the Custodian. This is entirely different from the procedure prescribed in Rule 3 of the Tribunal Rules when a party decides to approach the Tribunal under Section 10 of the EFL Act for redressal of his grievance. These are further reasons to find that the remedies available before the Tribunal and Custodian are not interdependent. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent vehementally argued that : Rule 3 of the Tribunal Rules could give us a clue that the Custodian's order is amenable to scrutiny by the Tribunal. Stated differently, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the Tribunal, in an appropriate case, could send back a case to Custodian for further scrutiny, if the aggrieved party had earlier approached the Custodian and suffered an adverse order and then had gone to the Tribunal. We shall extract Rule 3 of the Tribunal Rules for examination: “Application to the Tribunal.-(1) Every application under Section 10 shall be made in Form A and shall be accompanied by a fee of five hundred rupees with such number of copies of the application and the documents, as are necessary to be served on the respondents within 3 months from the date of decision of the Custodian or within 6 months from the date of communication of compensation under Section 8 as the case may be, submitted before the Tribunal: Provided that, in the case of petitions already disposed of by the Custodian, the application shall be submitted within three months from the date of notification of these Rules. (2) An application, which is found defective on scrutiny, may be returned for re-submission after curing defects within a specified time not exceeding two weeks by the Tribunal.” 14. The Rule speaks about the form in which an application under Section 10 of the EFL Act has to be filed. It prescribes a fee also in addition to other details. (2) An application, which is found defective on scrutiny, may be returned for re-submission after curing defects within a specified time not exceeding two weeks by the Tribunal.” 14. The Rule speaks about the form in which an application under Section 10 of the EFL Act has to be filed. It prescribes a fee also in addition to other details. Rule 3 further indicates that a party, who had approached the Custodian for scrutinising a notification and reversing it on showing that the notified land is not an ecologically fragile land, has a further option to approach the Tribunal within three months from the date of an adverse decision by the Custodian. This period of three months, according to us, is only a prescription of limitation. We are in agreement with the view expressed by another Division Bench of this Court in Thresiamma Varghese and others v. State of Kerala ( 2018 (1) KHC 327 ) wherein the scope of Rule 3 of the Tribunal Rules was considered in a different context. Last part of the above Rule may not apply to our case, since it deals with a claim for compensation. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent that in Thresiamma Varghese's case, this Court took a view that a person approaching the Tribunal under Section 10 of the EFL Act could do so at any time as there is no period of limitation prescribed. It is observed in Thresiamma Varghese's case that Rule 3(1) of the Tribunal Rules applies only to cases where the Custodian has taken a decision before or after the commencement of the Tribunal Rules. It is further observed that in cases where the Custodian was not approached and he had no occasion to take any decision, an application under Section 10 of the EFL Act is not barred by reason of limitation prescribed under Rule 3(1). This Court in Thresiamma Varghese's case held that there is an apparent anomaly in prescribing a period of limitation when a person approached the Tribunal seeking a recourse, after exhausting the remedy before the Custodian. 15. According to us, this apparent anomaly can be explained away by looking into the scheme of the Act, as well as the Tribunal Rules. This Court in Thresiamma Varghese's case held that there is an apparent anomaly in prescribing a period of limitation when a person approached the Tribunal seeking a recourse, after exhausting the remedy before the Custodian. 15. According to us, this apparent anomaly can be explained away by looking into the scheme of the Act, as well as the Tribunal Rules. As mentioned above, two remedies are open to a person who is aggrieved by the posture of the State that his land is an ecologically fragile land. It is explicit from Section 3 of the EFL Act that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any judgment, decree, or order of any court or Tribunal or in any custom, contract or other documents, the ownership and possession of all ecologically fragile lands held by any person or any other form of right over them shall stand transferred to and vested in the Government free from all encumbrances with effect from the date of commencement of the EFL Act (i.e., 02.06.2000) and the right, title and interest of the owner or any other person thereon shall stand extinguished from the said date. Emphatic words employed in Section 3 of the EFL Act would clearly indicate that a statutory vesting had taken place in respect of all lands in the State, if it fulfils the definition of “ecologically fragile land” in Section 2(b). In otherwords, there is no need to await a notification to be published that a particular land is ecologically fragile land for vesting to happen. On a close reading of Section 10 of the EFL Act, it can be seen that whether a land is notified under the EFL Act or not, a person who claims that it is not an ecologically fragile land has a right to approach the Tribunal for settlement of dispute. On the other hand, recourse to Section 19(3)(b) of the EFL Act can be resorted to by an aggrieved person only if his land had been notified as an ecologically fragile land either under any of the Ordinances or under the EFL Act. This distinction is very relevant in understanding the nature of rights available to aggrieved persons. So, it can be seen that the remedies available before the Tribunal and Custodian are mutually independent and to some extent, mutually exclusive. 16. This distinction is very relevant in understanding the nature of rights available to aggrieved persons. So, it can be seen that the remedies available before the Tribunal and Custodian are mutually independent and to some extent, mutually exclusive. 16. Rule 3 of the Tribunal Rules reveals a situation where a person aggrieved has an option to approach the Tribunal after exhausting the remedy available before the Custodian. If a person adopts that course, he should do it within three months as per the prescription in the Tribunal Rules. We find a logic in fixing a period of limitation because such a person must have approached the Tribunal not only after taking a chance before the Custodian, but also becoming aware of the fact that his land had been notified under the EFL Act. In that perspective, a person approaching the Tribunal after seeking remedy before the Custodian and losing it cannot be placed at the same level with a person who goes to the Tribunal for the first time, as he can approach the Tribunal either before or after publication of the notification. It is to be remembered that in some cases even before a notification, the Forest Department may take a stand that a particular land, belonging to a person, is an ecologically fragile land and that will give rise a cause of action to the person to approach the Tribunal. He can go to the Custodian only after the publication of a notification. For the above reason also, we find that persons approaching the Tribunal directly and persons trying their chance before the Custodian first and then approaching the Tribunal should be treated differently. Therefore, we find some reasoning for prescribing a period of limitation in respect of a person approaching the Tribunal after seeking remedy before the Custodian. 17. On an overall evaluation of Sections 10 and 19(3)(b) of the EFL Act, we find clear distinctions between the nature of remedies that can be claimed by a person from the Tribunal and those from the Custodian. Of course, the scope of enquiry by the Tribunal as contemplated under Section 10 is wider than that is to be done by the Custodian under Section 19(3)(b) of the EFL Act. 18. Of course, the scope of enquiry by the Tribunal as contemplated under Section 10 is wider than that is to be done by the Custodian under Section 19(3)(b) of the EFL Act. 18. On a scrutiny of Rule 3 of the Tribunal Rules and deductions made above, we find no legal reason to hold that the Tribunal is envisaged to be an appellate forum on a decision taken by the Custodian. In fact, the Tribunal and Custodian both exercise original jurisdiction as an aggrieved party has an option to approach any one of them for the first time. Even if a person approaches the Tribunal after rejection by the Custodian, from the very nature of powers that the Tribunal wields under the EFL Act and Rules, it can only be regarded as an original proceedings before it. Hence, we reject the contention of the respondent that the Tribunal functions as an appellate authority over the decision of the Custodian. 19. Having found that the Tribunal and Custodian function in different areas and they exercise original jurisdiction in respect of matters assigned to them, we find no difficulty in answering the question, if the Tribunal has jurisdiction to remand a case to the Custodian for adjudication, in the negative. In order to complete the discussion on the topic, we would like to mention a few abstract ideas relating to the appellate jurisdiction. 20. Unchallengeable is the proposition that power of remand is an incident or privilege of appellate power alone, because it is a power exercised by a higher authority to direct a lower authority, after elaborately considering the factual and legal aspects involved in the case, to re-examine the matter for reasons specified. It goes without saying that this power cannot be exercised between courts or judicial tribunals of co-equal jurisdiction. 21. Treatises like Halsbury's Laws of England, American Jurisprudence, Corpus Juris Secundum, etc. lucidly deal with the nature of appellate power. It goes without saying that this power cannot be exercised between courts or judicial tribunals of co-equal jurisdiction. 21. Treatises like Halsbury's Laws of England, American Jurisprudence, Corpus Juris Secundum, etc. lucidly deal with the nature of appellate power. In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edition, Vol.12, page 459), the principles relating to appeal have been explained as follows: “An appeal is an application to a superior court or tribunal to reverse, vary or set aside the judgment, order, determination, decision or award of a lower court or tribunal in the hierarchy of courts or tribunals on the ground that it was wrongly made or that as a matter of justice or law it requires to be corrected. A right of appeal is conferred by statute or equivalent legislative authority; it is not a mere matter of practice or procedure, and neither the superior nor the lower court or tribunal nor both combined can create or take away such a right.” 22. American Jurisprudence (Vol.4, page 535) deals with the existence and extent of appellate jurisdiction thus: “Appellate jurisdiction is derived from the constitutional or statutory provisions by which it is created, and can be acquired and exercised only in the manner prescribed. Thus, the determination of the existence and extent of appellate jurisdiction depends upon the terms of the statutory or constitutional provisions in which it has its source.” 23. Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol.4, page 98) too clarifies the appellate power in the following terms: “Appellate jurisdiction is derived from the constitutional or statutory provisions creating the court, and can be exercised only in the manner prescribed.” 24. Above excerptions from loci classici, it is evident that the appellate power arises from a constitutional or statutory provision alone and it cannot be simply inferred in favour of any court or Tribunal. 25. In the same lines, a lot of binding pronouncements exist, which we do not intend to enlist fearing verbosity. However, we may mention one among them for strengthening our reasoning. Dharmadas v. State ( 1962 KLT 505 ) is a Full Bench decision pronounced on Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 with the following clear expressions regarding the appellate power: “16. An appeal is a complaint to a superior body of an injustice done or error committed by an inferior one with a view to its correction or reversal. Dharmadas v. State ( 1962 KLT 505 ) is a Full Bench decision pronounced on Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 with the following clear expressions regarding the appellate power: “16. An appeal is a complaint to a superior body of an injustice done or error committed by an inferior one with a view to its correction or reversal. It is a creature of statute, not a constitutional or inherent right. But, as pointed out by Maxwell, where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution (11th Edition, page 350). 17. A remand by an appellate court is usually made when the record before it is in such shape that the appellate court cannot in justice determine what final judgment should be rendered and the power to do so cannot but be an essential requisite of the very jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. It is an old maxim of the law that to whomsoever a jurisdiction is given, those things also are supposed to be granted, without which the jurisdiction cannot be exercised: Cui jurisdictio data est, ea quoque concessa essee videntur, sine quibus jurisdictio explicari non potest.” 26. It is well settled by pronouncements that once a statute provides a right of appeal, it is not merely a matter of procedure, but it is a matter of substantive right. We do not find any express provision in the EFL Act conferring a right on the Tribunal to sit in appeal on a decision by the Custodian. From the provisions in the EFL Act and the Rules discussed above, we find no reason even to infer an appellate power for the Tribunal, albeit such an interference will not confer appellate jurisdiction to the Tribunal. 27. As mentioned above, power to remand is one of the facets of appellate power. This principle can be explicitly seen in Section 107 of the Code. It specifically states that subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, an appellate court shall have power (i) to determine a case finally; (ii) to remand a case; (iii) to frame issues and refer them for trial; (iv) to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken. It specifically states that subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, an appellate court shall have power (i) to determine a case finally; (ii) to remand a case; (iii) to frame issues and refer them for trial; (iv) to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken. Sub-section (2) of Section 107 of the Code clearly says that subject as aforesaid, the appellate court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by the Code on courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. The same principle applies to judicial Tribunals empowered to adjudicate legal rights. 28. Powers of a Tribunal with original jurisdiction alone and that of a Tribunal with both original and appellate jurisdiction are clearly distinct. When original and appellate jurisdiction coalesce in a Tribunal, it gets power to remand a matter to the original authority, from whose decision the appeal arose. This point was answered in Abdurahiman Haji v. Kerala State Wakf Board ( 2014 (2) KHC 578 ), a Division Bench decision in which one of us (Justice A.Hariprasad) was a member. That was a case where the powers of Wakf Tribunal, constituted under Wakf Act, 1995, came up for consideration and this Court found that the Wakf Tribunal has both original and appellate jurisdiction and therefore a remand by it to the Wakf Board is justified. Similarly, Supreme Court in Kinnari Mullick and another v. Ghanshyam Das Damani ( (2018) 11 SCC 328 ) after examining Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 held that no power has been invested by the Parliament in the court to remand a matter to the Arbitral Tribunal, except to adjourn the proceeding for the limited purpose mentioned in Section 34(4) of the said Act. For the above reasons, we find no sensible reason to hold that the Tribunal constituted under Section 9 of the EFL Act possesses both original and appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, the aforementioned decisions are not applicable to the case on hand. 29. We make it clear that the Tribunal failed in its duty to adjudicate the case. It could have considered the report by the committee and the order passed by the Custodian as relevant pieces of evidence for adjudication of the dispute. Therefore, the aforementioned decisions are not applicable to the case on hand. 29. We make it clear that the Tribunal failed in its duty to adjudicate the case. It could have considered the report by the committee and the order passed by the Custodian as relevant pieces of evidence for adjudication of the dispute. Nonetheless, those documents cannot be the sheetanchor for a decision of the matter. Having bestowed our careful attention as above, we find the order passed by the Tribunal is unsustainable. Hence, the appeal is allowed. We set aside the impugned order passed by the Tribunal and remit the case to the Tribunal for appropriate decision in accordance with law. Parties shall appear before the Tribunal on 01.08.2019. Tribunal shall permit both sides to adduce evidence, if they want to do so. We make it clear that the respondent's right, if any, to challenge the Custodian's order through an independent proceeding will not be affected by the observations in this judgment. All pending interlocutory applications will stand closed.