ORDER : 1. The present petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is filed for the purpose of seeking following reliefs: “(A) YOUR LORDSHIPS be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing and setting aside the order dtd. 22.03.2018 passed by the Ld. Principal District Judge, Rajkot in an application being Civil Misc. Application No. 20 of 2018 and further be pleased to transfer the Probate proceeding being Civil Misc. Application No. 625 of 1999 pending in the court of Ld. Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajkot, to any other court as deems fit by this Hon'ble Court, in the interest of justice; (B) YOUR LORDSHIPS be pleased to stay the Probate proceeding being Civil Misc. Application No. 625 of 1999 pending in the court of Ld. Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajkot, pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition; (C) YOUR LORDSHIPS be pleased to direct the Ld. Court below to expedite the hearing of Probate proceeding being Civil Misc. Application No. 625 of 1999 within some stipulated time as deems fit by this Hon'ble Court in the interest of parties. (D) YOUR LORDSHIPS be pleased to grant such other and further reliefs as deemed fit in the interest of justice.” 2. The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner is the original defendant in Probate application and the respondents No. 1 to 5 are the original plaintiffs in Civil Misc. Application No. 625 of 1999 filed by respondents No. 1 to 5 under Section 276 of the Indian Succession Act for getting the probate of will which was executed by the husband of the petitioner in favour of the respondents No. 1 to 5 herein. 3. When the matter was taken up for hearing, it was brought to the notice of this court that despite the fact that the so-called will was executed way back in 1989 for which the proceeding was initiated for probate but till date the proceeding is not finally decided, as a result of which the petitioner was constrained to file application seeking for transfer which was numbered as Civil Misc. Application No. 20 of 2018 before the learned Principal District Judge at Rajkot. 4. Application No. 20 of 2018 before the learned Principal District Judge at Rajkot. 4. The contention which has been raised is that on account of undue delay the proceedings are getting adjourned from time to time to which there is a serious grievance made by learned counsel Mr. Kakkad, and it has been submitted that, on the contrary, the power of attorney is cancelled way back in July 2017, still without the authority the power of attorney is dragging the matter and submitting that the present petition was at the instance of the petitioner itself is not maintainable. Be that as it may, it appears from the record that the learned Principal District Judge, Rajkot, had passed a reasoned order while disposing of Civil Misc. Application No. 20 of 2018. The learned Judge had taken a note that the public notice was issued on 21.7.2017 and also taken into consideration the contents of the application Exh.344 and 345 and then found th, on the basis of several decisions the request made by the petitioner was not entertainable, as a result of which the learned Judge had rejected the said application. The learned Judge had also taken a note while disposing of the application the following conclusions has been arrived at para 9 and 10 which reads thus: “9. It is true that assurance of a fair trial is the first imperative of the dispensation of justice but at the same time it is required to be considered by the court that when the application for transfer of matter is made, the same is not on the flimsy ground, hyper sensitivity or relative convenience of a party or mere grievance. Something more substantial, more compelling, more imperiling from the point of view of public justice and its attendant environment is necessitous if the court is to exercise its power of transfer. The burden of establishing sufficient grounds for transfer lies on the applicant. It is also required to be noted that no imaginary suspicion or capricious belief can be permitted to be raised as a ground of transfer. 10. The reason for transfer of Civil Misc. Application mentioned in the present application cannot be considered to be the valid ground. The burden of establishing sufficient grounds for transfer lies on the applicants which the applicants failed to prove. 10. The reason for transfer of Civil Misc. Application mentioned in the present application cannot be considered to be the valid ground. The burden of establishing sufficient grounds for transfer lies on the applicants which the applicants failed to prove. Further, the allegations with respect to prejudice by learned trial court is concerned, no such ground is made out. Moreover, vague allegations are made and on the basis of the same, the matter cannot be transferred. It is also required to be noted that the applicant has not clearly stated the stage of the matter pending before the learned trial court. Further, as per the arguments made on behalf of the opponent No.1 to 4, in Civil Misc. Application No. 625/1999 right of applicant and others are closed and arguments on behalf of the opponents are completed and thereafter the matter was kept for Judgment and during that time, Madhukantaben filed applications at Exh.344 and 345 for opening her right for filing reply and for cross-examination. Hence, it appears that the matter is at the stage of completion. In these circumstances, it would not be in the interest of justice to transfer the matter at this stage. Therefore, in view of the above discussion, the present application is not required to be entertained. Hence I pass the following order: The present application is hereby rejected.” 5. In view of the above circumstances which are projecting on record it appears that the learned Judge has exercised the discretion after application of mind and after assigning the cogent reasons and this petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and in view of settled legal proposition of law in the case of Sameer Suresh Gupta TR PA Holder V/s. Rahul Kumar Agarwal, reported in 2013 (9) SCC 374 . The relevant observations of the said decision particularly para 6 and 7, since relevant, deserve to be quoted hereinafter : “6. In our view, the impugned order is liable to be set aside because while deciding the writ petition filed by the respondent the learned Single Judge ignored the limitations of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. In our view, the impugned order is liable to be set aside because while deciding the writ petition filed by the respondent the learned Single Judge ignored the limitations of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. The parameters for exercise of power by the High Court under that Article were considered by the two Judge Bench of this Court in Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai and others (2003) 6 SCC 675 . After considering various facets of the issue, the two Judge Bench culled out the following principles: "(1) Amendment by Act No.46 of 1999 with effect from 01-07-2002 in Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by the CPC Amendment Act No. 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction, i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When the subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident, i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a longdrawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case." 7. The same question was considered by another Bench in Shalini Shyam Shetty and another vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 329 , and it was held: "(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh, followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, "within the bounds of their authority". (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality." 6. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality." 6. In view of the above discussion, this court is not inclined to exercise the extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. This court is also of the opinion that the transfer without any just reason is indirectly casting aspersion on court to which this court is not suggesting at all and the parties are not permitted to adopt such approach. On the contrary the Rojkam and the document shown by learned counsel Mr. Kakkad, is ingenious method of dragging the litigation to an extent as a result of which the court is of the considerable view that there is no error committed by the court below. On the contrary, since main Civil Misc. Application is of the year 1999, the same is required to be expeditiously dealt with by the court below and the parties are directed to co-operate with the hearing of the case. With these observations, the present petition being meritless, stands dismissed with no order as to costs. Writ be sent forthwith.